No Moon as Witness

Missions of the SOE and OSS in World War II

James Stejskal

• Publisher: Casemate
• Year: 2021
• ISBN:
  9781612009537
• Topic: History
• Subtopic: Military & Maritime History
• Index: History

The creation and intense training regimens of the British Special Operations Executive and the American Office of Strategic Services leading into WWII. Winston Churchill famously instructed the head of the Special Operations Executive to "Set Europe ablaze!" Agents of both the British Special Operations Executive and the American Office of Strategic Services underwent rigorous training before making their way, undetected, into Occupied Europe. Working alone or in small cells, often cooperating with local resistance groups, agents undertook missions behind enemy lines involving sabotage, subversion, organizing resistance groups, and intelligence-gathering. The SOE's notable successes included the destruction of a power station in France, the assassination of Himmler's deputy Reinhard Heyrich, and ending the Nazi atomic bomb program by destroying the heavy water plant at Vemork, Norway. OSS operatives established anti-Nazi resistance groups across Europe, and managed to smuggle operatives into Nazi Germany, including running one of the war's most important spies, German diplomat Fritz Kolbe. All of their missions were incredibly dangerous and many agents were captured, tortured, and ultimately killed—the life expectancy of an SOE wireless operator in occupied France was just six weeks. In No Moon as Witness, historian James Stejskal examines why these agencies were established, the training regime and ingenious tools developed to enable agents to undertake their missions, their operational successes, and their legacy. "The book is well organized and also an excellent read. It examines the close history of the SOE and OSS—and how they worked together... or not. In addition, the 'tools of the trade' chapter includes images and sketches that often do not appear in other books." — SOF News

CHAPTER 1

Origins

‘In three weeks Britain will have her neck wrung like a chicken.’

– FRENCH GENERAL MAXIME WEYGAND, 1940

‘Some chicken, some neck …’

– WINSTON CHURCHILL, BEFORE THE HOUSE OF COMMONS, OTTAWA, 30 DECEMBER 1941

The Need Arises: SOE is Born

In the early 1930s, the embers of an unfinished war were being stirred again. German Führer Adolf Hitler used a mantra of Germany being stabbed in the back after World War I to set a course for a ‘Thousand-Year Empire’ and expand his country’s power and territory, first through bluster and negotiation, then by audacity. Soon he would resort to force. Unlike the Great War of 1914–18, which seemingly began with little warning and shocked most civilians, if not their militaristic leaders, World War II was anticipated by many in the early 1930s. The rise of Hitler alarmed many from the moment the Reichstag went up in flames, taking the promise of the Weimar Republic with it. Hitler began his quest by ordering the building up of Germany’s armed forces, which had been emasculated by the Treaty of Versailles following World War I. Starting in early 1935, its air force, which had been completely banned, was re-established and the Army expanded. Hitler further flouted Versailles by reoccupying the Rhineland on 7 March 1936. Two years later, on 14 March 1938, German troops marched into and annexed Austria. But Hitler was intent that still more Lebensraum (‘living space’ = territory) was needed and threatened the liberation of Germans in the Sudetenland region of Czechoslovakia, which bordered Germany. To avert war, Britain’s Chamberlain and France’s Daladier called for negotiations and ceded Hitler the territory he demanded without the presence or consent of the Czech government.

Chamberlain declared the Munich Agreement, signed on 30 September 1938, to be ‘peace in our time’, while Winston Churchill declared it ‘a total and unmitigated defeat’. Churchill saw the consequences of the diplomatic surrender to Hitler as a ‘first foretaste of a bitter cup’. He would be proven correct when, in March 1939, despite Hitler’s assurances to the contrary, Bohemia and Moravia were subsumed as ‘protectorates’, while Slovakia became an ostensibly independent but servile vassal state to Germany, much like the collaborationist, aka Pétainist, Vichy France would later be. Britain finally began in earnest to prepare for war. Poland was obviously Hitler’s next target. Britain and France reassured the Polish government of their support if Germany invaded, yet in reality, there was little they could do but watch from hundreds of miles away. Hitler had already decided Poland’s fate and would invade that country on the pretext of a fake Polish attack on 1 September 1939. Three days later, Britain and France declared war on Germany, but neither ally was truly prepared to fight. Luckily, prescient men had begun to prepare for the upcoming conflict when it became apparent that Hitler would not be placated with the morsels of Austria and Czechoslovakia, and that world domination was his goal.

