Reliability and Alliance Interdependence

The United States and Its Allies in Asia, 1949–1969

Iain D. Henry

• Publisher: Cornell University Press
• Year: 2022
• Print ISBN: 9781501763045, 9781501763045
• eBook ISBN: 9781501763069
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: 20th Century History
• Index: Politics & International Relations

In Reliability and Alliance Interdependence, Iain D. Henry argues for a more sophisticated approach to alliance politics and ideas of interdependence.

It is often assumed that if the United States failed to defend an ally, then this disloyalty would instantly and irrevocably damage US alliances across the globe. Henry proposes that such damage is by no means inevitable and that predictions of disaster are dangerously simplistic. If other allies fear the risks of military escalation more than the consequences of the United States abandoning an ally, then they will welcome, encourage, and even praise such an instance of disloyalty. It is also often assumed that alliance interdependence only constrains US policy options, but Henry shows how the United States can manipulate interdependence to set an example of what constitutes acceptable allied behavior.

Using declassified documents, Henry explores five case studies involving US alliances with South Korea, Japan, the Republic of China, the Philippines, Australia, and New Zealand. Reliability and Alliance Interdependence makes a substantial contribution to our understanding of how America's alliances in Asia function as an interdependent system.

CHAPTER 1

Alliances, Reliability, and Interdependence

In this chapter I review alliance and deterrence theories, and critique their expectations of interdependence. I consider more recent scholarship—the “reputation skeptic” literature—which has argued that commitments are not interdependent, or at least not in the way expected by deterrence theorists. In short, my main critique is that because promises to allies have often been considered as an afterthought to the issue of threats to adversaries, incorrect assumptions about alliance politics have misdirected previous scholarship. Next, I explain why I find both the deterrence and the reputation skeptic arguments unsatisfying. In response, I propose and explain the concept of alliance reliability. This concept is not only more satisfying than resolve or loyalty, but also has greater explanatory power. I conclude the chapter by proposing the three hypotheses which comprise the alliance audience effect theory. This theoretical framework explains how alliance interdependence could operate on assessments of reliability, rather than judgments of resolve or loyalty.

Alliance and Deterrence Theory

Below, I briefly review the basics of alliance politics, including theories about why they form, how they function, and why they dissolve. Then, I examine how Cold War–era alliance and deterrence theories presumed an interdependence between discrete alliance commitments.

WHAT ARE ALLIANCES? WHY DO THEY FORM? HOW DO THEY EVOLVE?

As might be expected, authors have defined alliance in a variety of ways. Stephen Walt defines an alliance as “a formal or informal arrangement for security cooperation between two or more sovereign states.”¹ He uses the terms alliance and alignment interchangeably, while other authors delineate between these concepts. Glenn Snyder defines alliances as “formal associations of states for the use (or non-use) of military force, in specified circumstances, against states outside their own membership,” and alignments as “expectations of states about whether they will be supported or opposed by other states in future interactions.”² For Snyder, “alliances are a subset of alignments—those that arise from or are formalized by an explicit agreement, usually in the form of a treaty.”³ The creators of the Alliance Treaty Obligations and Provisions (ATOP) dataset define alliances as “written agreements, signed by official representatives of at least two independent states, that include promises to aid a partner in the event of military conflict, to remain neutral in the event of conflict, to refrain from military conflict with one another, or to consult/cooperate in the event of international crises that create a potential for military conflict.”⁴

Walt’s definition is the most expansive, and his inclusion of “informal arrangement[s]” means that many security partnerships, including those not governed by a formal treaty, would be considered as alliances. Though significant security cooperation can occur without a formal alliance, the most solemn alliances are those that are governed by a formal treaty, signed by national governments, endorsed by their elected representatives (if applicable), and publicly proclaimed. The definitions used by Snyder and the ATOP dataset are very restrictive: the absence of a formal treaty or written agreement is enough to see an alliance downgraded to an alignment. But relationships may exhibit decidedly alliance-like activity, even though formal treaties or agreements have not been signed. Accordingly, I adopt Snyder’s definition, but modify it to note that an alliance can be epitomized not by a treaty text but by an ongoing pattern of security cooperation.

