Fallen Eagles: The Italian 10th Army In The Opening Campaign In The Western Desert, June 1940

Major Howard R. Christie

• Publisher: Lucknow Books
• Year: 2015
• eBook ISBN: 9781786250346
• Topic: History
• Subtopic: European History
• Index: History

The Italian Army developed a sound and unique combined arms doctrine for mechanized warfare in 1938. This new doctrine was called the "War of Rapid Decision." It involved the use of mechanized warfare in the Italian version of the blitzkrieg. This doctrine evolved from the lessons learned in the Italian-Ethiopian War of 1935 to 1936 and the Spanish Civil War of 1936-1939. With Italy's entry into World War II, military operations ensued along the Libyan-Egyptian border between the Italian 10th Army and a much smaller British Western Desert Force. The Italian Army in Libya outnumbered the British Army in Egypt by a ratio of four to one. The setting seemed to be ideal for the employment of the War of Rapid Decisions. Moreover, Marshal Rodolfo Graziani, who was the commander of the Italian 10th Army in North Africa during its first campaign in the western desert, had pioneered this new form of mechanized warfare during the Ethiopian War. Surprisingly, the Italian forces in Libya did not employ their new doctrine, reverting instead to more conventional techniques of "mass." It was Graziani's failure to utilize the doctrine which he had helped to develop that led to Italy's embarrassing defeat in 1941.

CHAPTER 1 — INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND, 1911-1939

This is a study of the Italian Army’s opening campaign and subsequent defeat by the British Commonwealth in the opening stages of the North African Campaign. It will look at the fundamental reasons for the failure of the Italian Army in North Africa to use the doctrine established in 1938. The chief strategic importance of Egypt and of this campaign lies in the command of the Suez Canal, which connects the Red Sea and the Mediterranean Ocean. The Italian 10th Army and its commander Marshal Graziani were defeated during the first campaign in the western desert, June 1940 to December 1940, by the British Commonwealth in North Africa. Marshal Graziani failed to use appropriate Italian military doctrine in the initial Italian campaign in the invasion of Egypt. This thesis will develop this theory by examining Italian doctrine, leadership, the Army’s organization, and equipment in North Africa during the opening stages of the war in the desert and the Italian invasion of Egypt.

The Italian Army’s military record of coalition warfare with the Axis forces in World War II is not well known or understood. This is due to Allied propaganda and the initial defeats suffered by Italian forces. The Italian Army in 1938 adopted a new doctrine of mobile and combined arms warfare. With this new doctrine Italy hoped to defeat her enemies and expand her empire. Marshal Graziani, a veteran of World War I and Italy’s colonial campaigns, developed a new motorized doctrine during the Italo-Ethiopian War, which was expanded in the Spanish Civil War and ultimately adopted as doctrine in 1938. Ironically, when Graziani led the 10th Army to war in 1940, he failed to utilize the theory that he himself had been instrumental in developing. His force was severely defeated by a smaller British Commonwealth Army of only 35,000 soldiers. This defeat caused the German military to intervene in North Africa, and showed the failure of the Italian combined arms.

The defeat of the Italian 10th Army during the opening stages of the North African campaign, June 1940-December 1940, was a severe blow to Fascist Italy and the Italian Empire. This defeat allowed the British Empire to achieve one of her greatest victories on land, capturing 130,000 Italian soldiers, 845 guns, and 380 armored vehicles (Macksey 1971, 151). This defeat failed to meet the strategic military goals and national political objectives of the Italian government in World War II. Italian arms failed to produce the desired results ensuring military reliance on Germany to continue the Axis war effort in North Africa. Italy no longer played the dominant role in her African colony, Libya, which she governed from 1912 to 1943, or the Mediterranean Basin, which she sought to control. Successful application of Italian doctrine may have reversed the ultimate outcome of Fascist Italy in World War II during the initial campaign in North Africa.

With the Italian unification in 1860-1870, Italy was set on the world stage to become a great power. Italy was one of the last European nations to become unified. Only Germany would be behind her 1870. The measure of great powers at the time was the number of colonies that one possessed around the world. Italy becoming unified late in her history was in a poor position to increase her status and standing in the race for colonies. This did not deter Italy and she was drawn into the race to become a great power. Italy had to confine her expansion due to the late unification of her country. Italy sought to restore her lost imperial provinces and recreate the four shores of the ancient Roman Empire to build her colonial empire. These four shores of Italy were the Adriatic, Tyrrhenian, Sicilian, and North African coast. A natural expansion would lead her to the shores of Libya (Trye 1998).

