Phoenix Rising

From the Ashes of Desert One to the Rebirth of U.S. Special Operations

Keith M. Nightingale

• Publisher: Casemate
• Year: 2021
• Print ISBN: 9781612008776
• eBook ISBN: 9781612008783
• Topic: History
• Subtopic: Military & Maritime History
• Index: History

An insider's "entertainingly written, brilliantly insightful" account of the Iran hostage rescue attempt—and how it led to today's special operations forces (General Stanley McChrystal (Ret.)).
Phoenix Rising recounts the paradoxical birth of SOF through the prism of Operation Eagle Claw, the failed attempt to rescue fifty-two American hostages in the U.S. Embassy in Tehran. When terrorists captured the embassy on November 4, 1979, the Joint Chiefs of Staff quickly realized that the United States lacked the military capability to launch a rescue. There was no precedent for the mission, a mission that came with extraordinary restrictions and required a unique force to take it on. With no existent command structure or budget, this force would have to be built from scratch in utmost secrecy, and draw on every branch of the U.S. military.
Keith Nightingale, then a major, was Deputy Operations Officer and the junior member of Joint Task Force Eagle Claw, commanded by James Vaught. Based on Nightingale's detailed diary,  Phoenix Rising vividly describes the personalities involved, the issues faced, and the actions taken, from the operation's conception to its hair-raising launch and execution. His historically significant post-analysis of Eagle Claw gives unparalleled insight into how a dedicated group of people from the Chief of Staff of the Army to lower-ranking personnel subjugated personal ambition to grow the forces necessary to address asymmetrical warfare and the emerging terrorist threat—a threat the majority of uniformed leadership and their political masters denied in 1979. The Special Operations capability of the United States today is the proof of their success.
"Nightingale's fascinating account of the struggles to stand up the U.S. military's special operations capability is worth buying just for his first-hand description of the planning behind the effort to rescue the Iran hostages." —Sean Naylor, New York Times-bestselling author of Relentless Strike: The Secret History of Joint Special Operations Command
"Nightingale . . . is a combat leader who has been there and done that in some of the hardest places on the planet. On top of that, he's a fine and clear writer." —Thomas E. Ricks, #1 New York Times-bestselling author of Fiasco

PART 1

Creation of the Force and Development of a Rescue Plan

In the Beginning

And God saw the light, that it was good: and God divided the light from the darkness.

And God called the light Day, and the darkness he called Night.

—Chapter One, Genesis

Everything we take for granted today in the Special Operations Forces (SOF) world began with the Iran rescue attempt in 1980/1981 of 52 American hostages being held in Tehran by the Iranian government. Before this issue became a national priority to resolve, “Special Operations” was reserved for some small elements within each service that performed discrete unique tasks outside of the conventional mainspring. They rarely, if ever, worked together in common cause. The hostage crisis changed all that as we came to grips with the operational realities and necessities of the world.

In the beginning, with the requirement to rescue the hostages in Iran, the SOF shelf was essentially bare. We had to invent capabilities that heretofore had never existed. In light of what we enjoy today, these initial efforts were quaint at the least and shocking at the worst. Regardless, all that we enjoy today began at this event.

When the U.S. Embassy in Tehran was stormed and its U.S. citizens taken as prisoners, the Joint Chiefs of Staff examined its inventory of capabilities and concluded it had in reality no capabilities other than nuclear weapons or mass conventional forces, neither of which were rational tools to respond to this event. Any capability tailored for this form of conflict would have to be built from scratch. In a quintessentially American way, we began from nothing and progressed to something unique and competent.

In the Tank session with the Joint Chiefs, after it was clear no viable options could be provided, General Meyer, Army Chief of Staff, said, “We need a specialized force for a reasonable chance to free our hostages. I will provide the commander and we will start from there.”

That commander was Major General James Vaught, the head of the Army Department of the Army Management Office-Operational Directorate (DAMO-OD). He would have as his base staff, the members of the Joint Special Operations Directorate (JCS-SOD) located in Pentagon Room 2C840. The rest of a staff he would have to create from whole cloth.

I was a member of General Vaught’s DAMO staff, responsible for the Africa-Middle East desk. He asked, without explaining, that I go to 2C840 and see a Colonel Jerry King, the Director of JCS-SOD. I was met by Colonel King, signed a form and the journey began.

November 1980

Major General Vaught was in the United Kingdom when General Meyer decided to select him as the commander of the attempt. My entry is based upon what General Vaught recounted to me when we met in his DAMO-OD spaces that was combined with the first meeting of the ad hoc staff.

5 November

It is about 0400 on 5 November in room 2J2 of Claridge’s Hotel in London. The ivory-colored phone began to ring. The occupant picked it up, listened, made a few comments, hung up and then called the concierge. Though it was highly unusual to travel in such a mode, it was clearly necessary. By 0810, the phone call recipient was seated in seat 14B of a British Concorde supersonic jet liner. Major General James B. Vaught was returning to Washington to put together a plan to rescue the hostages in Iran.

