Beyond the Brain

Birth, Death, and Transcendence in Psychotherapy

Stanislav Grof

• Publisher: SUNY Press
• Year: 1985
• Print ISBN: 9780873958998, 9780873959537
• eBook ISBN: 9781438405087
• Topic: Psychology
• Subtopic: History & Theory in Psychology
• Index: Psychology

Beyond the Brain seriously challenges the existing neurophysiological models of the brain. After three decades of extensive research on those non-ordinary states of consciousness induced by psychedelic drugs and by other means, Grof concludes that our present scientific world view is as inadequate as many of its historical predecessors. In this pioneering work, he proposes a new model of the human psyche that takes account of his findings. Grof includes in his model the recollective level, or the reliving of emotionally relevant memories, a level at which the Freudian framework can be useful. Beyond that is perinatal level in which the human unconscious may be activated to a reliving of biological birth and confrontation with death. How birth experience influences an individual's later development is a central focus of the book. The most serious challenge to contemporary psycho-analytic theory comes from a delineation of the transpersonal level, or the expansion of consciousness beyond the boundaries of time and space. Grof makes a bold argument that understanding of the perinatal and transpersonal levels changes much of how we view both mental illness and mental health. His reinterpretation of some of the most agonizing aspects of human behavior proves thought provoking for both laypersons and professional therapists.

Chapter One
The Nature of Reality:
Dawning of a New Paradigm

In various sections of this book, important observations from diverse fields will be discussed—observations that cannot be accounted for and explained by mechanistic science and the traditional conceptual frameworks of psychiatry, psychology, anthropology, and medicine. Some of the new data are of such far-reaching significance that they indicate the need for a drastic revision of current understanding of human nature, and even the nature of reality. It seems, therefore, appropriate to start this book with an excursion into the philosophy of science by reviewing some modern ideas about the relationship between scientific theories and reality. Much of the resistance on the part of traditional scientists against the influx of new revolutionary data is based on a fundamental misunderstanding of the nature and function of scientific theories. In the last few decades, such philosophers and historians of science as Thomas Kuhn (1962), Philipp Frank (1974), Karl Popper (1963; 1965), and Paul Feyerabend (1978) have brought much clarity into this area. The pioneering work of these thinkers deserves a brief review here.

Philosophy of Science and the Role of Paradigms

Since the Industrial Revolution, Western science has achieved astounding successes and has become a powerful force, shaping the lives of millions of people. Its materialistic and mechanistic orientations have all but replaced theology and philosophy as guiding principles of human existence and transformed to an unimaginable degree the world we live in. The technological triumphs have been so remarkable that, until quite recently, very few individuals questioned the absolute authority of science in determining the basic strategies of life. The textbooks of various disciplines tend to describe the history of science as a linear development with a gradual accumulation of knowledge about the universe that culminates in the present state of affairs. Important figures in the development of scientific thinking are thus presented as contributors who have worked on the same set of problems and according to the same set of fixed rules that the most recent achievements have established as scientific. Each period of the history of scientific ideas and methods is seen as a logical step in a gradual approximation to an increasingly accurate description of the universe and to the ultimate truth about existence.

Detailed analysis of the history and philosophy of science reveals that this is a grossly distorted and romanticized image of the actual course of events. One can make a very powerful and convincing argument that the history of science is far from linear and that, in spite of their technological successes, scientific disciplines do not necessarily bring us closer to an ever more accurate description of reality. The most prominent representative of this heretical point of view is the physicist and historian of science, Thomas Kuhn. His study of the development of scientific theories and revolutions in science was first inspired by his observation of certain fundamental differences between the social and natural sciences. He was struck by the number and extent of disagreements among social scientists concerning the basic nature of legitimate problems and approaches. This situation seemed to contrast sharply with that of the natural sciences. Although it was unlikely that practitioners of astronomy, physics, and chemistry would have firmer and more definitive answers than psychologists, anthropologists, and sociologists, the former for some reason did not seem to get involved in serious controversies over fundamental problems. Exploring this obvious discrepancy further, Kuhn launched an intensive study of the history of science that, after fifteen years, led to the publication of his ground-breaking work, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1962).