Foundations of the SOE

As early as 1938, a very few British senior leaders and officers began contemplating irregular warfare as another way, along with conventional military means, to counter Germany’s seemingly overwhelming might. At that time, no organisation in Britain (or the United States) existed to carry out secret warfare, and the men who began to study the problem were faced with several challenges. The first was the lack of institutional knowledge; the second, a military that resisted change – especially changes that required ‘ungentlemanly’ conduct in warfare. Although irregular warfare has existed since human conflict began, most of its lessons had been forgotten and the concept of fighting unconventionally was never institutionalised into the conventionally minded militaries of the world. That said, there was much in recent British experience on which officers could orient themselves – not all of which was positive. The Boer War showed the British Army what a small, very mobile guerrilla force could do against a slow-moving army 10 times its size. That lesson was reinforced by the success of the British-supported Arab Revolt fought against the Ottoman-Turkish Army during World War I. That episode was followed by the 1919–21 Irish War of Independence, during which 3,000 Republican rebels confounded a force of over 75,000 British and Irish soldiers and police. There were other similar conflicts to consider: the East African campaign of German Colonel Paul Emil von Lettow-Vorbeck, whose forces never numbered more than around 15,000, kept 250,000 Commonwealth soldiers on the run for three years during World War I; while the more recent Spanish Civil War (1936–39) and the ongoing Sino-Japanese War (1937–45) demonstrated the value of unconventional warfare.

In 1936, the Deputy Chief of the Imperial General Staff (DCIGS) set up a one-man office to consider problems of tactics and organisation. Called General Staff (Research), or GS(R), it was a think-tank in which the incumbent officer could choose any topic to study and write about. In the autumn of 1938, Lieutenant Colonel J. C. F. ‘Joe’ Holland was assigned to the office and tasked to examine ways in which Britain might support guerrillas in Nazi-occupied Eastern Europe. He brought in two experts to help: Millis Jefferis, a Royal Engineer (RE), for his expertise in demolitions and sabotage, and Colin McVeigh Gubbins in April 1939 to study the subjects of organisation, recruitment and training. The latter was just in time for Holland’s newest tasking. Having proposed and received authorisation to proceed, GS(R) began to work on three topics:

(a) To study guerilla* methods and produce a guerilla ‘F.S.R.’ [Field Service Regulations], incorporating detailed tactical and technical instructions, applying to each of several countries.

(b) To evolve destructive devices for delaying and suitable for use by guerillas, and capable of production and distribution on a wide enough scale to be effective.

(c) To evolve procedure and machinery for operating guerilla activities, if it should be decided to do so subsequently.

– Holland, ‘General Instructions’, 13 April 1939, 2, TNA: PRO, HS 8/256 (*Both Holland and Gubbins spelled ‘guerrilla’ with one ‘r’.)

SOE was given many code names to cover its activities, but to the public and the press it was often known by several monikers:

‘Baker Street Irregulars’

‘Churchill’s Secret Army’

‘Ministry of Ungentlemanly Warfare’

The OSS also had a few amusing nicknames:

‘Oh So Secret’

‘Donovan’s Devils’

‘Bang Bang Boys’

But one reflected its membership, a high percentage of whom were ‘eastern establishment’ college professors and Wall Street bankers:

‘Oh So Social’

Gubbins and Jefferis took the reins for writing the ‘instruction’ books. Although he was an artillery officer by training, Gubbins had unique opportunities to observe unconventional warfare. Following the Great War he served on the staff of General Edmund Ironside with British forces during the Russian Civil War in 1919, before being reassigned to serve during the Irish War of Independence as brigade major to an artillery unit.

Within a short period, the two men completed three practical manuals that could be used to train resistance forces, entitled The Partisan Leader’s Handbook, The Art of Guerilla Warfare, and How to Use High Explosives. All three were translated into several foreign languages and would be dropped to underground and guerrilla forces in Europe. They also provided the basis for the syllabus to train the operatives of SOE and OSS.

