1. Classification of
Revolutions.
We generally apply the term
revolution to sudden political changes, but the expression may be
employed to denote all suddentransformations, or transformations
apparently sudden, whether of beliefs, ideas, or doctrines.
We have considered elsewhere the
part played by the rational, affective, and mystic factors in the
genesis of the opinions and beliefs which determine conduct.We need
not therefore return to the subject here.
A revolution may finally become a
belief, but it often commences under the action of perfectly
rational motives: the suppression of crying abuses, of a detested
despotic government, or an unpopular sovereign, &c.
Although the origin of a revolution
may be perfectly rational, we must not forget that the reasons
invoked in preparing for it do not influence the crowd until they
have been transformed into sentiments. Rational logic can point to
the abuses to bedestroyed, but to move the multitude its hopes must
be awakened. This can only be effected by the action of the
affective and mystic elements which give man the power to act. At
the time of the French Revolution, for example, rational logic, in
the handsof the philosophers, demonstrated the inconveniences of
the ancien regime, and excited the desire to change it. Mystic
logic inspired belief in the virtues of a society created in all
its members according to certain principles. Affective logic
unchained the passions confined by the bonds of ages and led to the
worst excesses. Collective logic ruled the clubs and the Assemblies
and impelled their members to actions which neither rational nor
affective nor mystic logic would ever have caused them to
commit.
Whatever its origin, a revolution
is not productive of results until it has sunk into the soul of the
multitude. Then events acquire special forms resulting from the
peculiar psychology of crowds. Popular movements for this reason
have characteristics so pronounced that the description of one will
enable us to comprehend the others.
The multitude is, therefore, the
agent of a revolution; but not its point of departure. The crowd
represents an amorphous being which can do nothing, and will
nothing, without ahead to lead it. It will quickly exceed the
impulse once received, but it never creates it.
The sudden political revolutions
which strike the historian most forcibly are often the least
important. The great revolutions are those of manners and thought.
Changing the name of a government does not transform the mentality
of a people. To overthrow the institutions of a people is not to
re-shape its soul.
The true revolutions, those which
transform the destinies of the peoples, are most frequently
accomplishedso slowly that the historians can hardly point to their
beginnings. The term evolution is, therefore, far more appropriate
than revolution.
The various elements we have
enumerated as entering into the genesis of the majority of
revolutions will not sufficeto classify them. Considering only the
designed object, we will divide them into scientific revolutions,
political revolutions, and religious revolutions.
2. Scientific Revolutions.
Scientific revolutions are by far
the most important. Although they attract but little attention,
they are often fraught with remote consequences, such as are not
engendered by political revolutions. We will therefore put them
first, although we cannot study them here.
For instance, if our conceptions of
the universe have profoundly changed since the time of the
Revolution, it is because astronomical discoveries and the
application of experimental methods have revolutionised them, by
demonstrating that phenomena, instead of being conditioned by the
caprices of the gods, are ruled by invariable laws.
Such revolutions are fittingly
spoken of as evolution, on account of their slowness. But there are
others which, although of the same order, deserve the name of
revolution by reason of their rapidity: we may instance the
theories of Darwin, overthrowing the whole science of biology in a
few years; the discoveries of Pasteur, which revolutionised
medicine during the lifetime of their author; and the theory of the
dissociation of matter, proving that the atom, formerly supposed to
be eternal, is not immune from the laws which condemn all the
elements of the universe to decline and perish.
These scientific revolutions in the
domain of ideas are purely intellectual. Our sentiments and beliefs
do not affect them. Men submit to them without discussing them.
Their results being controllable by experience, they escape all
criticism.
3. Political Revolutions.
Beneath and very remote from these
scientific revolutions, which generate the progress of
civilisations, are the religious and politicalrevolutions, which
have no kinship with them.While scientific revolutions derive
solely from rational elements, political and religious beliefs are
sustained almost exclusively by affective and mystic factors.
Reason plays only a feeble part in their genesis.
I insisted at some length in my
book Opinions and Beliefs on the affective and mystic origin of
beliefs, showing that a political or religious belief constitutes
an act of faith elaborated in unconsciousness, over which, in spite
of all appearances, reason has no hold. I also showed that belief
often reaches such a degree of intensity that nothing can be
opposed to it. The man hypnotised by his faith becomes an Apostle,
ready to sacrifice his interests, his happiness, and even his life
for the triumphof his faith. The absurdity of his belief matters
little; for him it is a burning reality. Certitudes of mystic
origin possess the marvellous power of entire domination over
thought, and can only be affected by time.
By the very fact that it is
regarded asan absolute truth a belief necessarily becomes
intolerant. This explains the violence, hatred, and persecution
which were the habitual accompaniments of the great political and
religious revolutions, notably of the Reformation and the French
Revolution.
Certain periods of French history
remain incomprehensible if we forget the affective and mystic
origin of beliefs, their necessary intolerance, the impossibility
of reconciling them when they come into mutual contact, and,
finally, the power conferred by mystic beliefs upon the sentiments
which place themselves at their service.