6 November

The Chairman, Air Force General David Jones, the Proconsul of the Pentagon, is both reserved and intense. He radiates energy, but of an uncertain kind. He is a tanker pilot by trade and prides himself in being totally ambidextrous, a skill he learned when having to switch cockpit seats. On one hand, he is very cautious and calculating. On the other, he has an almost maddening ability to cut you off at the moment of critical decision. He seems like a “systems” man. Trust the safe middle ground, consider all the ramifications, and don’t venture into uncharted waters. Keep your counsel. He is a workaholic coming to the office at 0500 and leaving late into the night. This would be commendable but he constantly demands precise information and detail, thus requiring an army of action officers to be workaholics as well. He has long, well-shaped fingers but dirty and scarred nails. I wonder what that means?

The Chairman sits at one end of a long mahogany table. It’s about 3 feet wide and 10 feet long. Arrayed around him are the Secretary of Defense (Dr. Brown); Dr. Zbigniew Bryzinski from the National Security Council (NSC); General Meyer, Army Chief of Staff; Colonel King, our Chief of Staff; and Air Force Lieutenant Colonel Rod Lenahan, our intelligence chief.

Lenahan is briefing us on the facts as known at the time, which aren’t much. We aren’t sure who the hostages are, who’s in charge or where the hostages physically are. (This last question was to plague us throughout the program and drove all force planning.)

The center of the table is bare except for a single white coffee cup. It is filled with pencils and pens, hastily thrown in when the office was told that the Chairman was en route. On the outside of the cup, etched in black, is a complex collage of fornicating rabbits. We are taking bets on how long it will be before it is recognized. Do people of such rank and position have a sense of humor? (Later, yes it was noticed. Empirical evidence indicates that a sense of humor was not present.)

Bryzinski, as usual, has his mouth on full blast. The Chairman is rubbing his head at the uncertainty of the information and Secretary of Defense, nuclear physicist by trade, has a pained look. Clearly, imprecise things bother them both. It’s hard to intellectualize away something of great import involving lives when we may be forced to make something happen after reflecting on a one-axis graph.

Seated behind the table is a cast of thousands or a dozen. Enough stars to put on an astronomy show. All eagerly leaning forward to be included in the deliberating of the almighty. This room has marginal air-conditioning at best and no windows. Most participants’ primary contribution is to raise the carbon dioxide level. Knowing the personalities, I doubt if this situation will change much.

The marginal information brief continues for another 10 minutes. It is agreed that something has got to be started toward planning a rescue. Bryzinski continues to talk, and I compare him to Muzak. General Meyer has the best suggestion, “We need someone in charge who knows what he’s doing. I’ll provide him.” The Chairman makes no definitive comment. Meeting breaks up, we open the door and redirect the fan. Yes, Virginia, generals also fart.

The Office

In that the rescue attempt was to be a Joint Chiefs of Staff operation, the location chosen for the Task Force was the existing spaces occupied by JCS Special Operations Directorate. It would remain so for the entire program.

JCS-SOD (Joint Chiefs of Staff, Special Operations Directorate) is located in the Pentagon as Room 2C840. It is an adjunct to the “Chairman’s Corridor”; the walls of the corridor are lined with large pictures of each previous chairman, his heroic deeds, and contributions to the nation. Also included are several explanations of how the joint system works. This has not been explained to the members of the joint staff. In all, the corridor is a monument to the Graphic Arts Division.

The door to SOD is controlled by a cipher lock. Knowledge of this cipher, which is routinely changed, opens the cover to the book on the Iran rescue. The door opens into an anteroom from which several smaller offices access. On the left side are three offices with windows. A window here is a status symbol. However for us it is a pain; it means we can’t post any material in those offices and we can’t speak of any classified issue. The corridor itself is jammed with security safes.

To the right of the entranceway is the director’s office. It has a frosted glass window; such as you would see in a bathroom. It is guarded by a secretary, blonde, indeterminate age, predictable makeup and surly disposition. She is not at all happy to see us descend on her and her previously quiet life. She did make a positive comment about the coffee cup so she has a spark of life.

The heart of the SOD is Room 2C840B. It has a separate cipher lock and a door that looks like a Mosler safe. That is where the “plan” is.

Inside, it looks like a storage locker in a submarine. Every inch of usable space, about 400 square feet, is jammed with desks, safes, maps, people, and pipes. In the Pentagon, everything was designed for easy access. The wiring and plumbing hang from the ceiling where it is easy to access, but the workspace is not. On average, 15 people work in here full time with another 15 constantly moving in and out, holding meetings and coordinating. There is no air conditioning, we had it turned off and sealed for security. We are going to get very familiar with each other.

Next to the secretary, there is a TV. It is cabled to a tape machine. The Pentagon tapes all relevant news and provides us with the tapes. Twice a day we gather around the tube and watch the three network reports from Tehran. These twice-daily events provide us with our greatest sense of frustration, but also our greatest sense of purpose. What we do behind these doors has a direct impact on the lives of the hostages and their captors. It is a rare event in the military where the soldier can simultaneously see the object of his planning efforts in a graphically real sense and translate this into a specific plan directed toward those same human beings.

