Russia and the World in the Putin Era

From Theory to Reality in Russian Global Strategy

Roger E. Kanet, Dina Moulioukova, Roger E. Kanet, Dina Moulioukova

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2021
• ISBN:
  9781000451252
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Politique et relations internationales
• Subtopic: Sécurité nationale

This volume examines the role of Russia in the world under President Putin's rule.

When the Soviet Union disintegrated after the Cold War, Russia seemingly embarked on the establishment of a democratic political system and seemed intent on joining the liberal international order. However, under President Putin's rule, there have been dramatic shifts in Russian domestic and foreign policies, in order to re-establish itself as a great power. This book examines broad aspects of Russian political culture and threat perception, such as Russia's reaction to NATO expansion; its information warfare and energy policies; and its policy towards the Global South, especially the Middle East and Africa. The objective of the analyses is to explain the factors that influence Russian foreign policy, and to show how and why Russian relations with the European Union and the United States have deteriorated so rapidly in recent years. The volume introduces an alternative approach to the standard realist perspective, which often underlies existing analyses of Russian policy – namely, the work offers a theoretical perspective that focuses on the Russian sense of identity and on ontological security.

This book will be of much interest to students of Russian foreign policy, security studies, and International Relations.

Part I
Sources and tools of Russian foreign policy

1 Russia’s self-image as a great power¹

Dina Moulioukova with Roger E. Kanet

DOI: 10.4324/9781003190417-1

It would be naïve to attempt a comprehensive analysis of Russian identity in one short chapter, given that Russian identity is complex, multidimensional and broad. Identity is not a static phenomenon, but is rather in a continual process of formation and contestation. Yet, despite its manifold nature with regard to nation-states, there does seem to be a consensus on certain narratives that dominate a country’s biographical discourse. One of them, in the case of Russia, is its self-perception as a great power (Adomeit 1995; Hopf 2002; Kanet 2007; Neumann 2008; Mankoff 2009). This self-perception as a great power – an important status position for the country – is one of the fundamental aspects of Russia’s identity and its sense of ontological security. Indeed, the great power narrative ties together ontological² and physical security in the country’s history. Historically, Russia’s identity and sense of ontological security were constructed in response to its physical security needs. With time, repeated use of this biographical narrative of great power was embedded into Russia’s sense of identity.

This unconscious ontological awareness on the part of Russian leaders made addressing physical security needs contingent upon the continuity of the country’s biographical narrative of being a great power. Such a dependency constitutes an “ontological trap” that, at times, dictates Russia’s foreign policy choices and threatens its physical security. For example, as Stephen Kotkin (2016) notes, Putin’s foreign policy stance is less a reaction to external pressures and more a recurrent pattern driven by internal factors – embedded routines of the country’s ontological security.

There are two important aspects of the construction of an agent’s ontological security. First are the experiences that influence the formation of the agent’s ontological awareness during its formative years. Second is the degree of routinization of these experiences. With time, this ontological awareness becomes further embedded through routine and practice that create predictability and allow agents to avoid anxiety about the unknown. The more routinized these experiences, the more embedded they become in the agent’s ontological security and, thus, agents apply them less consciously when making decisions. Therefore, the experiences of the emerging Russian state in defending its physical security needs and projecting a position of power created a basis for its ontological self-awareness as a strong power capable of projecting influence (great power). In addition, in order to become the basis of the country’s ontological security, these experiences had to be embedded through habitual use.

Such routinization is subjective and prone to social construction. What is particularly important is that such social construction and routinization are determined by whoever serves as the custodian of the collective memory of a polity. Since memory is highly selective, the custodian determines what experiences should be further routinized (Prizel 1998). The custodian, therefore, has the ability and the power either to deepen the use of ontological practices or to erode them through disuse (Ledoux 2003; Burton 2009​​​​​).

In order to demonstrate how Russia has navigated its foreign policy through an ontological security lens, several historical conditions must be analyzed. Thus, we shall proceed through a particular set of explorations. At the beginning is an overview of the importance that geography has historically played in determining the nature of Russia’s physical security threats, both economic and geopolitical. Following that is an analysis of how Russia’s response to these threats has affected the construction of its ontological security in three distinct and interconnected ways. First, Russia’s ontological beliefs emerged in a consolidated state, personified by a strong leader as a guarantor of physical security and power status. This belief is important within the context of the historically communal nature of Russian society. Second, Russia’s imperial identity has been shaped by physical security threats and the ways that they connect to Russia’s power status. Unlike other empires, imperial expansion in Russia was taking place at the time of its emergence as a consolidated state. Imperial identity, therefore, is deeply engrained in the sense of Russia’s ontological security. Third, the West plays a significant role in the content of Russia’s ontological awareness as a great power.

Russia as a great power

Different analysts note that Russia’s perception of itself as a great power is one of the crucial elements of its identity (Adomeit 1995; Neumann 2008; Thorun 2009). Among many possible narratives, one has been prevalent among Russia’s leadership: discourse on great power status. Despite the fact that sources of greatness and their implications have changed significantly from civil and historical to geopolitical and economic, the discourse itself has remained consistent for the most part. Hopf (2002) notes the continuity of the great power discourse that survived not only the historical evolution of the country but also its ideological shift from the U.S.S.R. to Russia. In 1955, while the former Soviet Union considered itself to be a great power during the Cold War, it seemed to feel the need to reassure other states that, despite being a great power, it was not a traditional one ideologically. As Soviet Foreign Minister Semenov responded to the concerns of Egypt regarding its close relations with the U.S.S.R., “Egypt can be certain that the Soviet Union isn’t a crocodile which can suddenly unleash its jaws and gobble up Egypt” (cited in Hopf 2002, 200). In 1999, after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, this differentiation from other great powers was not at the top of the country’s agenda. The great power discourse continued, however, maintaining its dominant position despite the country’s ideological shift (Hopf 2002, 157).

