Tackling Terrorism in Britain

Threats, Responses, and Challenges Twenty Years After 9/11

Steven Greer

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2021
• Print ISBN: 9781032117027
• eBook ISBN: 9781000469714
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Law
• Subtopic: Civil Rights in Law
• Index: Law

In September 2001, the world witnessed the horrific events of 9/11. A great deal has happened on the counterterrorist front in the 20 years since. While the terrorist threat has greatly diminished in Northern Ireland, the events of 9/11 and their aftermath have ushered in a new phase for the rest of the UK with some familiar, but also many novel, characteristics.

This ambitious study takes stock of counterterrorism in Britain in this anniversary year. Assessing current challenges, and closely mirroring the 'four Ps' of the official CONTEST counterterrorist strategy – Protect, Prepare, Prevent, and Pursue – it seeks to summarize and grasp the essence of domestic law and policy, without being burdened by excessive technical detail. It also provides a rigorous, context-aware, illuminating, yet concise, accessible, and policy-relevant analysis of this important and controversial subject, grounded in relevant social science, policy studies, and legal scholarship.

This book will be an important resource for students and scholars in law and social science, as well as human rights, terrorism, counterterrorism, security, and conflict studies.

1 Themes and trends

DOI: 10.4324/9781003221104-1

Introduction

Subject to peaks and troughs, terrorism and counterterrorism in Britain have been locked in a deadly embrace for at least a century and a half. The contemporary landscape is dominated by three distinct threats – from a national offshoot of global jihadism, from dissident Irish republicans, and from the far right. Other much less prevalent risks also lurk in the shadows. Modern domestic counterterrorist law and policy have also evolved over the decades, particularly since 9/11 in 2001. This chapter seeks to identify the key themes and trends which the remainder of the study will explore more thoroughly. These include relevant concepts and definitions, types and phases of terrorism in Britain, continuities and discontinuities in domestic counterterrorism, risk and resilience, evaluations of relevant law and policy, and the implications of wider challenges including Brexit and Covid-19.

Concepts and definitions

The two key concepts at the core of this study are, of course, ‘terrorism’ and ‘counterterrorism’, particularly in the domestic British context.

Terrorism

In spite of a massive literature, there is no consensus amongst scholars, jurists, security analysts, and policy-makers about whether there is such a thing as ‘terrorism’ and, if so, how it should be characterized. The term first entered the modern political lexicon as a label for the policy adopted by the Jacobins in the 1790s to defend the French Revolution from its foreign enemies and their suspected domestic allies. The guillotining of many innocent people in the indiscriminate ‘reign of terror’ which unfolded leaves no room for doubt that the state itself is capable of ‘terrorism’. However, the term ‘terrorism’ has since been more commonly applied to the activities of non-state actors using and threatening violence, particularly against soft civilian targets, in order to spread fear and insecurity in their conflict with the state, or in defending it from its adversaries.

Legal instruments in many states attempt to define non-state terrorism, and/or to list relevant crimes. Special processes to try such offences, and/or to deal with related issues, may also be provided. For instance, a schedule to the Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act 1973 provided a list of offences triable by Northern Ireland’s, now effectively defunct, single-judge, non-jury ‘Diplock’ courts.

According to the current UK legal definition found in section 1 of the Terrorism Act 2000, as amended, ‘terrorism’ includes action or threats, in pursuit of a political, religious, racial, or ideological cause – designed to influence the government, or an international governmental organization, or to intimidate all or part of the public through serious life-threatening violence – which presents a serious risk to public health or safety, serious damage to property, or serious interference with, or disruption to, an electronic system. This can be criticized as over-inclusive, particularly because it could, in theory, potentially embrace certain kinds of public protest, including criminal damage to property, and mobilization in the UK in support of armed resistance against tyranny abroad. It has, nevertheless, been adopted by other jurisdictions, is broadly compliant with international law, and has not often be litigated. ¹ There are, however, other approaches such as that found in the European Convention on the Prevention of Terrorism 2005 which, rather than attempting to define ‘terrorism’, instead provides an appendix citing ‘terrorist offences’ found in several other international conventions.

¹ C. Walker, Blackstone’s Guide to the Anti-Terrorism Legislation, 3rd edn. (Oxford University Press, 2014), p. 18.

Social science also offers various approaches which differ from their legal equivalents in several respects. Typically they cover a wider range of issues and debates, including for example analysis of historic trends such as the so-called four ‘waves’ (anarchist, anti-colonialist, new left/right, and religious); the relationship between terrorism, war, and crime; the distinction between instrumental and symbolic manifestations; and whether the term ‘terrorism’ merely describes a type of observable, ideological, or ‘grievance-motivated’ violence or, because it almost invariably involves the deliberate targeting of non-combatants as a matter of strategy, is inherently pejorative.

