Studies in Generalship

Lessons from the Chiefs of Staff of the Israel Defense Forces

Meir Finkel

• Publisher: Hoover Institution Press
• Year: 2021
• Print ISBN: 9780817924751
• eBook ISBN: 9780817924768
• Edition: 1
• Topic: History
• Subtopic: Military & Maritime History
• Index: History

The commander, or chief of staff, of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) is a prominent public figure in Israel. His decisions, advice, and persona are held in high regard by Israel's public and leadership, and have indirect impacts on social, economic, and foreign affairs. But until now, an in-depth study on the role and performance of the IDF's chiefs of staff has been sorely absent.

In this study, Meir Finkel offers a robust and original comparative perspective on the IDF chiefs of staff throughout modern Israel's history, examining their conduct in six key areas: identifying change in the strategic environment, developing familiarity with all military domains, managing crises with wartime generals, rehabilitating the army after a botched war, leading a transformation in force design, and building relationships with the political echelon.

The challenging and critical role of the chief of staff demands profound knowledge and authority in a vast and diverse range of fields. By providing a perspective that the IDF's known history has lacked until now, Finkel gives insights that may assist current and future high-rank leaders worldwide in carrying out their important work and offers lessons to students everywhere of strategy, military history, and military transformation.

1

IDENTIFYING CHANGE

One of the roles of the chief of staff is to identify an unexpected strategic shift at as early a date as possible, announce the change, and see that the necessary steps are taken in the IDF to prepare for it. Many information sources are available for tracking the emergence of a new situation, such as the military intelligence directorate (Aman) and other intelligence sources, as well as the chief of staff’s firsthand interaction with the reality in the field. Whatever the provenance, the chief of staff must be able to recognize that a change is taking place in the security reality and decide when to act so that the IDF will have sufficient time to prepare. The case studies in this chapter illustrate that in some instances the chief of staff identified the change and prepared the IDF in advance. On other occasions, the change was obvious and the chief of staff had only to reconceptualize the situation and proceed in the right direction. In yet other instances, the chief of staff apparently failed to grasp the change and thus reacted relatively late.

The following six cases are presented chronologically: David Elazar, who ordered the Blue and White alert in May 1973 five months before the Yom Kippur War; Dan Shomron’s relatively slow response to the outbreak of the first intifada in late 1987; Amnon Lipkin-Shahak’s definition of routine security operations in the security zone in Lebanon in 1995 as a combat situation; Shaul Mofaz’s preparation of the IDF in 2000 prior to the outbreak of the second intifada in October that year; Dan Halutz’s failure to shift the IDF from a routine security mindset to a war mentality in the Second Lebanon War in 2006; and Benny Gantz’s definition of the response to changes in the Golan Heights in 2011–13.

The examples here are “clear” cases, meaning that—regardless of each chief of staff’s successes or failures in identifying and defining the emerging threats—each had a significant impact on the IDF. The study does not examine instances in which the chief of staff initiated changes that occurred over a long period of time and are therefore difficult to capture and define.

In the conclusion to this chapter, I analyze factors that helped each chief of staff gain an early understanding of the change, those that impeded his understanding, and those that either assisted or impeded the implementation of a change in the IDF after the chief of staff recognized the need for such.

It should be emphasized that identifying a change in the region and launching the IDF on the path of change are not solely the chief of staff’s responsibility. The political echelon is also under obligation. One example is David Ben-Gurion’s swift realization that the soon-to-be-declared state had to prepare for war with the Arab armies and the measures he took to attain this readiness. Another is Defense Minister Moshe Arens’s establishment of the Home Front Command, a regional command responsible for civil defense, when he recognized the emerging missile threat to the civilian population.

David Elazar and the Announcement of the Blue and White Alert in May 1973

In April 1973, two and a half years after the War of Attrition with Egypt ended in August 1970, Lieutenant General David Elazar announced the Blue and White alert—raising the state of military readiness for conflict with Egypt—which remained in effect until August. The alert had a major impact on the IDF in the Yom Kippur War, which erupted on October 6 that year, because it allowed the IDF to acquire new equipment, organize units, and move bases closer to the borders. This enabled the army to meet the challenge admirably despite the war’s strategic surprise for Israel.

