Japanese War Orphans

Abandoned Twice by the State

Jiaxin Zhong

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2021
• Topic: Social Sciences
• eBook ISBN:
  9780429582493
• Subtopic: Regional Studies
• Index: Social Sciences

After Japan's defeat in August 1945, some Japanese children were abandoned in China and raised by Chinese foster parents. They were unable to return to Japan even during the mass repatriation carried out by the Japanese government in the 1950s. Most of them returned to Japan in the 1980s. They are called Japanese war orphans. They are victims of the Sino-Japanese War and have been exploited and abandoned by the Japanese government. They are also "border people" who have lived in the interstices between two nations, China and Japan, and are migrants who have exploited the gap in economic development between Japan and China to seek individual happiness.

Modern East Asia underwent drastic social change. These drastic social changes affected the lives of the Japanese war orphans and their families in a variety of ways. Over the years, Zhong has interviewed Japanese war orphans, their Chinese foster parents, and Japanese volunteers. The title is an interview-based sociological study of the issue of Japanese war orphans. The first half of the Japanese war orphans' lives were spent in China, and the latter half in Japan. It brings to the fore the dramatic personal histories of the Japanese war orphans surviving in the interstices between two nation-states. Through analyzing the issue of Japanese war orphans, the research on the subject makes the following three points: (1) the powerlessness of civilians caught up in modern warfare and the long-lasting effects of modern warfare on the life histories of individuals and their families; (2) the nature of the modern nation-state, which exploits and abandons its citizens as though they were expendable; and (3) immigration as a product of modernization gaps.

Scholars pursuing studies in both Japanese society & Chinese society and historians of the Sino-Japanese war would find this an ideal read.

1 Introduction The creation of Japanese war orphans in China

DOI: 10.4324/9780429198090-1

Ever since August 1945, a peculiar social group called Japanese War Orphans in China has existed in China and Japan. However, most Chinese are unaware of their existence. In contrast, many Japanese consider this social group to be Chinese speakers with whom they would rather keep their distance. In short, this mysterious group of people remains relatively unknown to both the Chinese and Japanese. The name for this unique social group differs between Japan and China. In Japan, the term most commonly used is “Japanese war orphans in China” (chugoku zanryu koji), but they are also referred to as “Japanese orphans in China”, “Japanese people in China”, “war orphans”, “compatriots left in China”, “repatriates from China”, “returnees from China”, “unrepatriated compatriots in China”, “Manchurian orphans”, and other such terms.

The Japanese government defines Japanese war orphans in China as Japanese children who, for a variety of reasons, were left behind in Northeast China after death or separation from blood relatives amid the chaos following the Soviet–Japanese War of August 9, 1945 and were unable to return to Japan through mass repatriation implemented from 1946 to 1948 and from 1953 to 1958. The Japanese government referred to children under age 12 left behind in China after August 1945 as “Japanese war orphans in China” and women aged 13 and older who were left behind or who married locally as “Japanese women left in China” (chugoku zanryu fujin). “Japanese war orphans in China” and “Japanese women left in China” were also at times referred to as “compatriots left in China” (chugoku zanryu hojin). Meanwhile, in China, Japanese war orphans are referred to as “日本遗孤”¹ (“Japanese orphans left behind”) or “日本孤儿” (“Japanese orphans”). This is because they were originally the children of Japanese nationals. The Chinese expression “日本残留孤儿” (“Japanese war orphans”), influenced by the Japanese expression “中国残留孤児” (“Japanese war orphans in China”), has also been observed.

This chapter analyzes (1) the historical background leading to the creation of Japanese war orphans in China, (2) the reach and limitations of prior literature, and (3) the characteristics of this research.

