From the Channel to the Ypres Salient
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From the Channel to the Ypres Salient

The Belgian Sector 1914 -1918

Chris Baker

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From the Channel to the Ypres Salient

The Belgian Sector 1914 -1918

Chris Baker

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About This Book

The sector north of Ypres is best known for the inundation of much of the ground to the east of the Yser that acted as a block to the German advance in the autumn of 1914. From that time on military activities were extremely limited. Much of this line was manned by Belgian troops, with some assistance from the French army at its southern end and of the British army on the Channel coast. The role of the Belgian army in the Great War is little known, apart from the opening months, when 'brave little Belgium' held on to its important fortified cities, notably Liege and Antwerp, for longer than German planning had anticipated. It was not until mid October 1914 that the Belgian army was forced back to the area of the Yser, when its defences were bolstered by French troops whilst Haig's I Corps came up on its southern flank. At this crucial phase of the campaign, the harsh decision was taken to open the dykes at the end of October 1914 and thereby flooding much of the low lying ground east of the Yser and so effectively halting major German offensive operations. For almost four years the Belgian army rested reasonably secure behind this sodden landscape, although certain key points were the scene of frequent, if limited, tussles. 'Free' Belgium was reduced to two significant towns that could be regarded as secure and out of the range of most German artillery - the coastal resort of La Panne (De Panne) and the much bigger settlement of Furnes (Veurne), Over these years the Belgian army was rebuilt under the dynamic leadership of the king, Albert I, and by the time of the general allied advance in September 1918, the Belgian army was able to take its place in the Advance to Victory, in an allied Army that was commanded by King Albert. Although this phase of the war is outside the scope of the book, it is important to realise that the Belgian army was a very active player in these last few months. Amongst the achievements of Belgian troops at this stage of the war was the final capture of Passchendaele. This book concerns itself with the years of defence and the reconstruction of the army behind the Yser. Relatively little of Belgium's efforts in the Great War remained, but recent years have seen action to preserve what does. Most significant of these, perhaps, is the so called Trench of Death near Diksmuide. Although always preserved, it has recently been very successfully refurbished and is now most effectively and informatively presented. Other remains from the war have also been developed so as to be more informative and the result is that touring this area provides a fascinating insight into one of the most unusual sectors of the Western Front and which is conveniently close to the much visited Ypres Salient. In this book Chris Baker brings his extensive knowledge of the Belgian army (helped by his ability to read French and Dutch) and of the Flanders region to produce a much needed insight into Belgium's army role for most of the war as the protector of the northern flank of the whole of the Allied line.

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Information

Year
2021
ISBN
9781526749321
Topic
History
Subtopic
World War I

Chapter One

The Strategic Context

The Belgian state and neutrality

The Kingdom of Belgium came into existence in 1830, separating it from the Kingdom of the Netherlands. Final settlement of its position came with the signing of the Treaty of London, also known as the Quintuple Treaty, on 19 April 1839. Amongst the many provisions and definitions of this treaty, the most important as far as its position in 1914 was concerned was that Belgium would ‘form an independent and perpetually neutral State’, which ‘shall be bound to observe such neutrality towards all other States’. The external signatories were France, Great Britain, the Netherlands, Russia and Prussia (for the German Confederation, Germany not being unified until 1871). They undertook to recognise and guarantee the position.
Belgium itself signed with some reluctance, accepting neutrality as a price of independence but only after months of negotiation in which it had resisted the idea. There were voices within the country in the years of increasing tension before 1914 that demanded international discussion, with a view to the legal abandonment of the enforced neutrality and that Belgium step up its military preparedness. In practice, Belgium had already comprised its neutrality when it entered into quiet discussions on military co-operation with Great Britain and when, in 1907, the latter consented to Belgium’s annexation of the Congo Free State, previously a territory personal to the King. By 1913, after recent crises when war looked increasingly likely, it was openly discussed in Belgium that the treaty would not possess the least weight when compared to the strategic interests of the Great Powers of France, Germany and Great Britain. Chancellor Bethmann-Hollweg’s characterisation of the treaty as a ‘scrap of paper’ when Germany invaded and breached her neutrality in August 1914 came as no genuine surprise to anyone in a position to know; but it handed Britain a justification for entry into the war and a propaganda asset of global value.
Newspapers in Britain printed the proclamation by Albert, King of the Belgians, on 6 August 1914: ‘Soldiers! Without the slightest provocation from us, a neighbour, haughty in its strength, has torn up the treaty bearing its signature. It has violated the territory of our fathers. Because we have been worthy of ourselves, because we have refused to forfeit our honour, it has attacked us. But the whole world marvels at our loyal attitude, which its respect and esteem strengthen at these supreme moments.’

