Hitler's V-Weapons

The Battle Against the V-1 and V-2 Written at the Time, An Official History

John Grehan

• Publisher: Frontline Books
• Year: 2020
• Print ISBN: 9781526770059
• eBook ISBN: 9781526770066
• Topic: History
• Subtopic: British History
• Index: History

A history of Germany's attempts to construct flying bombs during World War II and how to threat was handled by the Allies.
At 04.08 hours on the morning of June 13, 1944, two members of the Royal Observer Corps were on duty on the top of a Martello tower on the seafront at Dymchurch in Kent. At that moment, they spotted the approach of an object spurting red flames from its rear and making a noise like "a Model-T-Ford going up a hill." It was a development that they, and many others throughout the UK, had been anticipating for months. The first V1 flying bomb, an example of what Hitler had called his  Vergeltungswaffen or Vengeance Weapons, to be released against Britain was rattling towards them. The two spotters on top of the tower may well have been aware that a new Battle of Britain had just begun . . .
For years, key individuals in the UK had been aware of German experiments to build long-range weapons. From leaked documents, reports from the French Resistance, and aerial photography, a picture was gradually put together of the Nazis' extensive program to build pilotless aircraft, the Fi 103 V1 flying bomb, and the V2, the A4 rocket, which could be directed at the United Kingdom. By 1943, enough information had been gathered for Britain and its American allies to act, and the first bombing raids were undertaken against the long-range weapons installations.
From August 1943, British and U.S. Air Forces worked to destroy every site lined to the V-weapons. This book, written by the Air Ministry's Air Historical Branch is the official account of the measures undertaken by the Air Defence of Great Britain, Fighter Command, Anti-Aircraft Command, Bomber Command, and even the Balloon Command to defend the UK from what was potentially the greatest threat it had ever encountered.
It was only through this multi-disciplinary approach that the actual effect of the V-weapons was contained to the level it was. Even so, the extent of the damage and deaths the flying bombs and rockets caused and the fear they generated, was considerable and had this coordinated approach not been undertaken the UK's resolve in the crucial months of the war might have been seriously challenged.
This highly detailed, accurate, and unbiased account is a valuable addition to the history of the World War II. It demonstrates the difficulties the UK faced in identifying the nature of the highly secret German weapons and how, through an enormous, combined effort, this threat was overcome.
Praise for Hitler's V-Weapons
"Mr. Grehan collates reports and analysis from the war against the V weapons, divining important chunks of detail to underscore narrative histories that do the rounds." — War History Online

Part I

Spring 1943 – August 1943

1. Introduction.

a. The Decline of the German Air Force.

The decline in the fortunes of Germany which set in during the last months of 1942 was nowhere more clearly displayed than in the air. In the three years prior to the war the German Air Force had been perhaps the most important single military factor in Europe. Instructed and uninstructed were alike impressed by its potential striking power which to no small extent explained the success of German policy. Nor did war deflate its reputation. The first two years demonstrated that the force was well trained and well equipped. It was certainly checked in the August and September of 1940; but during the following winter and spring the night attack of Britain continued; and in the Mediterranean the same efficiency as had marked the earlier campaigns in Poland, Scandinavia and Western Europe was displayed in the Balkans and Crete.

However, this turn on the part of Germany first to the south-east and then to Russia eased the pressure of the air offensive against the United Kingdom. Thenceforwards, the German Air Force was at worst a nuisance, and chiefly a mere threat. Moreover, from the end of 1942 the offensive strength of the force so far declined or was so much needed for other tasks that a repetition of attacks on the scale of 1940/1 became practically impossible. Thus, throughout the period preparatory to the Allied invasion of France it was unlikely that the economy of this country and the forces assembling here would be subjected to a scale of attack so heavy that it might jeopardise the plans that had been laid.

b. The Role of Long-Range Weapons.

But by means of flying bombs and rockets the bombardment of London was made possible at a time when more orthodox methods were almost out of the question. This does not mean that the Germans had this object clearly in mind throughout the phase in which the weapons were developed. It is certainly untrue for the A.4 rocket; for experiments directly linked with this weapon were taking place in Germany before war broke out. It may be true in the case of the flying bomb, the development of which does not appear to have begun until the first half of 1942.1 However, intensive development of both weapons dates from the middle of 1942 when the Germans may well have realised that they were committed to the Russian campaign for much longer than they had visualised and that, in consequence, heavy bomber attacks on the United Kingdom, in reply to those which were beginning to be made on Germany, were problematical.

2. Early Intelligence.

The first serious evidence to fall into British hands that the Germans were developing rockets for military purposes came as early as November 1939 in the form of information which became known in this country as the “Oslo” Report. Later events proved this to be an especially reliable document on prospective German weapons some of which were in the very early stages of development. For example, the Hs.293 glider bomb, which the report mentioned, did not come into use until the summer of 1943.2

It was not until the end of 1942 that fresh information was received. Then, on 18th December 1942, a hitherto untested source of intelligence sent in the first of three reports which together indicated that on the last day of November 1942 and the first two in December trials of a long-range rocket had been carried out near Swinemünde on the Baltic coast. At least four more reports were received in the first quarter of 1943 linking similar trials more precisely with Peenemünde. This place was known to be important as a research centre and three photographic reconnaissances had been flown over it between May 1942 and March 1943. The whole story was given added credibility through the unwitting indiscretions of two high ranking German prisoners.

What was the size and performance of the rocket that was being tested was doubtful. Most reports indicated that it had a range of some one hundred and thirty kilometres; a war head containing five tons of explosive had also been mentioned. The latter was thought at first to be an exaggeration. According to Dr. A.D. Crow, Director of Projectile Development of the Ministry of Supply, the weight of the warhead was more likely to be about one ton.3

But by April 1943 there appeared to Military Intelligence at the War Office to be sufficient evidence to justify informing the Vice-Chief of the Imperial General Staff,4 Lieutenant General A.E. Nye, who after consultation with Professor C.D. Ellis, the Scientific Adviser to the Army Council, and Dr. Crow, brought the matter before the other Vice-Chiefs of Staff on 12th April 1943. This would have been a serious step to take on any matter where only preliminary and imprecise intelligence was available. It was especially grave when the threat that was apprehended had such extensive implications both for the defence of the country and for the security of the projected invasion. For in effect it asked that special notice should be taken of the threat, commensurate with the dangers that might rise from it.

3. The Sandys Investigation.

It is not surprising, therefore, that the main result of the meeting of the Vice-Chiefs was that a special investigation was set in train. Its direction, however, was put in the hands, not of a serving officer, but of a member of the government, Mr. Duncan Sandys, Joint Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Supply. His appointment dated from 19th April 1943.5 To begin with, he was required to answer a number of specific questions: whether a rocket of the dimensions and performance indicated by V.C.I.G.S. was technically possible; what stage of development the Germans had reached; what counter-measures were possible and how they could be improved.6 He was instructed to report back to the Chiefs of Staff; and it was with the authority of the latter that he could call upon scientists in other departments besides his own, for advice and help. It soon became clear, however, that the process of obtaining conclusive answers to the various questions that Mr. Sandys had been asked was likely to take a long time. Consequently, the various individuals and branches of departments which Mr. Sandys relied upon for assistance were embraced during May and June 1943 in an extraordinary organisation which overrode the usual divisions of responsibility, the whole being under the direction of Mr. Sandys. This organisation lasted until November 1943. Through its various parts practically all the work of investigation during this period was carried out.

4. The Problem of Identifying the Rocket.

That work was chiefly of two sorts: first, the establishing of the character of the threat; second, the planning of counter-measures. Ideally, of course, the second task was best attempted when the first had been settled. But this was never possible during these first six months of investigation, and the two activities had perforce to go on concurrently.

a. The Nature of the Evidence: Estimations of the Size and Effect of the Weapon.

As was to be expected, the most difficult problem facing the investigators was to discover exactly what sort of weapon the Germans were developing. Their approach took a dual form: first, to collect, collate and analyse all the relevant intelligence that was obtained from our sources in Germany and elsewhere and from photographic reconnaissances; second, to reconstruct the sort of weapon which the Germans might well have developed in the existing state of scientific knowledge and technical skill.

The first of these tasks was principally in the sphere of existing agencies of intelligence. Mr. Sandys could and did, request photographic reconnaissances and the special interrogation of prisoners of war. He also arranged that all intelligence information should be transmitted to him and to the scientists and technicians whom he consulted, although some of them were Intelligence officers. He thus overlapped the service branches in this type of work. But the collection of intelligence was entirely the work of those sources and contacts which supplied us with information from Europe; and the role of photographic reconnaissance was chiefly to follow up lines of investigation which came first from agents on the ground.

For four months, from April to July 1943, nothing came from this sort of source which made it possible to establish beyond doubt what size of weapon the Germans were developing. A general picture emerged, however, the main features of which were that a rocket was certainly being developed and that Peenemünde was undoubtedly the main experimental station and possibly also a centre of production. A photographic reconnaissance on 22nd April 1943 gave the information necessary for a comprehensive report tracing the structural developments that had taken place at Peenemünde during the previous year. It told us nothing about long range weapons, but at least it showed that a great deal of heavy construction had already taken place and that more was in progress. We were to discover during the next few weeks that large numbers of foreign workers were employed there, most of whom had been recruited in Belgium and Luxembourg.7 Two more reconnaissances on 12th and 23rd June supplied photographs showing two large objects which appeared to be rockets, some forty feet long and seven feet wide. One of them surprisingly called attention to itself by its light colour; but both were sufficiently unobtrusive as only to be recognised on photographs of excellent quality. Photographic reconnaissance also confirmed reports of heavy constructions in Northern France. As early as July 1943 suspicious and large excavations were detected at Watton, near Calais, at Wizernes and at Bruneval. But there was nothing to connect them for certain with what was taking place at Peenemünde. In sum – and apart from the fact that Peenemünde was important – the evidence that had accumulated by the beginning of August would bear no positive conclusions about the rocket, save that it was being developed. Certainly, there was nothing definite about the size and performance of the weapon. Looking back, it is now possible to select accurate details from the reports that were coming in; but usually these were associated with other details that were clearly false; nor was there any single report sufficiently accurate and comprehensive to furnish intelligence with a clear line to follow up.

During the same four months the approach of Mr. Sandys’ scientific advisers also yielded no results. Early in the investigation it was calculated that the very approximate characteristics of the rocket might include a length of twenty feet, a diameter of ten feet, and a total weight of seventy tons with a warhead of up to ten tons. This implied a much more destructive projectile than that postulated in the initial report of the V.C.I.G.S.; but quite apart from the scientific factors involved the estimate was in fact more in line with such vague information as had been obtained up to that time from agents. Nor was it much amended when the rockets photographed at Peenemünde were examined; for these were reckoned to be nearly forty feet long, seven feet wide, sixty to one hundred tons in weight and containing two to eight tons of explosive. The main difficulty in estimating the weight of the warhead and the performance of the weapon was that almost nothing was known of the propellant that the Germans had developed. It was suspected that they had evolved an entirely new fuel; and the calculations mentioned above were based on the assumption of a propellant with twice the calorific content of cordite. Yet it was known that no variant of cordite could possibly have been produced to give such results. The probability was, therefore, that some form of liquid fuel had been developed; and one of Mr. Sandys’ committees sat under Sir Frank Smith to investigate the possibilities.

If the Germans had indeed succeeded in producing a rocket of these dimensions the implications were truly terrible. Early in June the Ministry of Home Security estimated that a rocket containing ten tons of explosive might cause complete or partial demolition over an area of radius of 850 feet and might kill six hundred people. Two months later Mr. Herbert Morrison informed the Prime Minister that if one such rocket fell in the London area every hour for thirty days the cumulative casualties might be 108,000 killed and as many seriously injured. The figures made no allowance for overlap of craters not for the large-scale evacuation, official and unofficial, that would take place. But even if they were discounted by as much as a half or even three quarters the results might well be such that it would be impossible to maintain London as a centre of government and an area of production.8

b. Criticisms by Lord Cherwell.