In the course of this research it became increasingly evident that, from a historical perspective, even the development of the so-called hard sciences is far from smooth and unambiguous. The history of science is by no means a process of gradual accumulation of data and formulation of ever more accurate theories. Instead, it shows a clearly cyclical nature with specific stages and characteristic dynamics. This process is lawful, and the changes involved can be understood and even predicted; the central concept of Kuhn’s theory, which makes this possible, is that of a paradigm. In the broadest sense, a paradigm can be defined as a constellation of beliefs, values, and techniques shared by the members of a given scientific community. Some paradigms are of a basic philosophical nature and are very general and encompassing, others govern scientific thinking in rather specific and circumscribed areas of research. A particular paradigm can thus be mandatory for all natural sciences; others for astronomy, physics, biochemistry, or molecular biology; yet others for such highly specialized and esoteric areas as the study of viruses or genetic engineering.¹

A paradigm is as essential for science as are observation and experiment; adherence to specific paradigms is an absolutely indispensable prerequisite of any serious scientific endeavor. Reality is extremely complex and dealing with it in its totality is impossible. Science does not and cannot observe and take into consideration all the variables involved in a particular phenomenon, conduct all possible experiments, and perform all laboratory or clinical manipulations. The scientist must reduce the problem to a workable scale and his or her selection is guided by the leading paradigm of the time. Thus the scientist cannot avoid bringing a definite belief system into the area of study.

Scientific observations do not themselves clearly dictate unique and unambiguous solutions; no paradigm ever explains all available facts, and many different paradigms can theoretically account for the same set of data. Many factors determine which aspect of a complex phenomenon will be chosen and which of many conceivable experiments will be carried out or conducted first—accidents of investigation, basic education and specific training, prior experience in other fields, individual makeup, economic and political factors, and other variables. Observations and experiments can and must drastically reduce and restrict the range of acceptable scientific solutions; without this element, science would become science fiction. However, they cannot in and by themselves fully justify a particular interpretation or a belief system. It is thus, in principle, impossible to practice science without some set of a priori beliefs, fundamental metaphysical assumptions, and answers about the nature of reality and of human knowledge. However, the relative nature of any paradigm, no matter how advanced and convincingly articulated, should be clearly recognized and the scientist should not confuse it with the truth about reality.

According to Thomas Kuhn, paradigms play a crucial, complex, and ambiguous role in the history of science. Because of the above reasons, they are absolutely essential and indispensable for scientific progress. However, in certain stages of development they function as conceptual straitjackets that drastically interfere with the possibility of new discoveries and with the exploration of new areas of reality. In the history of science, the progressive and reactionary function of paradigms seems to oscillate in certain predictable patterns.

Early stages of most sciences, which Thomas Kuhn describes as “pre-paradigm periods,” have been characterized by conceptual chaos and competition among a large number of divergent views of nature. None of these can be clearly discarded as incorrect, since they are all roughly compatible with observations and with the scientific method of the time. A simple, elegant and plausible conceptualization of the data that seems to account well for the majority of available observations, and also holds promise as a guideline for future explorations, emerges out of this situation as the dominant paradigm.

When a paradigm is accepted by the majority of the scientific community, it becomes the mandatory way of approaching problems. At this point, it also tends to be mistaken for an accurate description of reality instead of being seen as a useful map, a convenient approximation, and a model for organizing currently available data. This confusion of the map with the territory is characteristic for the history of science. The limited knowledge of nature that has existed in successive historical periods has been seen by the practitioners of science of those times as a comprehensive image of reality that was incomplete only in details. This observation is so striking that it would be easy for a historian to present the development of science as a history of errors and idiosyncrasies rather than as a systematic accumulation of information and a gradual approximation to ultimate truth.

Once a paradigm has been accepted, it becomes a powerful catalyst of scientific progress; in Kuhn’s terminology, this stage is referred to as the “period of normal science.” Most scientists spend all their time pursuing normal science; consequently, in the past, this particular aspect of scientific activity has become synonymous with science itself. Normal science is predicated on the assumption that the scientific community knows what the universe is like. The leading theory defines not only what the world is, but also what it is not; it determines what is possible, as well as what is in principle impossible. Thomas Kuhn describes research as “a strenuous and devoted effort to force nature into the conceptual boxes supplied by professional education.” As long as the paradigm is taken for granted, only those problems will be considered legitimate that can be assumed to have solutions; this guarantees rapid success of normal science. Under these circumstances, the scientific community suppresses, often at a considerable cost, all novelties, because they are subversive to its basic commitments.

