The Fall Of South Vietnam: An Analysis Of The Campaigns

Major Gregory Heritage

• Publisher: Normanby Press
• Year: 2015
• eBook ISBN: 9781786250094
• Topic: History
• Subtopic: Military & Maritime History
• Index: History

This monograph addresses what operational level military factors enabled the North Vietnamese Army to defeat the former South Vietnamese Army during the Vietnam War's final campaigns of 1975. The Vietnam War covered the full spectrum of conflict from terrorism, to guerrilla warfare, to a conventional war of maneuver. The final North Vietnamese offensive that defeated the South Vietnamese Army were conventional campaigns that provide opportunities for operational level planners to learn from the Vietnam experience.The methodology followed in the monograph involves first establishing a basis of information on the strategic situation and the final campaigns, and then analyzing the campaigns with Cohen and Gooch's model of military misfortune.The communists began their final offensive campaigns in December, 1974 by seizing Phuoc Long Province. In March, 1975, they continued their offensive campaigns by conducting diversionary attacks in the north threatening Pleiku and then attacking the lightly defended South Vietnamese rear area. The Communists quickly captured the Central Highlands and then raced to the sea to divide the South Vietnamese Army (ARVN). The communists blocked the South Vietnamese attempt to retrograde from the Central Highlands and destroyed the ARVN II Corps. The communists then concentrated combat power to destroy the South Vietnamese six divisions isolated in the north. After destroying these divisions, the communist seized Saigon which ended the war.The South Vietnamese suffered a catastrophic failure and lost the war because of their inability to learn, anticipate, and adapt. The South Vietnamese, failing to learn the basics of operational art, tried to defend the entire country through corps area defenses. Thus, they never defended in depth or concentrated combat power to defeat their adversary's main effort.

Appendix G:

Appendix H:

{1} Richard Nixon, No More Vietnams, (New York, 1985) p. 237.

{2} John Bowman, The Vietnam War an Almanac, (New York, 1985) p. 358.

{3} John Bowman, p. 358.

{4} John Pimlott, Vietnam The Decisive Battles, (New York, 1990) p. 19.

John Bowman, p. 358.

{5} John Bowman, p. 358.

{6} Richard Nixon, p. 166.

{7} Edward Doyle, The Aftermath, (Boston, MA., 1985) p. 16.

{8} Richard Nixon, p. 206.

{9} FM 100-5, (Draft, January, 1993), p. 6-3.

{10} William Le Gro, Vietnam from Cases-Fire to Capitulation, (Washington DC, 1985) p. 2.

{11} Michael Maclear, The Ten Thousand Day War, (New York, 1981) p. 315.

William Le Gro, p. 85.

{12} William Le Gro, p. 2.

{13} Clark Dougan, The Fall of the South, (Boston, MA., 1985) p. 17.

{14} Anthony James Joes, The war for South Vietnam, (New York, 1989) p. 125.

William Le Gro, p. 2.

{15} Anthony James Joes, p. 125.

{16} William Westmoreland, A Soldier Reports, (New York, 1976) p. 408.

{17} Richard Nixon, p. 185.

{18} Stuart Herrington, Peace with Honor? (Novato, CA., 1983) p. 43.

Richard Nixon, p. 185.

{19} William Le Gro, p. 86.

Richard Nixo...

Table of contents

• Title page
• TABLE OF CONTENTS
• ABSTRACT
• INTRODUCTION
• THE STRATEGIC SITUATION
• THE CAMPAIGNS
• CAMPAIGN ANALYSIS/TEACHING POINTS
• CONCLUSIONS
• BIBLIOGRAPHY:
• Appendix A:
• Appendix B:
• Appendix C:
• Appendix D:
• Appendix E:
• Appendix F:
• Appendix G: