Sociology of Love

The Agapic Dimension of Societal Life

Gennaro Iorio

• Publisher: Vernon Press
• Year: 2016
• eBook ISBN: 9781622731633
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Social Sciences
• Subtopic: Sociology
• Index: Social Sciences

This short book deals with a sociological concept: love-agape. It is an attempt to demonstrate that love-agape resists, indeed insists, as a fact that cannot be reduced or concealed. Its simple goal is to introduce agape into the vocabulary of sociological analysis by demonstrating its potential to demarcate and to interpret social phenomena. Love-agape is presented as a critical concept. On the one hand, love-agape denounces the risks linked to the needs of closed groups, often absolutist and fundamentalist. On the other hand, it represents a concrete reality, lying at the root of a particular type of sociality. A sociality that, rather unconventionally, recognizes differences and distances, but also characterizes their condition of being together, as community founded on the recognition and respect of subjectivity.

Chapter 1 What is agape

In the sixties, David Matza denounced the existence of the ‘syndrome of Columbus’ among the world’s sociologists. He wanted to show that researchers often proposed new concepts that are not always useful in interpreting social reality (Matza, 1966), a tendency still alive today among scholars involved in this debate, each of whom, in their anxiety to interpret the new social configurations, propose conceptual novelties that are not always necessary to social analysis. The new concepts create a sense of frustration among scholars, in so much as they mine the necessary process of accumulation of knowledge that is typical of every scientific discipline. The objective of this chapter is to propose the concept of agape to social contemporary theory. It is ancient for theological research, and in many aspects, philosophical as well, but unprecedented for social sciences if not for more recent work such as Luc Boltanski’s (2007). The effort to define the concept of agape, to trace its epistemological outlines so as to use it for empirical analysis, seems to us necessary to describe a social reality ‘seen yet not recognized’ by the conceptual apparatus used by current social sciences (Gouldner, 1997). Such an approach can be placed in the perspective of critical theory .

1.1 The Rediscovery of Love

Recently, sociology has rediscovered the concept of love, although researched in its meaning as that restricted to the dimension of eros and the sphere of couples. Doing some review on this topic, one can come across some great frameworks: the historical and at times diagnostic one by Sorokin; those of Elias , Giddens , Beck and Bauman ; the one focused on sex as an exemplary case of interactive ritual by Randall Collins; and the one done to analyze the processes of commercialization of love by Arlie R. Hochschild , typical of a modernity characterized by calculation and quantification (Hochschild , 2003/2006). But there are other analyses on love, like those produced by Foucault on sexuality, seen as a form of experience. Such research has brought to the fore how individuals have been induced to recognize themselves as subjects of desire, as well as discovering in desire the truth of their being, first through an hermeneutical practice, and then through a disciplinary science, such as the bio-medical and psycho-pathological one (1978).

According to Elias (1988), in the course of the process of civilization, intimacy is gradually confined to the private sphere in so far as it became an activity relegated to the behind the scenes. The bedroom, carefully hidden, becomes the lawful space for intimacy, while in public it generates embarrassment and shame. Since humanity no longer felt threatened by extinction, eros became separated from its biological justification and, as such, became a key element for constituting and continuing conjugal relations. Nowadays, eros has reached the point where we are seeing a further separation between conjugality and sexuality.

We point in merit to the contribution of Luhmann , for whom love corresponds to a peculiar communicative code. The communication convergence is, by definition, problematic, there being a contingency in the way in which a message emitted by Ego can be received by Alter. Given this multiplicity of possible meanings attributable to such an act, what would guarantee a semantic convergence? Here, Luhmann introduces the concept of code or symbolic medium, whose function it is to increase the disposition of the speakers to accept what is being said, selectively tightening the meaning of possible alternatives. Among these codes is love, in virtue of which the probability that a message put forward by Ego (as a request, prayer, offer, silence) be accepted by Alter, will be higher than its eventual refusal. Love works by convincing Alter of the goodness of the message put forth by Ego (Luhmann , 1987).

Giddens , instead, in his The Transformation of Intimacy (1995), rebuilds the passage from a marriage arranged on the basis of economic factors (therefore not a union bound by mutual attraction, but a family affair for the perpetuation of progeny and the conservation of patrimony) to the birth of romantic love.

The ideals of romantic love, spread by the first mass literary genre, the romance, meant as courtship, and the tale of an amorous relationship as a ‘story,’ represent one of the factors that liberated a marriage union from a relationship of convenience. From an immutable parental system that had been sent down through the generations, now, a way arises of establishing ties based on intimacy and sexuality. Romantic love, so to speak, takes the place of possessions and income in the search for a partner. Husbands and wives start to appear as partners in a common sentimental enterprise, which has precedence even over jobs and children. The home becomes an environment separated from work and, in contrast with the instrumental nature of this latter, coincides with the place for affection.

To this end, Giddens defines the concept of ‘converging love,’ or, rather, he presupposes the end of romantic ethos, which implies a strong asymmetry in the couple, and a contemporary domestic subjugation for the woman. What seems to be happening today is the possibility of a ‘pure relationship,’ characterized by sentimental, emotional and sexual equality between the partners, which is negotiable and worthy of continuation only if there are benefits therein for both, or if both retain it to be emotionally gratifying. The current ‘divorcing society’ is a demonstration and consequence thereof, when it indeed does not end in violence as many official statistics show (Giddens , 1995:59). It is on this last possibility − that of interrupting the relationship at any time − that Bauman ’s critical reflection is inserted (2004). In Liquid Modernity society, in which identity and lifestyle, as well as careers, must be constantly re-elaborated, emotional ties also become flexible. According to Bauman , although anxious to establish relationships, we are fearful of remaining trapped in stable relationships. Such anxiety is compensated for by turning to the principle of consumerist capriciousness: we do not build a relationship, yet a number of needs are satisfied. A symptom of this attitude is the obligation of staying perennially connected with a large crowd of people. The language of connection progressively substitutes that of relationship. And each connection is, by definition, a temporary one and therefore, substitutable: to disconnect is, in fact, a likewise legitimate choice. From Bauman ’s point of view, nothing is lasting, save for the speed of change: it would be this rhythm to redeem. Certainly, in late-modern societies, because of geographical mobility both for work and affection, the social circles to which we belong are multiple and varied, and our identity , as well as the social relationships we build, are not written in a compulsory destiny. From this brief exposition we can gather, firstly, that the topic of love is an object of study in recent sociological productions and it has been also for the reflection of authoritatively represented classics by Simmel , Weber , and Sorokin, whom we will speak about in the following chapter.

