Contemporary Cases in U.S. Foreign Policy

From Terrorism to Trade

Ralph G. Carter

• Publisher: CQ Press
• Year: 2013
• Print ISBN:
  9781452241548
• eBook ISBN:
  9781483322995
• Edition: 5
• Topic: Política y relaciones internacionales
• Subtopic: Diplomacia y tratados

Many actors—from the president and members of Congress to interest groups, NGOs, and the media—compete to shape U.S. foreign policy. The new fifth edition captures this strategic interplay using 15 real-world cases, of which four are brand new: the death of Osama bin Laden and the use of targeted assassinations, nonproliferation policy and the U.S.–India nuclear agreement, the U.S. reaction to Egypt's collision with the Arab Spring, and the surprise asylum request of blind Chinese dissident Chen Guangcheng. Fully updated to cover the Obama administration, all cases have been revised to reflect recent developments. Whether grappling with use-of-force questions, the international financial crisis, legal and human rights, trade issues, multilateral approaches to the nuclear programs of North Korea and Iran, or climate change, Carter's engaging case study approach encourages students to question motives, consider alternatives, and analyze outcomes.

1 The United States versus Terrorism: From the Embassy Bombings in Tanzania and Kenya to the Surge and Drawdown of Forces in Afghanistan

Frédérick Gagnon and Ryan C. Hendrickson

Before You Begin

1. What is the traditionally accepted view of Congress’s exercise of war powers during the Cold War and after September 11, 2001? How does that view compare to Congress’s role leading up to President Bill Clinton’s, President George W. Bush’s, and President Barack Obama’s military actions against terrorism?

2. In the days prior to military action in 1998, 2001, and 2009, how did the diplomatic challenges differ for Clinton, Bush, and Obama?

3. Is Congress’s decision to endorse military action against those involved in the September 11 attacks a victory for Congress’s war powers? If so, why?

4. Which advisers seem to have the most significant influence on Clinton’s, Bush’s, and Obama’s decisions regarding terrorism, Afghanistan, and al Qaeda? Why?

5. Did President Clinton’s military action in 1998 have a “diversionary” intent? What evidence supports such a view? What evidence challenges it?

Introduction: Striking Back at Terrorism

The public, the media, and most members of Congress sometimes are not privy to the process in which U.S. use of force decisions are made. Although Presidents Bill Clinton, George W. Bush, and Barack Obama appear to have vastly different interests in policy matters, and certainly have divergent views of the appropriate role for the United States in international affairs, many similarities exist in the ways they made decisions as commander in chief. On August 20, 1998, when Clinton launched missile strikes against alleged facilities of Osama bin Laden in Sudan and Afghanistan, and on October 7, 2001, when Bush set in motion Operation Enduring Freedom against the Taliban and al Qaeda in Afghanistan, nearly all the critical military decisions were made by the executive branch. In 2009 Obama’s “strategic review” of Bush’s Afghanistan policy and decision to expand the war on terrorism in Afghanistan and Pakistan were also made primarily by the executive branch, with limited input from other actors. Congress also played a limited role in Obama’s decision to reduce the number of troops in Afghanistan. Unlike many other foreign policy issues in the post–Cold War and post-9/11 environments, the center of action concerning terrorism is the White House.

