Imagination, Music, and the Emotions

A Philosophical Study

Saam Trivedi

• Publisher: SUNY Press
• Year: 2017
• Print ISBN: 9781438467160, 9781438467177
• eBook ISBN: 9781438467184
• Topic: Philosophy
• Subtopic: Aesthetics in Philosophy

Both musicians and laypersons can perceive purely instrumental music without words or an associated story or program as expressing emotions such as happiness and sadness. But how? In this book, Saam Trivedi discusses and critiques the leading philosophical approaches to this question, including formalism, metaphorism, expression theories, arousalism, resemblance theories, and persona theories. Finding these to be inadequate, he advocates an "imaginationist" solution, by which absolute music is not really or literally sad but is only imagined to be so in a variety of ways. In particular, he argues that we as listeners animate the music ourselves, imaginatively projecting life and mental states onto it. Bolstering his argument with empirical data from studies in neuroscience, psychology, and cognitive science, Trivedi also addresses and explores larger philosophical questions such as the nature of emotions, metaphors, and imagination.

I

Emotions, Moods, and Feelings

I.1. Introduction

In this opening chapter, I begin by sketching a positive account of emotions, moods, and feelings. I then briefly discuss some (of the many) recent views advanced by philosophers (rather than psychologists) about these mental phenomena, arguing against accounts of these that I take to be mistaken and thus trying to show that my view has certain advantages over these current theories. Note that I cannot comprehensively discuss here all recent theories of emotions; nor do I claim to give an exhaustive theory of the emotions beyond a preliminary sketch, which should suffice for the purposes of a study focused primarily on musical expressiveness, after all.

More specifically, here is what I do in the different sections of this chapter. In section I.2, I sketch a cognitive-affective view of the emotions, as you will see shortly. Section I.3 distinguishes emotions from beliefs and also from moods; note that this latter distinction will in fact be used in section VI.2 against the musical formalism of Eduard Hanslick. The next three sections of this chapter critically discuss, respectively, Martha Nussbaum’s neo-Stoic cognitivist view, Paul Griffiths’s position, and Jesse Prinz’s somatic theory. The chapter concludes by conceding that it may be possible to reconcile a cognitive-affective view of the emotions with a somatic theory.

I.2. What are Emotions?

So, let us begin with the emotions and the question “What are emotions?”

In a nutshell, the cognitive-affective view of emotions that I favor claims that emotions, standardly, are dynamic complexes consisting of two components: (1) an affective element, consisting of affects or feelings; as well as (2) a cognitive element, consisting of (evaluative) beliefs, thoughts, judgments, imaginings, seeings-as and the like.1 In virtue of the cognitive element, emotions have intentionality, i.e., they are directed upon or about things such as states of affairs, actions, events, people, physical objects, and so on. Furthermore, it is claimed that desires, which are distinct from emotions, may often accompany or even constitute emotions, though this need not be the case for all instances of every emotion.2 Also, underlying bodily processes are the neurophysiological bases or causes of emotions that allow emotions and may be necessary for emotions, but are not themselves parts of emotions. And as for behavior, while emotions often have (typical) behavioral expressions, these latter are neither necessary for emotions as some people may feel emotions (e.g., sadness) without expressing or manifesting them outwardly, nor is behavior sufficient to actually have an emotion as an occurrent state of one’s psychology as shown amply by the case of very good actors; here I borrow Hilary Putnam’s decisive super-Spartan and super-actor objections against Behaviorism. Moreover, against Agnes Moors, Phoebe Ellsworth et al. (2013a, 119−20), emotions need not have an action tendency or action readiness or some sort of motivational component associated with them; think of couch potatoes wallowing in boredom in front of the television. It is granted, however, that emotions are often shaped by social and cultural influences, though I will not dwell on the point as this concession is not itself a part of the cognitive-affective view of the emotions. Note in passing that the cognitive-affective view I favor combines earlier judgmentalist or cognitivist views of the emotions with feeling views of the emotions, a claim made by Paul Griffiths on behalf of perceptual theories of emotions (Griffiths 2013, 220). Note also that while the claim that emotions are perceptions of evaluative properties suggests that emotions may give evaluative knowledge, the cognitive-affective view can also grant that emotions may give us evaluative knowledge both about what is of value in the world as well as about what we value (compare de Sousa 2011).

At this stage, let us specify what the elements of the above account of the emotions amount to. It is difficult to give a very precise account of affects, but I will make a start here and claim that very roughly one may say that affects are the non-cognitive, non-intentional part of emotions. They involve (a) “raw feels,” or inner “psychological” affects, of pleasure or pain, and they may also involve (b) physical or bodily affects (compare Oakley 1992, 9−14).3

