The Disruptive Impact of Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems Diffusion

Modern Melians and the Dawn of Robotic Warriors

Austin Wyatt

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2021
• ISBN:
  9781000469028
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: Politics
• Index: Politics & International Relations

Challenging the focus on great powers in the international debate, this book explores how rising middle power states are engaging with emerging major military innovations and analyses how this will affect the stability and security of the Indo Pacific.

Presenting a data-based analysis of how middle power actors in the Indo-Pacific are responding to the emergence of military Artificial Intelligence and Killer Robots, the book asserts that continuing to exclude non-great power actors from our thinking in this field enables the dangerous diffusion of Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems (LAWS) to smaller states and terrorist groups, and demonstrates the disruptive effects of these military innovations on the balance of power in the Indo-Pacific. Offering a detailed analysis of the resource capacities of China, United States, Singapore and Indonesia, it shows how major military innovation acts as a circuit breaker between competitor states disrupting the conventional superiority of the dominant hegemonic state and giving a successful adopter a distinct advantage over their opponent.

This book will appeal to researchers, end-users in the military and law enforcement communities, and policymakers. It will also be a valuable resource for researchers interested in strategic stability for the broader Asia-Pacific and the role of middle power states in hegemonic power transition and conflict.

1 Introduction

DOI: 10.4324/9781003172987-1

There are but two powers in the world, the sword and the mind. In the long run, the sword is always beaten by the mind – Napoleon Bonaparte

Built into a concrete outcrop in one of the most dangerous places on Earth, an electronic eye stares out from its squat housing, the long nose of its heavy machine gun deterring potential infiltrators in the absence of the camouflaged conscripts that previously patrolled this hazardous stretch of the De-Militarised Zone (Parkins, 2015).¹

While remote-operated and human-supervised weapons had been previously deployed, the Super Aegis II was among the first examples of a weapon platform with the capacity to exercise effectively independent control over the operational selection, identification and engagement of human targets.

Removing the human from the decision to employ lethal force raises a number of serious moral, ethical and legal questions that continue to dominate the debate at the semi-regular meetings of the United Nations-sponsored Group of Governmental Experts on Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems (LAWS). Setting aside the remaining technological barriers (Anderson, 2016), multiple states have declared their position on LAWS (and militarised applications of Artificial Intelligence [AI] more broadly). The problem with the formal discussions to date is that, while there have been some notable contributions by smaller states to the formal discussions, it has remained focused on great power perspectives.

The overarching purpose of this book is to address that gap in the international discourse by presenting the first full-length examination of the role Asia-Pacific middle powers will have on the development and proliferation of autonomous weapon systems, as well as an examination of how this innovation will shape the role of middle powers in the growing great power competition between the United States and China. This book, therefore, takes a step beyond the current public and scholarly debate to focus on how the emergence of LAWS will affect the regional security of South-East Asia.

This is certainly not the first time that the development of a particularly disruptive military technology has challenged the paradigm of conflict and international power. By undermining the existing power projection paradigm, such innovations can enable emerging states to challenge a dominant hegemon (Vickers and Martinage, 2004). When this occurs at the major state level, the resulting competition between a challenger state and the dominant hegemon results in a transition of hegemonic power. This transition increases tension, and often sparks conflict, between the rising power and the dominant hegemon (Allison, 2017). Historically high economic, technological or knowledge-based barriers (Horowitz, 2010), such as sophisticated composite materials or specialised knowledge, have injected a level of structural stability into this process by constraining the hegemonic conflict from spreading to minor powers. However, the dual-use nature of the enabling technologies (such as machine learning coding, computer processing power, relevant datasets and mass-produced sensors) distinguishes LAWS from previous major military innovations. While reliable, fully autonomous lethal weapon systems remain beyond the capabilities of modern technology, other forms of autonomous and semi-autonomous military technologies have much lower technological requirements. This book, therefore, considers the full range of autonomous military technology, recognising the potential impact of derivative or copied autonomous weapon systems and the diffusion of the underlying technology to other actors. The core research aim of this book is to explore how LAWS, with their lowered barriers to initial proliferation, to multiple middle powers could impact the transition of hegemonic power within the geographic confines of Southeast Asia.

Although the discussion around LAWS is far more advanced in 2021 than it was when the Super Aegis II was unveiled six years ago, the parameters of that discussion have not sufficiently shifted and remain focused on great powers and international law. This has left a gap in our understanding of the impact of autonomous weapon system proliferation when it comes to the actions and perspectives of small-middle power states. This gap is particularly damning in the case of Southeast Asia, which is a region of growing global economic and geopolitical importance that straddles some of the hottest potential global flashpoints and key corridors of international trade. Despite this importance, the Campaign to Stop Killer Robots only opened its Southeast Asian satellite arm in July 2019 (Picard, 2019), and only three Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) member states participated in the meeting of the Group of Governmental Experts on Emerging Technologies in the Area of Lethal Autonomous Weapon Systems in the following month. Furthermore, as of September 2019, no ASEAN member state has released a statement codifying their position on the merits of a ban aside from a short statement in 2018 issued by the Non-Aligned Movement. Far from staying idle during this period, however, Indonesia and Singapore (as leading ASEAN member states) have taken active and overt steps that indicate a clear desire to integrate increasingly autonomous and remote-operated weapon systems into their ongoing military modernisation efforts.

