From Teaching To Practice: General Walter Krueger And The Development Of Joint Operations, 1921-1945

Major George B. Eaton

• Publisher: Lucknow Books
• Year: 2015
• eBook ISBN: 9781786253545
• Topic: History
• Subtopic: European History
• Index: History

General Walter Krueger commanded the 6th Army in the Southwest Pacific Theater in World War II. As the Commander, 6th Army, he led the troops that liberated New Guinea and the Philippines and he was designated as the commander of the forces scheduled to invade Japan. Krueger's wartime accomplishments were simply a continuation of contributions made to the United States Army and Navy over a 47 year career. Yet, despite his achievements, after the war Krueger simply faded away. Krueger's lack of historical name recognition some 50 years after his greatest achievements deprives current officers and historians not only the knowledge of wartime exploits, but also of significant understanding of the development of joint operations doctrine in the years between World War I and World War II.The current consensus among historians is that the United States Marine Corps was responsible for the development of amphibious operations. While true at the tactical level, this paper demonstrates that the Army and Naval War Colleges and the Army and Navy General Staffs and War Plans Divisions were key players in the development of doctrine at the strategic and operational level. General Walter Krueger attended both war colleges, served on the faculty of both war colleges, and served two tours in the Army War Plans Division, including a two year stint as its Chief. He was on the Joint Board or the Joint Planning Committee for over six years. The intent of this paper is to show Krueger's personal influence in the development of joint doctrine.The paper considers Krueger's assignment history, the war plans he developed, his ideas on unity of command and the need for inter-service understanding, and his principles of war planning. It includes a case study of the Lingayen Gulf Landing in January 1945 to demonstrate the acceptance and rejection of his key ideas. The paper focuses on Army and Navy issues and considers air issues only tangentially.

CHAPTER I—INTRODUCTION

9 January, 1945. The Commander, 6th Army sat aboard the U.S.S. Wasatch in Lingayen Gulf and watched the first wave of soldiers from the United States Army’s 6th, 37th, 40th and 43rd Infantry Divisions storm ashore in Luzon. The campaign to liberate the main island of the Philippines, and Manila, had begun. However, before the first soldier waded ashore the Army and Navy had completed months of detailed planning, the remnants of the Japanese Navy had been driven off the convoy from Leyte, Lingayen Gulf had been swept for mines, naval gunfire had pounded the lowlands to the south and the hills to the east of the landing beaches, and the Japanese Air Force had been swept from the sky after losing at least 24 aircraft in kamikaze attacks alone. A joint effort had succeeded in preparing the battlefield for the Army soldiers, significantly increasing the chances of success. The first hours in establishing and holding a beachhead are critical and during the morning of 9 January 6th Army was hardly challenged. That evening the Japanese began to shell the beach with everything from 75mm howitzers to 12” naval guns, but by then it was too late.{1}

With the benefit of hindsight it is easy to conclude that the Lingayen Operation was one of those crowning moments; the culmination of a lifetime of work concurrent with the pinnacle of success. General Walter Krueger, just weeks shy of his 64th birthday, was commanding the largest amphibious operation of the Pacific War. Self-taught, he had risen from the rank of Private to full General. He had thought, studied, taught, developed, and trained for amphibious operations for over twenty years. The experiences of General Walter Krueger are a clear case of “from teaching to practice.”

Much of the historical literature relating to the development of joint operations focuses on the United States Marine Corps. Since shortly after World War II the Marines have received almost complete credit for amphibious doctrine. The general summation of the work on amphibious operations in the inter-war period is that the Marines had the idea all worked out before 1941 and then the Army adapted to the Marine plan. This argument can be seen in Allen Millet, Isley and Crowl, and others. Recently, however, this idea of Marine supremacy in the development of amphibious operations has been challenged by William Atwater and John Greenwood. Edward Miller in War Plan Orange has given the Army some credit for developing in the inter-war period some specific aspects of amphibious operations against Japan.{2} While attacking some of the basic premises of accepted Marine-crediting historiography, the above noted revisionists are lacking in the details of who was responsible on the Army side for developments in joint operations.

The contention of this paper is that, while the marines do hold the credit for thinking about the tactics of joint overseas operations, staff officers, students, and teachers in both the Army and Navy were key in developing the operational and strategic level considerations of joint operations. The process of developing joint doctrine happened concurrently at the Army War College, Navy War College, Army General Staff, and the Navy Staff. Once World War II started, much of the practical application and evolution of amphibious doctrine was in the hands of the commanders in the field. General Walter Krueger filled key positions in the schools, on the staff, and in command of a field army and was instrumental in the development and application of joint operations from 1921 to 1945 and beyond.

