A Companion to Greek Warfare

Waldemar Heckel, F. S. Naiden, E. Edward Garvin, John Vanderspoel, Waldemar Heckel, F. S. Naiden, E. Edward Garvin, John Vanderspoel

• Publisher: Wiley-Blackwell
• Year: 2021
• Print ISBN: 9781119438830, 9781119438816
• eBook ISBN: 9781119438854
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Storia
• Subtopic: Storia dell'antica Grecia

Provides a broad and deep exploration of ancient Greek and Macedonian warfare

A Companion to Greek Warfare is an authoritative survey of all major areas in the field of Greek and Macedonian military history, covering diverse operational, economic, social, psychological, and cultural aspects of ancient warfare. Bringing together essays by both international authorities and young scholars, this edited volume exposes readers to alternative views and original interpretations in a host of old and new topics.

Wide in scope, the book presents thematically organized chapters that explore the nature of Greek warfare, military training, discipline, and organization, the economics, pathology, and psychology of war, and depictions of war in Greek art and literature. Entire chapters deal with neglected topics such as espionage, propaganda, war crimes, emotional trauma, the role of women in warfare, Greeks in foreign service, and the armies and methods of the Greeks' and the Macedonians' opponents. Presenting a uniquely wide range of topics and contexts, this volume:

• Features contributions from ancient historians and scholars, including archaeologists, naval historians, and other specialists
• Offers broad chronological and geographical coverage, includingtheBronze Age and early Greek wars, the Persian Wars, the campaigns of Alexander, and the wars in Sicily
• Edited by internationally recognized experts in early Greek prosopography, warfare, and military history; Macedonian warfare and military history; Greek law and customs; and the history of scholarship in the field of Greek warfare

Part of the acclaimed Blackwell Companions to the Ancient World series, A Companion to Greek Warfare is an important resource for instructors, students, and scholars in all fields of ancient Greek history, particularly military history, and the perfect addition to the library of any general reader with interest in ancient military history.

PART I
Historical Survey

CHAPTER 1
Bronze Age and Early Greek Wars

Johannes Heinrichs

This survey begins with the final Mycenaean period, around 1200. For the preceding Mycenaean phases evidence is lacking, and in the yet-older Minoan period, though a part of the Greek mythological tradition, a non-Greek language was spoken and written (an Aegean substrate, in Linear A script, not yet deciphered). Written in Linear B script (expressing the Greek language) they seemingly belong to fourteenth-century strata, but for both linguistic and paleographic reasons must be coeval with the tablets from Pylos (from c. 1220/1200). The geographic theater is restricted to the south west Peloponnese (Pylos) and central Crete (Knossos). Tablets from further residences such as Mycenae or Thebes (the Kadmeía) do not shed light on military aspects.

Defense of the Mycenaean Kingdom of Pylos (c. 1220/1200)

Epigraphic evidence¹—reasonably coherent, albeit demanding interpretation—comes from an archive unearthed at the site of the palace of Pylos. It comprises sun-dried clay tablets covered with lines of script, written in vowels, syllabic units, and ideograms to record stored objects and services due to the palace. Another archive is lost; it was possibly housed in the adjacent residence, probably of the kingdom’s highest military official, the ra-wa-ke-ta (lawagétas, i.e. commander: hagetas, of the army: lawos).² When no longer needed, the clay tablets were regularly brought outside to decay; only the last set survived in the form of ceramics when the palace went up in flames. There must have been information on a threat emanating from the sea: defense posts were organized along the Messenian south west coast. Approximately in the middle, some way off the Bay of Pylos/Navarino, the palace of the king (wa-na-ka: wánax) was situated.

The actual spot of an attack was not clear.³ So the whole coast had to be guarded by small “commands” of watchers (o-ka: orché = arche), stationed at ten places, recorded on five tablets,⁴ each containing two records.⁵ The first starts with a headline for the whole series, the following entries are of a uniform type: “Thus watchers are guarding the coast. Command of Mareus: (4 personal names). At (place name) men from (2 place names): (ideogram for) MAN 50.” In this case, the o-ka consisted of one officer and four troops, assigned to watch the sea and, in case that enemy ships approached, to alarm both the lawagétas and the warships presumably concentrated in the central Navarino Bay.

The second group of 50 men must have been regarded as sufficient to delay landing operations, at first by long distance weapons such as arrows and slings, then by spears, especially where the Messenian coast was rocky,⁶ until the bulk of the army had arrived. All detachments add up to 740 + x men (some numbers have perished), probably c. 1,000 in all. Their nine commanders are labeled as e-qe-ta: followers (heq^uetai).⁷ That they belong to the nobility is indicated by a patronym added in most cases; moreover, they possess land parcels under very favorable terms.⁸ Hence, the e-qe-ta should be regarded as professional military officers paid indirectly by the palace, with responsibilities for the troops temporarily attached to the o-ka on the coast.

