American Literature and American Identity

A Cognitive Cultural Study from the Civil War to the Twenty-First Century

Patrick Colm Hogan

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2021
• Print ISBN:
  9781032125688
  9781032078953
• Edition: 1
• eBook ISBN:
  9781000470949
• Topic: Literature
• Subtopic: Literary Criticism
• Index: Literature

In recent years, cognitive and affective science have become increasingly important for interpretation and explanation in the social sciences and humanities. However, little of this work has addressed American literature, and virtually none has treated national identity formation in influential works since the Civil War. In this book, Hogan develops his earlier cognitive and affective analyses of national identity, further exploring the ways in which such identity is integrated with cross-culturally recurring patterns in story structure. Hogan examines how authors imagined American identity—understood as universal, democratic egalitarianism—in the face of the nation's clear and often brutal inequalities of race, sex, and sexuality, exploring the complex and often ambivalent treatment of American identity in works by Charlotte Perkins Gilman, Eugene O'Neill, Lillian Hellman, Djuna Barnes, Amiri Baraka, Margaret Atwood, N. Scott Momaday, Spike Lee, Leslie Marmon Silko, Tony Kushner, and Heidi Schreck.

1 National Identity and National Emplotment

DOI: 10.4324/9781003211983-1

As noted briefly in the introduction, my earlier volume on American Literature and American identity concerned the ways in which American authors of that early period addressed the all-too-obvious contradiction between the American ideal of universal, democratic egalitarianism and the actual practices that pervaded U.S. society—such as the genocide and dispossession of Amerindians, African slavery, and the disenfranchisement and broader subordination of women. To consider these issues, I outlined an account of how identity categorization operates. This account begins with a distinction between “categorial” and “practical” identity. In this chapter, I summarize and partially extend that account. From there, I add the issue of narrativization or emplotment, how nationalist thought and action are intertwined with the ways in which we shape scattered and fragmentary knowledge and feeling into stories.

Identity Categorization

Categorial identity is, fundamentally, a category label with some sort of inclusion criterion. For example, “male” is a category label; in ordinary usage, its inclusion criterion is, roughly, having a penis and testicles. (A technical, biological definition or other sorts of inclusion criteria would of course be different.) Such labeling or categorizing defines in-groups and out-groups. A great deal of research shows that merely labeling test subjects as members of different groups—even arbitrary ones—triggers in-group favoritism, leading people to judge their co-categorists to be, for example, better looking and harder working (Duckitt 68–69; see also Hirschfeld 1). Conversely, group divisions foster “hostility attribution bias” (Lukianoff and Haidt 158), our tendency to see hostility in the behavior and intentions of out-group members, even when it is not there (e.g., white test subjects exhibit greater readiness “to perceive anger in Black faces than in White faces” [Banaji and Greenwald 49], and greater readiness to perceive an angry face as black [224n.7]). In addition to inclusion criteria, categories also involve socially accepted norms. For example, a norm for a human male might include being stoical in the face of tender, yielding emotions, such as grief. (Note that norms may differ across individuals in a society; e.g., not everyone takes stoicism about grief as a norm for men.)

Practical identity, in contrast, is the total of one’s propensities and capacities. My practical identity might be stoical about grief, or it might not. Insofar as I am inclined toward stoicism in this area, I fit that male gender norm; insofar as I succumb to tearful mourning, I do not. Social practices—surrounding not only gender, but a range of other identity categories, crucially including nationality—function to make people’s practical identities conform more closely to the standard, social norms of their identity categories. For example, a great deal of childrearing serves to mold young females and males into normatively feminine and masculine children and adults. The same point holds for nationality in, for example, much formal education. Needless to say, the success of such programs is only partial.

