The Sources of Law
English law comes from a number of sources. First, because we do not have a written constitution in the United Kingdom, the laws with the highest authority in this country are statutes, passed by Parliament and given âroyal assentâ by the monarch. Statutes, also known as Acts of Parliament, are referred to as primary sources of law. These primary laws may be supplemented by secondary sources, known as secondary or delegated legislation, usually in the form of Statutory Instruments (SIs). These are the nitty-gritty, detailed, technical rules ïŹeshing out in more detail a provision laid down in a particular Act of Parliament. SIs are subject to less detailed parliamentary scrutiny. To give you an example, the right for parents with children and those with caring responsibilities to request ïŹexible working hours is laid down in general terms in the Employment Rights Act 1996. But you will ïŹnd all the details in various SIs such as Flexible Working Regulations 2014 (SI 2014/1398). However, when adopting Acts of Parliament and SIs, Parliament no longer enjoys the total freedom it once had: in the past it had to ensure that the rules did not contravene European Union law (considered further in chapter eight). Parliament must still ensure that the rules comply with the European Convention on Human Rights.
The statutory rules may also be accompanied by other documents which are not always legally binding but offer guidance to judges and other ofïŹcials striving to apply these rules. These include codes of practice such as the Advisory and Conciliation Serviceâs (ACAS) Code of Practice on Disciplinary and Grievance Procedures at Work.
The second source of law is the common law, much of it made a long time ago by judges. It continues to develop as judges have to decide new and different cases. It is all rather mysterious, because strictly speaking judges donât make new law, they merely declare and apply the existing law when deciding a case (although this is a bit of a chicken-and-egg puzzle because every common law rule must at some point in ancient legal history have been invented for the ïŹrst time). This declaratory theory is certainly accurate insofar as it relates to judges in the ordinary or lower courts (we will return to the structure of the courts later). These are judges who decide initially which party wins a civil dispute, or who preside over criminal trials. However, when the losing side is unhappy with the result and takes the case further, to the higher or appellate courts, the senior judges who decide the appeal often do things that look very much like making new law, such as deciding to expand a rule to cover a new area, or reverse an earlier rule because it is now out of date or didnât work very well. The appellate judges are adept at being creative with the existing law, managing to respect the declaratory theory while, in reality, changing the law slightly.
The basics of many important areas of law, such as contract, tort and equity (which are considered later in this book), are governed by judge-made law, although even these traditionally common law areas are increasingly being altered by statutory developments. Sometimes this happens when Parliament thinks that the common law is going in the wrong direction. At other times, politicians want to introduce a wholly new law in a particular area. Judges (however creative they are) cannot make major reversals or big changes to the common lawâthis requires legislation.
A good example of statutory intervention is the Unfair Contract Terms Act, passed by Parliament in 1977, which provided that certain very unreasonable contract terms and notices were no longer to be legally effective. Included among these clauses and notices were those which say that one person is exempt from any liability for negligently causing death or personal injury to another person. The courts had struggled for years to ïŹnd common law solutions to protect people from onerous exclusion clauses and notices of this kind, but parliamentary intervention was able to do the trick in an instant. From the moment this statute was passed, it superseded all the old common law on the question of the validity of such notices and clauses. When passing the Unfair Contract Terms Act, Parliament had the beneïŹt of guidance from the Law Commission. This body, consisting of judges, barristers, solicitors and academic lawyers, considers whether particular areas of law need reform, puts proposals for change out to consultation with lawyers and other interested parties, and produces reports detailing its ïŹnal conclusions. Parliament is not obliged to implement the Law Commissionâs recommendations, but sometimes does so.