In the late summer of 1939, Gubbins departed GS(R), which had been renamed Military Intelligence (Research) or MI(R). He would soon return.

In April 1938, the director of the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS), Admiral Hugh Sinclair, tasked Major L. D. Grand, an RE officer, to study ‘dirty tricks’. His small section was called ‘D’, for ‘Destruction’. His contributions will be looked at in more detail later.

Then one more element was added to the mix. The Committee of Imperial Defence proposed the creation of the Department of Propaganda in Enemy Countries. Called simply ‘Department EH’, for Electra House, the building in which it was located, it was headed by Sir Campbell Stuart, who was known by his initials ‘CS’ in the closed circles of intelligence. EH would be plagued by chaos in its management and control until 1941.

As early as March 1939, plans for a merger of the three elements were being discussed, but this only came about after the War Cabinet put forward a proposal by the Chiefs of Staff. They suggested the formation of a secret unit to foment sabotage and subversion behind enemy lines. The proposal came out of desperation: after France had surrendered in June 1940, there was little Britain could do to counter German forces on the European continent other than small-scale actions.

Winston Churchill became Prime Minister on 10 May 1940. Having seen several sabotage operations planned by SIS go badly, he realised new thinking was necessary. He tasked the Minister of Economic Warfare (MEW), Hugh Dalton, to set up a new organisation on 22 July 1940. It was cobbled together from SIS’s Section ‘D’, MI(R) and EH, and named the Special Operations Executive (SOE). Its mission was ‘to co-ordinate all action, by way of subversion and sabotage, against the enemy overseas’.

Although not its founder, Churchill was to be SOE’s most ardent supporter and protector through the war years. To make his intent clear, he told Dalton to ‘set Europe ablaze’.

SOE was created out of Britain’s weakness and intended to be one element of its strategic and military strategy to win the war – or at least not be defeated. Britain’s other strategic priorities – bombing to cripple Germany’s industrial capacity and a naval blockade to strangle its trade – would at times deprive SOE of the resources to carry out its operations.

Initially, SOE went through ‘teething’ problems as a number of its operations were either called off or failed outright. Although some would call the British unconventional warfare operations in Abyssinia SOE’s first success, that operation – called Mission 101 – was initially organised by MI(R) in 1940. The Abyssinian campaign would be a guidepost for SOE’s future endeavours.

SOE’s first successful foray into Europe would come in June 1941 with Operation Josephine, the sabotage of power transformers that serviced a German submarine base near Pessac in south-west France.

OSS

‘The British were trying to push the US into war. If that be so, we were indeed a pushover.’

– ERNEST CUNEO

The United States had forgotten most of its experience in irregular warfare. The US Army had its roots in fighting unconventionally against, of all people, the British. Nearly every war since that time had an unconventional aspect to it, whether fighting the Apache chieftain Vittorio or, more recently, Emilio Aguinaldo in the Philippines. Only in 1940 had the US Marine Corps even begun to consider writing a manual about ‘small wars’, despite its long history of engagement in police actions. The US would be starting from nearly nothing to build its special operations forces for the coming war.

From beginning to end, the driving force behind the Office of Strategic Services was William Joseph Donovan. Known as ‘Wild Bill’ for exploits that earned him the Medal of Honor in World War I, Donovan was a lawyer, soldier and an astute observer of political events overseas.

After his return to New York from the war in 1918, Donovan kept his eyes on the international scene. Throughout the 1920s and 1930s, he travelled far and wide to observe and report on political events and conflicts, all the while working for a New York City law firm. Witnessing events first-hand in Siberia, Manchuria and Europe convinced him the United States needed to prepare for a new type of warfare – fast-moving armoured combat supported by air assets.

One of his most controversial trips was to Ethiopia. After convincing Italian leader Benito Mussolini, Il Duce, that he was a private American businessman supportive of Italy, he received authorisation for a trip to observe the Italian Army’s campaign to annex Ethiopia in 1935. What he saw led him to write a report that went against everything most European nations had erroneously assumed about Italy’s ability to wage war. Donovan stated Italy would successfully defeat the Ethiopians despite the threat of League of Nations sanctions, and, as history would show, he was correct. Moreover, during his travels Donovan also reali...