Intuitively, it may seem that practical identity is fundamental, and of course in certain respects it is—such as facilitating routine social interactions (e.g., having even a minimal conversation). However, with regard to our social and political attitudes, alliances, judgments, and a wide range of other highly consequential matters, categorial identity is more significant. This is particularly true due to the centrality of in-group versus out-group relations in our social interactions. A key feature of such relations is interpersonal stance, the attitude with which we respond to the emotions—thus, the interests and experiences—of other people. We may sympathize with their pain or we may delight in it; we may crave their attention or fear it. It depends on whether our interpersonal stance toward them is parallel (thus sympathetic) or not. That, in turn, commonly depends on whether we categorize those people as “us” (e.g., as “black”) or as “them” (e.g., as “white”)

As already noted, we also have a series of cognitive biases against out-group members. Some of these biases are, roughly, literal beliefs, while others involve metaphorical assimilation or modeling.¹ Drawing on Ashis Nandy’s analyses of British colonial ideas about Indians and Africans, I have argued that these models (or metaphors) prominently include three domains—animacy, age, and gender (see chapter four of The Culture of Conformism). In hierarchizing in-groups and out-groups, one is faced with the problem that out-groups appear to be of the same, general, human category as in-groups. So, how does one imagine their (hierarchy-rationalizing) difference? One way is to take hierarchies that one already accepts as valid and then to map the new identity categories onto those accepted hierarchies. The age domain distinguishes, for example, adults from children. For certain types of in-group versus out-group relations, one may think of the in-group as comparable to adults and the out-group as comparable to children. Such a model has clear implications for the social hierarchization of authority. Alternatively, one may draw on the domain of age and think of the out-group as declined into old age, which also has implications for social hierarchization. The sex-gender model commonly assimilates the in-group to men and the out-group to women (though this is complicated by such factors as the common assimilation of women to children). These age and sex models recognize the humanity of the out-group and are therefore often associated with liberal racism. The animacy domain involves a different tactic—dehumanizing the out-group. Thus, out-group members may be viewed as (sub-human) animals or as (super-human) demons, with in-group members connected with humanity. These models are therefore likely to be associated with right-wing (or conservative) racism, including fascism.

One complication in categorial identification is that we all adopt a range of identity categories, demarcating different in-group versus out-group divisions. That is usually not a problem, because one identity category tends to be prominent at any given time. For example, suppose Jones is white and Christian, Doe is black and Christian, and Smith is black and Muslim. In circumstances where religion is the prominent social category, Jones and Doe may think of themselves as sharing an in-group. In contrast, when race is the prominent social category, Doe and Smith may think of themselves as sharing an in-group. In earlier work, I have explicitly treated identity categorization as highly variable, but I have implicitly treated it as univocal at any given time. Such univocity is probably the usual case. Moreover, we probably cannot hold many identity categories active at any given time. But it seems clear that we do sometimes hold two together. Indeed, in the case of sex, this form of “intersectional” identity seems quite common. For example, I suspect that many Americans are more or less continuously responsive to both sex and race categories in a mixed group of European American and African American women and men.

Intersectional identity is relevant for our present concerns due to an apparently somewhat peculiar feature of American identity as it has developed over the last century. With demographic changes over this time period, many countries have had to respond to a dissociation of previously interwoven categories of nationality and race or ethnicity. France has a large North African population; England, a large South Asian citizenry, and so on. Of course, this has been something of an issue in the U.S. for much longer, due to slavery. But, however severe, the problem remained localized. It concerned a single group. Moreover, that group was, for a long time, entirely deprived of social power, and even now is far less socially influential than its numbers should guarantee. Nations deal with this issue in various ways. The U.S. seems to have made some form of explicit intersectionality into the norm for national identity. Specifically, as Theiss-Morse writes, “The United States is a country of hyphenated Americans” (66). We all seem to have binomial identities, combining nation with race (as in “African American”) or ethnicity (as in “Irish-American”). Ethno-racial and national intersection just seems to be the way Americans do national identity. As Gerber puts it, “one of the tenets” of the tacit “American creed … has been the freedom to maintain a distinctive identity, even while adopting the common behaviors and attitudes” of Americans more generally (102). Indeed, ethnic communities have repeatedly operated to help integrate new immigrants into U.S. society (108). Moreover, it is crucial to American identity that this is “not simply a process of the immigrants becoming Americans, but ultimately of mutual accommodation, in which society changes alongside the changing individuals and groups that compose it” (107–108).

