Ontology and Epistemology in the Realist Paradigm
Within the discipline of history, the 1960s and 1970s saw a fresh blossoming of oral history research, in which personal narratives were recognized as a valuable source of information about overlooked or obscured aspects of the past. At the outset of that new blossoming, historians had predominantly endorsed positivism. In response to the ontological question, âWhat can be known?â positivist historians would say, âFacts about what took place in the past.â (Historians have likewise tended to be realists, which means that they believe some real past does exist, independent of anyoneâs observing it. If a tree falls in a realistâs forest, it always makes a sound.)
With regard to the epistemological question, âHow do we know?â positivist historians would answer that they are objective knowers, ones who observe the past from a neutral, value-free position. Thus, although many practitioners of oral history had avowedly political motivations for posing research questions about the hidden histories of subjugated groups, positivism informed how those in history departments defended the validity of their sources and analyses to colleagues accustomed to scrutinizing written sources. âOur analyses are valid because memories canbe accurate,â the oral historians would have said, falling back to the position that if the vagaries of oral narratorsâ memories and ephemerality of talk had tainted their data, so too had the subjectivity of the document writers of times past.
It was historian Luisa Passerini who, in 1979, made a significant intervention into her disciplineâs paradigm with her interviews about Italy under fascism. Passerini (1979) maintained that the conflicted feelings that her working class narrators recounted did not taint her project of discovering the objective truths of the past so much as they served as truths of a qualitatively different character. That her narrators had felt their labor to be a moral duty at the same time as they found it alienating helped to explain why they initially did not revolt against fascism, but later did: their subjectivity held the seeds for revolt. Since Passeriniâs intervention, oral historians in history departments have been far less apologetic about working with subjective data. In so doing, those seeking out the truths of the past have not had to abandon their positivist paradigm. As Guba and Lincoln (1994) explain, positivism can be stretched to incorporate and welcome subjective data, treating it as commensurate with what more objective sources offer. Thus, to technical analyses of the 1984 Bhopal, India industrial disaster, Mukherjee (2010) adds the voices of survivors as they recount their first glimpses of the strange white mist that would change their lives, their harrowing stampede for survival, and the continuing ordeal of unpredictable health conditions that they experience as monstrous.
Strategies for Rigorous Realist Analysis
Within both positivism and realism, reliance on talk data gathered well after events have passed means that errors of memory are seeping in, muddying oral historiansâ views into the past. Important criteria for such an analysis are whether it minimizes such errors and assesses whether data reliably point to clear conclusions: every single strategy we outline is concerned with achieving rigor by that definition. A first strategy is to take into account oral historiansâ experiences with the reliability of various kinds of oral evidence. Finnegan (2006) provides a most helpful summary of the reliability of key data involved in tracking individuals. While peopleâs memories of place names tend to be highly reliable, memories of first names and of dates are fraught with error, owing to nicknaming, mix-ups with similar names, differences between baptism and birth years, and the like. Attending to respondentsâ comments about the accuracy of their memories of various kinds of information may be useful if they themselves can make comparisons to other sources of data, such as personal notebooks (e.g., Turnbull, 2000); otherwise, say Neisser and Libby (2000), it would be illogical to depend upon respondentsâ memories of how good their memories are.
When talk data are about long past events or from cultures that rely more upon the knowledge technologies of orality than those of literacy (see Ong, 2012), additional considerations may come into play. Rather than calling your data oral history, you may speak of it as part of oral tradition. That is, consisting of cultural knowledge such as laws, legends, proverbs, origin myths, and childrenâs play songs, that have been passed down without having been recorded in writing. The foundational text to consult is Jan Vansinaâs (1985) Oral Tradition as History, which provides additional strategies for assessing the messages from the past, such as asking whether maintaining the reliability of these messages has been culturally rewarded, or whether there are material objects, such as treasured heirlooms or marred landscapes, that serve as mnemonic devices.
Psychologistsâ studies of memory can also be useful to oral historians â but within limits. Oral historians are interested in memories based in natural settings, be they factories, homes, or battlefields. Most psychologists, however, prefer to study memories created in laboratory settings, where they can control the stimuli to which subjects are exposed. Oral historians are often interested in long-term memories accrued over the years. However, few psychologists study such long-spanning autobiographical memories. In fact, psychological studies of autobiographical memory need not cover years of lived experience. Studies of it can assess how well subjects remember events that might be only a few hours past. (Psychologists distinguish such memory from working memory, which lasts for just the few seconds needed to write down a telephone number.) Thus, relatively few cognitive psychological studies can help us understand particularities of how the more remote past is remembered.
To assess sources, we can factor in these studiesâ insights about the broader processes by which memories of personal experiences tend to stay stable or alter. Autobiographical memory researchers have found that memories of events are generally more likely to be accurate when the events are more recent, distinctive, or highly emotionally charged (Bauer, 2007), and when the memories have frequently been retold (Neisser and Libby, 2000). Further, in whatâs termed the reminiscence bump, events experienced between the ages of 10 and 30 are more available and reminisced about than others, perhaps because these ages include distinctive and important changes in social roles (see Bauer, 2007). Meanwhile, common errors of memory include hindsight, which makes us believe we always could have foretold what has come to pass, consistency bias, wherein we tend to remember our past selves in ways that make them more predictive of our present ones (see Albright, 1994), and misattribution, wherein we cease to unite information about an event into a whole, and thus confuse one event with another (Schacter, 2001).
As an example, we can consider how co-author Katherineâs mother Johanna once said that she remembered gathering with her family around the radio so as to listen to the first shots of World War II being fired on Poland (see Bischoping, 2014), a distinctive event, but one that was over 30 years past by the time that Johanna told Katherine about it. Johannaâs memory does not entirely make sense, since German radio would hardly have announced a surprise attack as part of its programming. However, itâs possible that she had mixed elements of this event up with a subsequent radio dramatization. Indeed, it is sometimes to an astonishing extent that what narrators report as vivid personal autobiographical memory can turn out to be filled in with media and mass cultural depictions (for example, see Figes, 2008).
Moving beyond errors in memory, Martha Howellâs (2001: 60â8) From Reliable Sources: An Introduction to Historical Methods can be consulted for its excellent overview of historiansâ strategy of assessing the accuracy of sources through several criteria. These include trustworthiness (i.e., whether narratives are shaded by vanity, fear, political preferences, and the like), competence (i.e., the term that covers how factors such as individual interests, expertise, and capacity for comprehension can influence accounts), and authority (i.e. whether the writer was an eyewitness to an event or providing a hearsay account). Whether the account is internally consistent and plausible in light of other information is assessed too.
To see how these criteria of competence and authority work in practice, we focus again on Johannaâs not-quite-plausible story of what she had heard on German radio. It makes sense to wonder about Johannaâs competence to understand what she might have heard on the radio: born in 1935, she had been not quite four years old on the day that Germany began its attack. Further, because Katherine had herself heard this story in her childhood, her own competence to understand it can be questioned. Finally, we have the issue of Katherineâs authority in transmitting Johannaâs story second-hand. Although precisely what had been playing on the radio cannot be known, stepping back from that matter, the story can be thought of as offering a vivid and plausible fragment of information about how one German family had understood the importance of the attack on Poland.
For a stronger claim to be made would require additional narratorsâ voices, bu...