1.1 The product of a major turning point in East Asian history

The issue of Japanese war orphans in China is a product of social changes in China and Japan starting in the late 19th century as well as the interactions between China and Japan within the context of modernization. To understand the structure and nature of the issue of Japanese war orphans in China from a sociological perspective, we must understand the Japanese war orphans as “a process”, or as “a historical concept”. That is, we must have a comprehensive understanding of the political, economic, and consciousness structures as well as the history of both Japan and China since the 19th century. In the following section, we'll take a look at the historical background that led to the creation of Japanese war orphans in China.

1.1.1 Military and civilian invasion

The modernization of the West and the rise of nationalism transformed global power structures. After defeat during the 1840 Opium War with Britain, the feudal empire in China waned. China was then subjected to division by imperial powers such as Britain, Russia, France, and Germany, turning it into a semi-colony. Having witnessed the aftermath of the Opium Wars, Japan felt a sense of impending crisis and enacted the national policy “enrich the country, strengthen the army” after the Meiji Restoration of 1868, which led to rapid modernization that shifted the power structures in East Asia. China's defeat during the First Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895 reversed the power balance between Japan and China. Through its victory in the Sino-Japanese War, Japan stabilized its occupation of the Ryukyu Kingdom (Okinawa) and acquired Taiwan as a colony. The Korean peninsula also fell under Japan's sphere of influence.

Then, after victory during the Russo-Japanese War, Japanese politicians set their sights on expanding Japan's power to China as part of a national strategy to become a major world power. Recognized for his skills in managing colonial Taiwan by the central Japanese government, Shinpei Goto was appointed as the first director-general of Manchuria Railway, designed to expand Japanese power in Northeast China, in 1906. He conceived of a plan to migrate 500,000 Japanese to the area around Manchuria Railway, and in the same year established “Aikawa Village”, the first Japanese immigrant village in Weijiatun, Dalian City.

In 1907, Goto wrote the “Memorandum on the Fundamentals of Continental Policy in China”. In this document, he emphasized the importance of (1) sending a special ambassador to Peking, (2) establishing a central authority in Japan to govern colonial policy, and (3) emigration to Manchuria as national policy. On emigration to Manchuria, Goto stated the following.

What is the government's view regarding emigration to Manchuria? Should we not take measures to see at least 500,000 emigrants to Manchuria over the next few years?

(Tsurumi, 2005: 410)

Gentaro Kodama, the then Chief of General Staff of the Japanese Army, similarly insisted on mass emigration to Manchuria. Kodama predicted another war with Russia and considered the four following policies crucial to prepare for this: (1) operating a railway, (2) developing coal mining, (3) emigration, and (4) establishing facilities for livestock and agriculture. He said the following regarding the importance of emigration.

Emigration must be considered of the utmost importance. From a superficial perspective, one might be tempted to ascribe the suzerainty (the special power of a country to control another country's internal politics and external affairs) of Korea today as the result of diplomacy or military victory, but in fact it was not an easy or rapid success. The acquisition of suzerainty stems from prioritization of migration to Korea over other nations in the past, a pre-existing fact that cannot be disputed by mere words. This can be transferred and applied to the Manchurian problem. Details regarding rules for the system came afterwards.

Now, if we can migrate 500,000 people to Manchuria within ten years through railway operations, the Russians will be unable to start a war with us so easily, no matter how strong they may be. Control of war and peace will fall into our hands without us having to move. Even if the Russians were to defeat us in a single battle, we would not lose the groundwork for recovering what was lost.

(Tsurumi, 2005: 44)

Plans for mass migration to Northeast China as advocated by Goto and Kodama in the late Meiji era were implemented as national policy following the Manchurian Incident of 1931.

Japan acquired a variety of interests in Northeast China after defeating Russia during the Russo-Japanese War which was war fought over interests in the region. In 1918, a coalition force was formed between Japan, the United States, Britain, and France to suppress the socialist revolution in the Soviet Union. Among these nations, Japan dispatched the most troops and occupied Russian territory the longest.

