Coercive Diplomacy: Otto Von Bismarck And The Unification Of Germany

Lt.-Col. Kenneth R. Krasner USMC

• Publisher: Normanby Press
• Year: 2015
• ISBN:
  9781786250032
• Topic: Histoire
• Subtopic: Histoire de la France

Otto von Bismarck, Prussia's "Iron Chancellor, " was arguably the dominant political figure in Europe during the nineteenth century. With acute political moves, he adroitly manipulated opportunities to achieve European hegemony for Germany and, thus, considerably altered Europe's political scene and balance of power. As the principal architect of German unification, he utilized subtle diplomacy, the formation of alliances, Prussia's formidable army, and a series of calculated—albeit limited—wars against his European neighbors to create Germany's second empire. As the archetypical statesman who espoused the power of the state in the international system, Bismarck recognized that a successful foreign policy and national strategy required the conscious integration of force and diplomacy in order to achieve his overarching goal of German unification. His political leadership thus succeeded because he understood that the use of force was a complement, and not alternative, to diplomacy. This paper examines Bismarck's manipulation of diplomatic and military instruments of national power to achieve his political goal, concluding that the fusion of force and diplomacy was the essence of Bismarck's statesmanship.

COERCIVE DIPLOMACY: OTTO VON BISMARCK AND THE UNIFICATION OF GERMANY

“Bismarck is a colossal figure in modern history. He is the incarnation of German unity.” — Emilio Castelar{1}

Otto von Bismarck, Prussia’s “Iron Chancellor,” exercised extraordinary diplomatic power as the champion of German unity. Throughout the latter half of the 19th century, he politically maneuvered Prussia’s rise to the rank of a first-rate power. Exercising extraordinary skill as a diplomat and politician, he forged a German empire under Prussian leadership that was ultimately realized on January 18, 1871, when King William I was crowned Emperor (Kaiser) of Germany in the Hall of Mirrors in Versailles. This creation of Germany’s Second Reich and the empire’s subsequent elevation to the rank of a world power is directly attributable to the cunning diplomacy of Bismarck. Arguably, Bismarck was the dominant political figure in Europe during the nineteenth century. With acute political moves, he adroitly manipulated opportunities to achieve European hegemony for Germany and, thus, considerably altered Europe’s political scene and balance of power. As the principal architect of German unification, he utilized subtle diplomacy, the formation of alliances, and a series of calculated wars against his European neighbors and German states to create Germany’s second empire. Remarkably, Bismarck revised the continent’s geopolitical landscape and achieved his political aim to increase Prussian power by consolidating Europe’s German states without triggering a Europe-wide war—a feat few other statesmen can claim.

The purpose of this paper is to assess Bismarck’s statesmanship by examining how he maneuvered diplomatically to unify Germany. It begins with a brief overview of the European state system in the nineteenth century, particularly as it relates to the formation of the German Confederation in 1815, and continues with a short summary of the revolutionary movement that shaped German politics following the Napoleonic wars. The focus then narrows to analyze Bismarck’s use of power and persuasion during the wars of German unification to fulfill his political aim to elevate Prussia as the dominant force of Germany and as Europe’s leading power. Finally, the paper concludes with an emphasis on Bismarck’s diplomatic prowess, which is credited with uniting Germany under Prussia’s crown and sealing his place in history as one of the most preeminent figures of nineteenth century European politics.

German Confederation and the Rebirth of Nationalism

The new European order that emerged following the rise of Germany’s Second Reich began to take shape at the Congress of Vienna in 1815, when the statesmen there established the German Confederation—an international system of consolidated, but not united, German states under the leadership of the dual powers of Austria and Prussia. The purpose of the Confederation was to bring some semblance of order to the more than thirty German states that occupied the geopolitically fragmented territories of central Europe. It also served to deter future French expansionism, as well as to forestall German national unity. Essentially, then, the German Confederation was intended to “provide security against the dangers of external attack and internal revolution.”{2}As a mechanism to balance power across the region, the German Confederation proved too strong to invite attack, yet too weak to alarm neighboring European states. In this respect, the victors at the Congress of Vienna fused together a political alliance that brought peace and stability to Europe for more than a generation during the post-Napoleonic era. Indeed, international tensions remained relatively low across the European continent following the Confederation’s establishment, as no major war took place among the Great Powers—France, Great Britain, Prussia, Austria, and Russia—for nearly forty years until the Crimean War of 1854, which shattered the alliance of Russia, Prussia, and Austria and began to realign the concert of powers across Europe.{3}

Despite the effective role that the German Confederation played in maintaining peace and stability in Europe, competition between Austria and Prussia for overall leadership of the German states remained a significant international issue in European politics. Although the two countries were the leading and most powerful states in the German Confederation, Austria, by tradition, was the ranking power. The Hapsburg monarchy had no intention of surrendering the paramount position it had enjoyed for centuries over the fabric of German and non-German duchies across central Europe. It is worth noting that the Germanic population of the Hapsburg monarchy, while politically dominant, was a distinct minority. Nonetheless, friction between the dual powers steadily gained momentum following the formation of the Confederation, as both states asserted their respective authority over all of Germany and as each began to pursue its own self-interests.

