The Rhetoric of Brexit Humour

Comedy, Populism and the EU Referendum

Simon Weaver

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2021
• Print ISBN: 9781032100708
• eBook ISBN: 9781000452563
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Social Sciences
• Subtopic: Sociology
• Index: Social Sciences

Since 2016 there has been an outpouring of humour, comedy and satire on the United Kingdom's EU Referendum and decision to leave the EU, or Brexit. This book examines the relationship between Brexit and its comedy, exploring how Brexit and comedy are connected in both Leave and Remain discourse.

It argues that both populism and comedy are rhetorical in nature and so are linked through their semantic structure and communicative potential. Considering the incongruities that Brexit presents for British society, the author analyses the populism that has emerged from those incongruities in the form of ironic, ambiguous and dichotomous discourse. Through the analysis of a range of comedy on the EU Referendum and Brexit, including material from stand-up and situation comedy, and political satire of various types, The Rhetoric of Brexit Humour examines the way in which comedy acts as a rhetoric that draws on, supports and attacks the discourses of Brexit. This provides not just an advance in our understanding of political satire but also a clearer description of the nature of populism.

This book will appeal to sociologists, political scientists, media and communications scholars, and anyone interested in Brexit, populism and comedy.

1Leave or remain?

Unpacking the dichotomies of the EU Referendum and Brexit populism

DOI: 10.4324/9780429329715-2

This chapter examines the key characteristics of the EU Referendum, Brexit discourse and Brexit populism, as dichotomous phenomena that create incongruities and require rhetorical support. Humour and comedy are both social activities that can provide this support but also undermine populism. The chapter begins with a discussion of the three historical theories of humour and comedy, which elaborate on the useful functions of humour for populism. In Part One of the chapter, populist ambiguity, humour and comedy are connected in three ways. First, it is demonstrated that the social conditions in which populism emerges are identical to the conditions in which certain humour styles emerge. Next, it is shown that populism contains paradoxical tendencies for order-building and fragmentation or ambiguity, and that humour and comedy are unique tools that facilitate the former and alleviate the latter. Lastly in this section, populism is shown to be othering, and humour and comedy are revealed to be key facilitators of this process. In Part Two of the chapter, the six key themes of Brexit populism are outlined. It is demonstrated that these all employ rhetoric and humour. These are the specific incongruities of Brexit populism, as stark oppositions appear between it and its anti-populism. The key themes that are elaborated on are those from Moore and Ramsey (2017), who document six themes of Brexit discourse from both politicians and press that emerge in the ten-week referendum campaign (from 15th April to 23rd June 2016). These are: the establishment; economy; immigration; sovereignty; dishonesty; and fear (ibid: 5). These themes are shown to be dichotomous incongruities that are constructed through rhetoric and which are expressed and attacked in instances of humour and comedy. The themes are returned to throughout the book in different contexts.

The three theories of (Brexit) humour

Theories of humour have outlined the dominant tendencies, functions and impacts of humour and comedy. This section applies humour theory in an analysis of humour and comedy about the EU Referendum and Brexit populism, paying particular attention to the significance of the incongruous structure of both.

There has been an historical focus on three ‘grand narratives’, philosophies or theories of humour as the leading modes for interpreting laughter, humour and comedy. These are the superiority theory, the incongruity theory and the relief theory. These theories are useful for understanding humour and comedy about the EU Referendum, Brexit and Brexit populism. In addition, each theory, while offering fundamental observations on the nature of humour and comedy, aids the development of an understanding of Brexit populism through what it can offer to a description of the emergence and structure of populism itself, and the connections between populism, humour and comedy.

The first ‘grand narrative’ of humour and comedy is the superiority theory. This set of ideas are best summarised as the notion that jokes, humour and comedy offer the opportunity to laugh at the target of the joke or connected groups and individuals that are inferred or connoted in the joke-telling. Because of this, superiority theory suggests that humour and comedy can act as ridicule or aggression. This is the oldest theory of laughter and comedy and has been attributed to Plato and Aristotle (Aristotle, 1997, 2012; Morreall, 1987, 2008; Plato, 2017). It was the foremost interpretation in the West until the Renaissance, at which point the incongruity theory and the relief theory were developed by several writers.¹

Superiority theory was usually motivated by viewing humour and comedy as phenomena that should be controlled by those in power, and that ridicule and laughter should be feared because they might have the potential to destabilise social order if they were directed at the ruling classes. Despite its roots in conservativism and hegemony, superiority theory helps to elicit an understanding of humour and comedy directed at marginalised groups and/or those subject to prejudice (Billig, 2005; Weaver, 2011a), such as marginalised gender, class or racialised groups. In Ancient Greece, laughter and comedy were generally viewed with suspicion by philosophers. Plato took a particularly hard line towards comedy and argued that it would be banned in his fictional republic (Morreall, 2008, 2014). Aristotle was more moderate and wrote that although comic devices should not be overused, they could be employed as rhetoric and that a balance between comedy and seriousness was important (Aristotle, 2012). Superiority theories are returned to throughout history, for example, Thomas Hobbes employed superiority theory to explain laughter as cruelty and connected it with a sense of sudden glory:

Sudden glory, is the passion which makes those grimaces called laughter; and is caused either by some sudden act of their own, that pleases them; or by the apprehension of some deformed thing in another, by comparison whereof they suddenly applaud themselves.

