The Body, Embodiment, and Education

An Interdisciplinary Approach

Steven A. Stolz

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2021
• eBook ISBN: 9781000449785
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Education
• Subtopic: Education General

Notions of the body and embodiment have become prominent across a number of established discipline areas, like philosophy, sociology, and psychology. While there has been a paradigmatic shift towards this topic, there is a notable gap in the literature as it relates to education and educational research.

The Body, Embodiment and Education addresses the gap between embodiment and education by exploring conceptualisations of the body and embodiment from interdisciplinary perspectives. With contributions from international experts in philosophy, sociology, and psychology, as well as emerging areas in related fields, such as embodied cognition, neuroscience, cognitive science, this book sets a new research agenda in education and educational research. Each chapter makes a case for expanding the field and adds to the call for further exploration.

The Body, Embodiment and Education will be of great interest to academics, researchers and postgraduate students who are interested in the body and embodiment and/or its relationship with education or educational research.

1 Body, mind, and spirit

Education, gender wars, and personal identity

Jānis (John) Tālivaldis Ozoliņš

DOI: 10.4324/9781003142010-2

Introduction

Puzzles about the self, its connection to our bodies, and how these constitute our personal identity are not new. The self appears to be intangible, and separate from the body, so that our personal identity seems to bifurcate into two different parts, and it is not easy to say which part truly constitutes who we are. Plato argues in a number of his dialogues, such as The Republic (1955), Phaedo (1998), and Phaedrus (2008) that human beings are constituted as body and soul. The soul, which is immortal, however, is a reluctant inhabitant of the body. This is because the body with its fleshly desires and emotions prevents the soul from gaining wisdom, an essential requirement for a happy life. If we are our souls, if these form our essential being, then it matters to us that the soul is happy, since that is what we are. The soul, however, according to Plato, is immaterial, and only temporarily resident in the body, so the body is unimportant, because it is corruptible and eventually perishes (Phaedo, Section 67). The thought that we are not our bodies or at least not entirely so, has a venerable history.

It is hardly surprising that in the current zeitgeist of identity politics, what an individual feels he or she is takes precedence over the biological, physical body that he or she has. It is asserted that a person’s gender is fluid, and not determined by his or her physical or biological appearance, but is a matter of individual choice. The unprecedented growth in young people experiencing problems identifying with the biological sex with which they were born is concerning. It is not implausible to propose that rise in such problems is at least partly due to uncritical acceptance of the proposition that gender is fluid. This claim has reached the level of dogma in many quarters, so much so, that various attempts to inculcate gender theory into school curricula around the world have been made.¹ If gender theory is unsound, as we argue, then basing school curriculum and treatment of children on it will also be unsound.

One of the most influential theorists of the view that not only gender is constructed, but also that sex is constructed has been Judith Butler. We argue that this is not plausible and take issue with the idea that flows from gender theory that if someone thinks he is woman, then a he becomes a she. We argue that gender theory is an implausible idealist theory, which shares some features of gnosticism, and so we cannot avoid the essentialist question of personal identity,² and it is incoherent. Secondly, rejecting the post-structuralist view that not only is gender constructed, but also biological sex, we contend that our bodies are a crucial and essential mark of personal identity. This means the adoption of a realist position about the independent existence of everyday objects within the world, including human bodies.³

Locke

Against the Platonic and Cartesian proposition that we are our minds (or souls), Locke emphasises the significance of the body in the identification of a specific human being by observing that a parrot which is able to converse reasonably and rationally in the same way as a human being does not thereby become a human being, but remains a parrot. In addition, a human being who is unable to converse reasonably and rationally nevertheless remains a human being. It is the body which enables us to identify the individual as belonging to a particular species, as well as the individual himself or herself. Locke says: “… it is not the idea of a thinking or rational being alone that makes the idea of a man in most people’s sense: but of a body …” (Locke, 1997, II, xxvii, 8). An individual is identified through its continuity with the same body and the same soul, and whatever changes occur in the body, provided it remains the same shape, size, and contains the same immaterial spirit, it is the same individual. Moreover, Locke recognises the social component of the identity of the individual person.

Despite this emphasis on the body, Locke defines a person as follows:

[a] person … is a thinking, intelligent being that has reason and reflection and can consider itself as itself, the same thinking thing in different times and places; which it does only by that consciousness which is inseparable from thinking and, it seems to me, essential to it.

