Political Governance And Strategy In North And East Syria

M. Lashway

• Publisher: Branch & Arrow Press
• Year: 2021
• ISBN:
  9781087966687
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Politica e relazioni internazionali
• Subtopic: Politica

Report on the governance capabilities of the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria with policy recommendations for the American government. Report on the governance capabilities of the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria with policy recommendations for the American government.

1. American Foreign Policy Debates in Syria

Since the outbreak of Syrian protests in March 2011, American officials have had to calculate how to respond to the crisis. The White House initially urged the Assad regime to either govern democratically or step out of the way of others.² After months of mounting violence and the movement of weapons stockpiles including chemical weapons and sarin gas, President Obama sent a clear message- use of chemical weapons on citizens would cross a red line.³ Weary of committing troops to the Middle East, the Obama Administration attempted instead to broker a political solution in Syria without leveraging the threat of direct US military intervention. However, without understanding the full dynamics of the conflict or the intentions of other international actors such as Turkey and Iran, diplomatic efforts to dispose of Assad quickly failed.

In 2011, strategic focus shifted to clandestine support of opposition groups within Syria. The United States implemented a policy backing a “moderate” Sunni Arab political and military alternative to the Assad regime, the Free Syrian Army and Syrian National Coalition based in Istanbul. Unfortunately, American military and intelligence officials relied heavily on Turkey to find and recruit individuals. Rather than choosing moderate recruits, Turkish intelligence focused on militants who despised the Kurdish population in Syria- many of whom had strong ties to Al Qaeda and the Muslim Brotherhood.⁴ The Syrian National Coalition, now the National Coalition for Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces, based in Turkey attempts to present itself as the political alternative to the Assad regime, but both the political and military remnants are seen as proxies for Turkey.

When the Trump administration entered the White House, they vowed they would put an end to America’s forever wars in the Middle East and defeat ISIL. Combined, this policy left the US military with few options. While increased autonomy for battlefield commanders allowed them to be more proactive in the War on Terror, the inability to place a large number of troops in Syria meant they would have to rely on local partners to clear and liberate areas controlled by the Islamic State of Syria and the Levant (ISIL). US air support eventually helped the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) make substantial gains. However, the SDF lost nearly 11,000 men and women in the process, and many of the liberated cities were completely demolished with a high number of civilian casualties.⁵

Opportunities for the Biden Administration are numerous but require an in-depth understanding of the operating environment.

These include -       

Dividing the growing population and ideological threat of former ISIS families in Al-Hol Camp- Al-Hol has become an international debate where all sides have been unable to come up with a viable solution. Al-Hol demographics currently include 30,000 Iraqis, 22,000 Syrians, and 9,000 foreign fighters from 48 different countries.⁶ To address the growing concerns of radicalization and lawlessness within the camp, it must first be geographically dispersed across Northeastern Syria. This would make the individual camps more manageable while allowing the AANES to focus on the 22,000 Syrian nationals. To do this, a program should be developed to integrate families back into society with the sponsorship of individuals from their region. This could be done using the existing Internally Displaced People (IDP) registry in Manbij that was created by the AANES and includes 42,000 IDPs with confirmed identities. It would also include a multi-step process of biometric enrollment, in-depth background checks, and a commitment to deradicalization. If individuals from Al-Hol were unwilling to accept such a process, they then need to be transferred to a long-term rehabilitation facility.

Hold ISIL fighters accountable and provide justice for the victims. There are now 22 prisons in northeast Syria, many of which are poorly constructed and funded. The US Department of State (DOS) under the Trump Administration had attempted to organize “Nuremberg-style trials,” but holding show trials without a clear and legitimate legal process will not provide justice or dissuade other criminals in the future. If this process is mishandled, it could embolden sympathizers and feed into their propaganda machines resulting in more recruits. The International Criminal Court (ICC) currently has no jurisdiction under the Rome Statute - neither Iraq nor Syria are members, and the US is unlikely to bring a Security Council referral because the investigation could bring to light the large number of civilian casualties caused by American airstrikes in the liberation of Mosul and Raqqa. The Biden Administration should work with the international community and the Justice Branch of the AANES to create a legitimate process to fairly try accused ISIL members.

