The Story of Islamic Philosophy

Ibn Tufayl, Ibn al-'Arabi, and Others on the Limit between Naturalism and Traditionalism

Salman H. Bashier

• Publisher: SUNY Press
• Year: 2012
• ISBN:
  9781438437446
• Topic: Theologie & Religion
• Subtopic: Islamische Theologie

In this innovative work, Salman H. Bashier challenges traditional views of Islamic philosophy. While Islamic thought from the crucial medieval period is often depicted as a rationalistic elaboration on Aristotelian philosophy and an attempt to reconcile it with the Muslim religion, Bashier puts equal emphasis on the influence of Plato's philosophical mysticism. This shift encourages a new reading of Islamic intellectual tradition, one in which boundaries between philosophy, religion, mysticism, and myth are relaxed. Bashier shows the manner in which medieval Islamic philosophers reflected on the relation between philosophy and religion as a problem that is intrinsic to philosophy and shows how their deliberations had the effect of redefining the very limits of their philosophical thought. The problems of the origin of human beings, human language, and the world in Islamic philosophy are discussed. Bashier highlights the importance of Ibn ?ufayl's ?ayy ibn Yaq??n, a landmark work often overlooked by scholars, and the thought of the great Sufi mystic Ibn al-?Arab? to the mainstream of Islamic philosophy.

CHAPTER 1

The File of Illuminationist Philosophy and the Purpose of Writing Ḥayy

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THE LEGEND OF EASTERN PHILOSOPHY

Ibn Ṭufayl opens the introduction to his philosophical story by saying that he has been asked by a noble friend to reveal to him what could be revealed of the secrets of Eastern philosophy (al-ḥikma al-mashriqiyya)¹ mentioned by the Head of the Wise ʿAbū ʿAlī Ibn Sīnā.² Ibn Sīnā enjoyed a bad reputation or was, at best, ignored in the Western part of the Islamic state.³ Ibn Sabʿīn, for example, considers him an “intentionally misleading sophist,”⁴ and, like Suhrawardī in the East, claims that he, not Ibn Sīnā, was the first to unfold the secrets of illuminationist philosophy, which had been employed by the ancients before logic and dialectic were invented.⁵ Despite the fact that Suhrawardī shows more respect for Ibn Sīnā than Ibn Sabʿīn, his position toward him in relation to illuminationist philosophy is in essence not different from that of Ibn Sabʿīn. Suhrawardī says: “You should know that the great sages … such as the father of the sages Hermes⁶ and, before him, Agathadaemon and also Phythagoras and Empedocles and the majestically great philosopher Plato were greater in measure and nobler in significance than all those who excelled from among the Islamic logicians … For even as they elaborated and elucidated, much of the thought of the Ancients remained hidden from their sight.”⁷

Ibn Ṭufayl states that the philosophy that had reached Andalusia in the books of Aristotle and Fārābī, and in Ibn Sīnā's Shifā',⁸ which agrees almost completely with the works of Aristotle, is not sufficient for the needs of the seeker of illuminationist philosophy.⁹ He also refers to Ibn Sīnā's statement, at the beginning of Shifā', that truth is beyond this work, and urges the seeker to look for it in his book on Eastern philosophy.¹⁰ Indeed, this seems to be confirmed by Ibn Sīnā in a passage from the Prologue to Shifā' quoted by Dimitri Gutas: “I also wrote a book other than these two [the Shifā' and the Lawāḥiq (Appendices)], in which I presented philosophy as it is naturally [perceived] and as required by an unbiased view which neither takes into account in [this book on Eastern philosophy] the views of colleagues in the discipline, nor takes precautions here against creating schisms among them as is done elsewhere; this is my book on Eastern philosophy. But as for the present book [the Shifā'], it is more elaborate and more accommodating to my Peripatetic colleagues. Whoever wants the truth [stated] without indirection, he should seek the former book [on Eastern philosophy]; whoever wants the truth [stated] in a way which is somewhat conciliatory to colleagues, elaborates a lot, and alludes [talwīḥ] to things which, had they been perceived, there would have been no need for the other book, then he should read the present book [the Shifā'].”¹¹

Gutas claims that Ibn Ṭufayl misinterprets this passage to create “the fiction of an esoteric and exoteric Avicenna”¹² by identifying the exoteric Ibn Sīnā with Shifā' and the esoteric Ibn Sīnā with Ishārāt and the allegory of Ḥayy Ibn Yaqẓān.¹³ He makes reference to the passage in which Ibn Ṭufayl says that “Avicenna stated explicitly that in his opinion the truth is something else [al-ḥaqq ʿindahu ghayru dhālika], that he wrote the Shifā' according to the doctrine of the Peripatetics only, and that ‘whoever wants the truth without indirection should seek’ his book on Eastern philosophy.”¹⁴ He then argues that Ibn Sīnā nowhere stated explicitly that the truth is something else, and that the distinction that he draws between the two works is one of style and is not based on a difference in doctrine.¹⁵