(1651/1968: 125)

Building on the notion of laughter at ‘deformity’ that was identified by Plato (2017), Hobbes continues with a critique of the tendency to laugh at the expense of the ‘defects’ displayed by other people:

…it is incident most to them, that are conscious of the fewest abilities in themselves; who are forced to keep themselves in their own favour, by observing the imperfections of other men – And therefore much Laughter at the defects of others, is a sign of Pusillanimity.

(ibid: 125)

For Hobbes, laughter demonstrated a lack of courage and was therefore an easy victory. For other philosophers, laughter, humour and comedy are connected with social power relations. For instance, Friedrich Nietzsche argued that there is a connection between humour, teasing and feelings of power over others:

Malice does not aim at the suffering of the other in and of itself, but rather at our own enjoyment… Every instance of teasing shows that it gives us a pleasure to release our power on the other person and experience an enjoyable feeling of superiority…

(1878/2015: 21)

Nietzsche's comment points towards a connection between humour and comedy, the infliction of suffering, and the enactment of power. This suggests that humour and comedy are useful for hegemonic reproduction or indeed social change. Superiority theory as the explanation of the potential of humour and comedy to ridicule, reinforce, disrupt or resist power relations has become a central argument in much ‘critical humour studies’ (Lockyer and Pickering, 2008). In recent years, this field has grown and superiority theory has become a component of general theories of humour and ridicule (Billig, 2005) and studies of the role of humour and comedy in a number of social divisions, such as racialisation and racism (Weaver, 2011a; Pérez, 2016, 2017; Pérez and Ward, 2019), and gender and sex discrimination (Abedinifard, 2016a, 2016b, 2016c, 2019; Pérez and Greene, 2016). Returning to the EU Referendum and Brexit populism, in the later chapters of this book, we will see how serious and humorous discourses on Brexit contain myriad claims of superiority over the other side and that there is frequent ridicule of opponents. We will see that humorous ridicule, or the laugh of superiority, is central to the enactment of the dichotomous discourses of Brexit populism and its anti-populism.

Incongruity theory is the second of the three theories of humour. This is the most significant for understanding the relationship between humour, comedy, the EU Referendum and Brexit populism. In Part Two of this chapter, the central incongruities of Brexit discourse are presented. It is shown how the key themes of the EU Referendum and Brexit populism not only express but also build on the incongruous and ambiguous themes of populism (outlined in the Introduction). The central incongruities of the EU Referendum and Brexit populism are demonstrated, mediated and resolved in Brexit humour and comedy, and this is illustrated throughout the book.

Like superiority theory, incongruity theory is an old set of ideas. It is first referenced to Aristotle in The Art of Rhetoric, where contrasts (or incongruities) as examples of ‘liveliness’ are documented in relation to metaphor, simile and jokes (2012: 182–190). Despite this mention, incongruity theory does not receive the attention of superiority theory and detailed elaboration did not occur until the 18th century (Morreall, 2008: 225). Incongruity signals a lack of harmony or fit and describes the coming together in some form of two or more objects or concepts that do not usually fit together in a material or conceptual way. In relation to jokes, humour and comedy, it signifies the surprise (Attardo, 2014: 383), the unexpected (Critchley, 2002: 3), the inconsistent (Berger, 1998: 3), or the lack of usual conceptual pairing that demarcates humour and joking from more literal or serious communication. It is incongruity that is the central or structural, rhetorical device of humour. There is debate over the extent that incongruities are resolved in humour (Attardo, 2014: 384), and such debate is also unresolved and ultimately struggles with the vastness of humour tropes that offer different conclusions or ‘pictures’ of resolution. In Part Two, the central incongruities of Brexit discourse are explained by looking at how they create humour, and how the incongruities of Leave and Remain discourses are given rhetorical expression through humour and comedy.

The third theory of humour is relief or release theory. This, like the incongruity theory, is said to have developed in the 18th and 19th century (Morreall, 1998: 39; 2008: 221). Relief theory contains the idea that people gain a sense of psychological relief or release from laughter, joking and humour. One of the best-known relief theorists, Sigmund Freud, proposed two directions for the idea of jokes, humour and release. In Jokes and their Relation to the Unconscious (1905/1991), Freud argued that jokes are an expression of unconscious pleasure and release. In a later essay on humour, it is the superego that laughs at the terror of the world (Freud, 1927/1968). The relief theory of humour is useful for explaining the transference of the emotion provoked by Brexit populism and anti-populism away from serious populist discourse – which may contain considerable tensions – into other rhetorical forms, to manage and resolve that emotional response. Thus, Brexit humour may have a functional impact on the lived experience of Brexit populism.