Support local population governing structures. Unlike past attempts at nation-building, the United States does not need to fund or build bureaucratic institutions or civil society. The conditions for good governance are already present within the population of Northeastern Syria. Instead, American diplomacy and foreign policy should focus on providing formal support to subnational governments (in this case the AANES) who have taken quantifiable actions in areas of service provisions, gender equality, religious freedom, and ethnic tolerance. By supporting the AANES, America can avoid costly nation-building efforts and create long-term stability in Syria.

 

2. Dilemmas of Syrian Governance

The biggest dilemma in Syrian governance is not the multitude of international actors attempting to assert their influence, but rather the negligence and lack of governance by the Assad family. After years of corruption and neglect, governance across Syria has been scattered to formal, informal, illicit, and sub-national systems. These systems may have existed in part before the Assad regime, but grew organically out of the basic needs of the populous. As the government in Damascus failed to provide basic goods and services, everyday people united to fill those gaps. Future policy for the region should recognize the correlations between strong local governance and counterinsurgency efforts and work to strengthen these existing structures.

Formal Governance

Syria’s formal governance structure can be described as a violent dictatorship led by Bashar al-Assad and held together with a network of internal security and intelligence apparatuses (Mukhabarats). Following in his father’s footsteps, Bashar al-Assad has been willing to use violence to crush any threat to his authority. Years of violent repression have made many groups within the country wary of joining the opposition. While still formally in power, Bashar al-Assad has little influence beyond the borders of Damascus and Aleppo. Regime forces in the rest of the country serve out of compulsion and not a patriotic sense of duty. Most interviewed in this study still consider themselves teachers, and construction workers rather than soldiers. It is only with the support of nation-states such as Russia or Iran, and non-state actors- Hezbollah, and Iranian-backed militias that the Assad regime has been able to hold onto power.

Informal Governance

In areas where formal governance fails to penetrate or effectively provide essential goods and services to the people, cultural ties and traditional formalities tend to govern day-to-day life. These forms of informal governance center on tribal structures in the Arab areas and agrarian communal structures in many of the rural Kurdish, Christian, and Yazidi regions. Influential leaders and the groups they represent are also a form of informal governance. Just a few include Fouza Yousif of the Democratic Union Party, Elizabeth Kourie of the Syriac Union Party, and Sheikh Humaydi Daham al-Hadi of the Shammar Tribe. These institutions predate the Syrian Civil War and the Islamic State. Eventually, it would also be these informal governance structures that would have to unite against the external threat of ISIL.

Under the Assad regime, tribal areas were often marginalized. These areas consisted of some of the most aired and economically disadvantaged areas in the country. In places such as Deir ez Zor, Syrians often lacked basic necessities. This governance vacuum is what left tribal areas open to the potential benefits of the Islamic State. When ISIL militants swept across the Syrian border in 2013, some Arab tribal leaders along the Euphrates River Valley initially saw the caliphate as a better option than the Ba’athist dictatorship. Many welcomed the fighters into their towns with the belief that they would finally have representation and a government responsive to their needs. However, it wasn’t long until the brutality of ISIL’s management of savagery turned many once-welcoming Arabs against them.

Agrarian communal structures in other areas tended to form their informal governance structures to provide for the collective good. These areas were targeted more by the Islamic State because they were inhabited by mostly non-Muslims. Just over a year after the formal establishment of the “Islamic State in Iraq and Syria” militants were able to take nearly a third of Syria.⁷ They were only halted once they attempted to take larger Kurdish cities such as Hasakah, Qamishli, and Kobani.

Illicit governance

Illicit governance structures have also taken r...