In September 1911 Italy finally found her chance for the expansion she desired to the fourth shore, which was North Africa. With limited areas to expand she would have to choose her enemies and expansion carefully. Italy declared war against the Ottoman Empire and used this war for expansion into Libya and the Dodecanese Islands in the eastern Mediterranean. Seeing that the Ottoman Empire was weak, due to the Balkan Wars, she struck out against them. The Italian military quickly captured all the major port cities in Libya and the Dodecanese Islands. Italy was successful in her initial war aims in the summer of 1912. Because of this, the Ottoman Empire signed the peace treaty of Lausanne on the 18 October 1912. With the successful conclusion to the war Italy had firmly established herself in coastal Libya. The interior and Senussi Tribes were yet to be conquered.

The threat to Italian aims in its new colony of Libya came from the Senussi tribes. The Senussi tribes were the native people of the desert areas of Libya. Most of the manpower of the Ottoman Army in Libya came from these tribesmen. They viewed the peace treaty as a document which did not apply to them and felt that Libya should be their own independent country. Instead of surrendering or peacefully joining the new Italian administration after the Ottoman Empire’s defeat, they continued the war against Italy. They viewed the Italians in the same manner as the Ottoman Turks, just another occupying power to their homeland. They controlled the interior of the province of Cyrenaica in Libya. This war lasted from 1912 to 1917 and was a hard-fought campaign for the Italians. This war lasted until 1917 when the Senussi tribes were gripped by famine and when one of the major leaders defected to the Italian cause. This defection caused the Senussi tribes to lose power and ground against the Italian army. The Italian army was then able to occupy and expand their holdings and the rebellion ended across all of Libya.

This temporary peace did not last long for the Italians in Libya. In 1921 a new governor was appointed who used harsh and strict methods for governing Libya. These methods of Italian rule did not placate the native desert tribes of Libya. Instead it fostered negative feelings and fueled the fires of revolt. In late 1921 the Senussi tribes rose in revolt against the Italians. The Senussi attacked the coastal cities, where they were driven off and defeated. They would then retire to their desert homelands and continue a guerrilla war against the Italian Occupiers. Colonel Rodolfo Graziani, one of the youngest colonels in the Italian Army, participated in this fighting and was decorated for his actions. In 1923 Colonel Graziani led a campaign against the Senussi tribes of the interior. This action was the beginning of the Second Senussi war, which lasted from 1923-1932. He was a prominent figure over the course of the entire war.

This Second Senussi War lasted for ten years and was long and bloody for both sides. This protracted struggle drew valuable resources and material from the Italian military. It ended with a campaign by General Graziani who attacked the last Senussi stronghold in Libya, Cuff oasis, which was deep in the Sahara desert. He attacked this stronghold with an overwhelming force of tanks, artillery, infantry, and airplanes, supported by 3,500 camels. This victory would add additional fame to General Graziani’s reputation as a great leader. With the surrender of the last Senussi stronghold the war was over, and no organized resistance was left to the Italian administration in Libya. Marshall Pietro Badoglio, the governor general of Libya, declared Libya and Cyrenaica pacified. With Libya pacified Italy could continue with building her colony and she had an important, almost dominate military position on the North African shore. With the colony secure it was open to further military, industrial, and colonial development. Air Marshal and Governor Italo Balbo became governor of Libya in 1934. He was given the mission to transform a barren, backward colonial territory into an extension of Italy—”a fourth shore”—to add to Italy’s Tyrrhenian, Adriatic, and Sicilian shores (Taylor 1996, 73).

Libya was to become an extension of Italy and a showplace of Fascism. On 9 January 1939, the colony of Libya was made part of the Italian Empire. Balbo could now take credit for having created the forth shore (Taylor 1996, 80). The Italians started numerous and diverse businesses in Tripolitania and Cyrenaica. These included an explosives factory, railway workshops, Fiat Motor works, various food processing plants, electrical engineering workshops, ironworks, water plants, agricultural machinery factories, breweries, distilleries, biscuit factories, a tobacco factory, tanneries, bakeries, lime, brick and cement works, Esparto grass industry, mechanical saw mills, and the Petrolibya Society (Trye 1998). Italian investment in her colony was to take advantage of new colonists and to make it more self-sufficient. Total native Italian population for Libya was 110,575 out of a total population of 1915, 915,440 in 1940 (General Staff War Office 1939, 165/b). The goal was to have a self-sufficient colony not dependent on the motherland for survival. “They must have grown a lot of grapes, as there was a big winery in Tripolitania. I have vivid memories of arriving there and seeing a huge paddock of garden peas. After many weeks of bully beef and army biscuits you can imagine we scavengers going through the pea paddock until there wasn’t a pod left” (Trye 1998).