Between 1972 and 2020 many statutes and statutory instruments were passed to give effect to the UKâs commitments to the European Union. So, for example, in July 1985 the European Community (which is what the European Union used to be called) adopted a Directive on Product Liability requiring Member States to implement domestic legislation providing that manufacturers would be liable, even if not at fault in the traditional sense, for any personal injury or damage to property caused by their defective products. This Directive meant that the 28 Member States of the European Union all had compatible, harmonised product-liability regimes. The UK government implemented the Directive by passing the Consumer Protection Act 1987. Following the UKâs departure from the EU, there is no longer an obligation on the UK to implement EU obligations. However, where the UK has already done so, as is the case with the Consumer Protection Act 1987, that is now described as âretained EU lawâ, in accordance with the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018, and continues to apply in the UK until Parliament decides otherwise.
Most statutes, even those introducing completely new rules, assume and build on the existing common law in some wayâthey rarely arrive out of a clear blue sky. For example, statutory provisions protect employees from being unfairly dismissed, but the question âwho is an employee?â is answered by reference to the common lawâs understanding of a contract of employment. In addition, the common law often still has a role to play when a statute is enacted in a particular area. Judges may need to interpret what a particular statutory provision means and, having decided what it means, this interpretation will then become law in its own right and be applied in future cases.
By now, you will have worked out that existing common law cases, and the rules set down in them, are important in deciding new cases. They not only inïŹuence the result in the new case, but also dictate what that result will be, because the fundamental basis of the common law system is the doctrine of precedent. To grasp fully the importance of this doctrine, we must ïŹrst understand the structure of the courts in England.
At its simplest, the structure of the courts (see the diagram on page 10, below) consists of trial judges at the lowest level, then the Court of Appeal and ïŹnally the Supreme Court. The doctrine of precedent requires the lower-level courts to be bound by the decisions of superior courts on matters of lawâthey have no choice but to follow the rule set down in those superior decisions. Donât ignore the words âof lawâ in the previous sentenceâtrial judges often have to decide between conïŹicting pieces of evidence and work out the facts of the case, and in this aspect of their decision-making the doctrine of precedent has no role to play. But where issues of law are concerned, a trial judge is bound by decisions of the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court, and the Court of Appeal is bound by the decisions of the Supreme Court. In 2009 the Supreme Court replaced the House of Lords as the highest court. However, decisions of the House of Lords retain their superior status as precedent, a concept that we shall explain later. Following Brexit, pre-Brexit decisions of the European Court of Justice, the highest court of the EU, have the same precedential value as decisions of the UK Supreme Court but the UK Supreme Court and the Court of Appeal can depart from them where it is âright to do soâ (a test which raises all sorts of questions).
In addition, courts of a particular level are generally bound by decisions of other courts at the same level. So, for example, the Court of Appeal is bound by other, earlier, decisions of the Court of Appeal, although on very rare occasions it is possible for the Court of Appeal to overrule one of its own earlier decisions. Likewise, the Supreme Court can in theory overrule its own, earlier decisions, including decisions of the House of Lords, but like the Court of Appeal, it does so only on very rare occasions and for exceptional reasons. On the other hand, higher courts are not bound by decisions of lower courts. So, for example, the Supreme Court can, and frequently does, overrule decisions of the Court of Appeal in earlier cases, just as it can reverse the result in the particular case being appealed to it and allow the appeal.
This book focuses on the law of England, which includes the law of Wales. This system is primarily common law-based. Scottish law is different. It is derived from Roman law, which is the tradition which also applies in continental Europe. The Scottish system, also sometimes called the civilian system (not to be confused with the more common meaning of the phrase âcivilâ law as the opposite of criminal law, which is discussed below), is based on formal written Codes prescribing the detail of the law. In contrast to the common law, civilian judges have no law-making function at all, other than in interpreting and applying the Code. However, the law of England and Wales, on the one hand, and Scotland, on the other hand, is not as different as would ïŹrst appear. In areas which have not been devolved to the Scottish Parliament or the Welsh Senedd, statutes passed by the Westminster Parliament in London apply to all three jurisdictions and the interpretation of those statutes by the Scottish courts has persuasive effect on the English courts. Further, and somewhat surprisingly, decisions of the Supreme Court bind the courts throughout the United Kingdom, includin...