Belgian preparedness for war

It was understood by Belgian’s political leadership from the outset that the commitment of its guarantors was far from certain and it was recognised that the country must be in a position to defend itself. By 1851 the primary threat to its existence stemmed from a resurgent France. With a field army of no great size in comparison with France, it was broadly agreed that Belgium could not hold the enemy at the border and would base its defence on the fortification of its ‘national redoubt’ of Antwerp. During the Franco-Prussian war of 1870 the Belgian army, at that point fairly modern and capable if small, was mobilised but was not called upon to come into action. Over the decades that followed, political and military disagreement about the nature of the threat and how to counter it, together with financial stringency and opposition to military expenditure, gnawed away at its capability.
With evidence of the growing might of the unified and militaristic Germany in Europe, the potential threat to Belgian sovereignty became more clearly focused on the county’s south, for should either of the two great powers attack the other they would inevitably do so in the area of the valley of the River Meuse. France and Germany were developing field armies of enormous size; investment in border fortifications by both powers would force any potential action northwards towards the Meuse. However, it was not until 1887 that military engineer and architect Henri Alexis Brialmont was authorised to fortify the Belgian citadels of Liège and Namur, which together dominated the majority of the existing crossings over the river; but no steps were taken to increase the military manpower that one day might need to be called upon.
In the later decades of the reign of King Leopold II (1835–1909), Belgium enjoyed an economic boom. Capitalising on its position as an international trading place, ruthless exploitation of its possession of the Congo and with large sources of natural wealth in coal and iron at home, its population grew and its financial well-being blossomed. To a significant extent, this growth came mainly in the southern, Frenchspeaking, Walloon half of the country, which became one of the most industrialised and urban areas of Europe. By 1914, for example, it included the most modern and productive steel making industry - but all based in the very area in which a major conflict might well take place.
Belgium passed a new military law in 1902, which ignored recommendations to enlarge the army significantly. It should be recognised that this was a relatively tranquil period, before a succession of crises brought Europe to the brink of war. The peace time strength (or establishment) was set at just 42,800 men, which would swell to a field force of 100,000 and fortress garrisons of 80,000 should the army be mobilised. An annual total of 13,300 men would be conscripted for national service. Individuals would be selected by lot from the available class (that is, by age) but the process was subject to ‘remplacement’, whereby those who could afford it might pay someone to take their place. This seems a strange and unequal practice but was often welcomed by the less well-off, particularly in Flanders, as a source of employment and income. It was assumed that the total force would be achieved by an appeal for volunteers: in other words the enlarged army would be part volunteer, part conscript. In spite of strong Christian-Democrat support for this military expansion, the ruling Catholic party vacillated in the face of opposition from the socialist Parti Ouvrier Belge and produced little by way of internal propaganda to entice volunteers to enlist.
By 1909 only one Belgian male in 400 was being recruited annually. In contrast, France was enlisting one in 170 and Germany one for every 241. In proportion to the respective populations, Belgium’s forces were a pinprick and the country’s overall military expenditure lagged well behind even that of Switzerland, let alone the great powers. The Swiss, whose population was only half of that of Belgium, had, for example, three times as many infantry battalions and twice the artillery. Belgium was ripe for the picking.