(1997, II, xxvii, 9)

In Locke’s view, it is consciousness that constitutes personal identity and makes a person the same person throughout the passage of time. He continues: “For since consciousness always accompanies thinking and it is that that makes everyone to be what he calls self, and thereby distinguishes himself from all other thinking things: in this alone consists personal identity”. (1997, II, xxvii, 9). Consciousness, in Locke’s view, extends backwards in time, so that there is a continuity between present self (or consciousness) and the self in the past. It is the same consciousness which determines whether it is the same person or not, and it is this alone that determines whether that consciousness persists in one individual substance or soul or several. In saying this, Locke denies: (i) that the same body needs to be the same person and (ii) that the same person needs to be same immaterial soul substance. Locke likens this to a person wearing different clothes – it is the same person, but dressed differently. Likewise, a consciousness in different substances or souls is still the same person. Hence, we might conclude that if a consciousness is transferred to a computer, it is still the same person, but it is not the same man, since it does not have the same body. Under Locke’s analysis, it is possible that the person, the consciousness, inhabiting a particular body is a different gender to that of the body. The matter, however, is not quite so straightforward. A consciousness previously identifying as a man, for instance, changes at some point to identify as a woman. This introduces a discontinuity in the consciousness that cannot be explained by the memory criterion that Locke uses to account for the sameness of person over time.⁴ Worse still, there is no change of body.⁵

Locke illustrates this point in a thought experiment in which the soul or consciousness of a prince enters the body of a cobbler and asks how we would identify the individual. For example, is it the cobbler or the prince? Locke holds that it is the same person as the prince, but a different man, since the body is different. It follows that if the consciousness of a woman should enter a man’s body, the person is a woman, but the body a man. Locke says:

For should the soul of a prince, carrying with it the consciousness of the prince’s past life, enter and inform the body of a cobbler as soon as deserted by his own soul, everyone sees he would be the same person with the prince, accountable only for the prince’s actions; but who would say it is the same man? The body too goes to the making the man and would, I guess, to everybody, determine the man in this case, wherein the soul, with all its princely thoughts about it, would not make another man: but he would be the same cobbler to everyone besides himself.

(1997, II, xxvii, 15)

The body is that of the cobbler, and as Locke says, this is what we ordinarily use to identify the individual. It would, of course, be very strange if a cobbler started acting like a prince, with all the relevant airs and graces. Locke’s point is about different consciousnesses occupying, successively, the same body, and he observes that it is the body that is central in identifying the individual. It is more puzzling if a man proclaimed that he was now a woman, but his body remained that of a man. There are two possibilities: (i) If there is no apparent change in consciousness, then there is some kind of disconnect between the bodily reality and an individual’s consciousness of himself now which requires explanation. (ii) If there is a change in consciousness, there is a change in personal identity, and we would have something like the situation of the cobbler and prince. In either case the body would be essential in identifying the individual. Where there is neither a change in body (per impossible) nor consciousness, since the individual is conscious of himself as a man previously and now a woman, gender becomes irrelevant in the identification of the individual, since it is obvious that the individual identifies himself as himself on some other grounds. Moreover, according to gender theory, gender is fluid so it cannot be decisive in identifying sameness of person.⁶ Crucially, Locke alludes here to the social aspect of personal identity, but makes it clear that our first instinct is to identify the person through their body. Thus, if we were to claim that our consciousness – our personal identity – is female, but our body male, what ordinarily identifies the person is the body and so, according to Locke, what is present is a man.

There are other significant problems with Locke’s identification of personal identity with consciousness because sameness of person involves more than just consciousness. As Locke says, sameness of person implies a continuity between the present self and the self in the past. This leads Locke to anchor sameness of person in memory. Unfortunately, memory can be faulty, for there can be lapses of memory, false memory, and gaps in our consciousness of our experiences. These lead to a problem with continuity, as gaps in our consciousness mean we may no longer remember having carried out certain kinds of actions and so cannot attribute them to ourselves. If a hero cannot remember having performed a heroic act in the past, he might not feel deserving of a medal for heroism bestowed on him. Memory alone is an inadequate criterion for sameness of person.

The problem of the continuity of personal identity is further exacerbated if gender is fluid. This is because a shifting attribution of gender to an individual results in a destabilised understanding of the self as the same self, persisting over time. Although stable character traits and being embedded in a network of social relationships contribute to personal identity, it is the body that anchors continuity between successive consciousnesses of being the same person. This will be a body which is biologically male or female. If the body was irrelevant to personal identity, someone who consciously identifies as a woman, who found herself in a male body would regard this as inexplicable, not fully explained by labelling her condition as gender dysphoria.⁷ Consciousness of being the same person, existing through time and space involves not just memory, but also the body. Embodiment is an irreducible part of what it means to be a human person and what it means to be an individual. We can lose limbs, remove certain parts of our body, undergo plastic surgery, but the unity of the organic whole remains the same individual, as both Locke and Aristotle hold.

