Monopoly vs. Competition, 1840 to 1945
By about 1840, American railroads had stopped being a curiosity and were an accepted means of transportation. Explosive growth of the system east of the Mississippi in the two decades preceding the Civil War made railroads an essential component of economic life. The Unionâs railroads helped to defeat the Confederacy, but in the period to centuryâs end, the South also participated vigorously in the expansion of the national network from coast to coast and border to border. It was a time when the railroad both connected and created communities and dominated as an economic and social force. Through efficient transportation of people and goods, the railroad induced economic development, and economic development made railroads ever more necessary. Author Robert Selph Henry noted the pace of change: âFrom the beginning of American railroad history to the period after the First World War, traffic on the rails consistently doubled every fifteen years, on the average.â1
It was also a time of minimal regulation of business, and in this climate, the railroadsâ domination led to abuses. By 1887, they were powerful monopolies led by legendary moguls and financial speculators: Jay Gould, J. P. Morgan, Cornelius and William K. Vanderbilt, and James J. Hill, among others. Their reputation as inflexible and ruthless earned them membership in a sinister pantheonâthe âRobber Barons.â
Monopoly in the railroad industry should not have been a surprise. It had no competition; no other land transport mode matched its capacity, efficiency, and reliability. So, of course, its masters sought maximum financial benefit, often in conflict with each other. To be honest, the history of the industry would be pretty dull but for fascinating tales of corporate combat, thievery, and skulduggery.
These men are legendary in our nationâs history, but their ghosts haunt the railroad industry even today. While there were instances when monopolies actually were beneficial, this did not matter to a government attitude that any monopoly should be broken up for the public good. Not every railroad owner or manager was greedy and corrupt, but the rail monopoly led politicians into a crusade that resulted in increasing regulation of the industry. Farmers in particular, who were a large constituency and had to rely on rail transportation, raised enough protest to spur legislation curbing both real and perceived railroad excesses.
The federal response was the 1887 Interstate Commerce Act, which specifically targeted the railroads. It created the five-member Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC), which began as a regulator but under subsequent laws gained exclusive power to approve or disapprove railroad services and rates.2 When it was a matter of continuing or discontinuing passenger train service, under its provisions, the Commission relied upon an ill-defined concept of what constituted âpublic convenience and necessity,â and this phrase was often invoked in discontinuance proceedings. How this standard was determined was not always consistent and often involved multiple public hearings in communities served by the service involving rail officials who had to defend their petitions with financial disclosures. Hearings officersâ decisions were not always based on the economics of operations.
Commenting on the ICCâs governance of the industry, Burlington Routeâs president Harry Murphy stated in 1963 that train discontinuance procedures for the Burlington were based on trains that actually lost money for the railroad. âThatâs whatâs at the heart of the railroad passenger problem,â he noted. âI doubt if passenger business nets much for the railroad. Of course, I donât know how much passenger business would be left if the ICC formula were used. As a matter of fact, when we appear before the public commissions for taking trains off, if we used the ICC formula there would be objections and our case would have to be restated. Whenever we take off service, we cost-analyze what it would cost out-of-pocket to continue operations. Until a train actually loses money, we donât attempt to take it off.â Murphy pointed out what passenger executives had contended for a long time: âIf any other form of business operated under ICC rules such as have been set up for the passenger business, theyâd go out of business, fast. But weâre obligated to perform. We canât escape itâyou have to have due regard for the public.â3
Over time, ICC governance severely hampered the railroadsâ ability to earn a profit because their monopolistic grip had been significantly weakened by a new early twentieth-century transportation technology: cars, trucks, and paved highways.
Writing in the middle of World War II, Robert Selph Henry stated the issue: âThere was a time when the problem, to some minds at least, was how to keep railroads from making too much money. The problem for the past quarter of a century has been how railroads might make money enough to enable them to finance the improvements they had to have if they were to stay in business as solvent, self-supporting enterprises. That is the real railroad problem of modern timesâhow railroads can make a living.â4 Henry further noted that war traffic brought new prosperity but also that âthe problemâ would return and be worse after warâs end. Indeed, overregulation would not be seriously addressed until 1980, and since then the regulatory and economic climate for the railroadsâ freight operations has been vastly improved. Up to that point, highway and even air freight competition, onerous taxation, constraints on ratemaking, loss of mail contracts, and battalions of federal and state regulators had weakened but fortunately did not kill the industry.