Elazar’s decision to order the alert ran contrary to Aman’s official assessment. On Passover Eve (April 16, 1973), the chief of staff assembled the general staff and cynically warned that the meeting was not called “to hand out the traditional Passover holiday reading passages.” Major General Eli Zeira, the head of Aman, repeated his estimate that no substantial change had occurred in Egyptian strength since the previous year’s situation assessment at the end of 1972, and that the Libyan Mirage and Iraqi Hunter jet fighter planes that Egypt had received were incapable of altering the balance of airpower. Zeira said, “The probability of war is low, almost nonexistent—but it still exists.” Many of the participants in the discussion agreed. Ariel Sharon, the commander of Southern Command, said that he felt prepared for a war in Sinai: “All in all, we’re in very good shape regarding control measures and communications systems, command posts, and access roads to the Suez Canal.” The head of the doctrine and training branch (Mahad), Major General Shmuel Gonen, on the other hand, believed that the IDF did not have to proceed according to this information as though there were no danger, “because if something does happen we won’t be able to explain to ourselves and others that we thought that war wouldn’t break out.” Elazar said, “We must consider the warnings [of an Egyptian surprise attack] we’ve received with utmost seriousness and take full advantage of the coming month for intensive preparation.” He focused on developing bridging equipment to cross the Suez Canal, refreshing operational plans, and elevating the state of readiness. He summed up the situation thus: “If war erupts next month or month and a half, we’ll be able to respond with maximum effect.” Prime Minister Golda Meir consulted with Elazar on April 18. Afterward, the chief of staff called another situation assessment meeting in which he said: “This time the warning—unlike the warnings of October, November, and December 1972—is more serious. If previously the probability was estimated at ‘close to zero,’ this time the likelihood seems higher, regardless of Aman’s assessment that [Egyptian leader Anwar] Sadat won’t open fire at this stage.”¹

Elazar judged the probability of Egypt opening fire sufficiently high to commence preparations, all of which would be in the form of updating plans. The chief of staff stipulated the implementation of practical preparations on additional intelligence signals that he anticipated in the coming days.²

In the ministerial committee on security affairs on April 24, the chief of staff stated:

Even if I agree with the assessment of the head of Aman of low likelihood to this possibility—and I’m referring to the second part of the sentence, “low likelihood”—I still think that it is more likely than the two last [intelligence] warnings, in late 1972 and late 1971. And despite the low likelihood, we are forced to maintain a certain level of alert, which is what we’re doing. The current alerts do not include troop mobilization or movement, but we’re doing many other things.³

The Blue and White alert consisted of various steps to accelerate force buildup on the eve of war that had to be taken. The following are the main points:⁴

Organization. The dates for establishing the following units were significantly advanced to the second half of 1973: the 210th Division (originally scheduled for March 1974); the 418th Ivry Missile Unit; the 440th Division Task Force Headquarters; three reconnaissance battalions (originally slated for August–November 1973); two assault roller bridging units; and two reserve engineer battalions.

Operational infrastructures. In the Golan Heights, anti-tank ditches, dirt roads, and landline communications systems were constructed, and two reserve brigade bases were moved closer to the Heights; in Sinai, reserve bases were established close to the Suez Canal. (The Agranat Report—the official postwar investigation committee on the failure in war preparations—found that Northern Command’s early establishment of bases for reserve armored brigades closer to the border played a decisive role in their arrival in time to the Golan Heights to block the Syrian attack west into Israel.)

Equipment. Significant additions were made in communication systems, water-bridging equipment, and rocket launchers. R&D on tow bars for pulling the roller bridges (two-hundred-meter-long bridges for crossing the Suez Canal) at the steep lateral angles in the sand dunes in the Suez Canal area received top priority (regardless of cost) but failed to reach a suitable answer in time for the war.

Training. The early formation of units doubtless had a marked effect on the amount of training being carried out. Various training exercises were held, such as canal bridging for designated units. For example, the first training session for the 257th Armored Reserve Battalion/421st Brigade (established in April 1973) lasted ten days and was followed by a scaled-down divisional exercise in August. The 257th was originally scheduled to receive the tanks and equipment in 1974.

Alert. Calling an alert is not considered an element of force buildup. But in order to complete the picture, it is important to mention that on May 25, 1973, Agam began preparations for the mobilization of the reservists, which included checking emergency mobilization procedures; ordering regular army headquarters to test the call-up of reserve units and confirm home addresses; readying emergency stores units; dispatching mobile artillery units to Sinai; and hastily deploying bridging equipment.

Discussions were held on operational plans. In two meetings in late April and early May, the chief of staff affirmed all the operational plans. They were later presented to the defense minister and prime minister.⁵ All these preparations took place while Israel was celebrating its twenty-fifth Independence Day in a mood of prosperity and confidence, oblivious to the rumblings of the approaching war. A summary of this intensive activity was presented in GHQ on May 8, one day after the gala Independence Day military parade.⁶

The Blue and White alert lasted four months (April to August) and ended without any hostile action or increased tension at the border. The price tag of 69 million Israeli lira (approximately $73 million in 2019 US dollars) improved significantly the IDF’s preparedness for the Yom Kippur War, October 6–25, 1973.⁷ Major General Israel Tal commented on the alert’s effectiveness: “The IDF entered the Yom Kippur War stronger than what was planned for 1974–1975.”⁸

In concluding this section, it should be stressed that the chief of staff issued the alert without Aman’s backing. The head of Aman viewed with overt skepticism all of the possible scenarios that Elazar had laid out in detail. He regarded the outbreak of war as most unlikely and said that, as hard as he tried, he failed to find any signs of an increase in its likelihood. The discussions lasted over three weeks. GHQ assumed that Sadat may have had a “motive” and the threats should not be underestimated (an assumption shared by the ministers Dayan and Galili), but a significant difference existed between the assessments of the head of Aman (who also reports directly to the prime minister) and those of the chief of staff, a gap that remained throughout the period. Elazar also said that, based on available information, he agreed with the estimate that a low likelihood for war existed—but not a “very” low likelihood. On the contrary, he believed that “the likelihood is higher than at any time since 1967. All of the signs point to war—the intention to go to war and the preparation for war. Arab efficiency may lead to one or more postponements, but war is coming.”⁹