The governmental seat and military headquarters for Libya was located at Tripoli. The colony was governed by a governor who was also commander of the ground, land, and sea forces of the colony. He was nominated by royal decree on the proposal of the Minster for Italian Africa and confirmed by the councils of ministers (General Staff War Office 1939, 81b). A vice-Governor was located in Benghazi. The system of government was based on the ancient Roman system of perfects for each province in the colony.

The Italian government invested heavily in her colony during the interwar period. Large immigration of Italian civilians, and an investment in Italian Army forces, naval bases, and airfields provided the Italian army and government with an ideal and enviable position. From this strong military base the Italian government had a strategic position which could threaten both French North Africa and British-controlled Egypt. Not only could this colony be used for economic reasons but as a stepping stone for further Italian expansion in the Mediterranean Basin.

Libya was situated between French North Africa to the west and British-controlled Egypt to her east. From Libya an Italian Army could invade Egypt and secure the Suez Canal. The Suez Canal was the strategic objective of the Italian military. This could have threatened the British position in the Middle East, Sudan, the eastern Mediterranean and a pathway to India. Italian arms could have then proceeded to dominate the Red Sea, secure her lines of communication with Italian East Africa, and force the British Navy to abandon the Eastern Mediterranean. This would be the ultimate strategic goal of Fascist Italy, the strategic theater commander Marshal Graziani, and later, after the initial Italian defeat, General Erwin Rommel, commander of Panzer Army Africa.

The area of Libya was 1,774,00 square kilometers—5.5 times the area of Italy (Trye 1998). Of this area the vast Sahara plateau covers approximately 90 percent making it a land of desert. The Libyan Desert can be divided into two zones, the inner and outer zone. The outer desert consists of an inverted “L” of land, which stretches southward up the West Bank of the Nile River and westward along the Mediterranean coast. Across the northern portion of this “L” is the inner desert which is the coastal portion of Libya. This northern zone of the desert is where most of the fighting would take placing from 1940-1943. The most significant feature of this battlefield was that troops, equipment, supplies, and water had to be brought vast distances to where they were to be employed. Libya consisted of two provinces during the Italian occupation. The western province was Tripolitania and the eastern province was Cyrenaica. The population of Libya was almost 800,000 native people and 110,000 Italians in 1940 (Greene and Massignani 1994, 16). There were a number of important cities, ports, and military installations within the Italian colony of Libya.

The western province of Libya, Tripolitania, is bounded on the west by Tunisia and southern Algeria and extends south to the 29th parallel. It is bounded on the east by Sirte. The most important towns along the coast of this province were from east to west: Misurata, Zilten, Horns, Tagiura, Tripoli, and Zuara. Tripoli was the principal city and port of Libya with a population of 110,292 in 1939 (Tyre 1998). It was the seat of the Italian Governor General. The main economic and industrial development of the colony was found in this province. It was a brand-new Italian colonial capital and cathedral city, laid out on modern lines and quite distinct from the old Arab town. It was the showpiece of Fascism and the Italian Empire

Tripoli was the major military base for the Army. There were a number of military barracks located in and around Tripoli. These military bases consisted of the imperial barracks, Balli (youth) barracks, which had a motor pool and facilities for 500 vehicles adjacent to it, the tank barracks at Porto Benito, and the P. Veri barracks, which had an adjacent rifle range (Trye 1998). There was a training ground on the plain of Belaschar between Mellaha and Tagiurain on which training exercises, parades, and reviews were held. This area was a good place to practice combined arms warfare and normal military exercises. Tripoli was also the major port and base for the entire colony of Libya. This port alone could handle 45,000 tons of supplies per month (van Creveld. 1977, 184). Tripoli would be the main port for the sea lines of communication between Italian North Africa and Italy. It was a vital link to sustain the forces of the empire.

The area between Tripolitania and Cyrenaica was known as Sirte. It was located to the east of the town of Misurata in Tripolitania. The Sirte is a vast desert region, which separated the two Italian colonies from each other. This area formed a natural obstacle between the two provinces in Libya. Here is where the border of Tripolitania and Cyrenaica officially met. Benito Mussolini had a large ceremonial arch erected here to mark the official border between the two provinces and the completion of the Litoranea Libica, a hard surface road. Throughout the course of the campaigns in the desert, Sirte would be a natural obstacle and a location for the Axis forces to regroup and reconsolidate.