Japan staged the Manchurian Incident of 1931 in order to occupy Northeast China, then confronted the Soviet Union along its long national border. Alarmed by German invasion, the Soviet Union feared that the Japanese Army was advancing north and waited for an opportunity to counterattack. Meanwhile, Japan invented a variety of tactics to counter the Soviet Union and make Northeast China a permanent territory of Japan. Mass emigration was a critical part of this. In 1936, the Japanese government proclaimed the following plan for mass emigration to Northeast China called “Manchurian-Mongolian Pioneer Corps” (manmo kaitakudan) as one of its seven national policies:

1. Objective: To have roughly one million households (5 million people) emigrate for 20 years as agricultural emigrants to Manchuria. 2. Emigrant Workers: In consideration of the conditions of agriculture, fishing, and mountain villages as well as urban unemployment within Japan, emigrant workers will be selected from those who are sound of mind and physically fit.

(The Manchurian Railway Foundation, 2007: 458)

Competition for survival between nations intensified as the world entered the modern era. The elite group of politicians and bureaucrats in Japan at the time implemented a variety of policies involving both military and civilians to occupy the declining region of Northeast China, with the intent of expanding Japanese national interests. It was from the idea of all-out war that the Japanese government began sending large numbers of Japanese civilians to Northeast China.

These people were called “Pioneer Corps” by Japan and mobilized by the Japanese government. The majority of the “Pioneer Corps” came from those at the bottom of an overpopulated Japanese society before 1945 and were essentially being weeded out from Japan at the time. These people were moved to Northeast China in hopes of living a better life than the ones they led in Japan. The interests of the Japanese government and of the “Pioneer Corps” aligned.

One of the hallmarks of modern warfare is all-out war, which blurs the distinction between civilian and soldier. Some of the “Manchurian and Mongolian Pioneer Corps” sent by the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry and by the Ministry of Colonial Affairs were placed along the Soviet-Manchurian border. However, these “pioneers” had no way of knowing that they themselves were being exploited by the Japanese government as part of Japan's all-out war effort. At the time of Japan's defeat in 1945, there were 1.55 million Japanese living in Northeast China, approximately 270,000 of whom were associated with the “Pioneer Corps” (Ide, 1986: 10).

These “pioneers” were protected by the Japanese Kwantung Army occupying Northeast China at the time and were exploited by the Japanese government. They occupied land originally belonging to Chinese peasants displaced by the Japanese Kwantung Army or obtained land that Chinese peasants were forced to sell for nearly nothing. From the perspective of the local Chinese, whose lands were stolen, what the Japanese called “pioneers” were invaders, and they were indeed a group of pillagers. Nevertheless, Japan has continued to use the term “Manchurian Pioneer Corps” (manshu kaitakudan) even after 1945. This deceptive term conceals the group's pillaging nature. The role of the “Pioneer Corps” as perpetrators has been ignored, and in fact, they have been portrayed as victims.

1.1.2 Soviet–Japanese war

In February 1945, the Soviet Union entered into a secret agreement at the Yalta Conference to wage war against Japan. On August 6 of the same year, the United States dropped the atomic bomb on Hiroshima. On August 8, the Soviet Union declared war on Japan and entered the war in Northeast China, the Korean peninsula, and southern Sakhalin.

Many adult men from the “Pioneer Corps” were drafted or conscripted to support the southern front and defend the mainland at the end of the war. After the Soviet Union entered the war, the Japanese Kwantung Army rapidly retreated from Northeast China, blowing up bridges and other structures as they did so. For this reason, the “Pioneer Corps” were targeted for attack by the Soviet army. Some of the Chinese peasants whose homes and lands had been stolen by the Japanese Kwangtung Army began attacking the “Pioneer Corps” as well. Many among the “Pioneer Corps” became victims, and orphans were abandoned during this process.

A staff officer of the Japanese Imperial Army (General Staff Headquarters) stated the following regarding the withdrawal strategy of the Japanese Kwantung Army.

I know that this operation was criticized after the war. But I dare say that, as a soldier, it was an obvious decision. The military has a primary duty to defend the nation. In times of need, what the military must protect is the state and not its citizens.

