God and the Problem of Evil

Five Views

Chad Meister, James K. Dew Jr., Chad Meister, James K. Dew Jr.

• Publisher: IVP Academic
• Year: 2017
• ISBN:
  9780830891740
• Topic: Teología y religión
• Subtopic: Teología cristiana

Evil abounds. And so do the attempts to understand God in the face of such evil.The problem of evil is a constant challenge to faith in God. How can we believe in a loving and powerful God given the existence of so much suffering in the world? Philosophers and theologians have addressed this problem countless times over the centuries. New explanations have been proposed in recent decades drawing on resources in Scripture, theology, philosophy, and science.This Spectrum Multiview volume stages a dialogue between the five key positions in the current debate: - Phillip Cary: A Classic View- William Lane Craig: A Molinist View- William Hasker: An Open Theist View- Thomas Jay Oord: An Essential Kenosis View- Stephen Wykstra: A Skeptical Theism ViewAccording to the classic position, associated especially with the Augustinian tradition, God permits evil and suffering as part of the grand narrative of divine providence to bring about the redemption of creation. Molinism modifies the classic view by adding God's middle knowledge to the picture, in which God has knowledge of what creatures would do in all possible worlds. Open theism rejects the determinism of the classic view in favor of an account of God as a risk-taker who does not know for sure what the future holds. Essential kenosis goes further in providing a comprehensive theodicy by arguing that God cannot control creatures and thus cannot unilaterally prevent evil. Skeptical theism rejects the attempt to provide a theodicy and instead argues that, if God exists, we should not expect to understand God's purposes.Edited and with an introduction by Chad Meister and James K. Dew Jr., God and the Problem of Evil hosts a generous and informative conversation on one of the most pressing issues in the Christian life.Spectrum Multiview Books offer a range of viewpoints on contested topics within Christianity, giving contributors the opportunity to present their position and also respond to others in this dynamic publishing format.

Introduction

Chad Meister and James K. Dew Jr.

Evil abounds. Regardless of when or where we look—in the feudal systems of the Middle Ages or the cyber world of the twenty-first century, in the posh suburbs of a major city or the poor slums found across the globe, in the practice of organized crime or the peccancy in organized religion—in all times and in all places we find pain, we find suffering, we find evil. Evil is no less present, no less pernicious, and no less perplexing in the modern world than it has ever been. This poses a tenacious problem for those who believe in a God who is perfectly good and loving, all-powerful, and infinitely smart. For surely a God who is good and loving would not want there to be widespread pain and suffering in the world. And surely a God who is omniscient and omnipotent could ensure that no such world would exist. But such a world does exist. Our world.

In a world like ours, the adherents of traditional theism face the burden of attempting to offer a reasoned response to this problem of evil. At least the editors and contributors of this book believe that theists face such a burden, and that is why we have crafted it. By “traditional theism” we are referring to the conventional view of God historically held within the Judeo-Christian faith. On this view God is generally understood to be personal (or at least not less than a person: one who possesses mind and will, has goals and plans and purposes, and so on), ultimate reality (the source and ground of all things), distinct from the world yet actively involved in the world (creator and sustainer), and worthy of worship (wholly good, having inherent moral perfection, and excelling in power). This theistic concept of God includes a cluster of properties, and the ones most relevant to our discussion of evil are omnibenevolence, omnipotence, and omniscience. It is important to note that there are intramural debates within Christian theism about the meanings of these attributes. Some of these debates are reflected in the contributions to this volume. Yet all of the contributors affirm the grand wisdom, knowledge, goodness, and power of the God of historic Christianity.

We (the editors) have chosen five leading Christian thinkers who embrace five different perspectives to present in clear and accessible prose what they take to be the best way to respond to what is called “the problem of evil.” Before exploring their responses to the matter, it will be helpful to cover some of the relevant background material and major terms and concepts involved in the contemporary discussion on the subject.

To begin, what does the term evil connote? Evil is not an easy term to define in a precise and comprehensive manner. It is used in such diverse ways that one might wonder whether there truly is a singular meaning that captures each and every example of its usage. One might say, for example, that Joseph Stalin was an evil man, that the 2004 tsunami in Indonesia was an evil event, that an ISIS prison is an evil place, and that evolution in the animal kingdom (“nature red in tooth and claw,” to quote the poet Alfred Lord Tennyson) is an evil process. But what is an accurate meaning of the term evil that covers each of these examples and the countless others that could be included? Lexicons and dictionaries offer little help in this way by telling us, for example, that evil is “the opposite of good” or “that which is morally reprehensible.” Here, as with many other instances, the standard dictionary definition of the term falls short of capturing the depth, complexities, and variegations of the way the term is actually used. (A similar problem exists with the word good, for one might have a good pet, a good dinner, a good relationship, a good job, and a good God.)

While a useful, specific definition of the term evil might elude us, we can still have a sense of what we are talking about when we use it in various contexts. General descriptions such as those mentioned above can prove helpful. David Hume provides a few more: “Were a stranger to drop on a sudden into this world, I would show him, as a specimen of its ills [that is, its evils], a hospital full of disease, a prison crowded with malefactors and debtors, a field of battle strewed with carcasses, a fleet foundering in the ocean, a nation languishing under tyranny, famine, or pestilence.”1 The list of evils is endless, and it includes such broad notions as pain (physical states in which one wishes his or her circumstances were otherwise), suffering (mental states in which one wishes his or her circumstances were otherwise), and injustice (unfairness, the violation of the rights of others, and un­corrected abuse, neglect, or malfeasance).

