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Chapter 1
Blinded by Heaven
In this chapter we provide a background for Zhuangzi’s critique of the Confucians by looking at Sima Qian’s biography of him and describing the Confucian moral, social, and political concerns in the pre-Qin period of Chinese history (that is, prior to 221 BCE). This will be followed by an analysis of Xunzi’s well-known remark that “Zhuangzi was blinded by heaven and did not know the human” (莊子蔽於天而不知人) (Li 478). “Heaven” is a translation of tian (天). We shall see the significances of tian for the Confucians and for Zhuangzi in this chapter as well as in the chapters to follow. The ideas mentioned in this chapter will be investigated more fully in the subsequent chapters.
Biography and Background
The Han dynasty historian Sima Qian (司馬遷 c.145–86 BCE) provides the following biographical details about Zhuangzi:
Zhuangzi was a man of Meng (蒙). His personal name was Zhou (周). Zhou once served as an official at Qi Yuan (漆園) in Meng. He was a contemporary of King Hui of Liang and King Xuan of Qi. There was nothing on which his learning did not look into, but in essence they derived from the words of Laozi. Thus his writing, over 100,000 characters, consisted mostly of imputed words (寓言). He wrote “Yu Fu” (漁父 “The Old Fisherman”), “Dao Zhi” (盜 跖 “Robber Zhi”), and “Qu Qie” (胠篋 “Rifling Trunks”), in which he defamed the followers of Confucius (詆訿孔子之徒) and brought to light the teachings of Laozi. The likes of Wei Lei Xu (畏累虛), Geng Sang Zi (亢桑子) and others were all empty words without reality. Yet he was skilled in writing and turns of phrases, veiled references and analogies, and with these he attacked the Confucians and Mohists (剽剝儒墨). Even the learned men of that time were not free (from this). His words overflowed without restraint to suit himself. Thus important people from kings to dukes downwards were unable to make use of him in any capacity.
Sima Qian tells us that Zhuangzi was a contemporary of King Hui of Liang (梁惠王 370–319 BCE) and King Xuan of Qi (齊宣王 319–301 BCE). This means that he lived at the height of the Warring States (戰國 463–222 BCE). As its name suggests, this was a period when various states fought for power and control over vast territories. It culminated in total victory by the state of Qin (秦) in 221 BCE.
In one chapter of the Zhuangzi, “The Human World” (“Renjianshi” 人間世), there is a conversation between Confucius (Kongzi 孔子) and his disciple Yan Hui (顏回) which, though fictitious, reflects the chaos and violence of the times. Yan Hui asks Confucius for permission to leave for the state of Wei (衛). He wants to persuade its tyrannical ruler to govern humanely:
I have heard that the ruler of Wei is in his prime. He acts unilaterally, does not weigh seriously affairs of state, and fails to see his faults. He makes callous use of his people resulting in their death (輕用民死) and their dead bodies fill the swamps throughout the land like so much scorched weed (死者以量澤, 若蕉). The people have no place to turn to. I have heard you say, Master, “Leave the state that is well-governed and go to the state that is disordered. (This is like having) many sick people at the doctor’s door” (治國去之, 亂國就之, 醫門多疾). I wish to put into practice what I have learned (from your teachings). Perhaps this state can be saved. (Chen 116–17)
But Confucius dissuades Yan Hui from going. There is an irony here. Wei was the first state that Confucius had visited after leaving his home state of Lu (魯) in 497 BCE, disappointed with its rulers. He then visited other states to offer advice to the feudal lords. He was unsuccessful and returned to Lu at the age of sixty-eight to devote the rest of his life to teaching. Zhuangzi is parodying the Confucian mission to bring about social and political order through moral teaching and suasion. We shall see how this parody is carried out in the next chapter. The violent chaos of the times is indicated in the above passage by the statement that “dead bodies fill the swamps throughout the land like so much scorched weed.”
Disorder had gradually set in before and during the time of Confucius (551–479 BCE), who lived toward the end of the Spring and Autumn period (春秋 770–464 BCE). In his teachings, Confucius emphasized the maintenance of the traditional system of li (禮). This refers to norms of ritual propriety. These encompassed the relationship between the Zhou emperor and the rulers of states who had been enfeoffed, the mutual behavior of rulers and ministers or officials, host and guest (including the diplomatic context), father and son, husband and wife, male and female, and so on.
Beside norms of behavior and their forms of expression, this system of ritual propriety stipulated priorities and entitlements. It made hierarchical distinctions between the ranks of nobility and between the nobles, officials, and others. At the same time, it served to distribute power, honor, eminence, and wealth. The li also involved sacrificial ceremonies to be performed to tian and the spirits. There were rules that specified, for example, that certain ceremonies of this nature could be performed only by the Zhou emperor. During Confucius’s time, however, some rulers ignored this and performed them in their own courts (Analects 3.1, 3.2).
