Modernising Irish Government

The Politics of Administrative Reform

Neil Collins, Terry Cradden

• Publisher: Gill Books
• Year: 2024
• Print ISBN:
  9780717141555
• eBook ISBN:
  9780717155323
• Topic: Politique et relations internationales
• Subtopic: Gouvernement américain

Modernising Irish Government presents the major historical turning points in the development of Irish public services with a particular focus on the civil service, covering the mid-nineteenth-century reforms, the foundations of the State and the Lemass-Whittaker economic initiative. It introduces the Strategic Management Initiative, its origins and its impact, discussed in terms of efficiency, responsibility and democracy.

Authors Neil Collins, Terry Cradden and Patrick Butler examine the current, key issues within the Civil Service, including the contentious issue of decentralisation. Providing reviews of the institutional framework for regulating monopolies in such sectors as telecommunications, aviation and retail competition, they present a critique of the new kinds of relationships between government and the people by reviewing Social Partnership, the Citizen Charters of government departments and other similar instruments.

This textbook at once examines the scale, scope and structure of the delivery of services to the public and their relationship to the civil service, government departments, commercial semi-state companies and other public bodies, while identifying a number of significant failures in service delivery in detail and offering an analysis for their reasons.

1

Introduction: the basics of Irish government

Neil Collins & Terry Cradden

The politics of administrative reform in Ireland¹ is an important and timely subject as the Republic continues its major economic and social transformation in the first decade of the twenty-first century. The primary focus of this book is the civil and public service—a dimension of the Irish political landscape that has not been emphasised sufficiently in the literature for several years because political scientists and interested others have concentrated on political parties, elections, corruption, the conflict in Northern Ireland and, more recently, the reform of parliament.

The pace of reform in recent years has been a critical impetus; while the essential understanding of government institutions and process has been well set out in several texts—most notably Dooney and O’Toole (1998)—the need for a volume encompassing these recent changes has been clear for some time. It is also apparent that much factual and statistical information, which has formed the bedrock of previous studies, has become available via the internet,² so a more interpretive, discursive and analytical approach to the subject can now be attempted, without the need to rehearse many of the detailed descriptions of Irish institutions which previous accounts found to be necessary and provided so carefully. Nonetheless it is important to cover some of the same basics as others have done, especially as regards the institutional background of Irish government. This is what we shall do here, in as succinct a manner as possible.

THE WESTMINSTER MODEL

The political institutions of the Republic are, for the most part, based on the ‘Westminster model’. Each of the institutions referred to in Bunreacht na hÉireann (the Irish Constitution)—the Presidency, the Oireachtas (parliament), the Cabinet and the Courts—is given specific powers, to be exercised in accordance with the general principles of a British-style parliamentary democracy.

Perhaps the key characteristic of the Westminster model is the fusion of the legislature and the executive—in other words, the executive arm of government is drawn from among elected members of parliament. Critics of the model argue that this means there are inadequate checks on the power of the government and, in particular, on the power of the prime minister (Taoiseach). Advocates, on the other hand, claim that the close relationship between members of parliament and the government is, in fact, an advantage because it makes for efficiency in decision-making and the government can act swiftly, when necessary, without being blocked by other state institutional powers and without the need for cumbersome compromise. As against the claim of excessive power being granted to the executive, it is also argued—from experience—that built-in systems of correction are capable of forcing the resignation of a prime minister and the calling of an election. It is fair to say that both sides of this argument would find Ireland as fruitful a ground for detailed disputation as the United Kingdom.

On the basis of this constitutional resemblance non-Irish commentators have sometimes assumed there is a greater degree of similarity between the politics of the Republic and those of the UK than actually exists. There are two key differences from the British model. First, there is the proportional representation, single transferable vote electoral system (PRSTV—see more on this below). Although Fianna Fáil, Ireland’s largest political party, was able to form single-party governments for many years, most insiders would now accept that, under PRSTV, this possibility no longer exists. Thus PRSTV undermines one of the most fundamental features of the Westminster model. Secondly, Bunreacht na hÉireann is a written document. It therefore provides a focus for debate on new rights, duties and institutional arrangements and gives access to the courts, by way of judicial review, for interpretation and even vindication of the rights it sets down. For both these reasons, and reflecting over eighty years of independence, Irish government today is becoming far less ‘British’ in its texture. Politicians, bureaucrats and journalists are still influenced by trends and events on the larger neighbouring island, but wider points of reference are also important, particularly as regards administrative reform.

LEFT–RIGHT POLITICS AND THE VOTING SYSTEM

Another significant difference between Irish politics and those in Britain and many other European countries is the absence, on the face of it, of any very clear left–right divide. Although the Labour party, the third largest party, is on the left of the political spectrum, it has never enjoyed anything like the level of support of most of its European democratic socialist counterparts. By contrast, the division between the two main parties, Fianna Fáil (FF) and Fine Gael (FG), is rooted in the Civil War that erupted over the Anglo-Irish Treaty, following Independence. This has been subsiding steadily in significance since the 1930s, however, and although the FF/FG party division persists as a major feature of the political landscape, it has not come to reflect any more than minor class or social cleavages.