As Bismarck recognized, self-interest is the state’s primary motive in conducting foreign policy. In this respect, he was a true practitioner of Realpolitik—a term used to describe a foreign policy based on calculations of power and national interest. Adherents to the tenets of Realpolitik “evaluate ideas as forces in relation to all the other forces relevant to making a decision; and the various elements needed to be judged by how well they could serve the national interest, not by preconceived ideologies.”{4}In this tradition of Realpolitik, Bismarck’s correct calculus of Prussian power enabled him to pursue foreign policy objectives that enhanced the states influence vis-à-vis its European and Russian neighbors. Characteristically, Bismarck viewed political parity or alliance with Austria as an inhibitor to Prussian aims to unify Germany under its leadership. By the middle of the nineteenth century, a clash between these dual Germanic powers was mounting as both states also wrestled with their own unique domestic concerns.

In addition to the growing international tensions between Austria and Prussia, post-Napoleonic Germany was also characterized by heightened domestic issues, particularly demands for liberal reforms and increased national sentiment. Reinforced by the establishment of the German Confederation in 1815, the idea of German

Nationalism began to gain momentum throughout the first half of the nineteenth century. By the time Bismarck was appointed to the chancellorship of Prussia in 1862, a German national sentiment was already present throughout the geographically dispersed duchies. This growing national consciousness was accentuated by the call for a closer political union among the German states. For the first time “words such as German’ and ‘Fatherland’ entered the common lexicon. While the idea of a unified German nation was still embryonic, German culture flourished.”{5}It became increasingly evident that the forces of nationalism and liberalism were uniting against monarchical rule, dynastic allegiance, and the militaristic traditions of the Prussian state. The early nineteenth century was the heyday of European romanticism, of which nationalism was a distinctive part. It was an essential motive in 1848 during the German Revolution.

The 1848 Revolution

The revolutionary fervor that gripped Europe in 1848 gave birth to a new sense of German nationalism. In January 1848, popular uprisings stirred in Italy. Within a month, the French monarchy was overthrown and a new republic was established in Paris. The revolution soon spread to Germany, and by March the liberal movement forced the resignation of Austria’s Prince Metternich. The effects of the revolution caused German sovereigns to compromise their monarchical authority and give their respective countries constitutions and popular representatives. Although Prussia was more stable than its European neighbors, maintaining a strong army and an efficient administration, it yielded to the same pressures. King Frederick William cowered in the face of conflict, ordered his military to cease fighting the revolutionaries, and agreed to the organization of a German national assembly and a Prussian parliament.

As the staunchest defender of Prussia’s old regime, Bismarck was incensed by the revolution’s initial triumph. He first attempted to persuade the military’s leadership to wage a counter-revolution. However, the Prussian generals refused to act without explicit orders from their civilian masters. Next, he proposed that Frederick William relinquish his crown so that his [William’s] son could ascend the throne as a political figurehead.{6} This maneuver also failed. Liberalism had thus taken root, and the people of Germany celebrated the overthrow of authority and attainment of popular sovereignty. Bismarck, however, did not share these feelings, upholding his intense personal convictions of duty to crown and country. He saw only the threat to the Prussian monarchy, the subjection of the king to parliamentary rule, and the dissolution of the Prussian state into Germany. “Bismarck made him noteworthy by his championship of Prussian superiority and his lack of faith in the constitutional movement.”{7}

Ultimately, the German revolution failed because the National Assembly that organized in Frankfurt lacked executive leadership under the crowns of either Austria or Prussia and failed to unite the disparate German states or draft an acceptable constitution. The Assembly also suffered from a lack of political will to lead fundamental change. Nonetheless, the importance of the events of 1848 cannot be undervalued because of this perceived failure of the revolution, as the German popular movement had gained legitimacy. Equally significant, the idea of German nationhood and Germany as a future powerful state actor on the international stage began to take practical shape at this time.

Although it is not my purpose here to examine in detail the German liberal movement of the nineteenth century and the revolution it inspired in 1848, several points are worth emphasizing. First, the emergent national sentiment was widespread— albeit loosely organized—across the German-speaking states of Europe, as the ideal of German national unity began growing in appeal for most Germans. The popular movement, which was manifested in the revolutionary parliament of the Frankfurt Assembly of the German Confederation, petitioned for increased political freedoms and liberal state policies. Additionally, demands for constitutional reforms, such as parliamentary representation of all German citizens within the Confederation instead of council representation for only the monarchs of the various sovereign German states, were also made. To this end, the Frankfurt Assembly called for a restructured government under the monarchy, and for German unity. Second, the national uprisings throughout Germany, although short-lived (1848-1849), brought to the political stage a more vocal middle class that challenged the German nobility and aristocratic bureaucracy. German liberalism was beginning to emerge as a political force. As Otto Pflanze, an internationally recognized historian of 19th-century Germany reveals in his monumental work on Bismarck:

