Strategic Planning in the Humanitarian Sector

A Manual to Foresight and Futures-Focused Thinking

Eilidh Kennedy, Michel Maietta

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2021
• ISBN:
  9781000467048
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Politik & Internationale Beziehungen
• Subtopic: Frieden & globale Entwicklung

This book provides humanitarian practitioners and policy makers with a manual for how to apply foresight and strategy in their work.

Drawing on extensive research, the book demonstrates in practical terms how embedding futures-focused thinking into practice can help humanitarian actors to enhance their impact and fit for the future. The book provides readers with a step-by-step guide to an innovative combination of tools and methods tested and refined over the course of several years. However, it also goes beyond this, by grounding the approach within the broader ambition of making humanitarian action more effective. Overall, the analytical and strategic processes outlined in this book will accompany a decision maker through every stage of creating a robust, agile and impactful long-term strategy.

This accessible guide will be an essential point of reference for practitioners and decision makers in the humanitarian ecosystem, as well as students studying humanitarian affairs, global development, conflict studies and international relations.

1 Strategic foresight for transformation

DOI: 10.4324/9781003094753-1

Introduction

Strategic foresight is about creating a narrative and pathways for sustainable change and transformation. We believe it is a critical approach for anyone seeking to build resilience among people affected by crises in a rapidly changing world. This book has been written to provide an entry point for humanitarian actors to improve their futures literacy and exploit strategic foresight tools in their work. In order to use these tools in a transformative way you need to accept that you do not know everything, centre the lived experience of people affected by crises and be open to challenging your worldview (Bhagat et al. 2021). The ethos of our work is founded on creating flexible ways to mainstream collaboration between humanitarian actors and encouraging them to adopt systems-based approaches to build better futures.

The humanitarian ecosystem

Before we can begin to discuss strategic foresight and its uses in humanitarian action, we must first define what we mean by the term ‘humanitarian’. In aid work the term ‘humanitarian’ is often used synonymously with emergency responses; however, for the purpose of this book we have extended its definition to include all activities which are undertaken to improve the human condition. In short, we use the term ‘humanitarian’ to refer to all activities along the humanitarian–development–peace nexus, as we believe that the common thread linking these areas of work must be placing humans at the centre of the system.

Building on this broad definition of humanitarian action, we consider the actors who provide humanitarian assistance at every level (locally, nationally and internationally) to be very diverse. They include people affected by crises, religious or secular movements, non-governmental organisations, multilateral organisations, networks, state actors (including their militaries) and, increasingly, the business sector.

Within the broader group of humanitarian actors we distinguish two categories: formal and non-formal actors. The first includes actors for whom the provision of humanitarian assistance is their primary role and who have significant decision-making power in the ecosystem, namely the United Nations (UN), the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, international non-governmental organisations (INGOs) and traditional donor governments such as those in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) Development Assistance Committee (IARAN 2016). The second cohort, which is not new to the ecosystem but is playing an increasingly important role in the decision-making space, includes people affected by crises, local authorities and national governments in areas of humanitarian operations, local NGOs, military actors, the business sector and new donors (IARAN 2016).

All of these actors, their complex interconnections, the power dynamics between them, and the rules and norms that govern humanitarian action constitute the humanitarian ecosystem. The humanitarian ecosystem is an incredibly politicised space where norms, power and resources are contested.

The economy of the humanitarian ecosystem and the potential for transformation

The most significant dynamic that defines the relationship between actors in the humanitarian ecosystem is the flow of money. There are a multitude of financial flows funding the humanitarian ecosystem. Each of these distinct flows creates a different power dynamic depending on which actors in the system amass and control these funds. It is difficult to get a comprehensive picture of all of the funding streams which reach actors in the humanitarian ecosystem. We have tried to categorise the main flows of funding by their sources:

1. Official development assistance (ODA)
2. Private donations to humanitarian organisations
3. Remittances

The best tracked flow of money into the humanitarian ecosystem’s economy is the funding provided through ODA for international humanitarian assistance.¹ In 2019, this totalled US$23.2 billion (Thomas and Urquhart 2020, p. 30). The vast majority of this funding is allocated to multilateral institutions, INGOs, and the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement (Thomas and Urquhart 2020, p. 30). While this figure represents the funding that is dedicated to specifically ‘humanitarian’ considerations, a broader look at ODA demonstrates that there is a substantial pot of resources which complements these funds through bilateral support to governments (in the form of grants or debt relief) and to a more diverse group of multilateral institutions investing in development pursuant to the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). While international humanitarian assistance from ODA is often represented as being the core of the humanitarian ecosystem’s economy, in reality it is only a small proportion of its resources.

The funding stream of private donations is not tracked comprehensively at the global level. The primary source of private donations is individuals. However, figures tracking private funding streams also include the money channelled into the humanitarian ecosystem by foundations or trusts, companies, and national societies (Thomas and Urquhart 2020, p. 39). The funds from private donations are primarily streamed through INGOs and NGOs. While it is difficult to create a full picture of how much money private donors bring into the ecosystem, it was estimated to be around US$6.4 billion in 2019 (Thomas and Urquhart 2020, p. 30).

Though it is not often acknowledged by many humanitarian actors (especially formal actors), people affected by crises engage in their own crisis response, orchestrating support from within their communities both near and far, and appealing to other humanitarian actors within the humanitarian ecosystem when it is beneficial (Brown et al. 2014). Remittances sent by diaspora communities to friends and family in low- and middle-income countries (LMIC) of origin is an increasing source of support leveraged by people affected by crises, especially as transmitting money virtually becomes easier through increased global connectivity. The volume of remittances dwarfs the funds provided through ODA, reaching a record of US$554 billion in 2019 alone (Ratha 2020). However, unlike ODA, which is channelled through a small group of powerful formal actors, remittances are dispersed in relatively small amounts to billions of people. This means that while the overall amount of remittances is much greater than ODA funds, it does not translate into power.