It is easier to give an account of physical than psychological affects, though an adequate theory of the emotions must account for both—instead of denying the latter, or else reducing them to the former. Physical affects involve bodily reactions like hearts pounding faster, pulse rates quickening, hair standing on ends, breathing getting faster, etc. Such affects may be found when we have feelings of excitement or fear, though one general worry may be that these “physical affects” are just external, behavioral manifestations of inner, psychological affects, not affects themselves. To dispose of this worry, consider the case of being extremely drowsy. Now, being drowsy need not involve any inner, psychological affects of pleasure or pain, even as accompaniments, but may only involve physical affects like yawning and a general lethargy. This drowsiness may be so strong that it may induce us to go to sleep before we realize that we are drowsy, or else it may take a little while before we realize that we are drowsy. Thus, this state of drowsiness is non-cognitive insofar as, at least for a little while, it does not involve a belief or a thought or a judgment, and it is also non-intentional insofar as it is not about, or directed toward, anything. Moreover, we have here a feeling or affect of drowsiness, but not an emotion. All of this goes to illustrate my claim above that feelings or affects are non-cognitive, non-intentional parts of emotions. And it also serves to illuminate the distinction between emotions and feelings or affects. Note also that one can have emotions that involve physical or bodily changes (in terms of neuron firings and other changes in one’s neurophysiology) without having physical affects or feelings, and without being aware of the underlying physical changes.

Psychological affects, on the other hand, are best seen in cases of intense emotions. Suppose X’s mother, who X is very attached to, dies, and X feels an emotion of intense grief. Such grief involves not only assent to beliefs about her mother’s death, but also an inner, psychological feeling or affect of pain (or distress) that may (or may not) be behaviorally or physically manifested through crying, dejection, and the like. Psychological affects of pleasure, as opposed to pain, can be seen in aesthetic experiences of great works of art, or of beauty in nature, as the inner psychological affect of intense pleasure (or joy) that I feel when I admire Michelangelo’s David, for instance,4 or when I admire the beauty of a stunning landscape in the Himalayas.

Here are some more differences between physical and psychological affects. Affects of pain can be both physical as well as psychological, but while physical pain is usually localized to some part of the body that is in pain, psychological pain is not so localized. For example, the physical pain of being pinched or hit is restricted to, and felt in, the concerned part of the body, whereas the psychological pain felt upon the death of one’s mother is not localized to any particular part of the body (although one may have a heavy heart, metaphorically speaking), though it is not located outside the body either. Similarly, affects of pleasure can be both physical as well as psychological, but while physical pleasure is usually localized to some part of the body, the same need not be true of psychological pleasure. For example, the physical pleasure of being tickled is localized to the body part being tickled, whereas the psychological pleasure of aesthetic experience is not so localized; I do not feel the pleasure of seeing a beautiful Himalayan landscape (just) in my eyes, even if that sight is soothing to my eyes in some sense. Note that I said that unlike psychological affects or feelings, which are usually not localized, physical affects are usually only localized. But physical affects need not always be localized, as shown by the physical affect of being drowsy which is spread all over the body and not localized to, say, the eyes or the mouth.

Psychological affects of pleasure (or comfort) are, roughly, the “feel good” aspects common to all positive emotions (joy, elation, contentment, etc.), while psychological affects of pain (or discomfort) are, roughly, the “feel bad” aspects common to all negative emotions (anger, hatred, sorrow, despair, anguish, etc.). Perhaps there is a third genus of “neutral” psychological affects or feelings that involve neither pleasure nor pain. For example, there might be a neither pleasurable nor painful psychological affect associated with the physical affect or feeling of drowsiness. It is a further, open, question whether there are distinct psychological feelings involved in many emotions, psychological feelings that are unique to the emotion in question. For example, it might be thought that anger involves not just painful psychological feelings but “burning” ones; similarly, sorrow may involve a “sinking” feeling and not just painful psychological affects. If this is right, then the distinct psychological feelings involved in some emotions would all be species of one of the three genera of psychological feelings. At any rate, it needs to be clarified further what exactly psychological affects are and what they involve; what I have said so far is only a preliminary, rough sketch, one that suffices for my purposes.

Let us turn now to the cognitive element of emotions. As seen in the above example of intense grief felt by X upon her mother’s death, the cognitive element of emotions involves a belief that a certain judgment is true, or at least justified by the present evidence—X believes that it is true that her mother is dead.5 Sometimes, though, the cognitive element involved in emotions is weaker than strict beliefs and may involve thoughts or imaginings, as, for example, is the case when I fear small, 3-inch lizards, knowing fully well that they are harmless. At any rate, the cognitive element is also often evaluative. In the case of the example above of X’s grief, X not only judges that it is true her mother has died but also believes that this is somehow bad, which in turn causes feelings of loss and sadness.

As indicated earlier, in virtue of their cognitive elements, emotions have intentionality, i.e., they are about something, or are directed or focused upon some object. Thus, X’s grief is about her mother’s death, and my fear above is directed upon lizards; it is a fear of something, vis-à-vis lizards in this case. Emotions acquire intentionality because their constitutive cognitive elements (whether beliefs, judgments, thoughts or imaginings) have intentionality—a thought, for instance, must be a thought about something; it must be directed upon an object, including not just physical objects, but also states of affairs, actions, events, persons, and the like.

It is sometimes held that emotions also involve a desiderative element consisting of desires for action, or strivings, in addition to the affective and cognitive elements specified above.6 I believe that such accounts of emotions are mistaken in making desires constitutive elements of all emotions, though desires may partly constitute some emotions such as love (which typically involves a desire or yearning to be with the objects of one’s love) or anger (which typically involves a desire for revenge).