“Liberalism had become the conventional language of protest, and through its terminology…the dissatisfied gave voice to their resentments. The spontaneous violence of the masses elevated to power the moderate liberals who had never approved of revolution but were now called upon to lead one.”{8}

This latter point is particularly relevant, as it leads to a third, important lesson that emerges from the German liberal movement specifically concerning Otto von Bismarck. As a Prussian aristocrat and loyal servant of the Prussian crown, Bismarck believed that liberalism was the enemy of the state and that the Prussian monarchy should always retain the basis of power. For the future “Iron Chancellor,” liberalism ultimately weakened the political authority of the state and challenged the divine rights of the monarchy and its noble class. “Prussian monarchs owe their position to God’s grace and not to the gift of the people; it is a crown not hampered by any conditions.”{9} Bismarck’s disdain for liberalism was obvious. Nonetheless, despite his contemptuous attitude, he realized the usefulness of German nationalism to promote Prussia’s domestic and foreign policies—a realization witnessed during the series of limited wars he provoked from 1864 to 1871 in order to unite Germany. Bismarck also recognized that an aristocratic bureaucracy like Prussia was not impervious to liberal ideas. To a certain extent, “they could also be made compatible with the essential structure of the Prussian state and society.”{10} As evidenced by history, Bismarck eventually capitalized on this mounting awareness of German identity and liberalism to create the German nation-state, as he combined the forces of nationalism and Prussian expansionism to achieve German unification in 1871.

The Rising Statesman

Against this backdrop of domestic upheaval and international posturing between Prussia and Austria for leadership over the German Confederation, Bismarck rose to become Prussia’s leading statesman, assuming the office of Minister-Prӓsident, or Prime Minister, in September 1862. As previously noted, Bismarck opposed the revolution of 1848 because it threatened the integrity of the Prussian nation and its traditional class structure. Although he believed in a union of German speaking states— less, of course, Austria and Switzerland, the latter state not being one of his political objectives—Bismarck vehemently argued against unification at the expense of Prussian independence. Although he sought German unification, his political aims were to preserve Prussia’s monarchy. Still, it is worth commenting that Bismarck was no dogmatic ideologue. “[His] nationalism was of the type formed by the state rather than by a common culture.”{11} As Prime Minister of Prussia’s monarchical system, his rule was characterized by “a high degree of ideological flexibility that allowed him swiftly to change alliances in order to play off his political adversaries against each other.”{12} Indeed, Bismarck’s political genius was most evident in his ability to manipulate alliances—domestically and internationally.

Not long after assuming his new post, Bismarck refocused Prussia’s policy from domestic issues to foreign affairs. In one of his first parliamentary appearances, Bismarck announced that it was time to use the Prussian army to solve the question of German national unity “by blood and iron”—the signature phrase of his political career. He declared that:

“The position of Prussia in Germany will not be determined by its liberalism but by its power…Prussia must concentrate its strength and hold it for the favorable moment, which has already several times been passed. The great questions of our time will not be decided by speeches and majority decisions…but by blood and iron.”{13}

Despite the fiery rhetoric, Bismarck’s foreign policy was based on a limited objective to unify Germany under Prussian leadership. He, like other German conservatives as well as liberals, was concerned about French revanchist and believed that the best way to defend against a future attack was by uniting Germany. Bismarck was also quite cognizant of the limits of Prussia’s alliance with Austria and Russia to defend central Europe against French aggression, and he knew the potential always existed for coalitions to form against him. To be sure, as Bismarck politically maneuvered to unify Germany, he remained ever mindful of Prussian actions within the concert of European states.

A key note worth highlighting here is that Bismarck did not intend to unite all of Germany. Keenly aware of the dynamics of the balance of power in Europe during the post-Napoleonic era, he recognized that a united Germany that also included Austria could threaten Russia and his European neighbors who could organize to intervene in Prussian affairs. This, Bismarck wanted to avoid. His initial actions attempted to convince the region’s other political powers that he did not intend to jeopardize the equilibrium in Europe. Bismarck’s astute understanding of the dynamics of international relations also cautioned him to not simply rely on military power to achieve his country’s national objectives. Instead, his political leadership succeeded because he understood that the use of force was a complement, and not alternative, to diplomacy. “Diplomacy is not simply the art of persuading others to accept a set of demands. It is the art of discerning objectives the world will accept—and the restraints on one’s own power that one must accept in turn.”{14}Quite simply, Bismarck viewed war and diplomacy as inextricably linked together. He thus directed Prussia’s strategic initiatives and formed political alliances through a combination of power and persuasion that was virtually unequaled in history. The statesman thus reassured the other European powers that his foreign policy focused exclusively on limited objectives and a desire to simply increase Prussia’s leadership within the German Confederation with no intention of altering the geopolitical structure of the international system.

Bismarck’s sense of limits was one of his most distinguishing features as a statesman of the higher order. As Prussia’s minister of foreign affairs, he politically incited three successive wars to advance Prussian hegemony and ultimately unite Germany. Because of his limited objecti...