While they do not represent the majority of actors nor do they control the majority of the resources flowing into the humanitarian ecosystem’s economy, formal humanitarian actors persistently dominate decision-making in key international fora, dictate the norms and standards to which most actors in the humanitarian ecosystem must adhere and craft the narrative which defines how the humanitarian ecosystem is perceived. The behaviours of these formal actors are defined by their history and as such it is critical to understand how they evolved to address the cultural challenges which exist today.

A brief history of how formal humanitarian actors have developed

The history of modern humanitarianism has been broken down into several distinct time periods, each depicting a different stage of its evolution.² While there are several interpretations of where each period begins and ends, we find Barnett’s suggested three ‘ages of humanitarianism’ where he delineates periods of imperial humanitarianism, neo-humanitarianism and liberal humanitarianism (Barnett 2013, p. 29) to be the most compelling. In the following we present and adapt his categorisations by focusing on the evolution of the formal humanitarian system, a subset of the humanitarian ecosystem. With each shift that we identify there was a major evolution in the ways of working of the actors and the norms that govern the formal humanitarian system. Each period will be named Formal Humanitarian System 1.0, 2.0, etc. We focus on this small area of the humanitarian ecosystem to draw attention to its outsized power in shaping the culture of international humanitarianism and governing the resources which flow through ODA. Understanding how dominance of the formal humanitarian actors in many spaces evolved is critical to understanding the power dynamics at play in the humanitarian ecosystem at large.

“Caring for the sick, the poor and those in need, and easing their suffering are gestures of solidarity as old as humanity” (Maietta 2015, p. 53). However, the foundation of the Formal Humanitarian System, defined as organised interactions between actors operating internationally with the aim of alleviating suffering, can be traced to Europe in the 19th century and the signing of the first Geneva Convention in 1864. The Geneva Convention of 1864 was first signed by 12 Western states and the newly founded International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC); it set a body of rules for the treatment and care of the wounded and prisoners of war (ICRC n.d.).

The rules that governed the Formal Humanitarian System 1.0 mainly focused on the laws of war. This system would continue to evolve and adapt from the end of the American Civil War (1861–1865) to World War I (1914–1918). The Formal Humanitarian System 1.0 reached its maturity in the aftermath of WWI when the first secular INGO was founded in 1919, Save the Children – formerly the Save the Children Fund. The Save the Children Fund would soon be joined by other humanitarian INGOs from both religious and secular traditions such as Norwegian People’s Aid, the humanitarian wing of the Norwegian labour movement, created to respond to the humanitarian crisis caused by the Spanish Civil War. In addition to the new actors joining the space, other legal initiatives would be formalised in this period, building on the body of rules of the Geneva Convention (revised in 1906) and the League of Nations, such as the Nansen Passport in 1922, that set the base for refugees’ security and protection.

The first iteration of the Formal Humanitarian System was conceived and matured during what Barnett (2013) defines as the age of ‘imperial humanitarianism’. At its apogee, it was a dynamic interaction between state actors, the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, and INGOs, navigating a set of international treaties protecting prisoners of war and the victims of war or natural disasters such as refugees. During this time, INGOs were game changers, leading the evolution of the Formal Humanitarian System itself by securing and protecting communities which fell outside the existing body of rules or supporting those that were not serviced by other actors. INGOs were critical in pushing the other actors in the Formal Humanitarian System to consider new ways of working and an ever-increasing number of people for humanitarian support. For example, in 1942 Oxfam began campaigning to force the British government to reconsider its blockade on Greece, which was creating intolerable living conditions and pushing vulnerable communities into famine (Oxfam International n.d.).

The Formal Humanitarian System 1.0 evolved into its second iteration in the second half of the 1940s. The failures of the revised Geneva Conventions to make the scourge of war less terrible, the inability of the League of Nations to broker peace effectively and manage the fallout of a breakdown in relations, as well as the continued perpetration of crimes against humanity by state actors challenged the foundation on which the first Formal Humanitarian System had been built.

The signing of the fourth Geneva Convention in 1950 along with the creation of the United Nations and its humanitarian agencies and programmes (High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO), World Food Program (WFP), etc.) paved the way for the Formal Humanitarian System 2.0. During this period, secular and especially faith-based INGOs experienced unprecedented growth; in the United States alone nearly 200 NGOs were created in the latter half of the 1940s (Barnett 2013). The proliferation and development of humanitarian INGOs accelerated further during the decolonisation period where “the skills, material and money wielded by Northern organisations were called upon to supplement those of the newly established Southern governments … after the rapid withdrawal of the colonial power” (Davey et al. 2013, p. 11).

During this age of what Barnett (2013) coins as ‘neo-humanitarianism’, the Formal Humanitarian System 2.0 grew in terms of the number of actors involved, the scope of what was being attempted and the funding which was being put into humanitarian activities (Reimann 2006). This period, culminating in the Biafra War (Nigeria 1967–1970), showed how the agility and impact of INGOs could push the system forward as yet another generation of INGOs came into being. Once again, seeing the failure of many of the existing actors and structures to meet the spiralling need in Biafra, a new, more strident and interventionist generation of INGOs was born. These INGOs stand out from those that came earlier in the period by adapting their operating methods and principles to be more confrontational. Showing how the use of testimonials, advocacy and campaigns could achieve impact was in stark contrast to the discretion and silence of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement (Maietta 2015, p. 54). With the signing o...