And as the implications were so grave, yet nothing positive was known about the weapon which might bring about this disastrous situation, it is not surprising that a determined effort was made between June and September 1943, chiefly by Lord Cherwell, to shake the foundations of the case in favour of the rocket. Lord Cherwell’s arguments were partly scientific. He fastened on what was a weak point in the case as presented up to that date, namely that the Peenemünde rockets were clearly single stage, which meant, according to the best-informed opinion in this country, that its maximum range would only be forty miles. He also pointed out that most of the agents’ reports mentioned that the rockets would be steered by radio. This seemed to him practically impossible as the projectile would be rotating so rapidly. There was also the point that the only conceivable fuel for so large a body was one that was unknown to scientists in this country.

But his arguments were partly based on the grounds of common sense. He could not believe that the Germans would develop a weapon of sixty tons or more that would require huge launching installations which would be impossible to conceal and would therefore be heavily attacked. Then the firing trials of such a missile would surely be accompanied by terrific flashes of light; yet there had been no such reports from the Baltic area. 9 Finally, his suspicions that the whole story was a hoax were heightened by what appeared to be remarkable negligence on the German’s part: that they had failed to camouflage the rocket-like objects that had been photographed at Peenemünde. If the Germans were attempting a hoax, he thought it probable that they hoped thereby to conceal some other project, possibly, he suggested, the development of pilotless aircraft.

Events were to show, of course, that there was no hoax. The rocket was certainly being developed; and those who believed this were not convinced by Lord Cherwell’s arguments. In fairness to him, however, it should not be forgotten that some of his objections were quite valid, not for the rocket that the Germans actually developed and used, but for the hypothetical rocket of far greater dimensions with which Mr. Sandys and his advisers were, so to speak, threatening the country at this time.

5. The Beginning of Counter-Measures.

It was in this atmosphere of belief in the rocket as a threat, yet without any certain knowledge of the nature of the rocket or the organisation of supply and production that must undoubtedly have been behind it, that the first counter-measures were planned and carried out. As far as civil defence and radar were concerned, the work of planning and establishing what would be required went on chiefly through two committees, one presided over by Sir Findlater Stewart of the Home Defence Committee and the other, the Interdepartmental Radio Committee, by Sir Robert Watson-Watt. P.R.U. activities were also a vital part of counter-measures; and some indication has been given of the work that was done in photographing Peenemünde and Watten. But a beginning was also made in formulating a policy of counter-bombing.

a. Selection of Targets for Attack.

It had been obvious from the moment that the investigation began that the only means lying readily to hand by which the German preparations might be interfered with was the bombing of all relevant targets. So much was clear: but with the exception of Peenemünde itself next to nothing was known in the spring and summer of 1943 of any other experimental stations, centres of production, or launching sites. The Ministry of Economic Warfare thought that certain extensions to the I.G. Farben factories at Leuna, Ludwigshafen, and Oppau might be connected with the fuel of the rocket: Friedrichshafen was also suspected of being a centre for the manufacture of electrical components. These factories were down for attack as part of the main bomber offensive against German industry (Operation “Pointblank”). Watten and the other new constructions in northern France were also thought to be possible targets. Otherwise little was known of the best places to attack.

The question of an attack on Peenemünde was first seriously considered towards the end of June, when it was decided to despatch a strong Bomber Command force as soon as there were sufficient hours of darkness, which would not be until early August. A directive to this effect, in which the Leuna and Ludwigshafen factories were also specified for attack, was issued to Bomber Command early in July. General Eaker, who was commanding the 8th U.S.A.A.F. at this time, was also consulted; and he agreed to supplement, if necessary, Bomber Command attacks on these targets by attacks in daylight carried out as soon...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Title
• Copyright
• Contents
• Preface
• Publisher’s Note
• Part I: Spring 1943 – August 1943
• Part II: September 1943 – December 1943
• Part III: January 1944 – 12 June 1944
• Part IV: The Attack on London from Northern France: 13 June – 15 July 1944
• Part V: The Attack on London from Northern France: 16 July – 5 September 1944
• Part VI: Rocket and Flying Bomb Attacks on the United Kingdom, 8 September 1944 – 25 November 1944
• Part VII: Rocket and Flying Bomb Attacks on the United Kingdom, 25 November 1944 – 29 March 1945
• APPENDICES
• Notes and Sources
• Plates Section