Paradigms have not only a cognitive, but also a normative influence; in addition to being statements about nature and reality, they also define the permissible problem field, determine the acceptable methods of approaching it, and set the standards of solution. Under the influence of a paradigm, all the fundamentals of science in a particular area become drastically redefined. Some problems that were seen as crucial might be declared irrelevant or unscientific, others are relegated to another discipline. Conversely, certain issues previously nonexistent or trivial may suddenly represent significant scientific factors or achievements. Even in areas where the old paradigm retains its validity, the understanding of the problems is not identical and requires translation and redefinition. Normal science based on the new paradigm is not only incompatible, but incommensurate with the practice governed by the previous one.

Normal science is essentially puzzle solving; its results are generally anticipated by the paradigm and it produces little novelty. The emphasis is on the way of achieving the results, and the objective is a further articulation of the leading paradigm, contributing to the scope and precision with which it can be applied. Normal research is, thus, cumulative, because scientists select only those problems that can be solved with conceptual and instrumental tools already in existence. Cumulative acquisition of fundamentally new knowledge under these circumstances is not only rare and unlikely, but improbable in principle. New discovery can appear only if the anticipations about nature and instruments based on the existing paradigm are failing. New theories cannot arise without destructive changes in the old beliefs about nature.

A really new and radical theory is never just an addition or increment to the existing knowledge. It changes basic rules, requires drastic revision or reformulation of the fundamental assumptions of prior theory, and involves re-evaluation of the existing facts and observations. According to Thomas Kuhn, only events of this nature represent true scientific revolutions. These can occur in certain limited fields of human knowledge or they can have a sweeping influence on a number of disciplines. The shifts from Aristotelian to Newtonian physics, or from Newtonian to Einsteinian physics, from the Ptolemaic geocentric system to the astronomy of Copernicus and Galileo, or from the phlogiston theory to Lavoisier’s chemistry are salient examples of changes of this kind. Each of them required rejection of a widely accepted and honored scientific theory in favor of another that was in principle incompatible with it. They all resulted in a drastic redefinition of the problems available and important for scientific exploration. In addition, they also redefined what should be considered an admissible problem and what should be the standards of a legitimate solution of a problem. This led to a drastic transformation of scientific imagination; it is not an exaggeration to say that the very perception of the world itself changed as a result of their impact.

Thomas Kuhn noted that scientific revolutions are preceded and heralded by a period of conceptual chaos in which the normal practice of science gradually changes into what he calls “extraordinary science.” Sooner or later, the everyday practice of normal science will necessarily lead to the discovery of anomalies. In many instances, certain pieces of equipment will fail to perform as anticipated by the paradigm, numerous observations accumulate that cannot be in any way accommodated by the existing belief system, or a problem that ought to be solved resists repeated efforts of prominent representatives of the profession.

As long as the paradigm exerts its spell on the scientific community, anomalies will not be sufficient to question the validity of basic assumptions. Initially, unexpected results tend to be labeled “bad research,” since the range of possible results is clearly defined by the paradigm. When the results are confirmed by the repeated experiments, this can lead to a crisis in the field. However, even then scientists do not renounce the paradigm that has led them into crisis. Once a scientific theory has achieved the status of a paradigm, it will not be declared invalid unless viable alternative is available. Lack of congruence between the postulates of a paradigm and observations of the world is not sufficient. For some time the discrepancy will be seen as a problem that might eventually be solved by future modifications and articulations.

However, when, after a period of tedious and fruitless effort, the anomaly suddenly emerges as more than just another puzzle, the discipline involved enters a period of extraordinary science. The best minds in the field concentrate their attention on the problem. The criteria for research tend to loosen up, and the experimenters become more open-minded and willing to consider daring alternatives. At this time, competing formulations proliferate and become increasingly divergent. The discontent with the existing paradigm grows and is expressed more and more explicitly. Scientists are willing to take recourse to philosophy and debate over fundamental assumptions—a situation that is inconceivable during periods of normal research. Before and during scientific revolutions there are also deep debates over legitimate methods, problems, and standards. Under these circumstances, in a state of growing crisis, professional insecurity increases. The failure of old rules leads to an intense search for new ones.

During the transition, there is an overlap between the problems that can be solved by the old and by the new paradigms. This is not surprising since philosophers of science have repeatedly demonstrated that more than one theoretical construct is always applicable to a given set of data. Scientific revolutions are those noncumulative episodes in which an older paradigm is replaced in its entirety, or in part, by a new one that is incompatible with it. The choice between two competing paradigms cannot be made by the use of evaluative procedures of normal science. The latter are a direct outgrowth of the old paradigm that is at issue, and their validity is critically dependent on the outcome of the argument. The function of the paradigm is thus of necessity circular; it can persuade but not convince by logical or even probabilistic arguments.