The eastern province of Libya, Cyrenaica, was bordered in the east by Egypt and in the west by Tripolitania. The most important towns were, from west to east, Ghemines, Soluch, Benghazi, Tocra, Brace, Tolmeta, Cirene, Appollonia, Derna, Tobruk, and Bardia. The main town and port was Benghazi with a population of 65,704 in 1939 (Trye 1998). It was a mixture of modern Italian buildings and Arab architecture. It contained the headquarters of the naval, army, and air force units stationed in Cyrenaica, as well as the local Fascist and government organizations. It contained a number of military barracks. These barracks were the Torelli, with housing for 1,000 troops, and stabling for 100 horses, the Moccagatta, the Royal frontier guards, Campo Erteria (native barracks), and the Tennte Hetzel. This port could handle 45,000 tons of supplies per month (van Creveld 1977, 187), making it the second most important port in the Italian colony of Libya.

The second largest town of Cyrenaica was Derna. It was considered to be the most modern and comfortable of the region. It had a civilian population of 12,000 people in 1939 (Tyre 1998). It had a military airport, a naval wireless station, as well as, Sabatina barracks, infantry barracks, and an artillery barracks.

The area of Cyrenaica from the Gulf of Bomba east to the Egyptian border was called Marmaricia. This area was extremely poor and devoid of water and trees. The most important center was the harbor town of and naval base of Tobruk. It had a civilian population of 5,032 in 1939 (Trye 1998). The harbor gave excellent protection and was suitable for cruisers, light naval forces, submarines, merchant ships, and light craft. This port could handle 35,000 tons of supplies per month (van Creveld 1977, 187). There was a seaplane anchorage operational from this port. Tobruk was a fortified city with extensive fortifications constructed to protect it from a seaward or land attack. It contained an army and naval barracks, native Libyan barracks, and the Carabinieri (Para Military Police) barracks. Tobruk would play a dominant role as a military center in the campaigns in the western desert. It was an ideal strategic location for supplying and supporting an army in the desert.

The easternmost settlement of Cyrenaica was the harbor town of Bardia. It was the most eastern settlement in Libya and closest to Egypt. The harbor permitted anchorage of ships up to 4,060 tons (Trye 1998). Disembarkation was by lighter craft, which severely decreased its ability to become a major supply base. On the low ground near the harbor, there were military and harbor offices and garages, plus a number of military barracks for the garrison. Like Tobruk, it had permanent fixed fortifications constructed against sea or land attack. Bardia had extensive water pipelines, which supplied water to the entire forward Italian garrison on the Libyan-Egyptian border. Bardia would be the forward logistical and command control center for the Italian Army during the invasion of Egypt in September 1940.

To the south of Bardia, a number of oases stretched into the Sahara desert along the Egyptian border. These oases were Gialo, Garabub, and Cufra. They all had military garrisons and forts constructed to protect these important sites in the otherwise waterless Sahara desert. The oasis at Giarabub was positioned on the extreme western edge of the Egyptian border. The Italians established a meteorological post here in addition to the military garrison. These oases were important links in the ability to travel across the Saharan desert in Libya and Egypt. These garrison posts helped protect the long border between Egypt and Libya and could assist in any defensive or offensive operations.

The “frontier wire” was established in the Second Senussi War. It was designed to stop the traffic of supplies and tribesman between Libya and Egypt. The Senussi Tribes received aid in material and supplies from the British government in Egypt. The fence, itself, consisted of iron pickets ten centimeters in diameter set on concrete bases of 30 centimeters square. Its height above the ground was 1.7 meters with 30 centimeters buried. It was a huge obstacle, which only limited motor transport and personal (General Staff War Office 1939). It stretched from the wells of El Ramleh in the Gulf of Sollum across the high plateau and the barren steppe of the Marmarica beyond the oases of Giarabub for a distance of 271 kilometers. It was designed to restrict and slow down movement, not to stop penetration of the border areas. Italian outposts and mobile patrols performed surveillance on the wire and then reacted to any attempted penetrations.

Three main forts and six smaller forts guarded the length of the wire. The three large forts were located at Amseat, Scegga, and Giarabub. The six smaller forts were located at Ramleh, Sidi Omar, Sceferzen, Vescechet, Garn ul Grein, and El Aamara. They were “Beau Jeste” type forts, armed with modem weapons. These forts were positioned up and down the length of the wire, placed in strategic locations, so that patrols could cover the distances that separated them.