Like Gutas, George Ṭarābīshī claims that Ibn Ṭufayl invented the legend of Ibn Sīnā's esotericism to draw attention to his own work. Ibn Sīnā sought to advance with rather than beyond Peripatetic philosophy. And even if he wished to go beyond Peripateticism, he would then be attempting the impossible because he would have to transcend the epistemological limits of his time. This was impossible for him, however, due to the entanglement between Peripateticism and Neoplatonism and the presence of Uthūlūjiya, a work that belonged to Plotinus and that was mistakenly attributed to Aristotle.¹⁶ “Like Fārābī who was caught in this entanglement in his attempt to establish an agreement between Aristotle and Plato, Ibn Sīnā also and each time he thought he could release himself from Peripatetic gravitation would emerge from Aristotle's circle only to enter Plotinus's.”¹⁷ Ibn Ṭufayl, adds Tarabishi, composed his work within this context of the presence of Uthūlūjiya, making his own solemn contribution to the evolution of the legend of the philosophy of illumination. In the West, he played the role that Suhrawardī played in the East in cultivating and controlling the fiction of Ibn Sīnā's philosophy of illumination, whose control is still effective in the present days.¹⁸

Thus, Gutas and Tarabishi share the opinion that Ibn Sīnā was not a mystic and that the philosophy of illumination, which is attributed to him, is a fiction that was invented by Ibn Ṭufayl, followed by a host of mystifiers from medieval to contemporary times, who tend to confuse themselves and their readers by reading texts as they are reflected, in a state of misrepresentation, in the mirrors of other texts.¹⁹ More specifically, they claim that the distinction mentioned by Ibn Sīnā in the Prologue to Shifā' does not designate a difference in doctrine but only in style. Thus, when Ibn Ṭufayl says that Ibn Sīnā stated explicitly that the “truth is something else,” his intention is to misrepresent and misinterpret the latter's words. Let me quote the passage from Ibn Ṭufayl's introduction in Gutas's translation to see whether it is possible to think that Gutas and Tarabishi could be accused of the very misinterpretation that they charge Ibn Ṭufayl with: “As for the books of Aristotle, Avicenna undertook in the Shifā' to interpret their contents, proceeding according to Aristotle's doctrine and following the method of his philosophy. But in the beginning of the book, Avicenna stated explicitly that in his opinion the truth is something else [al-ḥaqq ʿindahu ghayru dhālika], that he wrote the Shifā' according to the doctrine of the Peripatetics only, and that ‘whoever wants the truth without indirection should seek’ his book on Eastern philosophy.”²⁰

Gutas renders ṣarraḥa as “stated explicitly,” which is a valid interpretation except that at least two other scholars do not use it. Lenn Goodman employs “admits” and Simon Ockley has it (simply) as “says.”²¹ As for al-ḥaqq ʿindahu ghayru dhālika, that is rendered by Gutas as “in his opinion the truth is something else,” which is again a valid interpretation, except that Goodman uses the words “the truth for him is something quite different,” and Ockley uses “the Truth was in his opinion different.” From “says” to “admits” to “stated explicitly,” and from “different” to “quite different” to “something else,” something is lost along the way, and that is Ibn Ṭufayl simple statement. Ibn Ṭufayl is making the straightforward statement that Ibn Sīnā says that the truth in Shifā' is different from the truth that is to be found in his book on Eastern philosophy. And this is exactly and simply what Ibn Sīnā says, as we can see from the first part of the passage from the Prologue to Shifā': “I wrote a book different from (ghayru) these two [Shifā' and Lawāḥiq] in which I presented philosophy as it is in itself and as required by an unbiased view which neither considers the side of colleagues in the discipline nor takes precautions against those who create schisms against them. This is my book on Eastern philosophy.”²² In the remainder of the passage, Ibn Sīnā explains in what sense the book on Eastern philosophy is different from, or, as Gutas puts it, “other than” Shifā'. It is different because the truth that it contains is presented as it is in itself, whereas the truth in Shifā' is Peripatetic. This is what Ibn Sīnā says, and it is also what Ibn Ṭufayl repeats.

To say, with Gutas, that Ibn Sīnā “is not talking about a difference in doctrine but one in style,” as well as that Ibn Ṭufayl created this fiction of difference in doctrine to win authority for his own mystical epistemology, is to oversimplify Ibn Sīnā's meaning and misinterpret Ibn Ṭufayl's. Surely, Ibn Sīnā wants something more than just a formal difference or a difference in style, even if this does not amount to a strict difference in doctrine or whatever other difference Gutas has in mind.²³