Synthesizing the most illuminating insights from the widest range of sources, ‘non-state terrorism’ for the purposes of this study is taken to be violence, and the threat thereof, arising from conflict against, or in defence of, the state. This is conducted by militarily and politically weak, but ideologically committed, movements, organizations, and individuals, generally involving attacks on officials, public and private institutions, property, and civilian targets. For those struggling against the regime, these activities are intended to deliver a dramatic and highly visible message to the authorities, the public, and the world in general, about the intolerability of certain grievances, to create a climate of fear and insecurity, to undermine the credibility and legitimacy of public institutions, to provoke counter-productive official over-reaction, and to cause or aggravate social division. In the ensuing crisis, whatever opportunities might arise for the advancement of related goals – including destabilization, propaganda, and recruitment – are also likely to be exploited. The primary goal of non-state terrorists seeking to defend the status quo is typically to attack, not only organized armed adversaries, but also indiscriminately the communities from which they are deemed to emanate. However, in spite of valiant attempts by jurists and social scientists, no clear bright line has yet been found to distinguish terrorism from, in particular, violent resistance to tyranny, hate crime, and violent protest including riots where potentially lethal weapons such as firearms and bombs are used.

Counterterrorism

It follows that ‘counterterrorism’ is anything and everything, official and unofficial, lawful and unlawful, legitimate and illegitimate (including terrorism itself), intended to address, respond to, or tackle ‘terrorism’, thus conceived, from other sources. But things are not, of course, so straightforward. There is, for example, the familiar ‘chicken-and-egg’ or ‘who-threw-the-first-stone?’ problem. Those who resort to terrorism, including against liberal democracies, typically claim merely to be reacting against ‘state terrorism’ or oppression at home and/or abroad. For example, during the Troubles in Northern Ireland the IRA justified its ‘armed struggle’ as simply the most recent instalment in a centuries-old war of ‘national liberation’ beginning when the English crown invaded and colonized Ireland from the 12th century onwards.

Attempting to settle such claims, is, however, far beyond the remit of this study. It can, nevertheless, be observed that the relationship between ‘non-state terrorism’ and official ‘counterterrorism’ is essentially symbiotic and interactive: one side delivers a blow, the other responds, the former replies, and so on. But, as we shall see, both in this chapter and in the study more generally, for liberal democracies the suite of possible responses is limited, not only by what is logistically possible, but also by what is politically, constitutionally, and normatively acceptable.

Types and phases of British domestic terrorism

Various milestones could be taken as points of reference in the long experience of terrorism in the UK, and in Britain in particular. However, for present purposes the onset of ‘the Troubles’ in Northern Ireland in the early-1970s provides a particularly convenient one. Since then, the UK’s domestic experience has fallen into three principal categories spanning two eras. ‘Troubles-based’ terrorism lasted from the early 1970s to 2003, the last year fatalities in this context reached double figures. Post-9/11 ‘British domestic jihadi’ terrorism, which continues to present the most significant challenge, began with the 7/7 London bombings in July 2005 and shows no sign of ending. ‘Miscellaneous terrorism’, including particularly the violence of the far right, and to a much lesser extent the far left, has waxed and waned over the past few decades. ²

² According to HM Government, CONTEST: The United Kingdom’s Strategy for Countering Terrorism, June 2018, Cm 9608, no animal rights, extreme left wing, or environmental group is ‘currently assessed as posing a security threat’, para. 63.

Between 1970 and the end of 2020 there were just over 3,300 fatalities in the UK as a result of all kinds of terrorism. ³ The majority, between 1970 and 1990 (86 per cent), the period with the highest casualty rate, were in Northern Ireland. Amongst other things, Chapter 3 considers the threat posed by dissident Irish republicans, the only protagonist in the Northern Irish conflict with an enduring commitment to organized violence, including against targets in mainland Britain. Give or take a handful of incidents which could plausibly be regarded either as acts of terrorism or hate crimes, from the 7/7 London bombings to July 2020 there were 107 fatalities due to terrorism in mainland Britain, an annual average of 7.1. ⁴ The vast majority of these, 96 per cent, were perpetrated by jihadis, all but one of which, the Glasgow airport bombing of 2007, were in England. Jihadi terrorists also accounted for just short of 100 per cent of the non-fatal casualties. These figures are all significantly lower than the homicide rate for England and Wales (an annual average of 507 between April 2012 and March 2015), ⁵ for fatal stabbings (285 in England and Wales from March 2017 to March 2018), ⁶ and for deaths in road traffic accidents in Great Britain, just over 1,752 in 2019 alone. ⁷ Indeed, globally, more people die as a result of suicide than from terrorism, crime, and armed conflict combined. ⁸