The military and civilian administration of Libya needed an adequate transportation network to defend and utilize the Italian colony of Libya. It would be critical to have modem infrastructure established to support the goals of the Fascist administration. These goals were to economically develop the colony and have it prepared to support itself in wartime. In 1939 there were 11,064 kilometers of road within the colony. There were 3,398 kilometers of these asphalt hard-surfaced roads. There was a total of 444 kilometers of small gauge rail lines in Libya. There were 271 kilometers in Tripolitania and 173 kilometers existed in Cyrenaica (Tyre 1998). These improved transportation networks would prove vital in the rapid movement of mechanized armies and in the logistical requirements to supply these armies.

The coastal road was known as the Litoranea Libicia. It was bu...

Table of contents

• Title page
• TABLE OF CONTENTS
• ABSTRACT
• CHAPTER 1 - INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND, 1911-1939
• CHAPTER 2 - ITALIAN MECHANIZED DOCTRINE AND ITS DEVELOPMENT
• CHAPTER 3 - SETTING THE STAGE
• CHAPTER 4 - THE CAMPAIGN
• CHAPTER 5 - CONCLUSION
• APPENDIX A - ITALIAN ARMY ORDER OF BATTLE, LIBYA 10 JUNE 1940
• APPENDIX B - ITALIAN 10TH ARMY ORDER OF BATTLE, LIBYA, 13 SEPTEMBER 1940
• APPENDIX C - ITALIAN ARMY ORDER OF BATTLE FOR THE 10TH ARMY, LIBYAN-EGYPT, 9 DECEMBER 1940
• APPENDIX D - ITALIAN AIR FORCE ORDER OF BATTLE, LIBYA 10 JUNE 1940
• APPENDIX E - ITALIAN ARTILLERY SITUATION, LIBYA 10 JUNE 1940
• APPENDIX F - ITALIAN NAVAL FORCES, LIBYA, 10 JUNE 1940
• APPENDIX G - BRITISH ARMY ORDER OF BATTLE, EGYPT 10 JUNE 1940
• APPENDIX H - BRITISH ARMY ORDER OF BATTLE, ITALIAN INVASION, 13 SEPTEMBER 1940
• APPENDIX I - BRITISH ARMY ORDER OF BATTLE, OPERATION COMPASS, 9 DECEMBER 1940
• APPENDIX J - ITALIAN ORDER OF BATTLE FOR THE D’AVANZO RAGGRUPPAMENTO FORMED ON 16 JUNE 40.
• APPENDIX K - ITALIAN ORDER OF BATTLE FOR MALETTI’S RAGGRUPPAMENTO AS TASK ORGANIZED ON 8 JULY 1940
• APPENDIX L - ITALIAN ORDER OF BATTLE FOR MALETTI’S RAGGRUPPAMENTO AS TASK ORGANIZED IN DECEMBER 1940
• APPENDIX M - ITALIAN ORDER OF BATTLE FOR THE COMANDO CARRI ARMATI DELLA LIBIA FORMED ON 29 AUGUST ‘40.
• APPENDIX N - ITALIAN ORDER OF BATTLE FOR THE BRIGATA CORZZATTA SPECIALE (BABINI ARMORED BRIGADE) FORMED ON 18 NOVEMBER 40. COMMANDER GENERAL VALENTINO BABINI
• APPENDIX O - TABLE OF ORGANIZATION FORA LIGHT ITALIAN TANK BATTALION, 1940
• APPENDIX P - TABLE OF ORGANIZATION FORA MEDIUM ITALIAN TANK BATTALION, 1940
• APPENDIX Q - THE ITALIAN FIAT ANSALDO CARRO VELOCE L.3 TANK
• APPENDIX R - THE ITALIAN FIAT ANSALDO CARRO ARMATO M.11 TANK
• APPENDIX S - THE ITALIAN FIAT ANSALDO CARRO ARMATO M.13 TANK
• APPENDIX T - THE 1ST LIBYAN ARMORED DIVISION
• APPENDIX U - ITALIAN GARRISON FORMATIONS ALONG THE WIRE, JUNE 1940
• APPENDIX V - COMPARISON BETWEEN THE ITALIAN L.3 AND 1924 PATTERN ROLLS ROYCE ARMORED CAR.
• REFERENCE LIST