This is not to say that Ireland has been unaffected by wider international developments in political thinking, especially the rise of the ‘new right’. Best testimony to this is the frequency of reference in current Irish political discourse to what is popularly summed up as ‘Berlin or Boston’: should Ireland be social democratic, welfarist and interventionist—like Germany, France and many other fellow members of the European Union—or neo-liberal, free market and anti- ‘big government’—like the USA and Mrs Thatcher’s Britain? Although the question is argued regularly, Irish politics are more nearly comparable to those of the USA, to the extent that the main parties (or groups of parties, given the propensity in Ireland for coalition governments) stand principally on their record of political competence, leadership and economic success rather than on their precise position on an ideological spectrum.³

Unlike the USA, however, Ireland does not have a two-party system. Parliamentary elections are conducted under PRSTV,⁴ which ensures the representation not only of minor parties—like the Greens, Sinn Féin and the Progressive Democrats—but also of independent candidates with no obvious party allegiance. PRSTV produces a reasonably close match between voting patterns and seats, but at the same time it encourages politicians to place much stress on local loyalties. For the individual candidate the most significant imperative is to secure sufficient personal first-preference votes to be elected ahead of his/her party colleagues, which means the greatest rivalries in Irish politics are often within parties, rather than between them. Elections are won or lost on the basis of relatively few voters switching their support, and by the success of parties in persuading their traditional supporters to go out and cast their votes.

As already noted, changing political fortunes mean that coalition governments have now become the norm. Fianna Fáil remains the largest political party and is currently (late 2006) in a coalition government with the much smaller Progressive Democrats, formed as recently as 1985. Fine Gael and the Labour party dominate the opposition, with an expectation that they may need Green party support to form a government should they do well in the next election (expected in 2007).

THE PRESIDENT, THE TAOISEACH AND HIS MINISTERS

The role of the President of Ireland is an essentially ceremonial one—much like that of the monarch in Great Britain—and in most circumstances s/he is constrained to act solely upon the advice or instruction of the government. Although the prestige of the office has been greatly enhanced by the two recent female holders, in policy-making terms it is virtually powerless.

This book uses the term ‘government’ to refer to the whole machinery of the state and its governance. In popular parlance, however, the ‘government’ is the Taoiseach (prime minister) and his team. Though the Westminster tradition would suggest that he (there has not yet been a female holder) is primus inter pares (first among equals), the Taoiseach has two crucial powers available to him. First is the right (in consultation with his coalition partner, if such there is) to choose his Cabinet ministers and junior ministers; second is the right to call a general election at any time within the constitutional limit of five years—an ability that can be used as a threat to recalcitrant Teachtaí Dála (TDs, or members of parliament) if the government is finding the going difficult. The Taoiseach has yet further powers to draw on, derived from: control over Dáil Éireann; management of the civil service; the right to represent Ireland in international forums (taking precedence over the Minister for Foreign Affairs in this respect); and the vast range of patronage and appointments at his command. Factors that can influence the power of the Taoiseach, either positively or negatively, include: policy success, especially as regards the economy; leadership of his party; opinion polls and electoral prospects; and the attitude of the media.

While ministers have clear status under the Constitution and can be very powerful figures, they are generally more vulnerable to criticism than the Taoiseach. So although Ireland has adopted many of the new developments that have occurred in public management internationally—developments that supposedly confine politicians to ‘steering’ rather than ‘rowing’ (see Chapters 2 and 3)—voters still generally hold ministers responsible for detailed failures in service delivery. The public odium that attends failure, or even just insensitivity in policy implementation, is directed at the politicians currently in office, even when their formal control is actually quite tenuous. For example, while over-runs in public expenditure may be a consequence of poor civil service management, the appropriate minister feels the consequences most immediately. Cabinet ministers, which comprise a group that Bunreacht na hÉireann confines to a membership of no more than fifteen, are particularly exposed to criticism, especially as their junior ministerial colleagues (who presently number seventeen), are seldom afforded a high profile regardless of their responsibilities. By contrast, all ministers naturally covet the plaudits for policy successes or popular initiatives. There are few more prized opportunities, even for the most senior politician, than the opening of a factory, a new road or a hospital in or near his/her constituency. Cynicism aside, for a politician of Cabinet rank, a ‘good department’ is one that provides substantial opportunities for favourable publicity.