Staff Selection

General Vaught’s first problem, after deciphering the mission, was to select a staff to put together a plan. The Unconventional Warfare branch of the Special Operations Division of JCS became the foundation for growth. The Intelligence Officer, the Operations Officer and the Chief of Staff were frocked from their previous JCS-SOD assignment. This meant, as an extra benefit, they wouldn’t have to move out of the cipher-secured area that became the rescue force planning spaces.

The position of personnel officer was filled by no one and everyone. Each staff member became his own recruiter for known talent and the unusual skills needed to assist. This followed the traditional “old boy” network and resulted in a constant stream of unique personalities and capabilities appearing in front of the secure door. While no formal personnel officer was assigned, the Chief of Staff, as a shrewd judge of character and with knowledge of the organizational needs and the tolerance levels of the joint system, began to assign personnel to key roles. In less than 10 days a total headquarters of 32 highly qualified people including the commander had been created.

The staff was small enough to get things done efficiently and keep everybody informed, and over-worked enough to avoid the creation of unnecessary work or needlessly expend effort. The chief was able to physically monitor about 25 of these people at all times. Like a Roman galley captain, he verbally beat the drum or flogged the laggard who seemed to be drifting from the mainstream of requirements.

The support personnel, a tiny but crucial part of the 32, came with the local furniture. The administrative chief was a Navy yeoman. Extraordinarily efficient and capable of dealing with any problem including manipulating divergent officer personalities, he came with a major additional benefit—a wife who unselfishly prepared dinner for the 32 JTF internees and the Chairman of the JCS on numerous occasions out of the goodness of her heart. The yeoman’s catering service became an essential part of the morale support system. This devotion to duty and comrades is not mentioned in any service manual.

The secretaries were the standard Pentagon issue—hard-boiled, efficient, and totally unsympathetic. Requests were met with a clear internal computation of the requestors’ congeniality factor before the request, position in the local power structure, and the potential result of noncompliance.

The New General

A new personality showed up today in SOD wearing civilian clothes. Air Force Lieutenant General Philip Gast. He recently returned from Iran where he was the Chief of the Military Assistance Group. He is en route to a new assignment and will spend some time with us. His knowledge of the city and the Iranian military could be of value. The group of cynics believes he is a spy for the Chairman. It is believed the Chairman feels uncomfortable with General Vaught, now code-named Hammer. He talks very straight and in precise terms. He even says “shit” occasionally and uses precise names when discussing uncooperative people or agencies. That’s refreshing.

Lieutenant General Gast is serving as special advisor on “Iranian” affairs and will be helping out General Vaught. Seems like a good man. He answers questions quietly without pontificating and even knows how to say “Sorry, I don’t know anything about that.” That’s refreshing too. Maybe he can be helpful.

About a week after his arrival, he comes to work wearing a uniform, blue in color, with wings and several stars. His permanent change of station orders to Langley Air Force Base, Virginia, have been deferred. It appears we have a “de facto” Lieutenant General air deputy. The general has served in Korea and Vietnam and been shot at several times. Hammer accepts him. Good enough credentials for the rest of us. It is odd to have a three-star ostensibly subordinate to a two-star but it’s not a problem for us; the entire organization is odd.

Charlie Charges

Within a few days of the creation of the Task Force, Colonel Charlie Beckwith, the Delta Commander, came to our spaces in 2C840. I saw him routinely through the program and after.

Army Colonel Charlie Beckwith “invaded” our spaces today. He is a big man with big gestures and pre-emptive statements. He does not display a great deal of sensitivity. which makes life around the Chairman and some of his joint seniors difficult. The Joint Director of Operations, Vice Admiral Thor Hansen, is particularly off-put by Beckwith. Apparently the Navy is not used to direct discussions in mono-syllabic words.

Charlie has a very clear understanding of what he wants and how he wants it and is very clear in all aspects. What he doesn’t seem to appreciate is that few people responsible for the program other than General Vaught either know or understand the specific nature of what Delta Force is being asked to do. Delta is an elite unit established in the 70s to combat terrorism and take direct action as required. Charlie wants 100 percent of everything he desires and he wants it immediately. Delay or caveat draws immediate ire.

General Meyer has a soothing effect on him and General Vaught clearly communicates in...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Title
• Copyright
• Contents
• Dedication
• Acknowledgments
• Author’s Note
• The Bottom Line
• Note Regarding Organization and Text
• Part 1: Creation of the Force and Development of a Rescue Plan
• Part 2: Training and Adjusting
• Part 3: Execution and Events
• Part 4: Aftermath and the Path Forward
• Part 5: Congress 1: Bureaucracy 0 The Nation Wins and SOF Becomes a Capable Force
• Part 6: The Strategic Services Command Proposal
• Part 7: How We Got to Osama Bin Laden
• Appendix A SOF Chronology
• Appendix B Joint Task Force Organization
• Appendix C Eagle Claw: What Happened
• Appendix D FOG
• Appendix E Memo to General Meyer Ref Joint SOF Airlift Procurement
• Appendix F Declassified
• Glossary
• Also available by Keith Nightingale