The Big L

American Logistics in World War II

Alan Gropman

• Publisher: Barakaldo Books
• Year: 2021
• eBook ISBN: 9781839747731
• Topic: History
• Subtopic: European History
• Index: History

American logistics in World War II was "big" by just about any measure one can devise. There is no question that it played a dominant role in the allied victory and thereby shaped the history of the rest of the century. The lessons of that achievement, consequently, remain essential today, especially for those who study and work with the resources component of United States grand strategy. So it is important that those lessons be accurate, that they portray a balanced view, pointing out shortcomings as well as documenting great successes; otherwise, a mythologized picture of the "Arsenal of Democracy" may be perpetuated. It was in this spirit that the Industrial College of the Armed Forces convened a symposium to address the lessons of World War II logistics—"the Big L." The extended essays published here began as papers delivered at the symposium, then were expanded and revised for this book. Written by faculty of the Industrial College, they address the massive subject from seven perspectives: industrial mobilization; acquisition of war materials; the economics of mobilization; the building of infrastructure; the Lend-Lease program; joint logistics in the Pacific Theater; and joint logistics—the "materiel battle "—in Europe. The American effort—mind-boggling as it was in sheer numbers—was flawed in many respects. With the advantage of hindsight, the authors take a hard, unsentimental look at these areas of WWII logistics and offer a balanced analysis that will best serve our understanding of this subject.

1. INDUSTRIAL MOBILIZATION

Alan Gropman

In a toast made by Joseph Stalin during the December 1943, Teheran Conference the Soviet dictator praised United States manufacturing:

I want to tell you from the Russian point of view, what the President and the United States have done to win the war. The most important things in this war are machines....The United States...is a country of machines. Without the use of those machines...we would lose this war.{7}

World War II was won in largest part because of superior allied armaments production.{8} The United States greatly outproduced all its allies and all its enemies, and at its output peak in late 1943 and early 1944, was manufacturing munitions almost equal to the combined total of both its friends and adversaries. The prodigious arms manufacturing capability of the United States is well known by even casual readers of World War II history, if its decisiveness is not as well understood. But myths provoked by sentimentality have evolved in the half century since the war ended, and these have become a barrier to comprehending the lessons of that era.

When viewed in isolation, the output is indeed impressive. United States gross national product grew by 52 percent between 1939 and 1944 (much more in unadjusted dollars), munitions production sky rocketed from virtually nothing in 1939 to unprecedented levels, industrial output tripled, and even consumer spending increased (unique among all combatants). But United States industrial production was neither a “miracle” nor was its output comparatively mighty given the American advantages of abundant raw materials, superb transportation and technological infrastructure, a large and skilled labor force, and, most importantly, two large ocean barriers to bar bombing of its industries.{9} Germany, once it abandoned its Blitzkrieg strategy, became similarly productive, if not more so, and British and Russian industry, given German attacks on Britain and the Soviet Union, performed outstandingly, too.{10}

This is not to say that United States logistics grand strategy{11} was not ultimately effective. The United States and its allies were, of course, victorious, and in winning, the United States lost far fewer lives than any of its adversaries and fewer than its main allies. Stalin was correct when he hailed American production. But the halo that has surrounded the era needs to be examined because enormous governmental supervisory, labor-management relations,{12} and domestic political frictions hampered the effort—and there is no reason to think that these problems would not handicap future mobilization efforts. With enormous threats looming in the mid-1930s and increasing as Europe exploded into war at the end of the decade, the United States was in no way unified in its perception of the hazards, nor was there any unity in government or business about what to do about it.{13} A nostalgic look at United States industrial mobilization during World War II will not make future mobilizations of any size more effective.

Certainly none of the major World War II adversaries was less prepared for war in 1939 than the United States. There were fewer than 200,000 men in the Army, only 125,202 in the Navy and fewer than 20,000 in the Marine Corps. Those troops who went on maneuvers in 1939 and 1940 used broomsticks to simulate rifles and trucks to represent tanks.{14} Despite war orders from Britain and France in 1939 and 1940 and Lend-Lease shipments to Britain, the Soviet Union, China, and elsewhere after Lend-Lease took effect in March 1941, there were still 5 million Americans unemployed at the end of the year.{15} Hitler’s Germany had long since absorbed its unemployment by building arms and German infrastructure. In the United States great progress had been made by the time production peaked in late 1943, compared with the situation in 1941, but output could have been even higher.

The inefficiency of World War II industrial mobilization, the fact that it took from August 1939, when the first federal agency designed to analyze mobilization options—the War Resources Board—was inaugurated, to May 1943, when the final supervisory agency was put in place—the Office of War Mobilization—should be instructive. That industrial mobilization, because it had failed in World War I, was studied throughout the inter-war period should also be sobering. Certainly the interwar planners hoped to improve on the World War I experience with industrial mobilization. They failed.