Their duties also include the recruitment of the ship crews. PY An 610 contains an incomplete list of these “rowers” (e-re-ta: eretai); its 19 entries contain local groups of men, 443 in all. If we add the average per group for nine further lost entries (approximately 210) the total is c. 650 “rowers.” Since in PY An 12 the crew of one vessel comprises 30 men, 650 men are sufficient for some 20 crews plus a reserve. This might be what the kingdom could muster in times of threat. Obviously, marines were also on board: much later, in 433, Thucydides (1.49) mentions sea-going hoplites, archers, and spearmen, giving the fighting “done in the old fashion” the character of a land battle. The command of the sea crews was evidently committed to the e-qe-ta; therefore it included the ships.

For the land troops under the lawagétas we are virtually at a complete loss. His high command will have included training in peace, in cooperation with palace authorities controlling the stocks of bronze, also in sanctuaries. Whether resources sufficed to equip more than some dozens of men can be doubted. In the palace’s final year, fewer than 50 corselets are listed (PY Sh 736: to-ra-ke: thorakes), some with hoops of bronze and probably also some made of linen with metal plates sewn all over.⁹ They constitute ensembles with “helmets” (PY Sh 737, 740: ko-ru-to: of a korys), which appear in ideograms as sets.¹⁰ Armor was probably reserved for charioteers and some high-ranking officers.¹¹ We may take for granted that such men had not only spears but also swords. However, tablets dealing with standard military “swords” (KN Ra 1458: pa-ka-na: phasgana) are lost at Pylos; at Knossos they occur in some number.¹²

Like the Egyptians, Hittites, and the north Syrian Kingdom of Mitanni,¹³ Greek Mycenaean kingdoms also had cohesive units of chariots, though information is scarce at Pylos, and once more comes substantially from the Knossos tablets.¹⁴ Since a special driver was indispensable to give the charioteer a free hand in fighting (he held on to the chariot with his left hand and could not hold the reins and a whip), a pair of horses—at times even three—were needed to draw two men.¹⁵

High expenses for chariots could be borne only by the palaces. Along with them, this weaponry disappears, but its memory endured. In the Iliad, Nestor arrays the Pylian chariots in front of the infantry (Il. 4.297–309) and warns the charioteers not to leave their formation: “Thus the old man exhorted them, from time immemorial an expert in fighting” (310). Nestor is generally styled as a representative of a bygone age; so the way he arranges his Pylian chariots at Troy as a unit, in striking contrast to the individual practise of younger Greek kings, may well be a reflection of the Mycenaean tactics.¹⁶

At Knossos,¹⁷ chariots have special ideograms; we may assume the same for Pylos where pertinent evidence is largely missing. Military chariots must once more have been the responsibility of the lawagétas—palace records will pertain to civilian versions of high officers. Since Greece is a rough country, chariots needed leveled roads and bridges, of the sort partly preserved to this day at some spots near Mycenae.¹⁸ There must have been many others, crumbled now or unknown. The costs for building and upkeep were certainly substantial, a further reason for abandoning chariot contingents in post-Mycenaean times.¹⁹

At the other end of the hierarchy rank the large majority of the infantry. Certainly, men were lightly armed, fighting as skirmishers with small shields of wicker and “caps of dog’s skin” (kynées). The bulk served as slingers using stones and as archers. Therefore, the supply of arrows—for both the army and the fleet—must have been immense. The palace, generally responsible for importing raw materials, had to supply the bronze needed for arrowheads.

To judge from archaeological finds, a single arrowhead weighed up to 1.5 g. Information about their production comes from the Jn series.²⁰ According to PY Jn 829 “those in charge of a region … and their deputies and … are to give bronze from sanctuaries for arrows and spears, as heads.”²¹ The long list of officials is strongly abbreviated here, but their contributions in weights are moderate and uniform. So we may guess that all men had to get the prescribed metal as personal loans, otherwise one person would have sufficed to get the total amount. It can be calculated to 34 talents (of 29 kg each) and 26 double MNA (of 1/30 talents each = 0.97 kg), in all 1,011 kg (PY Ja 449). At a minimum, it sufficed for 674,000 arrowheads or 2,886 spearheads (up to 350 g each). Both items were produced in proportions unknown to us.²²

Since sufficient amounts of wood were required for fuel, the production of the weapons was outsourced to villages on the land. Men living there as farmers, shepherds, or craftsmen had exactly defined obligations to work for the palace as (bronze)smiths (ka-ke-we: Chalcees). Their local chiefs (pa₂-si-re-we: basilées ²³) received portions of the collected bronze, distributed personal allotments,²⁴ and sent back the heads to the palace to be redistributed to the armed units.²⁵ In all, a surprisingly detailed system of pr...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Series page
• Title page
• Copyright
• Table of Contents
• Notes on Contributors
• Abbreviations and Short Titles
• List of Maps and Figures
• Introduction
• Part I: Historical Survey
• Part II: Military Operations
• Part III: Military Personnel
• Part IV: War with Non-Greeks
• Part V: Technical and Economic Context of Greek Warfare
• Part VI: Social and Political Context of Greek Warfare
• Part VII: Warfare in Art and Literature
• Bibliography
• Index
• End User License Agreement