³ G. Allen and N. Dempsey, Terrorism in Great Britain: The Statistics, House of Commons Library Briefing Paper CBP7613, 6 October 2017, 5. See also Appendix A. ⁴ See Appendix A. ⁵ Office for National Statistics, Compendium: Homicide, ‘Expected Homicide Incidents per Day’, available at: www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/crimeandjustice/compendium/focusonviolentcrimeandsexualoffences/yearendingmarch2015/chapter2homicide. ⁶ A. Walker, ‘Fatal Stabbings in England and Wales at Highest Level for More than 70 Years’, The Guardian, 8 February 2019. ⁷ Department for Transport, Statistical Release: Reported Road Casualties in Great Britain – 2019 Annual Report, 30 September 2020. ⁸ S. Pinker, Enlightenment Now: The Case for Reason, Science, Humanism and Progress (Allen Lane, 2018), p. 192.

However, casualty figures do not tell the whole story. For one thing, it is said that since 2005, scores of terrorist plots, most of them jihadi, have been thwarted. ⁹ And, unlike many other hazards, terrorism not only poses risks to life and limb, but also damages property, public institutions, transport systems, the economy, the sense of safety in public places, and community relations. Its grim theatricality also tends to instil a sense of public fear wholly disproportionate to the risk, itself one of the core terrorist objectives. So, although jihadi terrorism may not pose an ‘existential threat’ to Britain or to the UK, it nevertheless presents a problem which neither government nor society can, or should, ignore.

⁹ See Chapter 3.

Chapters 2 and 3 discuss the three types of terrorism to which the UK has been exposed since the 1970s, and their respective backgrounds. The main conclusion is that, although each is an instance of the same generic phenomenon – ‘terrorism’ – otherwise they could hardly be more different. In spite of some international dimensions, the Troubles were essentially a local conflict over whether Northern Ireland should remain part of the UK or become part of the Republic of Ireland. This effectively occurred within the parameters of modern European liberal democracy and was conducted by protagonists who, notwithstanding protestations to the contrary, share a great deal in common. Similarly, the terrorism of the British far left and far right, though not devoid of international dimensions, was and remains largely national in origin and focus. By contrast, British domestic jihadi terrorism is a national manifestation of a world-wide phenomenon motivated by the goal of establishing an ultimately global Islamic caliphate governed by a particularly uncompromising interpretation of Islamic law, the Sharia. Conducted by those from many races, ethnicities, languages, and nationalities, it is also compromised by multiple tribal, sectarian, and other rivalries which divide Muslims from each other as much as, if not more than, the jihadi cause unites and pits them against everyone else. In fact, ‘Muslims remain the most numerous victims of terrorism, far outnumbering members of other faiths in many of the countries where terrorist-related activity is most prevalent’. ¹⁰

¹⁰ M. Hill QC, The Terrorism Acts in 2017: Report of the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation on the Operation of the Terrorism Acts 2000 and 2006, the Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act 2011, and the Terrorist Asset Freezing etc. Act 2010, October 2018, pp. 3 and 18.

Reflecting the background characteristics of the Troubles and jihadi conflicts, other differences explored more fully in Chapter 3, include grievances, ideologies, and goals; intended beneficiaries; modes of mobilization including types of movement and/or organization; targets, especially the willingness to cause mass civilian casualties; the weaponization of suicide; the role of freelancers and loners; and the contribution of existential and mental health crises to recruitment.

Continuity and discontinuity in British domestic counterterrorism

Over the past few decades, domestic counterterrorism in the UK has also exhibited a complex amalgam of continuity and discontinuity. ¹¹ The central trends have included the ‘growing profusion, scope and complexity’ of counterterrorist law, ¹² increasing emphasis upon protection and prevention, and a decisive shift in official policy from attempting to ‘hold the ring’, pending the negotiation of a political solution as during the Troubles, ¹³ to managing risk and increasing public resilience on the assumption that no viable off-the-peg solution to any of the current domestic terrorist threats can even be conceived let alone implemented. There are also significant differences in the extent to which everyday life was securitized in Northern Ireland at the height of the Troubles compared with that in mainland Britain today. Core issues concern the collection and processing of intelligence, the management and supervision of counterterrorist law and policy, how the tension between liberty and security is structured by the Human Rights Act, and the official counterterrorist framework, CONTEST.

¹¹ See S. Greer, ‘Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism in the UK: From Northern Irish Troubles to Global Islamic Jihad’ in G. Lennon, C. King, and C. McCartney (...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half-Title
• Series
• Title
• Copyright
• Dedication
• Contents
• Preface
• 1 Themes and trends
• 2 Global jihad
• 3 Domestic terrorism
• 4 Protect and Prepare
• 5 Prevent
• 6 Pursue
• 7 Threats, responses, and challenges
• Appendix A: Fatal terrorist incidents in the UK, 2005–20
• Appendix B: Chronology of key events, 1997–2020
• Index