those defensive functions through which the individual tries to protect himself against anxiety caused by internal or external threats by using or exploiting other persons and/or fantasies about them. A successful warding-off of anxiety will then depend upon whether the other person behaves in the way he is expected to do, or whether at least such a fantasy can be maintained. At the world community level this conception is very relevant to a better understanding of the deeper causes of the so-called enemy stereotypes, projectively tinged apprehensions of the "other part," giving at the same time an acceptable and guilt-relieved motive for one's own aggressive feelings and actions directed at it. This also includes the psychological paradox that a feared andârightlyâcondemned aggressive intervention of the other part may also be experienced as an unconsciously welcome event, just because it gives additional evidence in support of the "correctness" of our prejudiced stereotype of that other part.
In groups, mental operations differ from those of dyads or of the individual. There is greater proneness to regression; to the eruption of primary process, irrational thinking; and to action governed by it (cf. Alford 1988: 579). The larger the group is, the deeper is the regressive potential; the greater are the depersonalization, dehumanization, and abstraction of adversaries and the diminution of reality testing; and the more unfettered is the dominion of fantasy. Organizational culture, like ethnic and religious cultures, rests upon deeply personal, conflictual, and emotion-laden foundations, most of which drive people unconsciously.
Wilfred R. Bion (1959) describes groups as organized around three types of unconscious basic assumptions: (1) dependency upon a leader or upon the group as an entity (the sense that the Ieader[s] will sustain the group by nurturing and protecting it or that the group itself is a mother-child unit); (2) fight/flight aggression (heightened vigilance, a sense of imminent danger, readiness to attack or to withdraw, heightened aggressive impulses); and (3) creation of a group savior through "pairing" (the group hopes for rebirth via a redeemer who is a product of the fantasized pairing of two group members or of outside parent figures). Bion (pp. 159-160) addresses the relationship between intellectual activity and group fantasies:
The individual, conforming with the behavior imposed by participation in the basic-assumption group, feels as if his intellectual capacity were being reduced. The belief that this really is so is reinforced because the individual tends to ignore all intellectual activity that does not fit in with the basic assumption. In fact I do not in the least believe that there is a reduction of intellectual ability in the group, nor yet that "great decisions in the realm of thought and momentous discoveries and solutions of problems are possible to an individual working in solitude" (McDougall 1920); although the belief that this is so is commonly expressed in the group discussion, and all sorts of plans are elaborated for circumventing the supposedly pernicious influences of the emotions of the group. Indeed I give interpretations because I believe that intellectual activity of a high order is possible in a group together with an awareness (and not an evasion) of the emotions of the basic-assumptions groups. If group therapy is found to have a value, I believe it will be in the conscious experiencing of the group activity of this kind.
In Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego, Freud ([1921] 1955b) argues that groups are formed and perpetuated by bonds of identification based on father-son conflict and its resolution. Bion (1959) proposes that this facet of group psychology rests developmentally upon even earlier mother-infant relationships and infantile defenses against massive anxiety. Alan Dundes (1980, 1984) notes similarly that the plausibility of a depthpsychology interpretation lies in the very cultural materialâthe folklore, slips of the tongue (parapraxes), metaphors, myths, and taboosâof people themselves.
The method of listening deeply discussed here has been especially influenced by the clinical and theoretical work of such object-relations psychoanalysts and psychiatrists as Harold F. Searles, M.D. (1975), Vamik D. Volkan, M.D. (1981), L. Bryce Boyer, M.D. (1983, 1989), Arnold H. Modell, M.D. (1984), James S. Grotstein, M.D. (1981), Thomas H. Ogden, M.D. (1989), Otto F. Kernberg, M.D. (1976), and Wilfred B. Bion, M.D. (1963). What resonates most strongly with my work in organizational groups is how earliest developmental issues of boundaries, continuity, sensation, rhythm, integrity, and cohesion of the body are the foundations upon which organizational group identities are built and destroyed.
In The Meeting: Gatherings in Organizations and Communities, Helen Schwartzman (1989) distinguishes between formal decision-making and the ebb and flow of meetings in which decisions take place. Our culture has widely shared categories, such as decisions, decision-making, outcomes, outcome measures, mission statements, goals, and objectives, according to which the official or formal work of groups is assessed. Schwartzman looks behind bureaucratic language, explicit genres, and official group self-representations to explore the eventfulness of meetings themselves for those who participate in them. Decisions become only one of the many elements of the meeting and not necessarily the most significant one for those participating. The meaning that meetings hold for their participants often diverges widely from the formal agenda and espoused meaning. Decision-making occurs outside the boundaries of what we officially and formally define and recognize as decision-making.
