From Siege to Surgical:

The Evolution of Urban Combat from World War II to the Present and Its Effect on Current Doctrine

Major William T. James Jr.

• Publisher: Lucknow Books
• Year: 2015
• eBook ISBN: 9781786253583
• Topic: History
• Subtopic: European History
• Index: History

This study investigates what effect the evolution of urban combat from World War II to the present has had on current urban combat doctrine. Urban combat operations have played a pivotal role in the conflicts of the twentieth century, and will continue to be a crucial part of future U.S. power projection operations. It is imperative that lessons learned from previous urban combat operations be studied for applicability to current urban combat doctrine.
The study analyzes the urban battles of Aachen, Manila, Seoul, Hue, JUST CAUSE, and Mogadishu to identify salient lessons for conducting successful offensive urban combat operations; then reviews current U.S. Army urban combat doctrine. The study then evaluates current doctrine using identified salient lessons to determine their effect. The study finds that the primary impacts of previous urban combat operations on current doctrine are that doctrine now embraces the idea of varied conditions for urban combat and validates the concept of fighting as a combined arms team in a built-up area. The study further finds that FM 90-10, Military Operations on Urban Terrain is obsolete, and that key procurement decisions have left U.S. forces without critical weapons that have proven decisive in urban combat.

CHAPTER 1—INTRODUCTION

Background

Projections are that the world’s population will reach 8.34 billion people in 2025.{1} Worldwide, the number of urban citizens has increased from 737 million in 1950 to 2.5 billion in 1993.{2} Additionally, there appears to be a significant population migration both outward from established city cores and inward from rural areas to suburban areas between the two. Simply stated, tremendous population growth and migration to suburban areas equal more urban terrain.

Problem Statement

Current United States (U.S.) Army doctrine is based on the operational concept of force projection. Units based in the continental United States (CONUS) deploy in response to a crisis or augment forward-deployed forces that are already engaged. Future power projection operations conducted by the armed forces of the U.S. will include unavoidable urban combat.

Crucial to the success of this doctrine is the ability to execute entry operations and rapidly introduce force into a lodgment. The ideal lodgment is an airfield or seaport. The problem is that the most likely scenario requires a forced entry operation, and the majority of the world’s air and seaports capable of accepting all U.S. strategic aircraft and sea lift vessels are part of complex urban terrain. Therefore, to gain the lodgment required to execute force projection operations, U.S. forces will have to fight in the urban terrain of the airport or seaport and then fight in or through the city containing the airport or seaport.

Research Questions

The primary question to be answered is simple. How has the evolution of urban combat since World War II influenced the current doctrine of the U.S. Army?

Several secondary questions also exist that must be answered prior to answering the primary question. Are there any useful examples of urban combat that were not combined arms operations? Are there any examples of weapons systems that were essential in urban combat? Are there any particular forms of maneuver or tactics that proved decisive in urban combat? Has current doctrine incorporated historical lessons for the urban fight? What role do special operations forces (SOF) play in urban combat?

Significance

Urban combat has played a huge part in combat operations in the twentieth century. Now due to the explosive urban population growth and resulting urbanization of developing countries,{3} it will play an even bigger role. Urban combat is the most likely condition in which U.S. forces will operate in the future. Tremendous resources and lives have been consumed in the urban fighting of the twentieth century. As a result, countless lessons have been learned on how to fight and win the urban battle. This study is intended to achieve two goals. One is to determine how the lessons learned during the evolution of urban combat have shaped the Army’s current doctrine. The second is to evaluate its current doctrine based on these lessons learned to determine if it is relevant.

Underlying Assumptions

I have made two underlying assumptions. The first assumption is that rules of engagement for urban combat will continue to require commanders to take all possible steps to prevent collateral damage and to use minimum force to accomplish assigned missions. This will severely limit the options available for dealing with a well-fortified, determined enemy in urban terrain. The second assumption is that the U.S. will continue to provide some or all of the post-conflict resources to rebuild infrastructure that is damaged or destroyed during urban combat operations

Terminology

Advanced MOUT Techniques (AMT) are defined as “the tactics, techniques, and procedures employed by Rangers to execute METL tasks in urban terrain across the spectrum of conflict from high intensity MOUT to more restrictive conditions requiring precision MOUT applications. The individual and collective skills include marksmanship, breaching, selected target engagement, and dynamic assault techniques in addition to more conventional tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) emphasizing firepower. It consists of a combination of standard Army TTP and equipment and special TTP and equipment peculiar to [special operations forces] SOF.”{4}

A built-up area is defined as “a concentration of structures, facilities, and people that forms the economic and cultural focus for the surrounding area.”{5}

