1 Introduction: Thinking within the Body
Paul struggled with the hope of resurrection in Christ, and he struggled physically. It was difficult for Paul and his communities to conceive and articulate this hope in detail because the idea of resurrection was contradictory to the nature of the human bodyâeveryone could see that the body wore away daily and that it would eventually decompose into dust. The Corinthians asked, âHow are the dead raised? With what kind of body do they come?â (1 Cor 15:35 NRSV). However, Paul also articulates a theology that demonstrates that his view of resurrection changed and developed throughout his ministry, prompted by the interplay between his physical struggles and his theological reflection on resurrection. Paul was inspired by a variety of physical experiences in religious activities, such as the ritual experience in baptism (e.g., 1 Cor 12:13; Gal 27â28; Rom 6:3â4) and the ecstatic experience of the Spirit (e.g., 1 Cor 14:14â15; 2 Cor 12:1â4), in addition to the daily experience of mortality. At times, these religious activities provided Paul with alternative experiences of the body and, consequently, an alternative physical basis for conceptualizing the hope of resurrection. This development resulted in the diverse articulations about resurrection throughout his corpus of writings.
In this book, we will explore and explain the development of Paulâs resurrection theology by looking at the correlation between his bodily experiences and his diverse articulations about resurrection. Faced with puzzling variations in Paulâs claims, including those that he makes about resurrection, the law, Jews and Gentiles, and eschatology, scholars have long wondered whether, how, and to what extent Paulâs thought might have changed or developed during the extent of time within which he composed his extant letters. While some variations can be explained as contingent expressions addressing different contextual issues, this explanation does not logically exclude the possibility that, in some cases, Paul had actually developed his ideas through his interactions with these contexts. Resurrection, among other topics, is a focal point of the modern scholarly discussion about Paulâs development. Thus, by emphasizing the bodily aspect, this study is an exploration of the way that Paulâs resurrection thought might have developed through contextual interactions. It argues that his thought about resurrection might be influenced not only by ideas available in his intellectual interaction with cultural backgrounds but also by a fuller range of his contextual experience. Specifically, it demonstrates that the bodily experience in some religious activities in Paulâs timeâdeath rites, spirit possession, and baptismâcontributed significantly to the formation and development of his resurrection theology.
Such an exploration of the influence of experience on thought requires a methodological link between Paulâs intellect and his bodily experience. Colleen Shantz has posed this methodological question in her book Paul in Ecstasy: how should we consider the emergence and formation of Paulâs ideas while recognizing that he is âa full-blooded human agentâ who does more than think and write?1 Indeed, the demand for an embodied understanding of Paul and his mind is pressing and justified since it is generally agreed in New Testament studies that Paul should not be considered as a systematic theologian and that his letters are occasional products emergent from his contextual interactions with particular communities. However, as Shantz observes, in spite of more and more exceptions, a mind-body dualism is still lurking behind New Testament studies, and the body tends to remain peripheral in scholarly understandings of Paul.2 The rather disembodied portraits of Paulâs mind, as Shantz indicates, are partly due to the methodological difficulty of analyzing texts in terms of the body. After all, our most reliable access to Paul is through the texts that he produced or interacted with, and the one thing that we can directly identify in the texts that might have interacted with Paulâs ideas are also ideas.3 There exists a methodological gap between the body, on the one hand, and texts and articulated ideas, on the other. Thus, much attention has been paid to discursive and literary evidence, and the categorization of Paulâs interactions with his environment that have contributed to the formation of his ideas has been largely limited to intellectual activities: borrowing or synthesizing ideas, accommodating various worldviews or values, and arguing with purported opponents who advocated different ideas. The absence of the body in our understanding of Paul is particularly problematic when dealing with the formation of Paulâs resurrection-related ideas. Resurrection is itself a hope about the body and is naturally conceptualized in relation to the body, either in accordance with or in tension with the experience of the body.