To begin with, I think we must distinguish clearly between the concepts of emotions, desires, and beliefs. The idea of a unidirectional fit (or agreement, if you like) with the world, with different directions of fit, applies standardly to beliefs and desires, but need not apply in the same way (if it applies at all) to emotions, where the fit with the world is bidirectional. In contrast, when emotions involve the idea of a fit with the world, this is true in a bidirectional way.7

To illustrate, my desire to listen to, say, Beethoven’s Seventh Symphony involves the striving that the world should change to match my desire so that somewhere in my vicinity there is a recorded or a live performance of this musical work; though this is not to say that we should always try to change the world to fit our desires, even if we want this typically, all else being equal. In contrast, we typically want our beliefs to be true, i.e., we want that our beliefs should match the world, not vice versa, and that we give up false beliefs, which do not match the world. So, for instance, when we realize that the belief that the earth is flat is false, we want to give it up and hold instead the true belief that the earth is round.

Emotions which do involve the idea of a fit with the world typically involve the direction of fit going from the world to the emotion, and also sometimes the other way around. Thus, the fit between emotions and the world may be bidirectional. Many emotions involve the idea that the world should come to fit the desire that is involved in, or constitutes, that emotion. There is, however, a sense in which the direction of fit may go from emotions to the world. The idea here is not that some emotions are true, as beliefs that fit the world are, but that some emotions may be appropriate given the way the world is, e.g., moderate fear of a deadly snake may be an appropriate emotion that fits the world. Such fitting emotions would involve assent to the true beliefs that constitute them. Thus, when emotions fit the world in the same direction in which beliefs do, the senses of fit involved are different. While true beliefs fit the world in a representationally faithful sense—they “mirror” or “picture” the world, if you like—appropriate emotions fit the world in the nonrepresentational sense of being befitting or suitable. It is also possible that one and the same emotion can fit the world bidirectionally, for so far what I have said is that some emotions may fit the world, whereas the world may fit some other emotions. For example, my moderate fear of the deadly snake may be appropriate, and moreover that emotion may involve the desire to flee so that the world comes to fit that desire when I do run away from the scene.

Now, emotions are often constituted by desires. For instance, the emotion of love for someone is standardly constituted by, or involves, a desire to be with the object of one’s love (be it a person, pet, place, book, musical work, film, or something else), and in this sense involves the idea that the world should come to fit this desire. Similarly, the emotion of being angry with someone may involve a desire for revenge,8 and in this sense may involve the idea that the world should fit this desire.

But there are other emotions where it is not clear that they are constituted by desires. For instance, suppose a student gets an “A” grade on a philosophy paper. The ensuing emotion of happiness is certainly caused by the satisfaction of the desire to fare well,9 and certainly the emotion involves, as its constituents, affects of pleasure as well as the student’s assent to the true, evaluative belief that she has obtained an “A” and that is a good thing. But it is not clear that this emotion itself is constituted by the satisfied desire to fare well, nor is it clear that this emotion is constituted by, or necessarily involves, a desire for action of the sort often found in anger or love. Of course, she may have a desire, later in time, to continue to fare well, but it is not clear that this later desire constitutes the very emotion of happiness that she feels when she is happy at her grade upon first coming to know of it. And she may also have a desire, later in time, to tell friends and loved ones about her grade, but again it is not clear that this later desire constitutes the very emotion of happiness that she feels when she is happy at her grade upon first coming to know of it. In this example, the first rushes of happiness, I contend, consist only of affects and belief, yet there is a full-fledged emotion of happiness. Moreover, I claim that even if the student is very modest and never has a desire to tell anyone about her grade, she can still have the emotion of happiness so long as there occur (a) the appropriate evaluative belief, and (b) the relevant pleasurable psychological affect.

Justin Oakley claims that one problem for accounts of emotions which do not include desires as constituents of emotions is that they may fail to distinguish between some emotions, like my fear (involving the desire to flee) felt upon seeing a snake, and interest (involving the desire to stay and examine) felt by a naturalist upon seeing the same snake (Oakley 1992, 22−28). Oakley thinks that only desires can distinguish fear from interest in this case. However, it seems that Oakley is mistaken here, for clearly there are different affects involved in this example given by Oakley, an affect of pain (or distress, more properly) in the case of fear, and an affect of pleasure (or excitement, more properly) in the case of interest; one may also question whether interest is an emotion or a mode of belief, though for argument’s sake let us grant Oakley that it is an emotion. Moreover, there are also different cognitions involved in the two cases: I cognize that the snake is deadly, while the naturalist cognizes that the same snake is harmless but rare. Alternatively, if the snake is indeed deadly, then the naturalist may indeed cognize t...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Title
• Copyright
• Contents
• Introduction
• Chapter I: Emotions, Moods, and Feelings
• Chapter II: Expression Theories and Arousalism
• Chapter III: Metaphors and Metaphorism
• Chapter IV: Resemblance-Based Theories
• Chapter V: Imagination
• Chapter VI: Imaginationism
• Summary and Conclusion
• Notes
• References
• Index
• Back Cover