The question of selfhood and personal identity remains mysterious, that is, the identity of the “I” is never fully discovered because the human person can never be completely disclosed, nevertheless, that there are several inescapable realities in which the human person is embedded. The mysteriousness of the self does not leave room for the individual to determine in what that self consists. It is equally mysterious to individuals themselves as it is to others. There is no prima facie reason to privilege a first person account of personal identity over a third person account, as they are both inextricably bound together. The identity of an individual is the product of his relationships as much as his actions. In addition, the first and foremost inescapable reality is that human beings are embodied and act in a world which constitutes an outer reality. The second inescapable reality is that the human person exists within a human community, having had his or her origins within a particular family that links him or her to a wider community, culture, and tradition. The third, that personal identity is not personal in the sense that it is determined by the individual acting alone, but is also communal in nature. Identity is conferred on us in the first place by others such as our parents. While it is true that individuals by their choices of moral actions demonstrate to themselves and to others their character, from which we can infer the kinds of persons they are, personal identity is relational and only makes sense in the context of the community to which they belong. There can be no “I” unless there is an “Other” from which it is differentiated. In the ideological battles about gender, these important points are either forgotten, denied, or in the case of the latter two, criticised for being an exercise of power and constraint over individuals, suppressing their free expression of their personal identity.

Ideological battles

The current ideological battle over gender has raised the question of personal identity anew. Following the critiques of feminist scholars such as Judith Butler, the view that gender is a social construct has gained some traction among postmodern scholars.⁸ The idea that there are only male and female has been attacked for ignoring the Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender, Queer or Questioning, and Intersex (LGBTQI+) community, some of whom argue that the binary classification of human beings belies the extent of possible genders, and fails to recognise those who do not identify as either male or female. This returns us to the question of whether we are our bodies or our souls, understood as mind or consciousness. This is because gender is disassociated from biological sex which expresses itself as either male or female, though in some exceptional cases, it is recognised, biological sex can be ambiguous.⁹ If gender is disassociated from biological sex, then it is not dependent on the body, but lies in the consciousness of the individual and is expressed through his or her behaviour or performativity. A second proposition, which is often asserted, proposes that the question of gender is a matter of individual choice, and that this is to be respected by others.¹⁰ This, however, conflates respect for human persons with the choices that they may make when it comes to gender, and assumes that personal identity is determined by the individual. This is not the case, because who we are is also a product of the community into which we are born and in which we live. A further assertion by gender theorists contends that there are more than two genders, and this is a matter of individual free choice.¹¹ The assumption that gender is a matter of free choice is contestable.¹²

The idea that gender is divorced from the body is a form of idealism in which the identity of the human person rests in consciousness, that is, in the mind, and more particularly, in the individual mind.¹³ This follows Locke’s distinctions among soul, person, and body, but goes further by proposing that consciousness of being a particular kind of person with a particular kind of gender is a matter of personal choice, unrelated to the physical body. A female consciousness can be in a male body. As such, it denies Locke’s separation of ideas and qualities. Ideas are in the mind or in consciousness, but the realist Locke locates qualities or attributes in bodies. The consequence of ignoring the distinctions that Locke makes leads to the assertion that female consciousness can be in a male body. This is because the identity of the person rests in consciousness, divorced from the body. Gender is “subjectivised” and becomes solipsistic, identical with the chosen personal identity of the individual person. Here, the individual becomes disconnected from his or her body, but also from the many relationships in the community in which he or she is embedded. In arguing that gender is not founded on biological sex, which is to say the material body, queer theory, and gender theory share some of the features of gnosticism. In gnosticism, the body is regarded as superfluous, who we are is understood to be founded in the immaterial mind. Gnosticism is pessimistic, holding that the existence of the universe is a disaster and that the sooner we are freed from the body the better.¹⁴ Moreover, it clings to the hope that there is mystical knowledge that can reverse the curse of human existence. In some ways, there are echoes of this attitude in gender theory, which proposes that not only is gender constructed, but so also is the body (Butler, 1993). The idea that the body is constructed too holds that the world itself cannot be known in itself and is a vestigial form...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Series Page
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Dedication
• Verse
• Contents
• List of figures
• List of tables
• List of contributors
• Acknowledgments
• Embodiment and education
• 1 Body, mind, and spirit
• 2 Freud, Jung, embodiment, and education
• 3 Phenomenology, embodiment, and education
• 4 Blended learning and digital education
• 5 The older academic woman
• 6 How gesture helps learning
• 7 Action and mathematics learning
• 8 Toward an enactivist mathematics pedagogy
• 9 Embodiment as a pedagogical tool to enhance learning
• Index