The Philosophy of Mixed Martial Arts

Squaring the Octagon

Jason Holt, Marc Ramsay, Jason Holt, Marc Ramsay

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2021
• eBook ISBN: 9781000450446
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Philosophy
• Subtopic: Philosophy History & Theory

Mixed martial arts (MMA)—unarmed fighting games permitting techniques derived from a variety of martial arts and combat sports— has exploded from the fringes of sport into a worldwide phenomenon, a sport as controversial as it is compelling. This is the first book to pay MMA the serious philosophical attention it deserves.

With contributions from leading international scholars of the philosophy of sport and martial arts, the book explores topics such as whether MMA qualifies as a martial art, the differences between MMA and the traditional martial arts, the aesthetic dimensions of MMA, the limits of consent and choice in MMA and whether MMA can promote moral virtues. It also explores cutting-edge practical and ethical topics, including the role of gender in MMA, and the question of whether trans athletes should be allowed to compete in the women's divisions.

The contributors to this anthology take down, ground and pound, and submit many essential questions about this fascinating recent development in the culture of sport and spectacle. This is important reading for anybody with an interest in combat sports, martial arts, or the philosophy, sociology, culture or history of sport.

1 Mixed martial arts is not a martial art

Irena Martínková and Jim Parry

DOI: 10.4324/9781003122395-2

What is a martial art? In the introduction to their fine collection of chapters by a dozen philosophers interested in the martial arts, Priest and Young (2014: 9n) observe that:

… one philosophical question about the martial arts is how to characterize them. This is a hard and non-trivial question. Should tai chi be included? Should war-gaming? … We do not need to address this issue here, though (and none of the other essays in the present volume do either). We will finesse it by sticking to some paradigm cases.

Our 2016 article on martial categories (Martínková and Parry 2016a), accepted the implicit challenge, and did try to address this hard, non-trivial philosophical question. We criticized several attempts to classify martial practices according to their surface features – techniques, weapons, armed/unarmed, civil/martial, or within a limited context (e.g., Japan). Instead, we proposed a method of differentiating martial practices according to their differing structural purposes.

Lest it be thought that we were thereby seeking to foreclose discussion, or to impose our account on others, we made it clear that we saw it as provisional and open to criticism and revision. We were, however, concerned to argue that some such account is not only useful (to researchers and practitioners) but also essential in gaining an understanding of an activity by bringing it under some description. For how else are we to characterize the nature of an activity? To seek to say something about X necessarily entails describing it in some way, and this involves categorical thinking. Is it useful to be able to categorize something as a martial sport, rather than a martial art or a martial path? We would say yes. And this is not to deny that a particular activity might take different categorical forms. Kendo has been thought of as a kind of close combat (kenjutsu), as a kind of martial path (kendo), and as a kind of martial sport. And lest it be thought that we offered this suggestion as if it were complete and finalized, we were careful to indicate that there were many other possible categories than the first five basic categories that we proposed.

Analysis of martial activities into martial categories

Those first five basic categories of martial activities, identified and distinguished according to their differing structural purposes, were close combat, warrior arts, martial arts, martial paths, and martial sports. We used the umbrella term ‘martial activities’ in order to avoid the use of the term ‘martial art’ in a promiscuous way, because this had been a source of criticism:

The common, everyday meaning assigned to the phrase ‘martial arts’ is said to include almost any fighting art … As currently used, it is a term useful for the general public, but not for serious scholars of these systems.

(Donohue and Taylor 1994: 13)

By ‘purpose’ here we mean the structural purpose(s) of the activity, which describes its character for all possible participants, and thus describes central (and possibly distinguishing) features of various martial activities. The criterion of ‘purpose’ is suitable for classifying activities since it determines the nature of the activity itself (what the participant is expected to achieve, e.g., victory, self-defense, etc.), the way in which it is practised (whether there are any limitations of techniques), the means to be used (with or without small weapons), its dangerousness (risk of death or serious injury), and its suitability for various kinds of participants (given their specific personal intentions and purposes). Thus, categorization is useful not only for academics, but also for practitioners themselves, who know thereby what to expect from the activity, and what demands will be placed upon them (see e.g., Miller 2008).