EASTERN AND WESTERN SCHOOLS OF PHILOSOPHY

In Critique of the Critique of Arab Reason,²⁴ Tarabishi argues against Jabiri's thesis according to which two main intellectual traditions ruled over the Arabic medieval mind: the Eastern tradition, championed by Ibn Sīnā, and the Western tradition, which included the three Andalusian philosophers: Ibn Bājja, Ibn Ṭufayl, and Ibn Rushd.²⁵ Jabiri affiliates the views of the Western philosophers with a school of logic that stood in contrast to the views of the members of the Eastern school, who advocated esoteric and illuminationist stands. Tarabishi indicates that to support his view that the three Andalusian thinkers were united in their rationalistic stand, Jabiri states that he searched for but could not find one word by Ibn Rushd against Ibn Bājja or Ibn Ṭufayl.²⁶ Now Tarabishi hurries to connect what Jabiri disconnected by connecting what he had previously disconnected: “In writing the history of the philosophy of Andalusia Ibn Ṭufayl does not disconnect himself from the philosophy of the East. On the contrary, he establishes his relationship with it in terms of continuity, and invests his efforts in presenting his personal attempt, as this is manifested in Ḥayy Ibn Yaqẓān, under the banner of the Eastern philosophy which is attributed to the Head of the Wise, Abū ʿAlī Ibn Sīnā.”²⁷ This is a strange statement from one who says that Ibn Sīnā's presence in Ḥayy is significant in name but not in actual fact.²⁸ As for Jabiri's claim that Ibn Rushd never said a word against Ibn Bājja or Ibn Ṭufayl, Tarabishi finds it easy to bring not one but many words of Ibn Rushd against Ibn Bājja. When it comes to Ibn Ṭufayl, he takes the reader on a long tour, with useful (but still not to the point) analysis of the poverty of philosophy in Andalusia. Only toward the end of his discussion does he attempt to say something that seems to be relevant to the point. There, he cites Ibn Rushd's famous statement in On the Harmony of Religion and Philosophy that “truth does not contradict truth,”²⁹ and says that this statement could be an appropriate title for Ibn Ṭufayl's story. But then he insists that the aim of Ibn Ṭufayl's work is the opposite of Ibn Rushd's. Whereas Ibn Rushd attempts to show that only experts in logical interpretation are capable of harmonizing philosophy and religion, Ibn Ṭufayl attempts to show that only gnostics are capable of accomplishing this mission. Now Tarabishi draws our attention to Ibn Ṭufayl's reservation in the introduction to Ḥayy against the experts in logical consideration and his claim that their rational deliberation does not come close to the knowledge that is attained through vision and that cannot be committed to writing. He also sees in the concluding passage of Ibn Ṭufayl's book an allusion to the person of Ibn Rushd:

This is … the story of Ḥayy Ibn Yaqẓān, brought in a manner of discourse not contained in books or ordinary speeches. It contains hidden knowledge received only by those who know God especially … In following this [course of open presentation] we broke the habit of our righteous ancestors in their unwillingness to expose [the mystery]. What made it easy for us to tear the veil and divulge the secret is the emergence of corrupt views that have been concocted by [the minds of] the philodoxers³⁰ of this era who spread them in the land and caused a considerable harm to the weak-minded, who have abandoned the tradition of the prophets. We feared for them [and wished to protect them] against imitating the light-headed and the ignorant in considering these views as the secrets hidden from those who are not worthy of them, since this only makes them all the more interested in adhering to them. Thus we saw it fitting to allow them a fleeting [moment of] allusion to the mystery of mysteries in the hope that this will draw them toward realization (taḥqīq) away from the way [of the misleading]. Nevertheless, we have not spared these few leaves, which are invested with secrets, a thin veil and a light covering, easily pierced by those who are worthy and too thick to penetrate it.³¹

Tarabishi detects in the emphasized words in this passage an allusion to Ibn Rushd. He also cites another passage in which Ibn Ṭufayl interrupts the narrative to register his fiercest criticism against extreme rationalists, and experiences a temptation to see Ibn Rushd as the target of this criticism.³² The passage in question is an especially important one and I will attend to it later in this book. For now, it suffices to say that it consists of what seems to be Ibn Ṭufayl's straight depreciation of the rational faculty and a clear declaration of its limitations in relation to comprehending divine truths by employing categories that pertain to the sensible world.³³ And indeed, it seems tempting to read this passage in the light of Tarabishi's interpretation and as indicating a rebellion against rationalism and Ibn Rushd as its chief representative. However, I will attempt to show that Tarabishi's reading must be limited due to his failure to grasp the true nature of Ibn Ṭufayl's “rebellion” against rationalism and his burning desire to freeze the relationship between him and Ibn Rushd.

The weakness of Tarabishi's view becomes apparent upon examining his (mis)interpretation of the third and last indication that he detects for an irreconcilable tension between the two Andalusian philosophers. This occurs in a statement in which Ibn Ṭufayl answers his reader's wish that he introduces the science of mystical visions in the way of rational consideration, and explains that this “can be set down in books and mastered by means of expressions. However, it is rarer than red sulphur, particularly in the region where we live. For it is so extraordinary that only some individuals grasp a slight portion of it here and there. And whoever has grasped something of it does not talk about it except in symbols (ramzan).³⁴ For the community of pristine religion (al-ḥanīfiyya) and the genuine Sacred Law forbid one to delve into it and warn against this.”³⁵ Tarabishi completely ignores Ibn Ṭufayl's affirmation that, although it is very rarely done, introducing the science of mystical visions in the way of rational consideration is still possible, and he freezes on his warning that the Law forbids one to delve into this matter. He then contra...