The two competing schools have a serious problem of communication or language. They operate on the basis of different basic postulates, assumptions about reality, and definitions of elementary concepts. As a result, they will not even agree as to what the important problems are, their nature is, and what would constitute their solution. Their criteria of science are not the same, their arguments are paradigm-dependent, and meaningful confrontation is impossible without intelligent translation. Within the new paradigm, the old terms are drastically redefined and receive a totally new meaning; as a result, they will appear to be related to each other in a very different way. The communication across the conceptual divide is only partial and confusing. Entirely different meanings of such concepts as matter, space, and time in the Newtonian and Einsteinian models could be used here as characteristic examples. At some point, a value judgment will also enter the field, since different paradigms differ in terms of which problems they solve and which questions they leave unanswered. The criteria for assessing this situation lie entirely outside the scope of normal science.

A scientist who is practicing normal science is essentially a problem solver. He takes the paradigm for granted and has no interest in testing its validity. As a matter, of fact, he or she has considerable investment in the preservation of its basic assumptions. In part this is based on understandable human motives, such as time and energy spent in past training or academic achievements closely linked with the exploitation of the paradigm at issue. However, the problem has much deeper roots and goes beyond human errors and emotional investment. It touches on the very nature of paradigms and their role for science.

An important part of this resistance is a deep reliance on the current paradigm as a true representation of reality and trust that it will ultimately solve all its problems. Thus, the resistance to the new paradigm is, in the last analysis, the very attitude that makes normal science possible. A scientist practicing normal science resembles a chess player whose problem-solving activity and capacity is critically dependent on a rigid set of rules. The objective of the game is to search for optimal solutions within the context of these a priori given rules; under these circumstances it would be absurd to consider questioning these rules, not to say changing them. The rules of the game are taken for granted in both instances, and they represent a necessary set of premises for the problem-solving activity. In science, novelty for its own sake is not desirable as it is in other creative fields.

Paradigm testing thus occurs only after persistent failure to solve an important puzzle has created a crisis and led to a competition of two rival paradigms. The new candidate for a paradigm has to meet certain important criteria to qualify. It must offer the solution to some crucial problems in areas where the old paradigm failed. In addition, the problem-solving capacity of its predecessor has to be preserved after the paradigm shift. It is also important for the new approach to promise additional problem solving in new areas. However, there are always losses as well as gains in scientific revolutions. The former are usually obscured and tacitly accepted, so long as progress is guaranteed.

Thus, Newtonian mechanics, unlike both the Aristotelian and Cartesian dynamics, did not explain the nature of the attractive forces between particles of matter, but simply took gravity for granted. This question was later addressed and answered by the general theory of relativity. Newton’s opponents saw in his reliance upon innate forces a return to the Dark Ages. Similarly, Lavoisier’s theory failed to answer the question why various metals are so much alike—one that had been successfully dealt with in the phlogiston theory. It was not until the twentieth century that science was again capable of tackling this issue. The opponents of Lavoisier also raised the objection that the rejection of “chemical principles” in favor of laboratory elements was a regression from established explanation to a mere name. Similarly, Einstein and other physicists opposed the dominant probabilistic interpretation of quantum physics.

The choice of the new paradigm does not occur in stages, step by step, under the inexorable impact of evidence and logic. It is an instant change, resembling psychological conversion or a shift in perception between figure and background, and it follows the all-or-none law. The scientists who embrace a new paradigm talk about...

Table of contents

• Cover Page
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Dedication
• Contents
• Acknowledgments
• Introduction
• Chapter One The Nature of Reality: Dawning of a New Paradigm
• Chapter Two Dimensions of the Human Psyche: Gartography of Inner Space
• Chapter Three The World of Psychotherapy: Toward an Integration of Approaches
• Chapter Four The Architecture of Emotional Disorders
• Chapter Five Dilemmas and Controversies of Traditional Psychiatry
• Chapter Six A New Understanding of The Psychotherapeutic Process
• Chapter Seven New Perspectives in Psychotherapy and Self-Exploration
• Chapter Eight Epilogue: The Current Global Crisis and the Future of Consciousness Evolution
• Notes
• Bibliography
• Index
• Footnote