Operation Overlord, Design And Reality; The Allied Invasion Of Europe

Dr. Albert Norman

• Publisher: Lucknow Books
• Year: 2015
• eBook ISBN: 9781786253224
• Topic: History
• Subtopic: European History
• Index: History

A fascinating in-depth study of the planning for the D-Day landings which set the first Allied troops on the road to Berlin. Dr Norman served with the US 12th Army Group staff during the Second World War under General Omar Bradley, which put him in an expert position to tell the story of the exhaustive preparations that went into the Normandy invasion on 6th June 1944.
'"Overlord" was unquestionably, as of this writing, the largest overseas military operation ever undertaken. In the pages which follow, Dr. Albert Norman presents, insofar as it can be compressed within one easily readable volume, a careful history of the planning which made its achievement possible and of the operation itself.
Dr. Norman's topic is absorbing, both for its historical interest and for the lessons it holds for those who, perhaps unfortunately, must be concerned with the possibility of "Overlords" yet to come. It holds yet another and even more important interest. The staff groups which contributed to the success of "Overlord" and the ultimate defeat of Germany were the exemplification of an idea of allied unity, developed by General Eisenhower and perfected to such an extent that it has become the symbol of successful international cooperation.'—General Walter Bedell Smith

PART I—THE STRATEGIC PROBLEM

CHAPTER 1—THE ENGLISH CHANNEL-MEDITERRANEAN SEA CONTROVERSY

The Basic Issues

Several fundamental issues of strategy faced the Western Allies in their war against Germany. The most fundamental of these was at what geographical point against the enemy-held territory to make the initial counteroffensive. And this in turn reduced itself, in the European theater of operations, to one central issue: should the counteroffensive be launched against some point on the enemy’s far-flung periphery or against the center of his economic, military, and political strength. To this issue was linked a second and no less vital one, an issue that had a direct bearing on the solution of the first. It was the question of the available means in manpower and technological resources to carry out one or the other of the two fundamental aspects of the strategic problem. Specifically, the problem resolved itself into a controversy over whether, taking into account the state of military preparedness of the Western Allies at the end of 1941 and the first half of 1942, initial offensive operations should be waged against the Germans’ periphery in the Mediterranean Sea from North Africa or from England against the center of their military and economic strength in northwestern Europe. On this basic problem were brought to bear traditional concepts of strategy and views based on individual understandings of the issues as well as individual proclivities.

The British military, naval, and air chiefs, in virtually complete unanimity and with the backing of the War Cabinet, advocated what came to be known as the Mediterranean strategy for land operations and a cross-Channel strategy for heavy bomber operations in the initial stages of an Allied offensive against Germany. The cross-Channel strategy for an invasion by ground forces they favored only in the final phase of the war, when Germany would be weakened by harassing offensives against her periphery and the Allies had gained strength by devising the means with which an invasion from England could be undertaken.

British Strategy and the U. S. Concept

The United States Army chiefs and the Secretary of War, in general with but lukewarm support from the Navy and President Franklin D. Roosevelt, were advocates of the cross-Channel strategy during the very outset of a campaign against Germany as a means of reaching and destroying the center of her strength. They recommended an invasion of the European continent at the “most direct point” in 1942. They considered operations in the Mediterranean as at best diversions, holding forth no prospects of decisive results. To the British Government, however, a full-scale invasion of the Continent at an early date was more a question of its feasibility than of opposition in principle. The timing, as the British authorities saw it, was based on the degree of preparedness of the Allies to launch a successful invasion. The British defense chiefs were indifferent to a premature amphibious operation across the English Channel. They considered such an operation as at best unduly dangerous and at worst as reckless rather than bold. They believed in the necessity of a cross-Channel invasion at a later date, when Allied resources would be equal to the task.{1} British defense authorities had begun to make preparations and to plan for such an invasion as early as 1940 and 1941. We shall return to this theme in chapter 2 of this work.

The strategy of both the United States and Great Britain was determined by their geography and history: Great Britain’s, largely by her insular position and historic imperial and Commonwealth ties; that of the United States, by her traditional isolationism from global affairs (outside the Pacific Ocean) and from areas in which she had little or no direct interest.

Since Great Britain, like the United States, is by tradition not a military nation, her war strategy, when attacked, has been, first, to defend the British Isles, then her vital oversea possessions and spheres of influence, which she was able to do by the exercise of superior sea power, and finally, to go over to the offensive. Until she garnered all her resources for a final engagement, however, Britain’s offensive actions were directed mostly at the enemy’s periphery—at distant points—in order to weaken his communications and to force him still further to disperse his military resources. This strategy was the foundation of Britain’s victory over Napoleon.{2} British defense chiefs employed it also in the Second World War. The battle of El Alamein, in Egypt, and the Allied invasion of North Africa in the autumn of 1942, as well as the invasions of Sicily and Italy the following year, were an extension of traditional British strategy of subjecting the adversary to a strategic encirclement, of driving him in, and of holding him as in a vise. So was the idea of invading France from England, once the resources had been accumulated. It was in line with well-established strategical thinking in Great Britain.

In the United States, owing to the absence of a global attitude and of direct strategic interest outside of the Pacific area, no general theory of world strategy had, it would appear, been evolved. Military and naval thinking, in its broadest sense, preoccupied itself mainly with Western Hemisphere defense. With few exceptions, military authorities in positions of responsibility did not appreciate the strategic trends of thought of their British colleagues, and military operations at distant peripheries seemed less justifiable to them than across 18 to 20 miles of sea.