Therefore, while the emergence of increasingly autonomous military technology will change our understanding of warfare and power projection, the question remains as to how their rapid proliferation will affect the balance of power in South-East Asia, especially once the smaller states gain access to autonomous weapon systems. This book responds to this gap, analysing and exploring how the Singaporean and Indonesian response to the emergence of increasingly autonomous weapon systems will impact relations of power at the regional level, and how this will shift their role in Sino-American hegemonic competition.

1.1 Research questions

Responding to this core research puzzle, this book centres on a primary research question:

1. What impact will the adoption of autonomous military technology by the middle power states within South-East Asia have on regional security in the Asia-Pacific?

Three secondary questions are derived from the primary question:

1. How did the key Southeast Asian states respond to the proliferation of remote-operated Unmanned Combat Vehicles (UCVs), and how is this influencing their approach to increasingly autonomous weapon systems?

Much of the military innovation and diffusion literature, as well as the military history literature, contends that the demonstration of a new major military innovation presents states with a stark choice; to adopt the new innovation or to allow the first mover state to gain a power projection advantage. As Horowitz (2010) indicates, the French navy of the late 19th century was the first mover in numerous major innovations in naval warfare, including the submarine, and yet the British cemented their status as the premier naval power. Where an early mover state has failed to capitalise on an emergent major military innovation, it has historically allowed a rival state to master the innovation for its own benefit (Silverstein, 2013). Furthermore, military policymakers have historically demonstrated a tendency to view the emergence of a major military innovation with reference to similar precursor innovations. Therefore, any analysis of an emerging military innovation should begin by outlining the development, and diffusion of its precursor innovation. In the case of LAWS, the precursor innovation is UCVs, which are distinguished by the fact that their ‘critical functions’ remain under the control of a human operator, albeit remotely.

1. B. What factors will influence the rate of LAWS proliferation into South-East Asia?

This question delves deeper into the puzzle, comparing how the lower barriers to proliferation will affect South-East Asian state response to a future LAWS demonstration point. There are a number of theories of military innovation and diffusion; Grissom (2006) presents a concise summary of the leading theories. This book adopts a neo-realist perspective of state behaviour and utilises elements from two leading theories of military innovation: organisation theory (Goldman and Andres, 1999) and adoption-capacity theory (Horowitz, 2010). These theories emphasise the importance of financial and organisational capacity barriers to determine which states are likely to adopt a particular innovation. When a major military innovation requires a high level of resources or is reliant upon controllable components, it is unlikely to be adopted by smaller states in the short term. Aircraft carriers, stealth aircraft and intercontinental ballistic missiles are all examples of such innovations. Equally, innovations that rely on specialised knowledge or require major doctrinal changes to be successfully deployed also diffuse slower (Horowitz, 2010). Finally, domestic pressures or a cultural aversion to the innovation, within the military or across the society, also reduces the likelihood that a given innovation will be adopted (Goldman and Andres, 1999). An example of this effect is nuclear weapons, which require specialised knowledge and skills, have high resource requirements and are the subject of strong cultural aversion. In contrast, cyber warfare has far lower barriers in each category and therefore proliferated at a significant speed. This book theorises that autonomous weapon systems, which have low barriers to proliferation, will follow a slower but similar proliferation pattern to cyberwarfare or remote-operated military aircraft. This would be the first time that an innovation as potentially disruptive as LAWS proliferated at such a fast rate, potentially de-stabilising any hegemonic conflict that autonomous military technology enables.

1. C. How are the expected capabilities of LAWS influencing the South-East Asian security environment?

The objective of this question is to engage critically with the first aspect of the difference between autonomous military technology and prior major military innovations, proliferation to smaller, middle power states in its early stages. While major previous innovations have enabled transitions of hegemonic power, sometimes involving conflict, their high barriers to proliferation have ensured that only the major powers have been able to acquire major military innovations in their early stages of development or proliferation. Prior to the development and proliferation of autonomous weapon systems, therefore, major powers were able to exert influence over smaller powers by virtue of a dominant position in the development and supply of related weapon systems.