This sort of intersectional identity is usually spoken of in terms of what I am calling “practical identity.” In other words, it is commonly seen as a matter of choosing mixed culture over assimilation. The idea of a hyphenated culture is worth considering, but that is not what I am talking about. I am talking about an intersectional (or hyphenated) categorial identity. To a remarkable degree, it seems that Americans see themselves and other Americans as having a dual identity, as simultaneously ethno-racial and national—or perhaps a triple identity, with sex further defining one’s identity. It is crucial that this is, fundamentally, a matter of categorial identification. It is not a natural relation derived from one’s putatively “true,” practical identity. It is a label with norms. To take a trivial example, I grew up strongly identifying as Irish-American. What exactly did that mean? Well, one thing it meant was wearing some article of green clothing and eating things suffused with green food coloring on Saint Patrick’s Day. I had no natural affinity for green socks or bread that looked as if it was baked using flour made from shamrocks. My family did not gravitate toward those practices because my maternal great-great grandparents escaped The Great Hunger with nothing but the shirts on their backs and a whiskey jar brimming with a shamrock-hued food additive, in order to continue a (fabricated) ceremonial tradition for which we had some sort of natural, ethnic affinity. Rather, we began with an identity category, then did something to affirm that label.

My comments on the celebration of pea-hued scones may seem to suggest that I take a dim view of hyphenated—or “hybrid”—traditions. That isn’t really true. What I do have little sympathy for is the ethno-racial determination of cultural affinity. I am entirely in favor of bringing together as many cultural practices as possible (insofar as these traditions promote human wellbeing and do not violate human rights). And, of course, one expects that a higher proportion of people will be drawn to practices common in their own families, which will tend to connect some aspects of practical identity with some (ethno-racial) identity categories. However, I also believe that such cultural enrichment should be widely available within the society as a whole. For example, when I teach “Literature and Culture of India,” I expect to have an unusual number of Indian students. But I tend to think that the greatest benefit of the course is to those students (of any ethno-racial background) who find themselves drawn to the culture—whether it is yoga philosophy or Bollywood musicals that excites them—rather than to those students who are taking the course principally because their parents were born in India.

Of course, none of this means that linking specific practices with particular ethno-racial categories is without any social function. It is, in fact, highly functional. Specifically, the formation of intersectional, national sub-groups is unsurprising, given the nature of social networks and group dynamics. We might isolate two problems that a social system needs to resolve in a hierarchically stratified nation. On the one hand, the society must be able to produce and sustain a sense of categorial identification against other nations. On the other hand, it must enable and rationalize the internal stratification that unequally distributes wealth and power within the hierarchized society (here, the U.S.) itself. Ethno-racial-national, hybrid categorization can help in both cases. It can distinguish a (large, national) “us” from other nations but also can distinguish one (smaller, subnational) “us” from another.

Needless to say, the development of such a functional system is not generally created by self-conscious planning (though such planning does sometimes occur in, say, the formulation of national cultural policies). It most often has to develop through relatively spontaneous processes of networks and through group dynamics. Such processes occur when categorial—and, to some extent, practical—identities of national sub-groups establish increased numbers of network links among people in those sub-groups, while decreasing links with members of other sub-groups. A tendency of this sort is enhanced by processes of in-group coalition building. For example, in a racially stratified U.S., categorial identifications lead white employers and landlords to discriminate in employment, housing, and elsewhere. One result of this is that white people have more network links with other white people and fewer network links with black people, with the reverse being true for blacks. This increased connectivity makes whites more readily available as coalition partners for whites and blacks for blacks, which also fits with the racial identity categorization. In some cases, this tendency will be enhanced by practical identity. For example, some Latin American immigrants will not only share ghettoization in housing or employment but also knowledge of Spanish, which facilitates coalition building and also makes identity category differences (with non-Spanish speakers) more salient.