The first five basic categories of martial activities are described according to structural purpose, as follows. Close combat and warrior arts both involve real-life fighting with the purpose of overcoming an opponent or defending oneself. However, the purpose of close combat is focused on efficiency – to ‘get the job done’ or, in the extreme, ‘to kill or be killed’. (In the Japanese historical context, these would be the Ninjas.) The warrior arts have a different purpose – that of exhibiting ‘honorable’ combat, that is, fighting according to a certain style or code. (In the Japanese historical context, these would be the Samurai.) Martial arts and martial paths both have educational purposes, using martial techniques as a means towards the aim of human cultivation; and both involve the learning of ‘safetified’ martial techniques for people living in a relatively safe society. Martial arts emphasize self-development in terms of the cultivation of character, whereas martial paths follow the aims of philosophical or religious systems. The purposes of martial sports are conditioned by their status as ‘essentially competitive’ activities, emphasizing victory and rule-adherence. Martial sports have their origins in martial skills, and include a subset of ‘combat sports’ that usually take the form of one-on-one fighting.

We also identified several minor categories of martial activities according to their structural purposes: martial therapy (whose purposes are health and wellbeing), martial training (fitness), martial games or warrior games (the re-enaction of historical events), martial artefacts, culture, and performance (the celebration of martial activity), martial entertainment and display (the entertainment of spectators and promotion and advertisement of military values and virtues), and gladiatorial entertainment (containing three main purposes – measuring oneself against an opponent in almost close combat, the attraction of a bloodthirsty audience, and the generation of excitement in combat as entertainment). This is a tentative and incomplete list, which does not pretend to be exhaustive or final. (See more in Martínková and Parry 2016a: 156f.)

Objections to categorization

Some people object to the entire project of categorization, for a number of reasons.

Categorization is ‘universalistic’

The suggestion is that categorization tries to establish, per impossible, categories that capture the eternal essence of martial activities. But this is not how we see the process of categorization, since it is obvious that martial activities have been invented and developed in an historical process that often involves transformations that may be observed, mapped out, and (re)categorized.

Categorization is ‘dogmatic’

We do not see this as an exercise in conceptual imperialism – we don’t insist on our version – we are open to revisions. We claim merely to be mapping the logical geography of martial activities. We offer it as an attempt at categorization. It is a suggestion, a cockshy – it invites the reader to consult her own intuitions, to see if they cohere with ours. And we are ready to consider objections, which may lead to an improved account.

But it’s also a challenge: if you don’t like it, say why not – maybe you can improve on it. For example, Legendre and Dietrich (2020: 12) complain firstly that there is ‘no consensus … on the proper definition of martial arts’. This is true – but if we had to await consensus before proceeding with enquiry, we would never start. There is no agreed definition of ‘democracy’ – but in political philosophy this disagreement is the beginning of enquiry. Again, they say that certain authors ‘fail to encompass and account for all manifestations of martial arts’ (ibid.), but they give no examples. However, any such failure would simply invite revision of the categories, to account for it. They go on to point out that ‘no matter how a practice itself might be a priori labeled, the training can sensibly deviate from expectations under the subjective influence of a designated teacher’ (ibid.). This is also true, but it is unclear how such a development threatens the idea of categorization. Either the teacher moves into a different mode (category) or he invents another – for us, there is no problem either way.

And here is another challenge: you need categories, too, otherwise you can’t say a word about differences between different kinds of martial activities. To identify difference is the first step to categorization; and categorization is the systematic identification of one’s research object. Without this, it is impossible to ‘operationalize’ one’s concepts for empirical enquiries. A research object has to be brought under a definite description in order to be identified and studied. This involves categorization. Without this, you literally don’t know what you’re talking about – and neither do we, your readers.

Furthermore, nor can you do comparative work, unless your comparators’ categories accidentally concur with yours.

