Partners in deterrence

US nuclear weapons and alliances in Europe and Asia

Stephan Frühling, Andrew O'Neil

• Publisher: Manchester University Press
• Year: 2021
• Print ISBN: 9781526150721
• eBook ISBN: 9781526150714
• Topic: History
• Subtopic: Military & Maritime History
• Index: History

From the dawn of the atomic age to today, nuclear weapons have been central to the internal dynamics of US alliances in Europe and Asia. But nuclear weapons cooperation in US alliances has varied significantly between allies and over time. This book explores the history of America's nuclear posture worldwide, delving into alliance structures and interaction during and since the end of the Cold War to uncover the underlying dynamics of nuclear weapons cooperation between the US and its allies.Combining in-depth empirical analysis with an accessible theoretical lens, the book reveals that US allies have wielded significant influence in shaping nuclear weapons cooperation with the US in ways that reflect their own, often idiosyncratic, objectives. Alliances are ecosystems of exchange rather than mere tools of external balancing, the book argues, and institutional perspectives can offer an unprecedented insight into how structured cooperation can promote policy convergence.

1 Realism, institutionalism, and nuclear weapons cooperation

Formal security commitments that entail obligations for parties to use, or consider using, force are an enduring feature of modern international relations. Typically portrayed as transactional arrangements of convenience, much of the scholarship on alliances has focused on the formal security treaties in Europe among major and less powerful states that were a standard feature of the nineteenth century. These alliances were purpose built to counter specific threats and had a limited shelf-​life that was dependent on the longevity of perceived security threats. Sustained by the imperative of balancing against states that threatened to dominate the European continent, these alliances were dominated by great power interests. Nineteenth-​ and early twentieth-​century alliances were fluid, underpinned by crude balance-​of-​power imperatives, and lacking in institutional depth. In many key respects, they bore all the hallmarks of ‘counterbalancing coalitions’, as distinct from the highly structured institutional arrangements that have evolved since the Second World War.¹

Together with the UN Security Council, bilateral and multilateral alliances formed by the US during the Cold War constitute the most resilient security institutions in contemporary international relations. Created in response to specific Cold War threats, US alliances have endured in spite of significant changes to the external threat environment of their member states. In marked contrast to the rapid tempo of alliance formation (and dissolution) before 1945, US alliances have not only endured, they have been progressively strengthened by increasing operational integration and political cooperation. While these arrangements have been asymmetric in the sense that the US has remained the dominant partner, they have nonetheless become more democratic in terms of decision making. The depth and breadth of alliance consultation and joint decision making in NATO is unparalleled historically, but America’s Asian alliances have also become less overtly hierarchical and focused increasingly on genuine information sharing and joint planning.

The prospect of using military force in unison with other states to achieve common goals lies at the heart of alliances. As Paul Schroeder writes, ‘whether offensive or defensive, limited or unlimited, equal or unequal, bilateral or multilateral, alliances must involve some measure of commitment to use force to achieve a common goal’.² These commitments are enshrined in treaties that constitute the alliance initially, but they are often reaffirmed subsequently in more detailed and operationally focused language. One of the prominent features of Cold War US alliances was that this reaffirmation was embedded in the institutionalisation of alliance structures that streamlined security cooperation in an operational sense, while at the same time giving expression to deeper political and ideological commitment between the US and its allies. Reflecting practice in NATO, the US–​Japan and US–​Republic of Korea (ROK) alliances have created various consultative committees in the twenty-​first century tasked with addressing defence cooperation, strategic policy coordination, weapons procurement, and status of force negotiations. In addition, these consultative committees have been supplemented by less formal working groups and routine consultations between mid-​level officials. ‘Everyday’ alliance interactions create and reinforce inter-​subjective understandings between the US and its partners that, mostly, serve to strengthen overall cooperation.³

This chapter outlines the primary differences between realist and institutionalist perspectives on alliances and provides the theoretical background that frames the two hypotheses outlined in the Introduction. We argue that realism and institutionalism are distinctive, even if they are not necessarily exclusive of each other, and they arrive at quite different conclusions about the relevance of formal cooperation arrangements within alliances. In general, realists treat alliances as epiphenomenal and are dismissive of the role of junior allies in shaping outcomes within alliances. They are also sceptical about the influence of domestic factors in alliance relationships and focus almost exclusively on external security threats as the primary causal factor shaping alliance behaviour. Given the pronounced power differential between the US and its junior partners, and because nuclear weapons are regarded by major powers as the jewel in the crown of their military capabilities, realist theory would predict that an alliance has negligible influence over the nature of nuclear weapons cooperation.