Beyond these general categories and examples, there are also classifications of evil. A standard classification divides evil into two types: moral and natural. Moral evils are those evils that are in some sense the result of a person who is morally blameworthy of the resultant evil. There was ­intention behind the event, and the person’s free will was involved. Some moral evils are very great, as in the horror of child abuse. Other examples include genocide, torture, and other terrors inflicted on humans (or perhaps other animals) by other humans. There are also less severe types of moral evils, such as stealing or speaking very negatively about someone. ­Furthermore, certain defects in one’s character are also often counted as moral evils, ­including dishonesty, greed, and gluttony.

The second category of evil has to do with naturally occurring events or disasters rather than with moral agents. Examples of natural evils include hurricanes, tornadoes, earthquakes, tsunamis, famine, illnesses such as leukemia and Alzheimer’s disease, disabilities such as deafness and blindness, and other terrible events that do harm to humans and other living creatures but for which no personal agent is responsible. Consider the tsunami noted above that occurred in Indonesia. Because of that event, over 250,000 people died. Countless others were left homeless or without fathers, mothers, siblings, and other loved ones. In times past such instances of uncontrollable natural forces have often been referred to as “acts of God” (notably in insurance claims), though more recently they are often referred to as “acts of nature.” In any case, such events are natural in the sense that no human person is culpable for them, and they are evil in the sense that harm was incurred to humans or other animals.

In this book we are concerned with responses to arguments from evil—arguments that attempt to show that belief in God is unreasonable. Such arguments generally begin by pinpointing some broad class of evils, or some particular evil or set of evils, and then presenting premises that point to the penultimate conclusion that a good, wise, and all-powerful God would not have allowed for there to be such evils. This leads to the final conclusion that, since such evils do exist, God does not exist (or at least it is likely that God does not exist).

As the phrase is used in the literature, “the problem of evil” has taken many forms. Consequently, it is probably more accurate to speak of problems of evil, as there are various difficulties we are confronted with given evil’s reality. Nevertheless, what is generally taken to be the heart of the problem can be put simply in standard logical form as follows:

If God exists, then evil should not exist.

Evil does exist.

Therefore, God does not exist.

The problem is that there seems to be an inconsistency between God’s nature and the reality of evil. As ancient Greek philosopher Epicurus (341–270 BC) put it: “Either God wants to abolish evil, and cannot; or he can, but does not want to. If he wants to, but cannot, he is impotent. If he can, but does not want to, he is wicked. If God can abolish evil, and God really wants to do it, why is there evil in the world?”2

There are two primary approaches in responding to arguments from evil. One approach, referred to as a theodicy (which comes from an ancient Greek term that means “a justification of God”), attempts to offer an account that demonstrates that God has a good reason or set of reasons for allowing or not preventing what appears to be the evil in question. A second approach, generally referred to as a defense, does not claim to provide an actual reason or set of reasons for God’s allowing or not preventing evil. Instead, it attempts to rebut the argument from evil in a different way, such as by controverting one or more of the premises in the argument. A defense takes on less of a burden than a theodicy, for it is not proposing a solution to the problem of evil, nor offering a justification for any particular evil or set of evils. With the exception of Stephen Wykstra, the contributors in this book are attempting to provide a theodicy (though Craig’s essay could also be construed as a defense). In other words, they are not merely trying to rebut the problem of evil. They are taking on the burden of providing a possible justification for why God allows or does not prevent evil.

Above we have sketched some of the main issues that are relevant to arguments from evil, laying out the terrain, clarifying some key terms, and introducing some of the general themes and relevant topics in the discussion that follows. Our authors are some of the leading thinkers today on God and evil. Each will first present an essay arguing for his view with respect to the problem of evil, then follow with a response to the other four authors’ views on the problem.

The first essay is written by Phillip Cary. He is professor of philosophy and scholar in residence at the Templeton Honors College at Eastern University. He is an Augustine scholar and has published many articles and books, including the trilogy Augustine’s Invention of the Inner Self: The Legacy of a Christian Platonist; Inner Grace: Augustine in the Traditions of Plato and Paul; and Outward Signs: The Powerlessness of External Things in Augustine’s Thought, all published by Oxford University Press (2000, 2008, and 2008, respectively). In his chapter, “The Classic View,” he articulates and defends what we are referring to in this book as the classic view of God and evil. It is classic in that its general contours can be traced back to that early medieval thinker who is widely considered to be the most influential theologian of early Western Christianity: fifth-century African bishop Augustine of Hippo (AD 354–430). As Professor Cary notes, the features of the position he develops were held not only by Augustine but also by such later luminaries as Thomas Aquinas, Julian of Norwich, Martin Luther, John Calvin, C. S. Lewis, and John Paul II. What is at stake for Augustine and others who held to the classic view is not so much “the problem of evil” as delineated above, but rather the related problem of wondering how evil can exist on the assumption that God is omnipotent, omnibenevolent, and so on. The classic reply is that evil occurs because God permits it, and God does so because of a greater good that derives from it.

The classic view sees the grand narrative of world history as one that begins with Adam’s fall and culminates with Christ’s return. It has a beneficent beginning, in which God creates everything good, and it has a beneficent ending, in which Christ restores all things (with the exception of the damned) to perfection. What is between the beginning and the end—the sin, suffering, and corruption manifest in the world—might seem to have no meaning or purpose or goal, but we have the hope, through the gospel of Christ, that a greater good will come out of it all.

The second essay is by William Lane Craig. He is research professor of philosophy at Talbot School of Theology and professor of philosophy at Houston Bapti...