Liberalised India, Politicised Middle Class and Software Professionals

Anshu Srivastava

• Publisher: Routledge India
• Year: 2021
• Print ISBN: 9781032250205
• eBook ISBN: 9781000425123
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Social Sciences
• Subtopic: Regional Studies
• Index: Social Sciences

This volume explores the emergence, evolution and definition of the middle class in India. As a class created as the interpreters between the colonial rulers and the millions whom they governed in the pre-Independence era, the Indian middle class has existed in congruence with the state, occupying vital positions in state administration. Since Independence, this middle class underwent major sociological change as they live independent of the state, which affected their social, economic and political position, reaping benefits of liberalisation and globalisation through education and employment.

An otherwise internally differentiated and heterogeneous group, the new Indian middle class often unifies itself to shape socio-political discourse that affects politics and policymaking, from domestic to international affairs. This volume analyses this class phenomenon through a close study of a new metropolitan middle class in India – the software professionals, emblematic of the 'new India'. It discusses this emerging class as a political category and their engagements with the state, democracy, political parties, issues of gender, basic necessities and social justice. Further, it discusses their social action and 'middle class activism' for issues such as environment, cleanliness and corruption, particularly highlighting its presence in the private sector and electronic media.

A fresh perspective on India's political milieu, this volume will be of interest to scholars and researchers of sociology, modern Indian history, political science, economics and South Asia studies.

1 The class ‘in-between’

DOI: 10.4324/9780429274602-1

The concept of class refers to the ownership of economic endowments, whether material, cultural or social, that influences a person’s power in the market vis-à-vis labour or money. According to this position, groups of people are divided into different categories in a class structure. Let us examine the historical and social processes of class formation – those that bring about collective organisation amongst people who broadly share class position – and of class struggle, when classes pursue their interests in opposition to those of others. Thus the essential elements of a class framework to explain political phenomena are four: class structure (class-in-itself), class consciousness (understanding by individual actors of their objective class interests), class formation (collectively organised actors of similar structural position, constituting a ‘class-for-itself’ for Marx) and class struggle (collective practices of actors for the realisation of class interest against the interests of other classes).

Though divided in terms of definitions and measures, the contemporary discussion of the middle class commonly departs from the notion of class in the classic Marxian sense. Neither control over means of production nor power relations vis-à-vis the production process are important in present-day calculations, which rely most often upon income or expenditure measurements. For instance, Ravallion (2010) identifies the developing world’s middle class as those whose daily consumption expenditures fall between $2 and $13.

A class structure is formally the articulation of classes in a particular society at a particular time. In contrast to the Marxist division of class based on means of production, the middle class can be looked in terms of income class or income-cum-occupation classes, thereby working with categories broadly similar in principle to Rudra’s intelligentsia and endorsed by Bardhan¹ (Wright, 1978). Globally, the middle class is a significant category in the social structure of a society. Kharas (2017), in his study on ‘The Unprecedented Expansion of the Global Middle Class: An Update’, concluded that the middle class was expanding, and by the end of 2016, 3.2 billion people would be middle class – almost majority of the world’s population would become middle class. Every year nearly 140 million people are joining the middle class, which can grow to 170 million people in five years’ time, majority of which will live in Asia.

There is history to the evolution of the middle classes in different economies but the experience of the evolution has not been the same. For instance, the experience of West in terms of middle-class social formation and shifting social order is different from the experience of Asian countries. No two nations, therefore, share a similar past, and thus no two middle classes (of two different economies) are the same. For this reason, P.M Pilbeam² terms the middle class as ‘chameleon’ among definitions. If we take the case of the European middle class, in the ancient regime this class was close to the nobility, but by the beginning of the 19th century, the European middle class who emerged as a post-corporate, supralocal social formation differentiated itself from the nobility. This character was strategically adopted by the class in order to project a post-corporate, self-regulating, enlightened ‘civil society’ for its own emancipation. Although the line of differentiation was broad, certain subgroups in the middle class followed some of the aristocratic principles, for instance, the civil servants who were both the agents of the state and a part of the middle class. In fact a boundary emerged between the middle class and the petty bourgeoisie or the working class. The middle class set itself apart through the culture of appraising individual achievements, positive attitude towards regular work, inclination towards rationality and emotional control, strife for independence, importance of educational needs, a secure family and social life. Although there isn’t anything particular which can help in defining the European middle class, shared experiences and common interests unify them (Kocka, 1995).