Part one – Populist ambiguity and humour

This section develops the definition of populism offered in the Introduction by focusing on its relationship with humour and comedy, which are significant components of populism and weapons in its arsenal. First, the conditions for the emergence of populism are explained with an emphasis on the incongruous and dichotomous social contexts of that emergence. Second, populism is described as a paradoxical discourse that displays order-building tendencies and the tendency to produce ambiguity. This is described as a circular production of ambiguity. Third, and connected to points one and two, populism is described as a discourse that is fundamentally othering. Each of these characteristics are explained through a discussion of the connections between populism, humour and comedy.

The emergence of populism/the birth of humour

The Introduction provided a definition of populism and an outline of how that definition corresponds with Brexit populism. It is necessary to consider the reasons for the emergence of populism in general and the idea of Brexit in particular, to account for its popularity with sections of the British public. This begins with a discussion of the causes of populism and ends with those causes, or social conditions, being shown to be incongruous and dichotomous social situations which also precede the emergence of humour. It is shown that the conditions of emergence for populism are just as dependent on incongruity as the very structure that populism creates.

There are democratic structures that allow for the emergence of populism, such as referenda and voting systems that use proportional representation. The former presents a binary choice to a populous and thus sets up a structure for the expression of populist themes. Referenda also allow for issues to be framed through a direct appeal to ‘the people’. The latter gives marginal populist politicians greater opportunity for democratic representation. These structures help explain how populisms emerge in some contexts, but they do not explain why. Research on the causes of populism is embryonic and incomplete (Hawkins, Read and Pauwels, 2017), and different theories are proposed to address why populisms emerge. Importantly, the major theories on the emergence of populism can be linked with theories of humour, or with humour styles. Hawkins, Read and Pauwels (2017) split explanations for the emergence of populism into two camps. These are the ‘mass society thesis’ (also called the cultural thesis) and the ‘economic thesis’ of populism.

The ‘mass society thesis’ argues that populism emerges in a vacuum that is created by the absence of other organising institutions such as Trade Unions or civil society structures (ibid: 269), which would usually provide people with a stable mode of identification. In this theory, ‘the collective conscious is reconstituted. But the process is fragile…’ (ibid) because populism and its ambiguities move into and occupy the vacuum. For humour theorists, the conditions of social vacuum resemble the conditions of liminality in which trickster tactics have been observed (Turner, 1974, 1982, 1987; Vizenor, 1988, 1990; Mackin, 2002; Hyde, 2008; Weaver and Mora, 2016; Weaver and Ozieranski 2016). In conditions of social change, that feature inertia or an absence of social institutions, the idea of the trickster has been used to describe people, gods and mythical creatures that manipulate social instability. These tactics can be value-free or ambiguous, and thus align well with the lack of core values and shape-shifting that is displayed in populism. They are also tactics that are built on and manipulate numerous incongruities. The ‘mass society’ or ‘cultural change thesis’ signals the potential of the concept of the populist trickster as a disruptor; as a provoker of social change. In addition, the trickster is usually an outsider, which is a characteristic that is frequently mobilised by populists as well (Hawkins, Read and Pauwels, 272). In the ‘mass society thesis’, we see a neat alignment between a well-researched humour trope and populist emergence. There is the significant potential for humour and populism to be twin concepts emerging in identical conditions of ambiguity.

The ‘economic thesis’ tends to focus on economic conditions such as medium or long-term economic change, corruption and/or poor governance (ibid: 271). It includes issues of relative decline or perceptions of relative inequality/decline, which can connect with the actual or perceived decline of liberal democracy (Wilkin, 2017: 317; Hawkins, Read and Pauwels, 2017: 275). In the context of the post-2008 global recession, this thesis explains current populisms across Europe and the United States of America, as a convincing account of why some people are attracted to populism. The economic thesis also connects neatly with theories of humour and can be align...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Dedication
• Contents
• Acknowledgements
• Introduction: Brexit, comedy and populism
• 1 Leave or remain? Unpacking the dichotomies of the EU Referendum and Brexit populism
• 2 Brexit, irony and populist politics
• 3 Brexit populism, trickster irony and comic responses
• 4 Brexit anti-populism, caricature and critique
• 5 Brexit, social class and comedy
• 6 ‘Brexit means breakfast’: The language of Brexit and comedy
• 7 Incongruity, transition and the shifting landscape of Brexit Britain
• Conclusion: Politics and satire in post-referendum Britain
• Appendix
• Bibliography
• Index