Finally, it is important to note how the sources, the empirical reference of a great part of the studies we cite, with the exception of Elias and that of Giddens , Luhmann , Beck or Hochschild have lost the sense of the real person. In fact, they refer to tales, romances, as well as questions by readers to experts, tabloid papers, and internet announcements. People, and their actions, the meanings given to actions, and observations, disappear in a path of abstraction of representations of love: people are substituted by celebrities. We must, however, realize that love, the object of analysis, is rooted ever more, on the one hand, in the private life of people, losing social meaning or assuming a relevance only as indirect and secondary affection, while on the other hand, it is prevailingly understood in the sense of eros , as a couple, affectivity and emotionality. But if we partake in this new sociological observation of love as eros , which at times stammers on the sense of love as philia , it has generally remained silent on that of agape. However, there are other authors who have considered love as a force capable of generating social bonds, of transforming or reviving human relationships. It is a love that is rooted in the public actions of people, which pervades the living together of singles, of social groups and of communities; that is, agapic action.

Be it in traditional French criticism, as in the German one, a recent review of social criticism was begun starting from the concept of love. In Germany , the revision of critical theory has been done by Axel Honneth. We wish to discuss two aspects of the rich social philosophy of Honneth (2009). In first place, in his most recent writings, he underlines that love and respect − as well as rights − are necessary so that human beings may be able to live autonomously. This inter-subjective recognition is intended as a prerequisite for individual autonomy.

Secondly, Honneth sustains that the multiplication of spheres of recognition requires a more complex historic rebuilding than a mere referral to institutional realizations brought by the historically placed proceduralism of Habermas , who, from this point of view, puts distance between himself and his teacher (Honneth, 1992). For Honneth, normative theory should not build a neutral point of view from which principles of justice may be identified and extrapolated. Rather, it should rebuild those principles on the basis of historical processes of recognition in which they are already effective as rules for mutual respect and consideration. Significantly, Honneth sustains that such a theory can have ‘trust in historical reality’ because socialized subjects already have, as a guide, the principles that theory must only explicate. This move is an opportune and necessary historification of the debate on normative principles.

In France, the starting point is the ‘sociology of critical ability’ (1999) by Luc Boltanski and Laurant Thèvenot, who define in the subjects’ daily practices, rather than in a detached theory, the source of social criticism. Boltanski introduces a new distinction between reality and the world, configured by moral and regulatory parameters, which show that every ‘reality’ presented is always only one of the many possible realities. Since human beings are ergonomic creatures, they are always capable of relating to a reality in such a way that a division between reality and the world may emerge. This is the place of criticism (1999). In De la Justification, Boltanski identifies two types of criticisms: the ‘reformist ’ and the ‘radical .’ Reformist criticism concerns those inadequate practices in respect to expectations and are criticized for this very reason; radical criticism , instead, comes from experiences of injustice and humiliation which are not represented in society’s institutional framework. In this context, Boltanski discusses the concept of agape, which we will consider more in depth shortly.

Briefly then, in a world without foundations, the root of criticism is offered by the historical ability of subjects immersed in their daily lives, of sharing a critical normative picture of reality. The space for criticism is given by the distance between ‘reality’ and the regulatory world possible but, at the same time, detected in historical procedures.

In the Italian context, we have noted a renewed interest in love, no only did two scientific reviews, that are, Sociologia (2011) and Societa’. Mutamento e Politica (2011) dedicates an exclusive issue to it, but also various scholars have analyzed this topic, pointing out the need to look at love for its social relevance. In this context, we are interested in highlighting the work of Pierpaolo Donati , according to whom love awaits for ‘a conceptual patrimony that is not always available' (Donati , 2011a, p.170) and observes an inadequacy in the symbolism of eros , philia and agape in our differentiated societies (ibid., p.174) and therefore highlights the need for a new configuration of love.

In keeping with his relational sociology, he highlights that:

“love, as seen as relationship, is the care of the Other… in as much as the subject in/of a relationship that otherwise would not exist without him/her.” (ibid., p.177).

Further on, he underscores that love is a symbolic code of the latency that communicates to the other codes, (eros , agape and philia ) how they should operate. Donati means to say that the constitutive need of a human being is to be in relationship, which offers the possibility to the different declinations of love to manifest themselves. The analysis by Donati appears to be truly interesting because it re-proposes the topic of love and highlights its social relevance. All the same, it appears reductive when it deals with the different forms of love, considering them as the difference generally of a type that is the latent metacode of relationships of caring, and, in addition, restricts love to care - thus recalling, in an implicit manner, the Homeric root of the verb agapan.

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Table of contents

• Chapter 1 What is agape
• Chapter 2 What Agape is not
• Chapter 3 Love in the sociological tradition
• Chapter 4 The agape: the micro and the macro.
• Chapter 5 Case Studies
• Chapter 6 Epilogue
• Index