There has always been something of a love-hate relationship between the railroads and the public. In the absence of highway and air competition, railroads had to do little to attract passenger traffic. Indeed, other than the introduction of the air brake, all-steel passenger car, and enclosed vestibules, there were few significant innovations in services up to around 1920. Prior to that, passengers were knocking down the doors, with passenger-miles and revenues increasing steadily.5 There was no incentive to increase patronage since it was so great already. Even the Pullman Company, which operated most of the comfortable, even elegant, sleeping cars on Americaâs railroads, took passengers for granted to a certain degree.
This changed when the country entered the Great Depression following the stock market crash in October 1929. As the economic calamity worsened through the 1930s and ridership declined, the railroads and Pullman had to make greater effortsâsuch as introducing ice-sourced air conditioning and streamlined trainsâto attract passengers.
In the meantime, Henry Fordâs innovative method for producing inexpensive automobiles had spread to other firms. By the eve of the Depression, automotive technology had so improved, and the car had been made so useful by the introduction of publicly funded paved roads, that rail passenger traffic had declined by more than a third.6 People still rode the trains, especially for long-distance travel, but it was becoming apparent that the private autoâs effects on the rail passenger network would continue.
In the 1930s, the railroads confronted another challenge: a precipitous decline in freight traffic and revenueâthe lifeblood of any railroad. Oddly enough, their passenger trains helped ease the problem. Those trains generated a significantly smaller percentage of railroad revenues than freight trains, but passenger ticket sales provided immediate cash while settlement of freight charges took much longer. Passenger service remained marginally profitable during the 1920s, but by 1930, the traffic decline was accelerating; by 1933, passenger-miles were two-thirds and passenger revenues were three-fourths of what they had been in 1920. Revenue per train-mile was $1.28, less than half of the 1920 figure.7 Even so, railroads avoided large reductions in service in order to keep passenger cash coming in.
Looming over the railroads was a real danger that alarmed both labor and managementâthe threat of nationalization. With large segments of the industry in bankruptcy, there was serious discussion of government ownership. Many outside railroading saw it as a viable option, but the railroads wanted to avoid it at all costs. The Burlingtonâs Ralph Budd (1879â1962), one of the industryâs most influential leaders at the time, did not mince words, saying that such a move would increase costs, lower productivity, and worsen service. All this had happened during federal government operation of the railroads during World War I but, even so, Depression-era nationalization might actually have evolved if the railsâ fortunes did not improve.8
Expression of confidence: New York Centralâs Great Steel Fleet was lined up at La Salle Street Station on October 23, 1949, specifically for the companyâs photographer, Ed Nowak. Left to right: the Wolverine, Pacemaker, New England States, Commodore Vanderbilt, and 20th Century Limited. A decade later, that confidence had evaporated.
NYC photo, Geoffrey H. Doughty Collection
Budd also declared that further regulation of the industry would only make matters worse.9 He cited the Emergency Railroad Transportation Act of 1933, which restricted the railroadsâ ability to reduce costs by eliminating jobs. Further, a bill limiting freight train length to a maximum of seventy-five cars, âfull crewâ laws, and another bill providing a six-hour period to calculate a dayâs pay were proof that government ownership would increase the cost of transportation. Such restrictions would make it impossible for the railroads to compete unless comparable constraints were enacted for their competitors.10 All the railroads wanted, in the words of actress Greta Garbo, was âto be left alone.â
The Great Depression actually was beneficial for railroad passengers because it forced some companies to think differently about that business. In the Northeast, passenger-heavy lines such as the New York Central, the Pennsylvania, and the New Haven, and on some lines running westward from Chicagoâthe Union Pacific and the Burlingtonâbecame aware that their trains would not attract travelers unless the railroads got in touch with the times. Appealing to current aesthetic tastes could make traveling by train popular again. Because of this, beginning in the mid-1930s, the railroads engaged prominent industrial designers such as Henry Dreyfuss, Raymond Loewy, Otto Kuhler, and Walter Dorwin Teague to make their trains appealing through exterior streamlining and innovative interior design.
These efforts, often kicked off by parading the new equipment around the country and allowing public walk-throughs, brought a rewarding blend of good press and increased patronage. The Burlingtonâs 1934 Pioneer Zephyr was one of several such trains and generated many column inches of ink with its dawn-to-dusk dash between Denver and Chicago. More importantly, it proved the viability of allâstainless steel construction, which ensured a long service life and would prove of great benefit to Amtrak.11
Even more was to follow. After the bombing of Pearl Harbor and the countryâs plunge into war, traffic increased exponentially and railroads began earning unprecedented profits, even in their passenger services. The wartime surge seemed to suggest that passengers had come back and would not abandon trains for ca...