Timeline

The Clinton, Bush, and Obama Administrations’ Strikes against Osama bin Laden

August 23, 1996	Osama bin Laden issues his first fatwa against the United States.
February 23, 1998	Bin Laden issues his second fatwa against the United States.
August 7, 1998	Bombs explode at the U.S. embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania.
August 14, 1998	Director of Central Intelligence George Tenet presents his agency’s assessment that bin Laden and his al Qaeda network were behind the attacks on the embassies.
August 17, 1998	President Bill Clinton admits to the nation that he misled the public about having an extramarital relationship with White House intern Monica Lewinsky.
August 20, 1998	In a 2:00 a.m. telephone conversation with National Security Adviser Sandy Berger, Clinton authorizes strikes against bin Laden. Missiles are launched on alleged al Qaeda sites in Afghanistan and Sudan.
Mid-September 1999	The Clinton administration initiates “the plan,” consisting of broader covert operations intended to gather intelligence on bin Laden and disrupt al Qaeda.
October 12, 2000	Al Qaeda launches a suicide boat attack against the USS Cole while it is docked in Aden, Yemen. Seventeen Americans are killed.
September 11, 2001	Al Qaeda operatives hijack four commercial aircraft, flying two into the World Trade Center towers and crashing another into the Pentagon. The fourth aircraft crashes in a field in Pennsylvania. The death toll is 2,995.
September 14, 2001	The Senate passes S. J. Res. 23, authorizing George W. Bush to use all necessary and appropriate force against those associated with the September 11 strikes on the United States. The House of Representatives responds the following day by passing the resolution.
September 15–16, 2001	President Bush holds meetings with foreign policy principals at Camp David to discuss military operations in retaliation for the September 11 attacks.
October 6, 2001	Bush gives final approval for military action against Afghanistan.
October 7, 2001	The United States launches Operation Enduring Freedom against the Taliban and al Qaeda in Afghanistan.
December 7, 2001	The Taliban lose Kandahar, the last major city under its control.
August 2003	NATO takes control of security in Kabul, its first-ever operational commitment outside Europe.
October 2006	NATO assumes responsibility for security across the whole of Afghanistan, taking command in the east from a US-led coalition force.
April 2008	NATO leaders meeting in Bucharest say peacekeeping mission in Afghanistan is their top priority. They pledge a “firm and shared long-term commitment” there.
September 2008	President Bush sends an extra 4,500 U.S. troops to Afghanistan, in a move he described as a “quiet surge.”
February 2009	President Barack Obama announces the dispatch of 17,000 extra U.S. troops in Afghanistan.
March 2009	President Obama unveils a new U.S. strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan to combat what he calls an increasingly perilous situation.
December 2009	President Obama announces the dispatch of 30,000 extra U.S. troops in Afghanistan. He also declares that the United States will begin withdrawing its forces by 2011.
January—December	As the surge plan is being implemented, President
2010	Obama escalates the use of Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAVs)/drone missile strikes against remaining elements of the Taliban and al Qaeda in Pakistan.
June 2010	Gen. Stanley McChrystal is relieved of command of American and NATO forces in Afghanistan. Gen. David Petraeus replaces him.
November 2010	The United States and its allies announce that all ISAF forces are intended to be withdrawn from Afghanistan by the end of 2014.
May 2, 2011	Osama bin Laden is found and killed in Pakistan by United States Navy SEALs.
June 2011	The American military presence reaches its apex in Afghanistan, with nearly 100,000 troops deployed.
May 2012	The Obama administration announces a Strategic Partnership Agreement with Afghanistan, which will keep approximately 15,000 to 20,000 U.S. military forces in Afghanistan after the 2014 conclusion of the ISAF mission.
July 2012	Afghanistan is named a “Major Non-NATO Ally.”
November 2012	Obama wins a second presidential term. Afghanistan has largely moved out of the public and political discussion as the 2012 elections moved forward.^a

^aFor a complete timeline, read BBC, “Timeline: Afghanistan,” http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/1162108.stm.

Background: Terrorism and Presidential Powers

The U.S. Constitution grants Congress the power to declare war, as well as other enumerated powers associated with the military. The president is given the explicit authority to act as commander in chief. Most constitutional scholars agree, however, that the president is empowered to use force without congressional approval to “repel sudden attacks” against the United States.¹ In other instances, the president must obtain Congress’s approval prior to using force.

For much of U.S. history, Congress’s war powers have been respected by the commander in chief.² With the Cold War’s onset and the widely accepted belief that the Soviet Union and communism represented a threat to the United States, the president’s perception of his power as commander in chief became increasingly one of omnipotence. Since 1945 presidents have asserted broad military powers with few recognized limitations. Because members of Congress agreed that communism should be checked, and because it was politically safer to let a president assume full responsibility for U.S. military endeavors, Congress often deferred to executive branch unilateralism in actions by the president as commander in chief.³ This practice remained the norm until the 1973 passage of the War Powers Resolution, which was designed to reassert the authority that many felt Presidents Lyndon Johnson and Richard Nixon had usurped from Congress during the Vietnam War.⁴ The resolution requires that the president “consult with Congress in every possible circumstance” prior to and after the introduction of U.S. forces into hostilities (P.L. 93–148). Despite its intent, the War Powers Resolution has been a failure. All presidents since 1973 have maintained that it is unconstitutional—arguing that it illegally limits their power as commander in chief—and Congress has often failed to enforce it.⁵ The Clinton presidency is a good example of this dynamic. Clinton viewed his powers as commander in chief broadly, maintaining that congressional approval was not required for him to take military action.⁶ Clinton’s outlook is evidenced by U.S. military actions against Iraq, NATO air strikes in Bosnia and Kosovo, military deployments to Haiti and Somalia, and the u...

Table of contents

• Cover Page
• Halftitle
• Title
• Copyright
• Contents
• Preface
• Contributors
• Introduction
• 1 The United States versus Terrorism: From the Embassy Bombings in Tanzania and Kenya to the Surge and Drawdown of Forces in Afghanistan
• 2 Assassinating bin Laden: Right or Wrong?
• 3 Executive Decisions and Preventive War: Strategies of Intervention and Withdrawal in Iraq (2003–2011)
• 4 The Nuclear Standoff between the United States and Iran: Muscular Diplomacy and the Ticking Clock
• 5 The United States and North Korea: Avoiding a Worst-Case Scenario
• 6 Nonproliferation Policy Crossroads: The US-India Nuclear Cooperation Agreement
• 7 Hitting the Russian Reset Button: Why Is Cooperation So Hard?
• 8 Friendly Tyrants? The Arab Spring and the Egyptian Revolution
• 9 Chen Guangcheng: The Case of the Blind Dissident and US-China Relations
• 10 The Global Financial Crisis: Governments, Banks, and Markets
• 11 Sino-American Trade Relations: Privatizing Foreign Policy
• 12 The Politics of Climate Change: Will the US Act to Prevent Calamity?
• 13 National Security Surveillance: Unchecked or Limited Presidential Power?
• 14 The Rights of Detainees: Determining the Limits of Law
• 15 The International Criminal Court: National Interests versus International Norms
• Conclusion
• Index
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