This paper will consider some primary elements in the development of joint operations. One of the most important issues was the development of doctrine. Doctrine was important in that it could provide the Army and Navy a common language. In the area of doctrine this paper will focus on the development of a system of command in joint operations. Second, officers had to be developed who were cognizant and conversant in the traditions, technical language, methods, strengths and limitations of the sister services in order to implement the doctrine and think sensibly about needed changes. This process could be accelerated by developing inter-service contacts. A third key issue was the development of joint war plans that were feasible and practical. Supporting the development of these war plans was a fourth issue of the development of joint war games and exercises to test key ideas. General Krueger was involved in all of these issues. His involvement will be considered both topically and chronologically. After a short biographical sketch, his background and experiences will be explored, in order to illustrate his development of inter-service contacts, his understanding of the Navy and his forays into doctrine, war games and war planning, by considering his duties in a succession of assignments after World War I. The paper will then in one chapter address the general area of joint doctrine and inter-service cooperation and understanding. In the subsequent chapter the issues of war plans and war games will be explored. The paper will conclude with a short case study of the Lingayen Gulf landing to illuminate the result of Krueger’s efforts in each of the issues noted above.

CHAPTER II—GAINING EXPERIENCE AND MAKING CONTACTS

Biography

Walter Krueger was born in Flatow, West Prussia on 26 January, 1881. His father died in 1884 and in 1889 Anna Hasse Krueger brought Walter and his two siblings to the United States. After remarrying, to Emil Carl Schmidt, the Krueger-Schmidt family settled in Madison, Indiana. Walter attended school there and was enrolled in the Cincinnati Technical Institute in 1898 when the Spanish-American War broke out. Walter enlisted in the 2d Volunteer Infantry and served in Cuba at Santiago and Holguin before being discharged. By now he was intrigued by army life and in June 1899 Krueger enlisted in the Regular Army. He was assigned to the 12th Infantry and posted to the Philippines. Krueger fought in several engagements during the Philippine Insurrection, including the campaign to reduce the rebels in the Central Plain north of Manila near Baguio and Tarlac. After rising to the rank of Sergeant, Krueger received a commission in 1901. He was assigned to the 30th Infantry and did not return to the United States until 1904. In the meantime, he gained a familiarity with the Philippines and had met both Lt. Douglas MacArthur and Lt. George Marshall. After a tour in the United States, which included teaching at the Infantry and Cavalry School, Krueger returned to the Philippines where he was in charge of a project to map Luzon. He himself worked in the areas to the north and east of Manila.

Krueger’s career soon settled into the slow grind of the old Army. After over 15 years of service and 13 years as a commissioned officer he was assigned as an evaluator-instructor to the Pennsylvania National Guard and worked directly with the 10th Pennsylvania Infantry. He was still with this unit when World War I broke out, although he had been promoted to Captain in 1916. After the United States entered World War I Krueger inspected and activated National Guard units in Pennsylvania and Washington, D.C. until he was sent to the 84th Division in August 1917.

After the war, which included two trips to France and service with the occupation troops in Germany, Krueger was assigned to the second Army War College class convened after the war. After graduation Krueger, although qualified by the College for either General Staff service or higher command, was retained as an instructor and was then attached to the Historical Division. He traveled to Berlin in early 1922 in order to study German strategy and was the first American allowed to use World War I documents in the German War Archives.

After returning to the United States Krueger began his first tour in the Army War Plans Division (AWPD) in April 1923. He remained in the Division until June 1925 when he was assigned to the Naval War College as a student in the senior class of 1926. In 1928, after washing out of Army Flight School at the age of 47, Krueger returned to the Naval War College as an instructor. Krueger was responsible for teaching German strategy in WWI, the Army command system, and joint operations. He left Newport in 1932.

After a two year stint in command of the 6th Infantry Krueger returned to the Army War Plans Division as the Executive Officer. During this period he again served on the Joint Planning Committee, as he had in 1923-25. This time he worked with the Army Chief of Staff, Douglas MacArthur. In June 1936 he was appointed as Chief, AWPD and served on the Joint Board. It was during this four-year tour that the manual Joint Action of the Army and Navy was revised and expanded, War Plan Orange was drastically revised, the defense of Oahu was upgraded, and the Rainbow plans were begun. George Marshall succeeded him when Krueger was assigned to command a brigade in June 1938. In 1939 he commanded the 2d Infantry Division, in 1940 the VIII Corps, and in 1941 3d Army. In February 1943 he was transferred to Australia and took command of 6th Army and began the long campaigns across New Guinea and New Britain, finally reaching the Philippines.