Combat Power is defined as “the total means of destructive and/or disruptive force which a military unit/formation can apply against the opponent at a given time. A combination of the effects of maneuver, firepower, protection, and leadership.”{6}

Close Quarters Combat (COC) is defined as “special techniques for clearing rooms and buildings during more politically sensitive operations when restrictive rules of engagement are in place to limit collateral damage and casualties to non-combatants. These techniques cause increased risk to the assault force to clear buildings methodically, rather than using overwhelming firepower to neutralize the inhabitants.”{7}

Combined arms is defined as” the synchronized or simultaneous application of several arms such as infantry, armor, artillery, engineers, air defense, and aviation to achieve an effect on the enemy that is greater than if each arm was used against the enemy in sequence.”{8}

Doctrine is “the statement of how America’s Army, as part of a joint team, intends to conduct war and operations other than war.”{9}

A lodgment is defined as “a designated area or hostile or potentially hostile territory that, when seized and held, ensures the continuous landing (build-up) of troops and material and provides sufficient maneuver space for build-up of combat power to resolve the crisis rapidly and decisively.”{10}

Military Operations on Urban Terrain (MOUT) are defined as “military actions planned and conducted on a terrain complex where manmade construction impacts on the tactical options available to commanders.”{11} The term’s “urban combat” and MOUT are synonymous.

Special Operations Forces (SOF) are defined as “those active and reserve component forces of the Military Services designated by the Secretary of Defense and specifically organized, trained, and equipped to conduct and support special operations.”{12}

Limitations

The thesis is limited to the study of U.S. forces in offensive urban combat operations from World War II through the present. Also, research is limited to unclassified units, sources of information, tactics, techniques, and procedures.

Methodology

The thesis uses a historical analysis method. Current doctrine is evaluated to determine if the lessons learned from past urban combat operations have been incorporated, discounted, or rejected. An analysis is then made on whether or not current doctrine is viable for conducting urban combat operations.

Thesis Outline

Chapter 1 is an introduction that provides a proposed scenario for future urban combat, the thesis topic, key definitions, underlying assumptions, the primary question to be answered, secondary questions to be answered in support of the primary question, and the methodology to be used in answering the questions.

Chapters 2, 3, and 4 contain separate analysis’ of the following urban battles: The Battle of Aachen (World War II, October 1944), The Battle of Manila (World War II, February 1945), The Battle of Seoul (Korean War, September 1950), and The Battle of Hue (Vietnam War, Tet 1968). I will use the secondary questions stated above to evaluate these battles for factors and lessons that supported successful urban combat operations.

Chapter 5 will analyze urban combat during contingency operations. Actions studied include The Battle for La Comandancia (19-20 December 1989) and the seizure of the Colon DENI Station (23-24 December 1989) during Operation JUST CAUSE. In addition, a detailed analysis of the Battle of Mogadishu (3-4 October 1993) during Operation UNOSOMII is included. Again, I will use the secondary questions stated above to evaluate these battles for factors and lessons that supported successful urban combat operations.

Chapter 6 will be a literature review of what is considered to be the state of the art in urban combat doctrine. This review is limited to field manuals from the 5 (engineer), 6 (field artillery), 7 (infantry), 17 (armor), 71 (combined arms), 90 (how to fight), and 100 (operational) series. The review also includes special operations forces training circulars specific to the 75th Ranger Regiment and Special Forces Operational Detachment-A Teams.

In Chapter 7, I will identify and then use the factors and lessons from the past that supported successful urban combat operations to analyze the doctrinal state of the art. This will then allow me to answer my proposed research question: “How has the evolution of urban combat since World War II influenced the current doctrine of the U.S. Army?”

Chapter 8 will conclude the thesis and provide recommendations on how to correct any shortcomings discovered.

CHAPTER 2—URBAN COMBAT IN WORLD WAR II

The Battle of Aachen, European Theater, October 1944

There are two factors that proved decisive in the Battle of Aachen. First was the unconstrained use of supporting fires to isolate strong...

Table of contents

• Title page
• TABLE OF CONTENTS
• ABSTRACT
• ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
• ILLUSTRATIONS
• CHAPTER 1-INTRODUCTION
• CHAPTER 2-URBAN COMBAT IN WORLD WAR II
• CHAPTER 3-URBAN COMBAT IN THE KOREAN WAR
• CHAPTER 4-URBAN COMBAT IN THE VIETNAM WAR
• CHAPTER 5-URBAN COMBAT IN CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS
• CHAPTER 6-STATE OF THE ART IN URBAN COMBAT DOCTRINE, TACTICS, TECHNIQUES, AND PROCEDURES
• CHAPTER 7-ANALYSIS
• CHAPTER 8-CONCLUSION
• BIBLIOGRAPHY