Categorization is an ontological exercise

Traditionally, following Aristotle, ‘a system of categories has been seen as a complete list of highest kinds or genera, [so as to] provide an inventory of everything there is, thus answering the most basic of metaphysical questions: “What is there?”’ (Thomasson 2019). However, recent work concentrates rather on category differences, than on category systems. Work on category differences ‘tries to draw particular distinctions, especially among our conceptual or linguistic categories, as a way of diagnosing and avoiding various philosophical problems and confusions’ (ibid.).

This is precisely our task, as we see it. One such problem/confusion in Western conceptions of ‘martial arts’ is the deep and significant failure to distinguish martial arts from martial sports (or combat sports). Thomasson’s challenge is that those who ‘argue for category differences owe an account of the conditions under which two concepts, terms, or objects belong to different categories’ (ibid.). This is precisely the aim and methodology adopted by the present authors in their earlier paper (Martínková and Parry 2016a), which seeks to present just such an account.

Categorization is fossilization

It should be clear by now that we do not espouse any categorization that would rule out revision or development, nor that would impose a solution on the description of a particular martial activity in a particular social context. We concur with Waismann, who argued that ‘the ideal of correctness is a deadening one, it is vain to set up a language police to stem living developments’ (1968: 186). As Bowman puts it,

Furthermore, any of those involved in taijiquan in any of its different times and places will believe themselves to be either or both learning a martial art, either or both for sport or for self-defence, and/or involved in healthful calisthenics, and/or preserving or changing a culture, and/or involved in a religious or mystical practice. And so on.

(Bowman 2017: 19–20)

However, this way of putting things raises a number of issues.

1. We do not think anyone disputes the suggestion that a martial activity may take different forms. One example is the dispute in Japan over the nature of kendo (sport, or martial path?), or capoeira in Brazil, ‘which has been interpreted as an art of defense, a battle dance, a martial art or a kind of “showcase” capoeira for display, etc.’ (Martínková and Parry 2016a: 144; see also Talmon-Chvaicer 2008: 2). Bowman objects to the practice of ‘defining’ taijiquan as belonging to one category or another, but still he identifies three categories. We are entitled to ask: how does he manage to identify, characterize, and distinguish these three categories without engaging in categorical thinking?
2. According to Bowman, at least practitioners themselves are able to form and apply categorical thinking to their activity. They can identify whether they are doing this for sport or self-defense, for health or religious expression, etc. (not ruling out the possibility that they might be pursuing more than one of these purposes at the same time). How can they do this, unless they are thinking categorically? ‘I’m doing karate as a sport, not as a martial path’ requires a self-understanding regarding one’s purposes and intentions in participating in the present activity, and this cannot be expressed except in categorical terms. The practitioner must be aware that there are categorical differences between sports and martial paths, which constrain one’s actions in participation.
3. This raises the third point: Bowman’s characterization is ‘voluntaristic’, relying on the personal ‘beliefs’ of the participant. Here we must distinguish between structural purpose (of the activity) and the personal purposes (intentions) of the individual. A farmer might find (personal) life meaning in raising animals for the market. But the (structural) purpose of his activity is raising animals for the market, not making life meanings. One’s personal purposes are conditioned by the structure of the activity whose purposes one must pursue, if one is to pursue just that activity.

Once an activity such as a martial art or a martial sport has been established as a relatively stable practice, and ca...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Series Page
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Dedication
• Table of Contents
• List of Contributors
• Acknowledgments
• Introduction: Weighing In
• 1. Mixed martial arts is not a martial art
• 2. On the martial arts status of mixed martial arts: ‘There are no rules’
• 3. Loyalty, deference, and exploitation in traditional and mixed martial arts
• 4. Violence and constraints in combat sport
• 5. Experimentation, distributed cognition, and flow: A scientific lens on mixed martial arts
• 6. Finding beauty in the cage: A utility-based aesthetic for MMA
• 7. An aesthetic apology for MMA
• 8. The line of permissibility: Gladiators, boxers, and MMA fighters
• 9. Friendship as a moral defense of mixed martial arts
• 10. MMA as a path to stoic virtue
• 11. Ethics of mixed martial arts
• 12. Gender, pain, and risk in women’s mixed martial arts
• 13. Gender and ethics: Thoughts on the case of transgender athlete Fallon Fox
• Index