Despite the common belief that decision-making in organizations is governed by realism and rationality, unconsciously motivated hidden agendas affect group thinking, interaction, and action. There are often informal, if not formal, prohibitions against acknowledging certain ideas or feelings in groupsâpower, membership, leadership, insidership, outsidership. Participants enforce a group fantasy of ignorance that sustains the illusion that the group is really only about decision-making. Group members can unwittingly play out issues of insiderness/outsiderness and conflicts over power via some formal topic (budget, curriculum, production quotas) that embodies what cannot be spoken. Similarly participants can rally around a tightly bounded agenda to divert attention from, and even avoid, an emotionally toxic subject such as what it feels like to be a member of the group or meeting at that moment.
Unless these unconscious agendas are given their due and addressed in group meetings, they will contaminate, if not sabotage, official roles and tasks; distort reality; and perpetuate conflict even if for a while they artificially boost morale. To the degree that unconscious agendas fail to be brought to conscious awareness for greater access and control in work groups, organizations will fail to mature and evolve. They will instead continue to repeat old patterns, often called mistakes. Conversely as groups acquire better insight into these powerful underlying factors, they will increase their ability to be liberated from the pull of the past and to explore genuinely new alternatives.
Although this book is not social psychology or sociology per se, neither is it their adversary. The psychoanalytically informed approach taken in this book complements and helps complete the analyses of groups, organizations, and work offered by social psychologists and sociologists (for example, Erikson and Wallas 1990; Lindsmith and Strauss 1968; Argyris 1990). Decision making processes, consensus, conformity, the construction and use of group norms, the nature of leadership, task and process roles, group cohesiveness, power and status, and the relationship between individual and group decision making are all topics long addressed in these fieldsâfields now integral to schools of business and management training. What a psychodynamically oriented approach strives to do is add yet another dimension to an understanding of these processes, that of the unconscious and its relation to the conscious.
Let me briefly illustrate this by drawing from a classic experiment performed by Solomon Asch (1952) on how individuals in groups often conform themselves to their social environments as a means of conflict resolution. Richard S. Lazarus (1961: 18) summarizing Asch's work, writes:
Asch (1952) has performed a fascinating experiment on the effects of social pressure on perceptual judgments. The subject in his experiment was required to match a visually presented series of lines with comparison lines of different lengths. In the same room with him were other persons who the subject thought were also being tested but who, in reality, were allied with the experimenter and said what they had been rehearsed to say when they were asked publicly to make their judgments. A large portion of the time they gave incorrect answers so that the actual subject often found himself a minority of one. Even though the correct answers were quite obvious, tremendous social pressure was exerted on the subject to modify his judgment in favor of the group.
As Asch (1952, pp. 4-5) wrote, "There was a marked movement toward the majority. One third of all the estimates in the critical groups were errors identical with or in the direction of the distorted estimates of the majority. The significance of this finding becomes clear in the light of the virtual absence of errors in the control group, the members of which recorded their estimates in writing.". . .
In response to this situation, the subjects conformed to the pressure of the group about 30 per cent of the time. In fact, some subjects, when questioned later, seemed to be entirely unaware that they had responded to this pressure, believing that they actually perceived the lines in the same way as the majority.
Asch's experiment parallels Irving Janis's (1982) later studies of "groupthink," except that in Asch's, conformity occurred with a leaderless group rather than in a group rallying around a leader, A person obliterates his or her distinctiveness in the service of fitting in. Reality distortion and abrogation of personal judgment are two consequences and casualties of this subdy coerced conformism. Organizational groups of all kinds lose in reality testing and creativity what they gain in consensus. Groups can be wrong but insist that they are right. People will change what they "know" and perceive in order to belong. Concepts such as separation anxiety, identification with the aggressor, and dependency wishes help us understand why people in organizations often behave as Asch discovered in his experiment four decades ago. Furthermore, these concepts direct the consultant to largely out-of-awareness dynamics that influence perception and judgment in decision-making.
A number of authors have discussed unconscious influences in what we today call the industrial psychology or management psychology of work groups (Stein and Fox 1985). Nevertheless, the literature remains sparse and continues to be identified as clinical, which makes it seem exceptional, unusual, and exotic rather than mundane. The small-group research of Janis illustrates the promise of depth psychology in understanding group life. Janis studied decision-making in the circle around President John F. Kennedy to understand how the calamitous Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba was conceived. Janis (1982) also studied corporate policy-making processes and coined the Orwellian term groupthink. Janis (1971: 43, 44) describes groupthink as
a mode of thinking that persons engage in when concurrence-seeking becomes so dominant in a cohesive group that it tends to override realistic appraisal of alternative courses of action. . . . The term refers to a deterioration in mental efficiency, reality testing and moral judgments as a result of group pressures. . . . Groupthink involves nondeliberate suppression of critical thoughts as a result of internalization of the group's norms.
In groupthink, the participants' goal of group cohesiveness through unanimity...