On the other hand, such in-group restriction is limited by nation-building processes, which are in part spontaneous, but which also include self-conscious policies (in education, national ritual, and so on). These occur through all the usual techniques, from displays of the national flag to singing the national anthem, reciting the pledge of allegiance, studying national history or literature in school, participating in elections, and so on—including writing books on American literature and American identity. Indeed, there are continual interactions between the sub-national and national identifications. These interactions produce partial, temporary, local, dynamic equilibria. For example, in literature departments in colleges, surveys of American literature will include authors from various sub-national, ethnic, identity groups; at the same time, other courses will focus on literature by one or several such groups. The exact configuration of courses or works within a given course will change with changing national, local, and (for individual instructors) personal circumstances. These dynamic equilibria manifest themselves, partially, in the appearance and alteration of intersectional, categorial identities of hyphenated, or hybrid Americanism. These include, for example, whether we consider someone to be ethnic American, Asian American, Vietnamese American, or to fall into some further category. Actions and events associated with such developments range from text selections in particular university courses to election trends and presidential policies, and may take many different forms, including (though not confined to) an affirmation of ethnic particularism (as in some forms of multiculturalism), an attempt to align national identity with a specific ethno-racial identity (as in white supremacism), ethno-racial separatism, and a universalization of cultural practices from different traditions but without future ethno-racial restrictions (in some other forms of multiculturalism).

Emplotting the Nation: Story Genres and Emotion

Another important aspect of national identification, discussed but not stressed in the earlier book, is emplotment, the ways in which national identification and nation-building rely on recurring types of story or genre prototypes. As will become clear, this is a prominent concern in the present volume. In Understanding Nationalism, I have argued that there is a fundamental form of national emplotment. It is the cross-culturally recurring heroic prototype. Consistent with the preceding reflections, this genre addresses national identification over against other nations and social stratification within the nation. Specifically, the heroic prototype has two components. One is the invasion/defense scenario in which the in-group society is overrun and dominated (temporarily) by some out-group society, typically through a defeat in battle. The other component is the usurpation/restoration scenario in which the leadership hierarchy of the in-group society is undermined so that the (presumptively) legitimate organization of society is (temporarily) undermined.

Again, the heroic prototype is a sort of default structure for thinking about one’s national identity. This is not because the usual condition of a nation is one of being occupied by a foreign power and experiencing the subversion of the legitimate government. It is, rather, because nations foster active national identification in part by encouraging vigilance over external and internal threats. The degree of vigilance varies, sometimes being very slight, while at other times verging on collective hysteria. But it is commonly an important part of fostering national identification. It is no accident that this is connected principally with negative emotions. Nation building does involve the encouragement of positive emotions also. But, due to “hedonic asymmetry” (Frijda 323), we are much more likely to habituate to pleasurable experiences than to painful ones. Our pleasure in being able to vote for our leaders (for example) fades very quickly, as we come to experience democratic participation as routine. Conversely, however, fear of, say, Communist subversion—once genuinely internalized—is less likely to lose its motivational force due to habituation.

Other narrative prototypes tend to become prominent in non-normal conditions. Consider the romantic prototype. In this structure, two people fall in love but are prevented from being united due to social restrictions. Often, the lovers belong to opposed identity groups (such as the Montagues and Capulets in Romeo and Juliet). Their separation—routinely through exile and/or confinement—is commonly enforced by parents or other attachment figures. Social norms may lead to the assignment of another prospective spouse to one or both lovers, resulting in a love triangle. In the comic version, the lovers are eventually united, often with the help of a third party.

A romantic narrative of socially separated lovers is often used to address and reconcile sub-national divisions, with the lovers representing the opposed, sub-national groups (see chapter seven of my Understanding Nationalism; see also Sommer). This is the reason why interracial romance tends to assume such importance in treatments of American national identity, whether in Whitman celebrating the marriage of the “trapper” and the “red girl” (1318) or Melville pairing Ishmael and Queequeg explicitly as akin to a married couple (see, e.g., 22 and 46–47). Inter-racial romance can be used to pretend that inter-racial divisions have been overcome. It can also be little more than authorial virtue signaling (creating the impression that one is virtuous; see Lukianoff and Haidt 73) or, related to this, individual self-exculpation by members of the dominant group. However, inter-racial romance also works against treating racial Others as objects of disgust, distrust, fear, or other emotions that commonly drive racism. As...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• series Page
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Dedication
• Contents
• Acknowledgments
• A Note on Terminology
• Introduction Celebratory Nationalism, Critical Nationalism, and Disillusion: America After the Civil War
• 1 National Identity and National Emplotment
• Part I: Race (I): Native America
• Part II: Race (II): African America
• Part III: Sexual Orientation
• Part IV: Sex and Gender
• Afterword: A Note on Pessimism of the Intellect and Optimism of the Will
• Works Cited
• Index