A neo-realist approach holds that at the core of the international system are power relationships, an intricate web of economic, security and cultural ties that allow for day-to-day international relations. Relative international stability is derived from the maintenance of a balance of power between the various states, supported by a network of norm-based agreements (Mearsheimer, 2013). This balance is maintained by a collection of major powers, of which one is considered the overall hegemon. In the post-Cold War balance of power, the hegemon is the United States. Central to the theory of hegemonic power is the concept that the hegemonic state can only maintain its status by being the strongest and wealthiest state, a requirement that inevitably results in tension between the existing hegemon, which is clinging to its position of power, and the emerging power, which feels constrained by its rival (Allison, 2017).

A key trigger of conflict between major powers, and a common determinant of their outcome, is the adoption of paradigm-shifting military innovations. A shift in the paradigm of warfare and power projection creates an opportunity for a challenger state to disrupt the international system, by using dominance over the emerging technology or capability to compensate for a comparative lack of conventional military power. For example, instead of expending exorbitant resources in developing an aircraft carrier fleet, a challenger could develop autonomous surface vehicles to swarm and disable carrier battle groups in shallower waters. Alternatively, a smaller state could cripple a rival’s air force by sending a swarm of small, cheap, autonomous aircraft to interfere with enemy aircraft as they take off (Gaub, 2011). Historically, the increase in a state’s ability to project power, as well as their prestige, has disrupted the dominant balance of power, enabling the rising powers to challenge the existing ones (Gilpin, 1988). Although earlier adoption does not guarantee ascendance for the challenger (Silverstein, 2013), the state that proves superior at integrating the major military innovation has historically gained comparative influence in the post-conflict balance of power.

The end state of hegemonic conflict is the establishment of a new balance of power. Historically, this has been a stable, albeit occasionally violent, process. This is because the initial diffusion and adoption of prior major military innovations were limited to large states, ensuring their comparative advantage over minor states and limiting the scope of the conflict. Historically, competing major powers have instead bound minor powers to their cause, building supporting coalitions within their claimed sphere of influence. While the ideal situation for a middle power is to exist in a stable dual hegemony, they rarely have the security or economic capacity to alienate a potential hegemon (Ikenberry, 2016). This effect, while disenfranchising to the minor states, reduced their security dilemma because their allegiance to a major power provided protection and stability. Among the earliest examples of this effect was the Melian Dialogue, while a more recent example was the consolidation of alliances during the Cold War. This is currently the case in the Asia-Pacific, where the ASEAN member states are finding it increasingly difficult to maintain a split allegiance, relying on the Chinese economic influence and the US security partnership. In the event that major states were not able to maintain their comparative advantage in terms of an emerging military innovation, there is no real scholarly consensus on how minor regional powers would react, although the rapid proliferation of remote-operated drones would suggest an intensification of the existing regional arms race unfolding in Southeast Asia. This research question focuses on exploring the potential responses of middle and minor powers in the region with the goal of promoting more active engagement with this issue by policymakers and fellow scholars.

1.2 Hypothesis

The core hypothesis of this book is that the uniquely low diffusion barriers of autonomous military technology comparative to previous major military innovations will allow for rapid proliferation to middle power states in Southeast Asia. The rapid diffusion of a disruptive military innovation to non-major powers, which has never occurred before, will de-stabilise the emerging hegemonic conflict between China and the United States, leading to an unstable balance of power in the region. The presence of such a disruptive weapon system in the armouries of minor, rising regional powers will raise the security dilemma of neighbouring states and make multiple regional conflicts more likely. This will contribute to increased intra-regional conflict and instability in a region of vital geopolitical importance to the global economy and security.

Despite their revolutionary nature, previous major military innovations have, for a number of reasons, reinforced an underlying structural paradigm within international power relations by excluding minor powers from active participation in major transitions in the balance of power. Instead, minor powers were subsumed to the will of a major power for the duration of the hegemonic conflict. The Melian Dialogue has become illustrative of this effect, lacking the resources and technological superiority required to play an independent role they are subjected to the will of one side or the other for the duration of the conflict. As a more modern example, consider the broadly bi-polar consolidation of states during the Cold War. During the Cold War, the Non-Aligned Movement emerged to counterbalance the influence of the competing hegemonies over smaller states in the global south. Joining a balancing coalition in this manner allows weaker states to offset the influence of the more individually powerful competing hegemonies (Hamilton and Rathbun, 2013). Regional supranational trade/security organisations such as ASEAN and the African Union are the modern successors of this Non-Aligned Movement.

Breaking down this core hypothesis, (A) Southeast Asian states are expected to have responded to the proliferation of remote-operated vehicles as secondary adopters, sitting within the early majority section of an S-curve. However, it is expected that Indonesia and Singapore would attempt to integrate these systems in emulation of their larger peers once the underlying technology had matured and adoption barriers had sufficiently fallen. Based on the examples of prior military diffusion, it is hypothesised that the initial perceptions of LAWS by both the Indonesian military (TNI) and Singaporean Armed Forces (SAF) TNI and SAF would be heavily influenced by their existing platforms and developing experience with remote-operated platforms. Secondly (B), it is hypothesised that neither case stu...