ARE THE âOTHER GODSâ that we read about in the Bible something or nothing?
A statue is real enough. A carved or molten image has three-dimensional existence in the real world. But what about the god or gods those images supposedly represent? Are they real? Do they exist? Are they something or nothing? What did Israel believe about the gods in relation to its own God, Yahweh?
That last question has vexed the minds of Old Testament theologians for many decades. With monotheism defined, in the generic categories of human religion, as the belief that only one divine entity exists, along with the consequent denial of the existence of any other deities whatsoever, the search was on for the process by which and the time by when Israel could be said to have achieved monotheism in that sense. Clearly Israelites expressed their commitment to Yahweh in some very exclusive terms. But did that mean that Israelites categorically denied the existence of the other gods whom they were forbidden to worship?
The classic answer given within the guild of Old Testament scholarship has been the evolutionary or developmental one summarized, repackaged, and reissued by Robert Gnuse.1 With variations as to the precise dating of the transitions, this view reconstructs the religious history of Israel as proceeding from (1) polytheism (as conceded in Josh 24:14), through (2) henotheism (or mono-Yahwism, the demand for exclusive worship of Yahweh by Israel, while accepting the existence of the gods of other nations), to (3) true monotheism (the explicit denial of the existence of any other gods than Yahweh) as a final and fairly late conclusion of the process.
According to some scholars, the first and second stages span most of the Old Testament history of Israel. That is, they argue, originally Israelite religion was virtually indistinguishable from Canaanite religion. Then for centuries the major drive within Israel was merely to get Israel to be loyal to its national covenant with Yahweh and not âgo after other gods.â The other gods that they might be tempted to go after were clearly presumed to exist. Yair Hoffman, for example, argues that even in the Deuteronomic traditions, the characteristic phrase ĘžÄlĹhĂŽm ÄḼÄrĂŽm, âother gods,â presumes, rather than denies, their existence as gods. âThe phrase . . . although reflecting some idea of otherness, does not certify that these deities were considered an utterly different essence from the God of Israel. . . . They are other gods since they are not ours.â2 Finally, only in the late exile (to which Is 40â55 is assigned), did anyone in Israel say in so many words that no other god than Yahweh even existed.3 Only at that final stage was it envisaged that the category of deity was a house with one sole and exclusive occupantâYahweh.
On this view, the answer to our question about whether, in the religion of Israel, other gods actually existed depends on the point in the chronological development of Israel at which the question is asked. Suppose you could have approached an Israelite and asked, âDo you believe that there are other gods as well as Yahweh?â For a long period, the answer you would have received (according to the critical consensus) would have been, âOf course. There are many gods. Yahweh is one of the gods and a very powerful one, so weâre rather glad heâs our god.â Then, when the more exclusive ideas of a national covenant were introduced and emphasized by the prophets and the reforming Deuteronomistic party, the answer would have been, âYes, other nations have their own gods, but Yahweh is the only God that Israel must worship, or we will face the consequences of his anger.â That view clashed with a more liberal, popular polytheism for a long time. Finally, however, with the triumph of the âofficialâ Yahwistic party in the late exilic and postexilic period, the answer eventually would have been a firm, âNo, Yahweh alone is âthe God,â and other gods have no real existence at all. All so-called gods are actually nonentities.â
Such a neat linear view, however, is almost certainly just thatâtoo neat. It is far too simple to put the question (or its answer) in a simple binary form: Do other gods exist, or do they not exist? Are they something or nothing? The issue is more complex and depends on the predicate of such questions (that is to say, to what does the word god refer to?). What needs to be added to the question is âDo other gods exist within the same order of existence that Yahweh does?â âAre they the same âthingâ as Yahweh is [the same divine âsomethingâ]? Or are they not what Yahweh is [âno-thing,â i.e., no-divine-thing]?â
Now, we can tell from reading multiple Old Testament texts that the essence of Israelite monotheism lies in what Israel affirmed dynamically about Yahweh (namely, that Yahweh alone is the universal Creator, the sovereign Ruler of all histories, the Judge of all nations, and the Savior of people from all nations who turn to him), not primarily in what it denied about other gods. Nevertheless, what the Old Testament affirms about Yahweh has unavoidable negative consequences for whatever may be claimed about other gods. Commenting particularly on Deuteronomy, and disputing Nathan MacDonaldâs argument that the book does not deny the existence of other gods (and is therefore not formally monotheistic, in terms of the Enlightenment categories that MacDonald rightly rejects as irrelevant and damaging in Old Testament study), Richard Bauckham makes the following carefully nuanced point (the references are to Deuteronomy):
What Israel is able to recognize about Yahweh, from his acts for Israel, that distinguishes Yahweh from the gods of the nations is that he is âthe Godâ or âthe god of gods.â This means primarily that he has unrivalled power throughout the cosmos. The earth, the heavens and the heaven of heavens belong to him (10:14). By contrast, the gods of the nations are impotent nonentities, who cannot protect and deliver even their own peoples. This is the message of the song of Moses (see especially 32:37-39). The need to distinguish among âthe godsâ between the one who is supreme (Yahweh) and the others who are not just subordinate but powerless, creates, on the one hand, the usages âthe Godâ and âthe god of gods,â and, on the other hand, the contemptuous ânon-godâ (32:17: ××× ××; 32:21: ×× ××), and âtheir mere puffs of airâ (32:21: ××××××). Though called gods, the other gods do not really deserve the term, because they are not effective divinities acting with power in the world. Yahweh alone is the God with supreme power . . . (32:39). . . . It is not enough to observe that Deuteronomy does not deny the existence of other gods. We should also recognize that, once we do attend to the ontological implications that MacDonald admits Deuteronomyâs âdoctrine of Godâ must have, this theology is driving an ontological division through the midst of the old category âgodsâ such that Yahweh appears in a class of his own.4
So, coming back to the question, are the gods something or nothing? If the question is asked in relation to Yahweh, the answer has to be nothing. Nothing whatsoever compares with Yahweh or stands in the same category as he does. Yahweh is not one of a generic categoryââthe gods.â Yahweh alone is the God, in what Bauckham calls âtranscendent uniqueness.â5 With reference to Yair Hoffmanâs point above: while it may be true to say that the phrase âother godsâ does not by itself imply that âthese deities were considered an utterly different essence from the God of Israel,â nevertheless what is said about Yahweh makes it categorically clear that he is of an utterly different essence from them. âYahweh, he is the God; there is no other beside himâ (Deut 4:35, my translation).
But if the question is asked in relation to those who worship the other godsâwhether the nations who claimed them as their own national deities, or even if asked in relation to the temptation that Israel faced to go after themâthen the answer can certainly be something. The gods of the nations, with their names, statues, myths, and cults, clearly did have an existence in the life, culture, and history of those who treated them as their gods. It is not nonsense to form sentences such as âMarduk was a god worshiped by the people of Babylon.â Only excessive pedantry would complain that since Marduk did not have any real divine existence it is meaningless to say that anybody worshiped him. In the context of such a sentence (and all similar descriptions of human religions), it makes understandable sense to talk about other gods as somethingâsomething that exists in the world of human experience. In other words, it is not impossible, theologically or in ordinary discourse, to answer the question âAre other gods something or nothing?â with the paradox âBoth.â They are nothing in relation to Yahweh; they are something in relation to their worshipers.
This is precisely the paradox that Paul carefully articulates in his res...