By contrast, institutional theory sees alliances as independent phenomena that shape not only the structures within which states operate, but also the behaviour of these states. From this perspective, alliances are themselves institutions, but how they function is influenced by the formal and informal institutions within them where officials from both sides meet and work. As is the case for institutions generally, within alliances, ‘agents and institutions interact dialectically and are mutually constitutive’.⁴ For institutionalists, alliances empower smaller states by formalising structured avenues for accessing information and influencing policy outcomes. Nuclear weapons cooperation is no exception to this.

Realism and institutionalism provide the theoretical foundation for the two competing hypotheses about the drivers of nuclear weapons cooperation in US alliances. Against this background, the chapter is organised as follows. First, it defines the key differences between realism and institutionalism. Second, it outlines how realism and institutionalism seek to explain the existence and endurance of alliances. Third, the chapter describes realist and institutionalist views on how allies interact over time. Fourth, it explores realist and institutionalist perspectives on deterrence and reassurance in alliances, which remain at the core of nuclear weapons cooperation. Fifth and finally, the chapter outlines a series of frames that are used in the book’s empirical case studies to capture the objectives of allies and the sources of influence with respect to nuclear weapons cooperation.

Realism and alliances

Dominated by realist theory, early international relations scholarship characterised alliances as a by-​product of the balance of power. As the balance of power shifted over time among states, so too did alliances, as they were based on shared interests in the balance of power, rather than shared interests per se. As the doyen of neorealism Kenneth Waltz observed, ‘alliances are made by states that have some but not all of their interests in common. The common interest is ordinarily a negative one: fear of other states’.⁵

As a paradigm, realism incorporates a number of theories designed to explain how the international system works. However, as Benjamin Frankel has argued, all realists agree on six key assumptions: that states are the central unit of analysis; that the international system is anarchic; that, because of this, states seek to maximise their power or security; that the international system, as distinct from domestic politics, is largely responsible for state conduct in international relations; and that the utility of force is regarded as the major currency by states.⁶

Traditional realism seeks to explain the behaviour of states in an anarchical international system on the basis of one fundamental variable, power, which is both the means and aim of state behaviour. Robert Dahl defines power as ‘A having power over B to the extent that he can get B to do something that B would not otherwise do’,⁷ but power can also be manifest as a more diffuse influence on social relations.⁸ Neorealism presents an alternative theory, and sees countries seeking security rather than power for its own sake. This leads to consideration of structure in the international system insofar as countries’ security is influenced by their relative position. Neoclassical realism emphasises that decisions about the use of power in international affairs and perceptions of security arise from the domestic context of states, meaning that the behaviour of states cannot be explained solely by their external environment; internal factors of political systems, norms and elite perceptions, and access to resources also need to be taken into account. All variants of realism, however, have in common that they see the international system as fundamentally anarchic, that states act first and foremost in their own interest, and that these states are ultimately responsible for their own security.

For realists, alliances are merely the sum of their parts, as distinct from constituting independent entities in international relations. Alliances are epiphenomenal because they do not in themselves exert influence over specific events but are instead dependent on what states parties, in particular major powers, permit them to do. As Jeremy Pressman argues, ‘institutional aspects of the alliance provide mechanisms for the powerful ally to flex its muscles if it so chooses’.⁹ From this perspective, alliances in the form of institutions have a negligible independent effect on states’ behaviour; at most, they impose sporadic constraints on the actions of sovereign states. Realists believe that, everything being equal, states would much prefer to remain separate from multilateral or bilateral entanglements and make do in life with their own capabilities.

However, in a world where material power capabilities are anything but equal, realists acknowledge that weaker states are attracted to the major power protection they receive under alliance arrangements. Indeed, for realists, alliances exist because of the insecurity felt by smaller states in international relations. These states want protection from actual and potential adversaries, and they seek to achieve this at minimum cost. For major powers, alliances help to formally co-​opt like-​minded states into regional and global spheres of influence. As one analyst notes, ‘a minor power is concerned mostly with direct threats to its security, whereas a great power must also consider the security of those proximate and overseas territories and countries instrumental to the security of its homeland and national interests’.¹⁰ While even those most sceptical of international institutions acknowledge that ‘great powers sometimes find institutions –​ especially alliances –​ useful for maintaining or even increasing their ...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Contents
• Preface
• Abbreviations
• Introduction
• 1 Realism, institutionalism, and nuclear weapons cooperation
• 2 Nuclear sharing and mutual dependence: Germany and NATO nuclear weapons cooperation
• 3 Local accommodation: Norway and nuclear weapons cooperation in NATO
• 4 Security at arm’s length: US–​Japan nuclear weapons cooperation
• 5 Assurance and abandonment: Nuclear weapons in the US–​South Korea alliance
• 6 Informal bargaining: Nuclear weapons cooperation and the US–​Australia alliance
• 7 Understanding the drivers of nuclear weapons cooperation
• Bibliography
• Index