(Soeda, 2012: 19)

Shigeko Takemoto was born in Yokohama in 1924 and went to China in 1942 at the invitation of her eldest brother. She worked in Jinzhou then, after the war, married a Chinese man named Yuanpu Cui who had studied at Meiji University. She returned to Japan in 1975 with her second son. She described her experience of war and life in China as follows.

When the Soviet Soldiers came at the end of the war, I was able to escape, but several of my friends were raped. Some of them lost their minds, and one woman even committed suicide by jumping to her death the following day. We were so scared, we boarded the doors of our dormitory. We were, after all, all young women. Even so, the Soviet soldiers came to our dormitory and pried open the doors, so we escaped through a back window. We escaped to a company dormitory within the city, there were hundreds of bandit-like men there that came to attack, and I didn't feel alive…Even after the Cultural Revolution, trumped-up articles in newspapers were plastered on walls in regional areas to defame people. What was posted was not ideological, but salacious tabloid-like topics like who was in a relationship with whom, at least in the area around me. I felt uncomfortable as a Japanese person, and it seemed completely different from the ideology of the Cultural Revolution in the central government… In 1960 I was expunged from the family register as having disappeared during the war. There was even a grave for me in Yokohama. I'd been too scared to write a letter before that, because of the national climate…I'd only gone to visit my family, but my second son ended up liking Japan. I was nearing retirement age and had a bad heart, so I decided to leave cold Bautou City and return to Japan…There are still a lot of women like me left behind in China. A lot of them of course got married and had families, but there are many for whom we don't really know the real situation.

(Murakami, 1997: 121–122)

From Takemoto's narrative, we can see a fragment of the damage to ordinary Japanese nationals during the end of the war.

In addition to the withdrawal of the Kwantung Army and a lack of thorough emergency measures, the Japanese government indicated the following as causes behind why many of the “pioneers” were killed. The government stated that “the problem is also rooted in Japanese policy toward Manchuria itself”, and gave the following specifics.

It is perhaps unsurprising that the awareness of Japanese nationals in Manchuria as the leading race created antagonism among other ethnic groups. Not to mention that, as Japan entered the war, Japan's rule over Manchuria grew increasingly militaristic and authoritarian, which undeniably put pressure on the lives of the native peoples. Forced labor and grain shipments led them to despise Japanese military officers. The day Japan's authority and power collapsed was for them an opportunity for retaliation and to let their discontent burst. Not only that, but the Soviet soldiers themselves possessed retaliatory hostility toward Japanese civilians and had no qualms about raping, pillaging, and killing, which inspired the native people who, in a state of great agitation, followed suit and committed rampant atrocities.

Many of the native people who were truly antagonistic toward the Japanese had experience serving in the Manchukuo Imperial Army, as conscripted laborers, or in the Labor Service Corps, but the crude and caustic measures combined with the coercive attitude of some of the Japanese nationals implementing them fostered animosity and vitriol toward Japan in their minds, putting them on the forefront of Japanese persecution after war broke out between the Soviet Union and Japan.

In general, the Pioneer Corps themselves harmonized and cooperated with the native people, achieving what could be called ‘harmony’. When the news of Japan's unconditional surrender came, discontented anti-Japanese elements rose to action in alliance with the communists, which inspired rebels from the Manchukuo Imperia...

Table of contents

• Cover Page
• Half-Title Page
• Series Page
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Dedication Page
• Contents
• Acknowledgments
• 1 Introduction: The creation of Japanese war orphans in China
• 2 Surviving as a Chinese
• 3 Awakening Japanese identity
• 4 The warm “motherland” and the cold “motherland”
• 5 Lawsuits against “motherland” Japan
• 6 Gratitude and rejection toward Chinese foster parents
• 7 Japanese war orphans from the point of view of Japanese volunteers
• 8 In between Chinese and Japanese cultures
• 9 Conclusion: The nature of issues surrounding Japanese war orphans
• Notes
• Bibliography
• Index