The crises, from Morocco in 1905 onwards, forced Belgium to reconsider its military approach. Talks quietly began with Great Britain and decisions began to be made; but in retrospect they were all too late and too small. A new fortress ring was to be constructed around Antwerp: it was still incomplete when it was besieged in 1914. One of Leopold II’s final acts was to approve another military law, this time abolishing ‘remplacement’ and the lottery system and introducing universal (male) service but limiting it to one son per family. By this means, and various other enticements, which included shortening the period of service, the army now had a theoretical capacity of some 33,000 men becoming available per year. The proposed length of service differed by the arm of the service, but in all cases was cut remarkably short: infantrymen would serve only for fifteen, artillery twenty-one and cavalry for twenty-four months. All these men were then kept in the active reserve, up to a total service of fifteen years.
The Agadir Crisis of 1911 led to an emergency decision to increase expenditure on machine guns and ammunition and to call up three year classes of the reserve, but the latter was soon halted when Germany let it be known that it was pulling back from the brink. It was quite clear that Belgium’s military preparedness was at a low ebb, but it still took time to react to what was becoming the clearest of challenges: the guarantee of neutrality was looking very threadbare. In 1913, the ‘single-son’ clause was lifted as part of further expansion plans but which, however, projected that it would take until at least 1918 to have available an army of 340,000 trained men. This was considered by some in the staff to be the minimum number required to defend the country from a serious attack. Orders were belatedly placed for modern artillery – but with the German firm Krupp and the national armament factory at Herstal, the major ownership of which was German. The orders remained unfulfilled when war came.
Germany monitored Belgian military developments; it considered Belgium incapable of offensive operations, would if attacked seek to avoid a decision in the field and would very quickly fall back to occupy the ‘national redoubt’, where its army could easily be contained. This appreciation of Belgian capabilities played a key part in the planning for attack.
In July 1914 the Belgian army was approximately 190,000 strong. It was organised as a field army of six divisions, along with the garrisons of the fortresses centred on Antwerp, Liège and Namur. Of the total, the field army numbered some 118,000 men of all arms, of which 14,000 were regular professional soldiers; the rest had or were serving obligatory national service, including being available in reserve. Some 40,000 did not become available in August 1914 for various reasons – not least that their home areas were soon overrun - so Belgium went to war with 104,000 men of the called-up classes and the 14,000 regulars. The fortresses at Liège, Namur and Antwerp were garrisoned by 5,000 regulars plus 60,000 older men of the 1899–1905 classes. In addition to the army, Belgium had a system of armed local militias as well as a gendarmerie.
The armament and equipment of the army reflected the decades of neglect and tight budgets. In all there were available only 93,000 rifles and 6,000 swords, which was bad enough, but the real problem in terms of the coming fight was the paucity of modern mobile artillery. There were only 324 obsolescent field guns and a paltry 102 machine guns. There was virtually no mechanised transport, the army relying on motive power provided by horses and dogs. There were also serious shortages of engineer stores, minor equipment and even uniforms, as the administration had struggled to gear up for the expansion of the classes of 1913 and 1914.
Disagreements at the highest levels about the strategy to be adopted continued until the very moment of crisis. General Antoine de Selliers de Moranville, in place as Chief of the General Staff only since 25 May 1914, was of a defensive mindset and proposed centring the whole army on Antwerp, leaving the fortress garrisons on the Meuse only as a delaying screen. General Louis de Ryckel, the Adjutant-General, favoured a more aggressive forward policy of strongly manning the Meuse border, snuffing out the intruders as they appeared and only falling back on Antwerp if necessary.
On 27 July 1914, in light of the deteriorating international situation, a precautionary measure was taken by the government to recall the 33,000 men of the 1913 class, who had gone on leave on 10 July. On the 31st, general mobilisation was ordered, following the German announcement of Kriegsgefahrzustand at 1.30pm that afternoon. The final decisions regarding deployment were taken on 2 August as the Germans were already rolling into Luxembourg.
Belgium had a reasonable expectation and hope of support from Great Britain and France, but a divergence of political and military thinking between the two ensured that it was unlikely to come, or at least to come any time soon. To a great extent, she would face the onslaught alone.