There are two means of increasing a state’s security: the first is internal balancing, which involves “moves to increase economic capability, to increase military strength, to develop clever strategies.” The second, external balancing, involves “moves to strengthen and enlarge one’s own alliance or to weaken and shrink an opposing one.”⁵ Many alliances are formed with the primary intent of pooling the military capabilities held by the member states, ensuring that any potential aggressor will have to plan for the possibility of a fight against all the allies.⁶ This is called a “capability aggregation” alliance: the military capabilities available to each nation in the alliance exceed their own indigenous forces, and thus the alliance should improve their security.⁷ Other states enter alliances to increase their influence or control over other nations. James Morrow has developed a theory of asymmetric alliances, defined as relationships where one ally receives security benefits and the other ally receives autonomy benefits. These benefits might come in the form of political influence over an ally’s internal or foreign policies, or perhaps through military bases on an ally’s soil. As Morrow notes, an asymmetric alliance “leads to a disproportionate sharing of military expenditures.”⁸

Common to both alliance models is the belief that alliances should only form and persist when they provide a net security gain for all members. As Michael Altfield argues, “it can never be rational for a government to form an alliance which does not increase its security.”⁹ For an alliance to form, and persist, one question—“Do the benefits of this alliance outweigh the cost?”—must be answered in the affirmative. If the answer gradually shifts from “yes” to “no,” then the state should withdraw from the alliance, renegotiate its terms, and/or enter into a new alliance. Based on their pursuit of self-interest, states should seek to negotiate (and renegotiate, if necessary) the best alliance deal possible.

ALLIANCE MANAGEMENT: ABANDONMENT AND ENTRAPMENT

Within alliances, two fears are paramount: abandonment and entrapment. Snyder describes abandonment as “the constant worry about being deserted by one’s ally. The worry arises from the simple fact that the ally has alternative partners and may opt for one of them if it becomes dissatisfied.” Snyder argues that abandonment has two aspects: “the subjective probability that the partner will defect and the cost to oneself if it does.” Abandonment can also manifest in a refusal to provide promised military support, or the “failure to support the ally diplomatically in a dispute with its adversary.”¹⁰

According to Snyder, entrapment occurs when one is “dragged into a conflict over an ally’s interests that one does not share, or shares only partially … when one values the preservation of the alliance more than the cost of fighting for the ally’s interests.”¹¹ In contrast to abandonment, which entails “a serious loss of security, the cost of entrapment is an extreme form of lost autonomy,” as a state fights in a conflict it would have rather avoided.¹²

Alliances are never free of uncertainty and although the concepts of abandonment and entrapment are usually applied to wartime or security crises, they are also relevant in peacetime. For example, a state may decide that in order to improve its relations with an adversary, which has tense relations with the state’s ally, it is necessary to abrogate the alliance. If the state decides that the cost of its alliance (i.e., the preclusion of a more productive relationship with the ally’s adversary) is higher than the benefit (e.g., improved security or influence on the ally), then the state will abrogate the alliance. Though this might not occur during wartime, it certainly resembles abandonment. Snyder, too, notes the potential for peacetime abandonment, when he describes the “failure to support the ally diplomatically in a dispute with its adversary, when support was expected,” as abandonment.¹³

Extending Snyder’s analysis, I argue that there is a need to relax the strictest definitions of abandonment and entrapment. Doing so enables us to more accurately identify and assess how these fears operate in peacetime settings. I argue that abandonment occurs when a state’s ally asks the question “Do the benefits of this alliance outweigh its costs?,” answers in the negative, and acts accordingly. In this situation, the ally decides that its interests are best served by reneging on, abrogating, or revising the alliance commitment. This occurs most dramatically in a crisis situation but it can also happen in peacetime: When Washington abrogated the US-ROC Mutual Defense Treaty in 1980, it did so because Beijing made this a condition of establishing diplomatic relations with the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Washington’s answer to the key question—“Do the benefits of the US-ROC alliance outweigh its costs?”—was negative. Unsurprisingly, this led to the abrogation of the alliance and the abandonment of the ROC.