Russia continued its great power discourse despite economic and political challenges after the end of the Cold War and the subsequent dissolution of the Soviet Union. In 1996, when the government’s approval ratings were in single digits, Evgeny Primakov, as Russia’s new Minister of Foreign Affairs, saw his primary role as strengthening the effort “to protect Russia’s national interest” as a great power and having a policy that reflected this status (Primakov 1996). Despite their vocal disagreements on what it meant for Russia to be great, they concurred that it was “doomed to be a great power” by virtue of being Russia (Kozyrev 1994, p. 62).

While great power status is important for both Russia and the West, it seems that the two entities understand it differently. Some Russian scholars emphasize the perceptions of the Western states. For example, Krashennikova (2007) argues that the status misunderstandings and gaps between Russia and the West stem predominantly from systemic misinterpretations by the West of conditions in Russia. She goes on to claim that Western depictions are so distorted that Russians hardly recognize their country from the accounts presented in the West.

Other scholars center their arguments on perceptional inconsistencies of both agents. Forsberg (2014), for example, suggests that, conceptually, both actors have different understandings of what it means to be a great power. He attributes issues between Russia and the West to the gaps in perceptions of the factors that contribute to Russia’s status. Therefore, while Russians consider some aspects of their country’s identity to be status-enhancing, Western analysts consider them to be status-diminishing. Russia’s great power status is tied to a variety of objective factors with an emphasis on geographic location (Leichtova 2014). Russia is the largest country in the world, and stretches over two continents. It is understood that security threats exist in border areas, as well as to Russia’s political and economic interests. Russia’s identity as a great power is, thus, closely connected with the Russian state geographically and geopolitically.

Along with Leichtova, Richard Pipes (1995)³ considers geography to be one of the crucial factors in the construction of Russia’s perception of itself and the world around it, forming part of the country’s ontological awareness. He ties this ontological awareness to the nature of Russia’s geographically determined physical security, both economically and geopolitically. In the Realist School of international relations, great power status is closely linked to a state’s ability to withstand threats and to project power. For Russia, the nature of physical threats has historically called for the consolidation of power into a strong centralized state represented by a strong leader capable of withstanding threats and projecting power. In addition, geographically determined geopolitical influences from Asia further contributed to the establishment of a strong patrimonial state in Russia. While physical security threats prompted the ontological need for a strong leader, the communal nature of Russian society allowed it to embed further and to routinize this belief. The need for a strong leader in Russia, therefore, demands a guarantor of a strong state and great power status. The leader ensures external physical security to its citizens, while exercising unlimited domestic power. There is a continuity of this belief throughout Russian history. The political regime established in Russia between the 12th and 17th centuries, with certain modifications, has survived to the present day (Pipes 1995; Trenin 2002; Mankoff 2009; Tsygankov 2014). This regime, characterized by a strong, consolidated state, is therefore embedded in the notion of Russian identity. In pre-revolutionary times, the strong state manifested itself in Russia through an autocratic monarchy. In Soviet times, it was replaced by an equally strong Single Party state with a strong monopoly of power. In contemporary Russia, this notion has been constructed into a unique definition of sovereign democracy that, according to Andrei Tsygankov (2014), reflects the distinct nature of Russia’s biographical continuity.

Another historically embedded characteristic of Russian authority is the network nature of its state. Conceptualized as a means of less formal interaction, networks, in general, link individuals and groups that share similar interests and allegiances. In Russia, the members of the networks do not operate from the outside, as could happen in the case of other countries’ networks, but rather hold high-ranking positions within the state and are integral to it (Kononenko 2011, p. 6). Historically networks permeated almost all areas of policy in Russia. Currently, they influence and shape the relations between the federal center and the regions, foreign policy and the military. As a result, these allegiances cut across bureaucratic structures and defunct institutions, defining the current state of the country (Kononenko 2011). Hence, the policy-making rhetoric of a “strong state” and “national interest” is infused with “special interests” of the state-private actors.

In its present manifestation, the “sistema,” as the current political regime is referred to by noted Russian political analyst Gleb Pavlovsky (2016), with its complex practice of decision-making and power management, comprises one of the core elements of the country’s ontological security. The “sistema,” for Pavlovsky, combines the idea that the state enjoys unlimited access to all national resources, both public and private, and that it turns people into operating resources in a breach of their rights. It is a “deep seated facet of Russian culture that goes beyond politics and ideology” and could persist long after the end of Putin’s rule (Pavlovsky 2016, 14).

Its establishment in Russia can be traced to the country’s response to economic security needs. Russia’s geographic location compelled people who inhabited it to operate within a very narrow band of options. A harsh climate and the unequal distribution of rainfall are the major reasons why Russia has averaged one bad harvest out of every three with very low yields. In addition, the highly unproductive and wasteful nature of Russian agriculture pushed the country toward constant agricultural expansion in the search for virgin lands. By placing more land under cultivation, Russia sought to practice extensive rather than intensive agriculture. Since the rich, desirable so...