On the contrary, ‘middle class’ was an alien term in America, as scholars have argued that there wasn’t any third category existing in the social order apart from the rich and the poor in America. Junius Henri Browne in 1869 observed that “there are two great and distinct classes of people – those who pass their days in trying to make money enough to live; and those who, having more than enough, are troubled about the manner of spending it”. Scholars like Hartz (1955) have maintained that the country was a middle-class society since inception. On the contrary, Blumin (1985) in his work ‘Hypothesis of the Middle Class’ states that the middle class in America emerged in phases. He marks that the evolution of the middle class initiated from the daily lives of the individual. He argues that the changes in work structure, consumption pattern, residential preferences, voluntary associations and social groups formed the necessary base for the evolution of the middle class in American societies. He further argued that development in all the above-said sectors have led to the creation of sharp boundaries and have further marked the separation in each of the three categories.

The middle-class category in America became identifiable only after World War II, yet it remained understudied and unexplored in the domain of popular culture and reforms movement (Ryan, 1981). Unlike the American experience of the emergence of the middle class, Asia had a completely different trajectory because Asian societies followed Western modernity and path of development, both economic and social, through colonisation. It has been argued that the formation of the middle class in Asia was a result of the rapid process of economic development as opposed to the West. Contesting the scholars on the Asian modernity bearing an overarching influence of the West, Funatsu and Hattori (2003) argue that the Asian middle class was a result of a combination of tradition and modernity. These societies were under the influence of the Western societies and were subsequently under pressure to modernise as per the West. They argue that Asian societies did not modernise by leaving behind their traditional culture, as a result of which the traditional and the modern continue to coexist.

The pre-dominance of Western influence was observed in the adoption of Western institutions, knowledge systems, new values and the social order. Modernisation in Asian societies meant a huge reliance on the public sector, since these newly independent societies depended highly on Western economic institutions like World Bank and IMF for funding and development. This approach to modernisation impacted the rural–urban divide as there was a transition from agricultural to industrial societies, which led to migration from rural areas to urban areas. The migrants in the industrial structure employed with ‘new kinds of job’ formed the category of the middle class. Since these countries modernised under the influence of the West, it was observed that the middle class was dependent on the state. They were not a homogeneous category, nor did they share a common strength for class consciousness. “It was very rare for the middle classes in Asian countries to act consistently and continuously as key agents of democratisation due to lack of development of democratic values” (Hattori and Funatsu, 2003). Reasons attributed for the lack of development of class consciousness amongst such societies are: the state-funded industrialisation led the managerial class to focus on the state interest rather than the class interest of the subjects, the advent of auto-mechanisation led to significant job insecurity amongst the working-class population, which gave little scope for a class conflict between the managerial class and the proletariats, and the influence of Western consumerism along with education led to social mobility and prevented class consciousness (Hattori and Funatsu, 2003). In the advanced countries, the middle class is seen as a distinct separate class, due to its relative autonomy from the property-owning class, the industrial bourgeoisie and the land owners and also due to their control of the state and possession of skills.

Global Politics of the middle class

The global middle class is known for its activism, political character and the balancing role it plays in the politics of the country. Scholars, such as Acemoglu and Robinson (2000), focusing on the positive role of the middle class argue that the increasing number of middle classes can lead to greater chances of political reform/democratisation. In societies where the ruling class, who are close to the power structure, tend to exploit the poor and drive them to deeper levels of poverty, the middle class act as the buffer between the two classes and support democracy and democratic transitions. However there are many theories put forth by scholars who contest this balancing nature of the middle class, as they argue that the middle class react only when they are affected directly and not for the benefit of all, making their contribution limited in scope. Politics of the middle class is characterised by their capacity to pressurise the government and its agencies for the delivery of services, while claiming their rights and holding the leaders accountable. Going back to the social movements of the 1970s, the third wave of feminism and the third wave of democratisation were led by the urban middle class, which implies that the global middle class has held a prominent position in the political history of their respective country. The middle class have been an active participants in movements of change; for instance, the 1984 demonstrations against the Marcos regime in the Philippines and the 1987 demonstrations against President Chun in South Korea were led by the urban middle class. The upsurges in Brazil, Turkey and Bulgaria in 2013 were also middle-class-led movements.