Experience and Contacts

In the remainder of this chapter Krueger’s tours at the Army War College, Navy War College, and AWPD will be detailed in order to illustrate the gaining of practical experience and the personal contacts he developed in the Army and the Navy.

The Army War College, June 1920-October 1922

The Army War College ceased operations during World War I and reconvened in 1919. Major Krueger attended the Class of 1921 while the College was still testing new material and the structure of the curriculum. The Class of 1921 was specially selected by the War Department in order to ensure success of the reconvened College.{3} In the Army Reorganization Bill of 4 June 1920 the War College was established as the highest school for Army officers. In addition, the Act required that “hereafter no officer of the General Staff Corps except the Chief of Staff shall be assigned as a member of the War Department General Staff” unless he had attended the course and his name was placed on the eligible list.{4} In the opening address to the students General Peyton C. March, Chief of Staff of the Army, noted:

“This legislation [Army Reorganization Act] insures that there will be added to the War Department General Staff each year...only officers of the highest training, and proved capacity for General Staff work. It also makes certain, that in future wars, the Department will have a selected list of officers fitted for the highest command and for General Staff duty. Each man in this class is a selected man. Your records were minutely scrutinized and no officer permitted to take the course who has not shown promise of being able to master it and on graduation have his named placed on the list of eligibles for future advancement and great responsibility.”{5}

Krueger had already developed a reputation for excellence in staff work.

Among the students with whom Krueger worked were Asa Singleton, S.E. Embick, Guy V. Henry, and Upton Birnie all of whom would later be colleagues on the AWPD staff. Birnie would become Commandant of the War College and Embick would become Chief, AWPD in 1935 and Assistant Chief of Staff of the Army. Among the staff and faculty were four officers who would be Chief, AWPD while Krueger was in that division.{6} The Class of 1921 became known as “The Class That Made the War College Famous.” Of the 87 members of the class 31 had made general officer by 1936.{7}

The course of instruction included lectures on Intelligence, Manpower, Economics, Politics, Operations, Training, and Strategy. The students spend two months on the subject of Command, including staff rides and preparation of historical studies.{8} The students participated in working out problems on Operations, Training, and Intelligence, usually in the Committee Method with group presentations. In the Operations block Krueger was a member of a committee on mobilization. In the Intelligence block Krueger was on a committee responsible for preparing a report on the military, economic, and political situation in Germany and another committee preparing a similar monograph on the United States.{9}

In a general orientation on the entire course Col. H. Smith, Assistant Commandant, noted that at the end of the course each officer would be recommended for “(a) Suitability for high command; (b) Suitability for War Department General Staff; (c) Special qualifications.” Most officers were recommended for duty in a specific section of the General Staff (G1, G2, G3, G4, or WPD). Krueger was one of only a handful recommended for both duty in any staff section and higher command, and he was deemed sharp enough to be detailed to the General Staff College faculty for the 1921-22 school year along with Embick and Birnie.{10} In summary, Krueger studied elements of staff work, military history, operations, war planning, strategy, and command, with special work on mobilization. There was only one naval officer in his class, Capt. Althouse, and two Marines, neither of whom were on any of his committees. The class did not study joint operations.

For the second year of his association with the Army War College Krueger, now a Lieutenant Colonel, focused on Operations, War Planning, and lecturing on Strategy of the World War. Other than lectures on “The Basic War Plan,” Germany, and Hannibal, his activities of that period, until April 1923, are vague. A lecture schedule for the 1921-22 school year does not exist and the only lectures kept by Krueger in his own files are from January, September, and October 1922 and January and March 1923, the latter two from after he reported to AWPD. Suffice it to say that Krueger, qualified to work in any General Staff section, probably was part of the section responsible for Operations, Strategy, and Command.{11} In addition, Krueger, after being assig...

Table of contents

• Title page
• TABLE OF CONTENTS
• EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
• PREFACE
• CHAPTER I-INTRODUCTION
• CHAPTER II-GAINING EXPERIENCE AND MAKING CONTACTS
• CHAPTER III-JOINT DOCTRINE, 1921-1938
• CHAPTER IV-WAR PLANS, GAMES, AND EXERCISES, 1922-1938
• CHAPTER V-LUZON, 1945
• CHAPTER VI-CONCLUSIONS
• BIBLIOGRAPHY