MINISTERIAL RESPONSIBILITY, COLLECTIVE RESPONSIBILITY AND CABINET CONFIDENTIALITY

Irish ministers are constrained by the inherited, and now codified, conventions of collective and ministerial responsibility and Cabinet secrecy. Ministerial responsibility means that if corruption, misbehaviour, policy failures or administrative errors occur within a department, the minister is responsible even though s/he may not be involved directly, or perhaps has an influence upon only a small proportion of the policy for which s/he is ostensibly responsible. This convention is supposed to guarantee that an elected official is answerable for every single government decision and that, if things have indeed gone wrong, the minister in question must resign. This code notwithstanding, in Ireland ministers seldom resign from office because of errors or failures, still less as a consequence of parliamentary pressure or policy disagreements with their colleagues (see Appendix 1.1). Indeed, proportionately, more presidents have resigned than Cabinet ministers, even though the Head of State’s position is almost entirely ceremonial.

Cabinet, or collective, responsibility requires that all members publicly support all Cabinet decisions, whether or not they agree with them. This convention is of most importance if a vote of no confidence is passed in the Dáil, which would oblige the entire, collectively responsible government to resign. The obvious consequences will be either the formation of a new government (perhaps by an alternative coalition, as has happened on just one occasion) or, more likely, the Taoiseach will ask the President to dissolve the Dáil and a general election will follow. The concept of Cabinet confidentiality is closely related to this, to the extent that collective responsibility would seem to require that there be no public airing of divided counsels. Nevertheless, and particularly as between coalition partners, the need for a distinctive party political profile leads to perhaps more patterns of leaks and selective media briefings than in other parliamentary systems. The primacy of parliamentary procedure is adhered to formally in government announcements, but all policy decisions are manifestly—and sometimes ostentatiously—the subject of ‘media management’. Constitutional conventions are thus often followed more in the breach than in the observance.

THE DÁIL AND THE SEANAD

The lower, but more important, house of the Oireachtas, Dáil Éireann, has 166 members at present, based on the ruling that there must be one TD for every 20,000–30,000 electors. The Republic is divided into forty-one constituencies, each returning between three and five members, and the number of constituencies and the seats allocated to them must be revised at least once every twelve years in order to take account of population changes. At the time of writing there is controversy over the deficiencies of the current legally valid but outdated constituency boundaries, with the government refusing to use preliminary census returns to make amendments to them and insisting that changes must await the full census results, which are due in mid-2007.

The upper house, Seanad Éireann, has sixty members and is subordinate to the Dáil. The Seanad’s membership was originally intended to be made up in major part of people elected to so-called ‘vocational panels’ representing various interest groups, but it has long since become dominated by the same parties as are represented in the Dáil. As well as the forty-three ‘vocational’ members—elected indirectly by members of the Oireachtas and by county and city councillors soon after the declaration of the final result of a general election for the Dáil—there are six university seats, while the Taoiseach nominates a further eleven members, the intention of this latter arrangement being to ensure that the government has majority support in the Seanad.

The work of the Dáil is primarily to consider legislative proposals from ministers (and very occasionally from TDs) and expenditure proposals (on which see more below) from the various government departments. It is also a classic parliamentary debating chamber, as well as a forum in which government ministers can be questioned about their activities and those of their departments.

Constitutionally, the purpose of the Seanad is to check, redraft and amend legislation, whether first presented to the Seanad or passed to it by the Dáil. Its powers are limited to revising and clarifying Bills, together with some minor constitutional duties and rights. As compared to other ‘Westminster model’ second chambers—especially the British House of Lords—the Seanad has no substantial power or, for that matter, influence.

It is often claimed that the Oireachtas, and the Dáil in particular, does not take its legislative responsibilities seriously enough, and that TDs are excessively pre-occupied with constituency business. There has been a succession of proposals for reform, but these have fallen by the wayside and there seems little enthusiasm for change. Moreover—as will be discussed later in this book—the real powers of the Oireachtas, were it to choose to exercise them, have been diminished significantly by developments outside Leinster House (where both houses are located), especially the corporatist arrangements known as ‘social partnership’, within which so many political, economic and social decisions are now made without reference to the Dáil and Seanad.

THE BUDGETARY PROCESS

The Treasury does not work out what it needs and then think how to raise the money. It pitches for as much as it can get away with and then thinks how to spend it.⁵

The budgetary process has been less constant in its format than the other features of Irish government described in this chapter, although the influence of the British tradition is still substantial. As we will have reason to stress in Chapter Two, the Department of Finance established it...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Title page
• Chapter 1: Introduction: the basics of Irish government
• Chapter 2: Ireland’s bureaucratic traditions
• Chapter 3: NPM: a new orthodoxy
• Chapter 4: Modes of delivery: who does what, when and why?
• Chapter 5: Failures to deliver: letting the public down
• Chapter 6: The public service and regulatory reform
• Chapter 7: The public service and the citizen-consumer
• Chapter 8: People management: HRM in the public service
• Chapter 9: Conclusions: enhancing governance and protecting democracy
• Endnotes
• Appendices
• Acknowledgments
• Copyright Page
• About the Authors
• About Gill & Macmillan