These rulers were evidently arrogating to themselves such ceremonial displays in their quest for power. To Confucius, this violation of propriety was both a sign and source of a general and gradual moral degradation. Another such source which Confucius lamented was the establishment of punitive laws, advocated by “Legalists,” in order to gain absolute control over the populace. The implementation of such laws may bring order in the short term, but will lead people to obey the state just to avoid punishment. Thus, they will not know right from wrong and have no sense of shame. These can only come about through the guidance of li. Confucius saw the maintenance of the ritual proprieties as an instrument of moral virtue in the people as a whole, although these proprieties were ultimately integral to his conception of the human being. This moral virtue is encapsulated in the word ren (仁), or humaneness. Ren is for Confucius a fundamental ethical orientation involving virtues, emotions, and values that reflect the meaning and significance of modes of conduct and relationships governed by li.
Confucius tried to integrate li with ren, making them complementary, if not inseparable. As he said, “Surely when one says ‘The rites, the rites,’ it is not enough merely to mean presents of jade and silk. Surely when one says ‘Music, music,’ it is not enough merely to mean bells and drums” (Analects 17.11). Jade, silk, bells, and drums are instruments used in ritual ceremonies. The perfunctory performance of such ceremonies through these instruments without an attitude of respect, reverence, and other virtues goes against their spirit. These virtues and virtuous feelings together constitute ren and are said to form the basis of li. For instance, we find statements about xin (信 trust) being the upholding of li, yi (義 rightness or righteousness) as expressing li, xiao (孝 filial piety) as the beginning of li, and so on. Under the teachings of Confucius, the expressions of these virtues became associated with the practice of li to the extent that someone who is deemed not ren is, strictly speaking, placed out of the system of rites: “What can a man do with the rites who is not ren? What can a man do with music who is not ren?” (Analects 3.3).
We know from Confucius’s own efforts to integrate li with ren and from the criticisms of others that, right up to the end of the Warring States period, there was a continuous debate among the different schools about the traditional system of li. Xunzi (荀子 298–238 BCE), for instance, defended the Confucian emphasis on li against the Mohist (the school of Mozi 墨子) criticism that it was both largely unnecessary and a huge waste of economic resources. The Mohists also argued that the preferential love for family members (especially parents), which the Confucians held to be a mainstay of li and ren, violated the principle of impartiality (jian ai 兼愛). The Legalist philosopher Han Feizi (韓非子 d. 233 BCE) criticized the Confucians for looking backward toward a system that was no longer effective. He put this in terms of a parable now ensconced in the common saying, shou zhu dai tu (守株待兔)—keeping watch over a stump to wait for a rabbit. A farmer of the state of Song (宋) captured a rabbit that had bumped into a stump on his field. Thereafter, he took up watch beside the stump hoping to get another rabbit the same way. Both Xunzi and Han Feizi lived toward the end of the Warring States period. But, much earlier, Mencius (Mengzi 孟子 390–305 BCE) had already found it necessary to defend li and ren against the Mohists and others by grounding them in innate feelings of human nature.
According to Mencius, everyone has the four sprouts or beginnings in his/her xin (心), or the heart-mind of compassion, shame, respect, right, and wrong. These moral sprouts, properly developed, become the virtues of ren, yi, li, and zhi (智 wisdom). Mencius explicitly attributes the possession of these innate moral sprouts to tian, or Heaven, here spelled with a capital H for reasons that will be clarified shortly. After describing this theory of the moral sprouts, he cites Confucius’s approval of a passage from the Odes (詩經 Shi Jing, alternatively The Book of Poetry or The Book of Songs):
Heaven produces the teeming masses,
And where there is a thing there is a norm.
If the people held on to their constant nature,
They would be drawn to superior virtue.
天生蒸民, 有物有則。 民之秉彝, 好是懿德。 (Mencius 6A:6)
And in another passage, Mencius says: “For a man to give full realization to his (heart-mind) is for him to understand his own nature, and a man who knows his own nature will know Heaven. The retention of his (heart-mind) and the nurturing of his nature are the means by which he serves Heaven” (Mencius 7A:1). Mencius speaks of Heaven as the source of the heart-mind (Mencius 6A:15). Heaven not only endows the individual with moral potentialities in the heart-mind, but also spells out a proper destiny, zheng ming (正命). This is a normative sense of destiny that enables one to take a steadfast attitude toward death and to cultivate one’s moral character. If one dies “after having done his best in following the Way,” he would have followed this proper destiny (Mencius 7A:2).
Thus, Mencius thinks of tian, or Heaven as being normative and which the individual acknowledges and “serves” by fulfilling the moral potentialities that it has endowed. This is a conception of tian as having a moral will and purpose, producing a universal human nature, providing the norms of a “proper” destiny, and so on.
This is consistent with Confucius’s own attitude toward Heaven. When his life was threatened by Huan Tui (桓魋 Minister of War in the state of Song), for instance, Confucius said, “Heaven is the author of the virtue that is in me. What can Huan Tui do to me?” (Analects 7.23). As D.C. Lau notes, Confucius is saying that “Heaven had endowed him with special virtue so that he could shoulder the tian ming (天命 Heaven’s decree) of awakening the Empire to its moral purpose and that if Hua...