Chapter Two

The Last Stand on the Yser

The opening moves

The military plans and intentions of Germany and France that resulted in the initial manoeuvres of the war in Europe have been well described elsewhere. However, for the purposes of this book it is necessary to pick out the key points and in particular how they affected the Belgian army and brought the war to the Westhoek.
That Belgium received little immediate military support from Great Britain and France in the opening phase had its roots in the fundamental strategic concerns of the two powers. Britain fully recognised the imperative of friendly possession of the North Sea coast, yet had committed itself to send its small Expeditionary Force to support France and the latter’s plan for an immediate offensive strike into the Ardennes, Luxembourg and Lorraine. It was only once Antwerp became seriously threatened that Britain sent military resources to support the Belgians there. With enormous reluctance, France was persuaded to allow the British Expeditionary Force to disengage on the Aisne and move to Flanders later in October 1914, but by then the die had been cast.
With tension at its height and France and Germany mobilising, the Belgian government issued orders for a general mobilisation of its army on 31 July 1914 and action began next day. Notices were posted in public places, newspapers ran headlines, bells were rung and the police and fire brigade went around the streets to call men out. The reservists began to report to their normal depots and war volunteers queued to enlist. Official announcements were at pains to say that Belgium was ‘perpetually neutral’ and that no hostile act that was likely to provoke hostilities in return would be tolerated and would even be severely repressed. They also stated that France had made a commitment to respect her neutrality. Dire warnings were given that reservists who had not reported by noon next day were liable to arrest. In Brussels, public transport was offered free of charge to enable the reservists to report. Privately owned horses and motor vehicles were being requisitioned for military use within a very short time. The Minister of the Interior, Paul Berryer, sent a circular to the provincial governors prohibiting any gathering of people whose purpose was to express ‘sympathies or antipathies’ to any foreign country and all ‘cinematographic or other’ shows representing military scenes that were likely to inflame passions were banned. In Antwerp, military governor General Dufour stressed the need to monitor all foreigners, for there might be spies amongst them: an early manifestation of suspicion and spy mania that would lead to the loss of many an innocent life.
images
Movement across Flanders, 1914. The small dots to the middle and top right of the map are forts.
On 2 August 1914 German troops advanced into Luxembourg without opposition. The border posts along all Belgium’s frontiers received an order to open fire on any hostile forces attempting to cross into Belgium. In the evening of the same day, the German Ambassador in Brussels presented the Belgian Foreign Office with a letter, an ultimatum demanding free passage for German forces through Belgian territory on the pretext that they had intelligence that France was about to attack Belgium. It was discussed by the Belgian Cabinet and was unanimously and courageously rejected. The Minister for Foreign Affairs, Henri Davignon, delivered the official rejection next morning: ‘… if, contrary to our expectation, Belgian neutrality should be violated by France, Belgium intends to fulfil her international obligations and the Belgian army would offer the most vigorous resistance to the invader. … The attack upon her independence with which the German Government threaten her constitutes a flagrant violation of international law. No strategic interest justifies such a violation of law. The Belgian Government, if they were to accept the proposals submitted to them, would sacrifice the honour of the nation and betray their duty towards Europe. … If this hope is disappointed the Belgian Government are firmly resolved to repel, by all the means in their power, every attack upon their rights.’
France commenced hostilities against Germany on 3 August, and Belgian General Headquarters issued orders to deploy the army. The 3rd Division, under General Gérard Leman, was ordered to reinforce and hold Liège, and the 4th, under Lieutenant-General Augustin Michel, went to Namur for the same purpose. The four other divisions were ordered to the area east of Brussels: the 1st Division left Ghent for Tienen; the 2nd went from Antwerp to Leuven; the 5th from Mons to Perwez; and the 6th moved on Wavre. The fortress cities were placed under martial law.
At dawn on 4 August orders were received by advanced German units that they should execute the next step of the plan: the capture of Liège. Units crossed into Belgium at six different places. A telegram was sent from the small border garrison of the Belgian 34 Brigade at Gemmenich to Leman, by now at Liège: Le terroire Belge avait été envahi par les troupes Allemandes! (‘Belgian territory has been invaded by German troops!’).
The immense forces of the German right wing, the First and Second Armies under Generals Alexander von Kluck and Karl Wilhelm Paul von Bülow respectively, advanced westwards into Belgium. They met with unexpectedly determined resistance but with such a weight of numbers and firepower it was inevitable that what Britain was soon calling ‘Brave little Belgium’ fell increasingly into German hands. It faced not only conventional forces but a new form of terror: during the night of 5–6 August Liège was bombed from the air by the Zeppelin LZ VI Köln and nine civilians lost their lives. Köln was damaged by anti-aircraft fire and crashed near Bonn on its return journey.
The fortress of Liège fell to the Second Army on 7 August, the ring of forts being overcome one by one by the unprecedented firepower of heavy 30.5cm Skoda and 42cm Krupp mortars, but only after initial attempts to attack using infantry and field artillery had met with a severe repulse. The Germans had planned to knock out the forts and capt...

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