With the advent of technology, the global new middle class have also transformed their means and modes of participation as they use the internet and social media to the best of their capabilities in order to spread information, form associations and initiate movements and dialogue on large scale. It is because of this tech savvy nature of the global middle class that their movements have a global reach, which in turn strengthens their cause. The political nature of the global middle class has often been a subject of debate as scholars are yet to fathom the precise reason for the class’s active participation. What is it that makes them so actively involved in politics, especially voicing opinion on matters of larger concern such as protesting for freedom of speech, freedom of press or environmental issues? Fukuyama (2013) argues that the failure of governments to meet the expectation of the middle class leads to their collective action against authorities, but does not explain why this social stratum, instead of the poor, hold such high expectations for the quality of governance. One popular idea about the observed middle-class activism is that their political character is facilitated by the educational capital which the class possess. However, scholars like Luskin (1987) have proved that the possession of education capital by the middle class is not directly proportional to the middle-class activism.

Two approaches, namely the unilinear approach and the contingent approach, offer an explanation for the middle-class orientation towards democracy, democratisation and activism. The unilinear approach equates economic modernisation with political democratisation. Accordingly, an increase in levels of education, income and socio-economic mobility leads to an increase in the values associated with freedom, which in turn promotes democratisation and growth of a democratic society. In such societies it is the middle class which become instrumental in demanding for democratic principles and in spearheading the democratic movement. This approach is true for the Western society middle class, who have transitioned or have been transitioning towards democratic society.

The second is the contingent approach, which is developed from the studies done on the middle class in developing countries, especially those which have transitioned rapidly from an agrarian to an industrial economy. According to this approach, democratisation of an economy results not from economic growth but from a process of constant conflicts, turmoils, setbacks and rapid changes. The approach drew an analysis of the middle-class inclination towards democracy resulting from various socio-political and socio-economic factors which vary according to society. In societies where the middle class is heavily dependent on the state, it is less likely that there will be demands for democracy, but where the dependence on the state is minimal, it is observed that the middle class tends to incline towards the demand for democratic principles (Chen and Lu, 2011).

The ‘power-resource theory’ and historical accounts of the development of welfare state institutions in advanced economies highlight that it is the conflicts between urban working classes and elites of the state which primarily led to democratisation and social reforms (Korpi, 1983; Therborn, 1977; Rueschemeyer et al., 1992; Lindert, 2004). These theories state that the increase in the level of wages of the working class followed by the political advancement of this class helps in facilitating political change. There is an explicit rejection of the participation of the middle class in developing economies as it is argued that the middle class participate in politics for vested interests (Leventoglu, 2013). What can be concluded from these approaches is that the middle class in advanced societies are more likely to push for democratisation and often shape political discourse as compared to the middle class in less advanced economy.

In an interesting study based on the contingent approach, ‘Democratization and the Middle Class in China: The Middle Class’s Attitudes toward Democracy’, Jie Chen and Chunlong Lu conclude that China’s middle class does not necessarily support democratisation, hence refuting the unilinear claims. They argue that the middle class who are associated with the power structure or the current state party are less supportive of democratic principles as compared to the lower class who are not dependent on the state party. Another reason attributed by them is the level of middle-class satisfaction with their social and economic conditions – the more they are satisfied with their income and occupation, the less it is likely that they will support democratisation. However, most members of the middle class are in support of individual rights offered in a democratic setup but refrain from political rights of the citizen like the freedom to protest, associate, demonstrate and participate in electoral activities.

In contrast to the above study which exemplifies the contingent approach, a global attitudes project conducted by the Pew Research Centre proves that the growth in economic status contributes to the important role of the middle class in the political sphere. In both the rich and the poor countries the essential driver for political democracy is the global middle class. With increasing well-being, the middle class is more likely to assert for individual liberties, freedom of speech, liberal social values and rights of the citizen, environment and liberal religious norms in developing countries. Further there is an increased inclination towards a democratic way of life amongst the middle class of the society. The classical middle-class development theory proposed by scholars like Moore (1966) and Lipset (1959, 1960) states that democratic development is directly proportional to the growth in middle-income groups in higher employment positions (Sumner, 2012; Wietzke, 2014). The economic strength of the middle class depends largely on professional skills rather than on inherited capital or political network, which affects the classes’ ability to mitigate conflicts between elites and extremist movements. As Ansell and Samuels (2010) argue, the increase in the income level, along with accumulation of assets by the upwardly mobile middle class, can lead to an increase in demands for the extension of economic and political freedoms. Scholars like Weinstein et al. (2004) point out that much of the work on development and democratisation has underestimated the resilience of democracy in lower-income countries. Diamond (2003) has noted that “Over th...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half-Title
• Title
• Copyright
• Contents
• List of figures
• Acknowledgements
• Introduction
• 1 The class ‘in-between’
• 2 Economic reforms and the new middle class
• 3 Profiling ‘software professionals’
• 4 Reading the class politically
• 5 New middle-class activism
• Conclusion: The making of consumer-citizen
• Bibliography