The foregoing conceptions are too
novel as yet to have modified the mentality of the historians. They
will continue to attempt to explain, by means of rational logic, a
host of phenomena which are foreign to it.
Events such as the Reformation,
which overwhelmed France for a period of fifty years, were in no
wise determined by rational influences. Yet rational influences are
always invoked in explanation, even in the most recent works.Thus,
in the General History of Messrs. Lavisse and Rambaud, we read the
following explanation of the Reformation:ā
``It was a spontaneous movement,
born here and there amidst the people, from the reading of the
Gospels and the free individual reflectionswhich were suggested to
simple persons by an extremely pious conscience and a very bold
reasoning power.''
Contrary to the assertion of these
historians, we may say with certainty, in the first place, that
such movements are never spontaneous, and secondly, that reason
takes no part in their elaboration.
The force of the political and
religious beliefs which have moved the world resides precisely in
the fact that, being born of affective and mystic elements, they
are neither created nor directed by reason.
Political or religious beliefs have
a common origin and obey the same laws. They are formed not with
the aid of reason, but more often contrary to all reason.
Buddhism,Islamism, the Reformation, Jacobinism, Socialism, &c.,
seem very different forms of thought. Yet they have identical
affective and mystic bases, and obey a logic that has no affinity
with rational logic.
Political revolutions may result
from beliefs established in the minds of men, but many other causes
produce them. The word discontent sums them up. As soon as
discontent is generalised a party is formed which often becomes
strong enough to struggle against the Government.
Discontent must generally have been
accumulating for a long time in order to produce its effects. For
this reason a revolution does not always represent a phenomenon in
process of termination followed by another which is commencing but
rather a continuous phenomenon, having somewhat accelerated its
evolution. All the modern revolutions, however, have been abrupt
movements,entailing the instantaneous overthrow of governments.
Such, for example, were the Brazilian, Portuguese, Turkish, and
Chinese revolutions.
To the contrary of what might be
supposed, the very conservative peoples are addicted to the most
violent revolutions. Being conservative, they are not able to
evolve slowly, or to adapt themselves to variations of environment,
so that when the discrepancy becomes too extreme they are bound to
adapt themselves suddenly. This sudden evolution constitutes a
revolution.
Peoples able to adapt themselves
progressively do not always escape revolution. It was only by means
of a revolution that the English, in 1688, were able to terminate
the struggle which had dragged on for a century between the
monarchy, which sought to make itself absolute, and the nation,
which claimed the right to govern itself through the medium of its
representatives.
The great revolutions have usually
commenced from the top, not from the bottom; but once the people is
unchained it is to the people that revolution owes its might.
It is obvious that revolutions have
never taken place, and will never take place, save with the aid of
an important fraction of the army. Royalty did not disappear in
France on the day when Louis XVI. was guillotined, but at the
precise moment when his mutinous troops refused to defend him.
It is more particularly by mental
contagion that armies become disaffected, being indifferent enough
at heart to the established order of things. As soon as the
coalition of a few officers had succeeded in overthrowing the
Turkish Government the Greek officers thought to imitate them and
to change their government, although there was no analogy between
the two regimes.
A military movement may overthrow a
governmentāand in the Spanish republics theGovernment is
hardly ever destroyed by any other meansābut if the
revolution is to beproductive of great results it must always be
based upon general discontent and general hopes.
Unless it is universal and
excessive, discontent alone is not sufficient to bring about a
revolution. It is easy to lead a handful of men to pillage,
destroy, and massacre, but to raise a whole people, or any great
portion of that people, calls for the continuous or repeated action
of leaders. These exaggerate the discontent; they persuade the
discontented that the government is the sole cause of all the
trouble, especially of the prevailing dearth, and assure men that
the new system proposed by them will engender an age of felicity.
These ideas germinate, propagating themselvesby suggestion and
contagion, and the moment arrives when the revolution is ripe.
In this fashion the Christian
Revolution and the French Revolution were prepared. That the latter
was effected in a few years, while the first required many, was due
to the fact that the French Revolution promptly had an armed force
at its disposal, while Christianity was long in winning material
power. In the beginning its only adepts were the lowly, the poor,
and the slaves, filled with enthusiasm by the prospect of seeing
their miserable life transformed into an eternity of delight. By a
phenomenon of contagion from below, of which history affords us
more than one example, the doctrine finally invaded the upper
strata of the nation, but it was a long time before an emperor
considered the new faith sufficiently widespread to be adopted as
the official religion.
4. The Results of Political
Revolutions.
When a political party is
triumphant it naturally seeks to organise society in accordance
with its interests. The organisation will differ accordingly as the
revolution has been effected by the soldiers, the Radicals, or the
Conservatives, &c.
The new laws and institutions will
depend on the interests of the triumphant party and of the classes
which have assisted itāthe clergy forinstance.
If the revolution has triumphed
only after a violent struggle, as was the case with the French
Revolution, the victors will reject at one sweep the whole arsenal
of the old law. The supporters of the fallen regime will be
persecuted, exiled, orexterminated.