Entrapment can also be defined in relation to this key question. Entrapment occurs when a state asks itself—“Do the benefits of this alliance outweigh its costs?”—and answers “probably.” This requires some explanation. If the answer is an unequivocal “yes,” and the benefits clearly outweigh the costs of the alliance, then no real dilemma arises: in peacetime the alliance happily persists, in times of security tension the state moves to signal its support of the ally, in wartime the state moves to fight alongside its ally.

The real issue of entrapment arises when it is difficult to accurately estimate the prospective costs and benefits involved in alliance action. For example, the state may believe that the value of the alliance outweighs the costs of preserving it, but only barely. Because the state cannot confidently predict the exact outcome of the alliance interaction—which may be war, with all of its uncertainties—there is a risk that it will make the wrong decision. It may eventuate that the costs of supporting the ally will be far higher than expected. As the cost/benefit value of the alliance approaches equilibrium, the outcome of the alliance interaction will become more uncertain and the fear of entrapment will increase. Thus, entrapment occurs when the state supports its ally on an issue, even though it is unsure that this is the correct decision and/or would have preferred to avoid the situation altogether.

Snyder writes that “entrapment occurs when one values the preservation of the alliance more than the cost of fighting for the ally’s interests.”¹⁴ My definition of entrapment—that a state supports its ally’s policy despite being unsure whether the value of the alliance will outweigh the costs of this support—maintains Snyder’s emphasis on the cost/benefit calculation, but broadens the concept to both crisis and noncrisis situations.¹⁵ It also removes Snyder’s implication that abandonment will result in the abrogation of the alliance.¹⁶ For the sake of simplicity, and because my definitions do not differ violently from those offered by other authors, I use the terms abandonment and entrapment throughout the book. That said, the change of emphasis is meaningful. Like my definition of entrapment, my definition of abandonment—that it occurs when a state decides its interests are best served by not supporting an ally’s policy—also slightly broadens Snyder’s concept by extending it to noncrisis situations.

MANAGING ABANDONMENT AND ENTRAPMENT

Within an alliance, at any time each state will usually have one prevailing fear: either abandonment or entrapment.¹⁷ The fear need not be severe, but most states will regard their ally as either too aggressive or too timid on particular issues. For example, if a state fears that its ally will abandon it if conflict breaks out with an adversary, it is unlikely to fear its ally entrapping it into a conflict with this adversary. However, it may be fearful of its ally entrapping it into a conflict with a different adversary. Fears of abandonment and entrapment will be highest when allies have different adversaries and/or different strategic interests. These fears are less likely to be present at the creation of an alliance agreement because they will complicate—or perhaps prevent—the negotiation of an alliance. However, it may be possible to address some entrapment fears through careful drafting of an alliance treaty. A defensive alliance can guard against some entrapment by specifying that a mutual defense obligation does not apply if one’s ally is an aggressor. Abandonment fears can be addressed, at least partially, by the forward stationing of a state’s forces to an ally’s border with an adversary.¹⁸

Once in an alliance, a state can try to manage the dangers of abandonment and entrapment as they arise. Faced with a risk of entrapment, a state can attempt to modify its ally’s behavior. In a crisis situation, the ally might be restrained by the threat of nonsupport, or it might be reassured and calmed by a strong pledge of support. Faced with the prospect of abandonment, a state might offer to modify its behavior, in the hope of attracting a stronger commitment from its ally. Another method may be to demonstrate greater loyalty to the ally, in the hope that this fidelity will be reciprocated.¹⁹

In some circumstances, where a state is unable to address the risk of entrapment, it may allow itself to be entrapped. As Victor Cha notes, “the consequences of defecting from a valued partner (i.e. dealignment by that partner) can be more disastrous to one’s security than being dragged into the partner’s conflict.”²⁰ Abandonin...

Table of contents

• Acknowledgments
• Abbreviations
• Introduction
• 1. Alliances, Reliability, and Interdependence
• 2. Forming Alliances in Asia, 1949–1951
• 3. Unleashing and Releashing Chiang Kai-shek, 1953–1954
• 4. Allies Encourage Limits on US Loyalty to Formosa, 1954–1955
• 5. Revision of the US-Japan Alliance, 1955–1960
• 6. Negotiating the Reversion of Okinawa, 1967–1969
• Conclusion
• Notes
• Bibliography
• Index