MOBILIZATION ACTIVITIES BEFORE PEARL HARBOR DAY

Despite the fact that World War I had been raging for 32 months when the United States declared war, and in spite of the large numbers of war orders received by United States industry to arm the French and the British, and despite the National Defense Act of 1916{16} which, among many other things, established a mechanism for mobilizing industry, United States ground and air forces that fought in World War I were largely supplied by French and British munitions.{17} Industrial mobilization had been so inept that Congress passed legislation soon after World War I ended to build an apparatus to ensure that the next time the United States went to war it would be better mobilized industrially.

The National Defense Act, June 1920, explicitly outlined responsibilities in the Office of the Secretary of War that streamlined procurement for that day’s military and planning for the future.

Hereafter, in addition to such duties as may be assigned him by the Secretary of War, the Assistant Secretary of War,...shall be charged with the supervision of the procurement of all military supplies and other business of the War Department pertaining thereto and the assurance of adequate provision for mobilization of materiel and industrial organizations essential to wartime needs...There shall be detailed to the office of the Assistant Secretary of War from the branches engaged in procurement such numbers of officers and civilian employees as may be...approved by the Secretary of War...Chiefs of branches of the Army charged with the procurement of supplies for the Army shall report direct to the Assistant Secretary of War regarding all matters of procurement.{18}

The Assistant Secretary of War now had under his control something that had been lacking in the Army for 150 years: unified procurement and a directive to plan for future purchasing. In October 1921 in his first memorandum, the Assistant Secretary established a Procurement Division to supervise “the procurement of all military supplies and other business of the War Department...and the assurance of adequate provision for the mobilization of material and industrial organizations essential to wartime needs.” This division was further subdivided into a Planning Branch and a Current Supply Branch. The Planning Branch was accountable for planning for wartime procurement and industrial mobilization, and was also the agency designated to deal with the Navy department and all other government departments on “all matters pertaining to the allotment of industrial facilities and materials required for war.” The Planning Branch was further subdivided into many sections including: Industrial Policy, Purchase, Production Allocation, Labor, Finance, Foreign Relations, Transportation, and Storage. It survived into World War II, and for more than a decade was the only agency engaged in industrial mobilization planning.{19}

People who worked in the Assistant Secretary’s office, however, received no respect from members of the General Staff, and throughout the 1920s and 1930s there was friction between the logisticians and the operators. At times the relationship became sulfurous. For example, General Charles P. Summerall, Army Chief of Staff from 1926 to 1930, “forbade his subordinates to cooperate with” the Office of the Assistant Secretary of War, “which he recommended be abolished.” He called the Assistant Secretary’s Executive Officer, Brigadier General George Van Horn Mosely, a logistician, a “traitor,” and a “scoundrel.”{20}

In addition to the Planning Branch in the Assistant Secretary’s office, there was another logistics entity: the Army and Navy Munitions Board, created in 1922 to coordinate “the planning for acquiring munitions and supplies required for the Army and Navy Departments for war purposes and to meet the needs of any joint plans.” This Board was also charged with developing “a suitable legislative program” to be put into effect at the appropriate time to “enable the procurement program to be” established. Unlike the procurement and planning duties determined for the Assistant Secretary, the Army and Navy Munitions Board had no specific legislative sanction and no appropriation until July 1, 1939 when President Franklin D. Roosevelt directed that this organization and several other joint boards come under the direct supervision of the president.{21}

It was clearly understood that the Army and Navy Munitions Board was not subordinate to the Army and Navy Joint Board—mainly an operational planning organization—but was equal to it. Through the early 1930s there was little life and no power in the Munitions Board because of interservice problems. The Army G-3 did its planning for troop mobilization without reference to the Navy, and the Planning Branch did its industrial mobilization planning similarly oblivious to the Navy’s potential needs. In 1932, however, the Munitions Board was reorganized to include the Director of the Planning Branch and similar personnel from the Navy logistics community. A secretary was authorized and eight divisions formed dealing with such items as price controls, contracting, commodities, power, etc. In 1933 the Board took over sponsorship of the industrial mobilization plans and began to compile lists of strategic and critical materials.{22}

EDUCATION FOR MOBILIZATION

But when the Planning Branch was formed in 1921 and the Board in 1922, there was no for...

Table of contents

• Title page
• TABLE OF CONTENTS
• FOREWORD
• ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
• INTRODUCTION
• 1. INDUSTRIAL MOBILIZATION
• 2. ACQUISITION IN WORLD WAR II
• 3. THE ECONOMICS OF AMERICA’S WORLD WAR II MOBILIZATION
• 4. BUILDING VICTORY’S FOUNDATION: INFRASTRUCTURE
• 5. LEND-LEASE: AN ASSESSMENT OF A GOVERNMENT BUREAUCRACY
• 6. JOINT LOGISTICS IN THE PACIFIC THEATER
• 7. MATERIALSCHLACHT: THE “MATERIEL BATTLE” IN THE EUROPEAN THEATER
• APPENDIX: THE WAR AGENCIES OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT (Status as of December 31, 1945)
• BIBLIOGRAPHY
• THE EDITOR AND AUTHORS