The maximum of violence in these
persecutions is attained when the triumphant party is defending a
belief in addition to its material interests. Then the conquered
need hope for no pity. Thus may be explained the expulsion of the
Moors from Spain, the autodafes of the Inquisition, the executions
of the Convention, and the recent laws against the religious
congregations in France.
The absolute power which is assumed
by the victors leads them sometimes to extreme measures, such as
the Convention's decree that gold was to be replaced by paper, that
goods were to be sold at determined prices, &c. Very soon it
runs up against a wall ofunavoidable necessities, which turn
opinion against its tyranny, and finally leave it defenceless
before attack, asbefell at the end of the French Revolution. The
same thing happened recently to a Socialist Australian ministry
composed almost exclusively of working-men. It enacted laws so
absurd, and accorded such privileges to the trade unions, that
public opinion rebelled against it so unanimously that in three
months it was overthrown.
But the cases we have considered
are exceptional. The majority of revolutions have been accomplished
in order to place a new sovereign in power. Now this sovereign
knows very well that the first condition of maintaining his power
consists in not too exclusively favouring a single class, but in
seeking to conciliate all. To do this he will establish a sort of
equilibrium between them, so as not to be dominated by any one of
these classes. To allow one class to become predominant is to
condemn himself presently to accept that class as his master. This
law is one of the most certain of political psychology. The kings
of France understood it very well when they struggled so
energetically against the encroachments first of the nobility and
then of the clergy. If they had not done so their fate would have
been that of the German Emperors of the Middle Ages, who,
excommunicated by the Pope, were reduced, like Henry IV. at
Canossa, to make a pilgrimage and humbly to sue for the Pope's
forgiveness.
This same law has continually been
verified during the course of history. When at the end of the Roman
Empire the military caste became preponderant, the emperors
depended entirely upon their soldiers,who appointed and deposed
them at will.
It was therefore a great advantage
for France that she was so long governed by a monarch almost
absolute, supposed to hold his power by divine right, and
surrounded therefore by a considerable prestige. Without suchan
authority he could have controlled neither the feudal nobility, nor
the clergy, nor the parliaments. If Poland, towards the end of the
sixteenth century, had also possessed an absolute and respected
monarchy, she would not have descended the path of decadence which
led to her disappearance from the map of Europe.
We have shewn in this chapter that
political revolutions may be accompanied by important social
transformations. We shall soon see how slight are these
transformations compared to those producedby religious
revolutions.
1. The importance of the study of Religious Revolutions in respect of the comprehension of the great Political Revolutions.
A portion of this work will be devoted to the French Revolution. It wasfull of acts of violence which naturally had their psychological causes.
These exceptional events will always fill us with astonishment, and we even feel them to be inexplicable. They become comprehensible, however, if we consider that the French Revolution, constituting a new religion, was bound to obey the laws which condition the propagation of all beliefs. Its fury and its hecatombs will then become intelligible.
In studying the history of a great religious revolution, that of the Reformation, we shallsee that a number of psychological elements which figured therein were equally active during the French Revolution. In both we observe the insignificant bearing of the rational value of a belief upon its propagation, the inefficacy of persecution, the impossibility of tolerance between contrary beliefs, and the violence and the desperate struggles resulting from the conflict of different faiths. We also observe the exploitation of a belief by interests quite independent of that belief. Finally we see that it is impossible to modify the convictions of men without also modifying their existence.
These phenomena verified, we shall see plainly why the gospel of the Revolution was propagated by the same methods as all the religious gospels, notably that of Calvin. It could not have been propagated otherwise.
But although there are close analogies between the genesis of a religious revolution, such as the Reformation, and that of a great political revolution like our own, their remote consequences are very different, which explains the difference of duration which they display. In religious revolutions no experience can reveal to the faithful that they are deceived, since they would have to go to heaven to make the discovery. In political revolutions experience quickly demonstrates the error of a false doctrine and forces men to abandon it.
Thus at the end of the Directory the application of Jacobin beliefs had led France to such a degree of ruin, poverty, and despair that the wildest Jacobins themselves had to renounce their system. Nothing survived of their theories except a few principles which cannot be verified by experience, such as the universal happiness which equality should bestow upon humanity.
2. The beginnings of the Reformation and its first disciples.
The Reformation was finally to exercise a profound influence upon the sentiments and moral ideas of a great proportion of mankind. Modest in its beginnings, it was at first a simple struggle against the abuses of the clergy, and, from a practical point of view, a return to the prescriptions of the Gospel. It never constituted, as has been claimed, an aspiration towards freedom of thought. Calvin was as intolerant as Robespierre, and all the theorists of the age considered that the religion of subjects must be that of the prince who governedthem. Indeed in every country where the Reformation was established the sovereign replaced the Pope of Rome, with the same rights and the same powers.
In France, in default of publicity and means of communication, the newfaith spread slowly enough at first. It was about 1520 that Luther recruited a few adepts, and only towards 1535 was the new belief sufficiently widespread for men to consider it necessary to burn its disciples.
In conformity with a well-known psychological law, these executions merely favoured the propagation of the Reformation. Its first foll...