At the outset of the war, Britain’s paramount strategic task was to safeguard the British Isles against invasion. The Royal Navy prevented Hitler from invading England in 1940 under the plan named “Sea Lion.” When, by late 1940, the danger of invasion had abated and the British Government felt that the homeland was reasonably secure, the possession of sea power enabled the British to reinforce their strategic areas. During the third year of the war they sent abroad five planes and 15 tanks for every one they received from the United States.{3} The Middle East offensive that followed toward the end of 1941 had as its strategic objective the denial of the Middle East oil resources to the Germans and Italians and of clearing Axis troops from the entire coast of North Africa. A proposed occupation of the northwestern coast of Africa, extending from Casablanca on the Atlantic to Algiers and Tunis in the Mediterranean was mooted as an auxiliary operation. Great Britain then intended to invade Sicily and Italy as part of her encircling movement of her adversaries. She planned these operations, and made extensive preparations, before the United States became a belligerent.

As a counterpoise to this strategy, the United States War Department chiefs proposed an assault on France from England in the summer of 1942, as a means of engaging the main body of the German Army in the West and of relieving the pressure on the Russian Army. Although both the United States and Great Britain had only one end in view, namely, the defeat of Germany, they proposed different methods of attaining it. The United States, it would appear, proposed the straight and direct—the easy—road; Great Britain, the circuitous, round-about—the more difficult—road.

How to reconcile the two methods without compromising the goal became the most important strategic problem the Western Allies had to solve when the United States entered the war in December 1941. It is worth noting at this point that when all the facts bearing on the determination of strategy were closely examined, and the feasibilities of each investigated, the strategy of cross-Channel operations in 1942 as against operations in the Mediterranean had little to be said in its favor. It was found that Allied capabilities were unequal to the requirements of a cross-Channel invasion after only some six or seven months of active United States participation in the war. To the responsible military authorities in the United States, it was, as General Mark W. Clark, wartime commander of the Allied 15th Army Group in Italy, states, a case of “being new on the job” and of being “ready to tackle anything.”{4} To the responsible military authorities in Great Britain it was a case of long experience and preoccupation with strategy based on all the seas and continents. Moreover, the manpower and material resources were not available in 1942 for the launching of an invasion of France. The United States was first able to contribute anything substantial to a military campaign in the northwest of Europe late in 1943.{5} It fell, therefore, to President Roosevelt, after taking counsel with Admiral William D. Leahy, his personal Chief of Staff, to exercise prudence and keep Allied military strategy on an even keel.

Wartime military cooperation between the United States and Great Britain began in 1940. A military mission, headed by Rear Admiral Robert L. Ghormley, U. S. Navy, left the United States for London in July for military staff conversations with British defense chiefs. A basic Allied policy emerged from these conversations: A policy of taking the strategic offensive in Europe and of going on the strategic defensive in the Pacific. These conversations were followed up by additional consultations in Washington early in 1941. The agreements, embodied in a formal document known as ABC-1 (American-British-Canadian Staff Conversations), declared that of the nations comprising the German-Italian-Japanese Axis, Germany was the most dangerous to the security of the Western Hemisphere. They called for a defeat of Germany first, for the maintenance of control over the Atlantic, for operations in the Mediterranean to drive Italy out of the war, and for the concentration of Allied ground forces in the United Kingdom to prepare for an invasion of western Europe. It was accepted that some of the provisions of the agreement would come into force only if the United States became a belligerent. The principle of unified command of all Allied forces in each theater of operations was affirmed.{6}

The “Arcadia” Conference

Almost immediately after the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, the ABC-1 agreement became operative. A conference was arranged between President Franklin D. Roosevelt and Prime Minister Winston Churchill at Washington for the purpose of translating the Allied agreement into specific military measures. The “Arcadia” Conference, as it was called, lasted from December 22, 1941 to January 14, 1942. Besides confirming earlier decisions on strategy, such as declaring Germany the chief enemy, a single Allied military command for directing the war was formed under the name of the Combined Chiefs of Staff. This body was made responsible to the President of the United States and the Prime Minister of Great Britain. The strategy adopted for the Pacific was that of denying to the Japanese access to raw materials and of holding essential Allied areas in the early stages of the war.{7}

Before it reached the United States, the British delegation, headed by the Prime Minister, cabled a proposal, for the consideration of the conferees, that the main effort of the Allies in 1942 be devoted to the occupation of the entire seaboard of North Africa, stretching from Dakar to the Middle East. The British were to operate westward out of Egypt and United States forces eastward from Casablanca and other ports. The aid of the Vichy French was to be sought. The British also proposed that American bomber forces be brought to England and that, together with their own strategic bomber force, an intensified air offensive be started against Germany’s centers of production and other strategic targets.{8}

The “Arcadia” Conference adopted these proposals, which were made binding on both the United States and Great Britain. Since Canadian forces in oversea theaters came under the operational control of British commands, the Canadian position was represented by the British defense chiefs and the conference decisions made binding on that country, too. The essence of the grand strategy adopted was the closing of the military, naval, and air ring around the territory held by the Germans and their European satellites, of extending aid to Soviet Russia, of occupying the North African coastline in both the Mediterranean and Atlantic...

Table of contents

• Title page
• TABLE OF CONTENTS
• DEDICATION
• FOREWORD
• PREFACE
• MAPS
• PHOTOGRAPHS
• PART I-THE STRATEGIC PROBLEM
• PART II-ORGANIZATION FOR THE INVASION
• PART III-THE DESIGN
• PART IV-THE REALITY
• APPENDIX I-CALENDAR BASED ON D-DAY, 1944
• APPENDIX II-GLOSSARY OF LANDING SHIPS AND CRAFT USED IN WORLD WAR II
• APPENDIX III-GLOSSARY OF CODE NAMES APPEARING IN THE TEXT
• APPENDIX IV-BIBLIOGRAPHY