1.1 Embodied: The Way the Human Mind Works
The concept of embodiment provides the theoretical basis for this studyâs methodology to explore the interaction between the body and text. In opposition to the body-mind dualism, embodied cognition studies and many cognitive linguists claim that our cognition is âembodiedâ in the sense that our somatic experience provides us the basis for the formation of many concepts that are most fundamental to our thinking and, in this sense, directly influences our conceptualization, the construction of meaning, and language.4 According to the concept of embodiment, Paulâs somatic experience had direct impact on his ideas and linguistic articulations.
Our experience and construal of reality is largely mediated through the sensory-motor systems of our physical bodies. Thus, because of the very nature of our bodies, we experience the world differently from other species and accordingly have a unique perception of the world.5 In other words, our experience and perception are embodiedâthey are bodily shaped and conditioned. For example, since the human visual system has three kinds of color channels, we have a specific experience of color that differs from that of rabbits, who have two color channels. Consequently, as Vyvyan Evans and Melanie Green indicate, our cognition is also embodied because âwe can only talk about what we can perceive and conceive, and the things that we can perceive and conceive derive from embodied experience.â6 Edward Slingerland also indicates that there is âa growing consensus in the fields of neuroscience and cognitive scienceâ that human thought is largely derived from recurrent patterns of bodily experience.7 Thus, it is not possible to investigate the human mindâand so languageâindependently from the body. As psychologist Arthur M. Glenberg and his collaborators state, âthe fundamental tenet of embodied cognition research is that thinking is not something that is divorced from the body; instead, thinking is an activity strongly influenced by the body and the brain interacting with the environment.â8
That our mind and language are both somatically grounded is particularly observable in our metaphorical thinking and expressions. As George Lakoff and Mark Johnson indicate, a more concrete conceptual domain can function as a (usually somatic) basis from which a âconceptual metaphorâ emerges that allows a more abstract domain to be understood.9 For example, a metaphorical expression âwe have a long way to go before this project is doneâ is structured in relation to a concrete, recurrent bodily experience of walking on a journey, which functions as a somatic basis allowing us to understand the expression itself.10 Other metaphorical expressions that describe being in states like love or depression, such as âI am in loveâ or âshe is out of her depression,â further illustrate this point. In these expressions, abstract concepts like love and depression are metaphorically conceptualized through our repeated somatic experience of containment and containers. As Evans and Green indicate, due to the nature of our physical body, we experience an enclosed region in space (such as a room, a house, or an elevator) as a container that can constrain our activity, and this sort of embodied experience allows us to conceptualize states such as love or depression in which we usually feel unable to escape the situation or change our mood or behavior.11 By utilizing such metaphorical projections, recurrent patterns of somatic experience are an integral part of the functioning of human cognition and directly form our perception, conceptualization, and linguistic construction and articulation of the world.12 Thus, our recurrent embodied experience not only shapes the way we perceive and make sense of the world but also fundamentally influence the way we conceptualize more complex and abstract ideas. In this sense, Paul, and everyone else, had to think within the body.
This kind of impact of recurrent experience on human cognition and, consequently, on the construction of complex ideas is also a prominent phenomenon in ritual and religious experience in addition to experience in daily life. As a kind of bodily practice, ritual and religious activities create repeated patterns of bodily experience. Thus, religious activities not only express or symbolize ideas but also provide recurrent experiential patterns that generate ideas and linguistic expressions, a process that participants in religious activities might not be consciously aware of.13 Based on the concept of embodiment, the interface between bodily experience in religious activities and ideas articulated in texts is considered in this study as reciprocal and interactive. In other words, while practice and experience in religious activities reflect the theological ideas of Paul and his communities, these activities might also contribute to the development of ideas through experiential patterns.
Recently, based upon embodied cognition theory, Frederick S. Tappenden applied cognitive linguistic tools to the resurrection-related ideas in Paul and in Jewish traditions. In so doing, he breaks down resurrection ideas into experiential patterns. As I will introduce in Chapter 2, he demonstrates that these complex ideas about resurrection are fundamentally grounded in recurrent patterns of somatic experience and are imagined and expressed through conceptual metaphors. For example, through our repeated experience of verticality, such as perceiving a tree or climbing ladders, resurrection is usually conceptual...