Summary of the Test Case

Here is a positive example of the chief of staff’s performance concerning identifying a change and acting upon it. Elazar’s opposition to the head of Aman’s recommendation began a process that included elements of force buildup—from the immediate renewal of emergency mobilization procedures to planning steps and finally to pushing up the date for establishing units and expediting weapons procurement—all of which had a crucial impact on the IDF’s victory in the war. Since the intelligence analysis was conveyed directly to the political echelon (Prime Minister Meir, Dayan, and Galili), Elazar was allegedly “covered” (i.e., he was not required to act), and in this light his initiative to raise the level of alert was commendable.

One major issue that would later have an impact on the IDF’s ability to contain the October 6, 1973, surprise attack by Egypt and Syria that launched the Yom Kippur War was the relative strength of the chief of staff’s position compared to that of Zeira, the powerful head of Aman. As it turned out, war did not break out during the Blue and White alert, a fact that bolstered Zeira’s views vis-à-vis Elazar and the political echelon when Zeira repeated that the likelihood of war in the autumn was low. This is an example of the relations between the chief of staff and the head of Aman, which will be dealt with briefly in the book’s conclusion.

Dan Shomron at the Outbreak of the First Intifada, 1987

The first Palestinian intifada (Arabic: uprising) began in December 1987 after twenty years of Israeli occupation in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. The intensity of the insurrection waned by 1991 and formally ended with the Israeli-Palestinian Oslo Accord in 1993. The focus here is on its beginning. Before initiating our discussion on the conduct of Chief of Staff Dan Shomron in the first intifada, it is important to note that this type of conflict—mass civil rioting—was an unprecedented challenge for the IDF. Little wonder that the vocabulary employed in describing the IDF’s actions in the December 1987 events included “surprise,” “consternation,” and “confusion,” especially as the unrest in Gaza spread to the West Bank. When Defense Minister Yitzhak Rabin returned from abroad, Shomron and General Shmuel Goren, the Coordinator of Government Activities in the Territories (COGAT), were waiting at the airport to update him on events. The general staff did not consider the riots of December 9–10 as something out of the ordinary and still believed that order would be restored in a few days.

The outbreak of the intifada caught all of the security forces off guard. The deputy head of Agam, General Giora Romm, publicly acknowledged this: “The IDF was surprised by the riots in the West Bank and Gaza.” Aman, too, was caught off balance. It had not focused on dealing with an uprising, mass disturbances, or civil disobedience but rather on preventing terror. The IDF and the Shin Bet (Israel’s internal security agency, also called the Shabak) argued over who was responsible for gathering data and providing intelligence, since no one had defined which party was in charge of a general assessment in this area and no entity existed for dealing with it. The commander of Southern Command, Major General Yitzhak Mordechai, was the first to grasp what was happening in the Gaza Strip. He demanded immediate reinforcements. He wanted regulars sent to Gaza to deal with the new phenomenon. He was worried that the situation might deteriorate because of the lack of sufficient manpower. He did not want the troops on the ground facing thousands of rioters, lest they be forced to open fire. Mordechai transferred to the Gaza Strip a battalion of regulars from the Givati (Infantry) Brigade that was on training, despite the order that training could not be halted without permission from the chief of staff.¹⁰

In an interview, Mordechai claimed, “It took Shomron some time to realize that a basic change had occurred on the ground.” According to Mordechai, Shomron “made every effort to keep the troops to their training schedule and maintain their operational capability for war.” Mordechai felt that Shomron’s misreading of the situation compelled the commanders of the regional commands to pressure him to allocate troops and resources to quelling the intifada.¹¹ The attitude of the Southern and Central Command generals vis-à-vis the chief of staff’s attitude toward the suspension of training and military education courses became an issue of contention. Shomron wanted to see the regular units prepare for war. He opposed any curtailment of the IDF commanders’ training programs because of routine security operations and unrest in the West Bank and Gaza. Furthermore, he regarded the events in the Gaza Strip as part of the Palestinians’ periodical letting off steam. During his tour in Gaza on December 15, he spoke with commanders and soldiers and came away with the impression that the ...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Title Page
• Copyright
• Dedication
• Contents
• Foreword by H. R. McMaster
• Preface to the English Edition
• Acknowledgments
• Glossary and Abbreviations
• Introduction
• 1. Identifying Change
• 2. Developing Familiarity with All Military Domains
• 3. Losing Trust in a Wartime General
• 4. Rehabilitating the Army after a Botched War
• 5. Leading a Change in Force Design
• 6. Building Relationships with the Political Echelon in Force Design
• Conclusions
• Appendix A: Tenures of IDF Chiefs of Staff
• Appendix B: Prime Ministers, Defense Ministers, and Generals
• Notes
• Bibliography
• Photo Credits
• About the Author