Army Special Forces Training For The Global War On Terror

Major Daniel C. Moll

• Publisher: Tannenberg Publishing
• Year: 2014
• eBook ISBN: 9781782894339
• Topic: History
• Subtopic: Military & Maritime History
• Index: History

With USSOCOM assuming the role as supported command in the Global War on Terror, Army Special Forces will no doubt to play a primary role in that effort. The unspoken assumption seems to be that America's new, unconventional foe will best be combated with America's own unconventional warriors. It is unclear, however, if a force raised to conduct behind-the-lines operations against a large conventional enemy will remain the force of choice against al-Qaida and similar threats. This thesis' central research question is: Is US Army Special Forces adequately prepared, and trained to fight the Global War on Terror? This thesis examines the contemporary operating environment, the threat represented by al-Qaida, and whether it represents a traditional terrorist threat or a new, transnational insurgency. A review of both types of organization over the last century indicates that al-Qaida is, at this stage, merely a terrorist organization, and not an insurgency. However, al-Qaida sprang from a region that is ripe for insurgency should the terrorists choose to become more than what they currently are. Combating the threat posed by al-Qaida, then, seems to require both an aggressive counter-terrorist campaign and a simultaneous pre-emptive counter-insurgency. A review of current training indicates that Special Forces appears well prepared for both efforts with one glaring deficiency: foreign language proficiency.

CHAPTER I — INTRODUCTION

Whether we bring our enemies to justice, or bring justice to our enemies, justice will be done. — President George W. Bush, Address to Congress and the Nation

President George Bush spoke these words following the attacks of 11 September 2001 on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon (Bush 2001, 1). One month after the attacks, the United States opened its campaign to remove the Taliban government that had harbored the planners and perpetrators. While the Afghan government crumbled far sooner than generally predicted, the operation failed to obliterate the al-Qaida terrorist organization behind these and other attacks. Realizing the United States would have to pursue terrorist enemies beyond Afghanistan, President Bush declared a War on Terror, vowing to fight it wherever necessary (Bush 2001, 1). To most observers, he seemed to mean al-Qaida especially, and any other terror groups operating with global reach.

Owing perhaps to the United States Special Operations Command’s (USSOCOM’s) major contributions in rapidly bringing down the Taliban, as well as the perception that US unconventional warriors may be best suited for the job, USSOCOM will soon become the supported combatant command in this effort. This evolving emphasis will put special operations forces (SOF) in general, and Army Special Forces (SF) in particular—organizations established during the Cold War to deal primarily with Cold War targets—in the forefront of the fight against terrorism. While US Special Operations Forces are arguably the best suited to deal with this threat, the new emphasis does not mean that these forces are as well prepared as they might be. SOF, especially Army SF, possess many attributes that make them better suited to fight this war than their conventional military counterparts. However, the assumption has been that these forces are now fully prepared to wage the War on Terror, and little attention has been devoted to additional and unique training they may require to ensure full preparation.

Background

Today’s Army Special Forces grew out of the World War II Office of Strategic Services (OSS) (Bohrer 2002, 73). Established early in the war to fill a void in the US military machine that mere military intelligence could not fill, the OSS employed a variety of intelligence and special operations operatives to collect sensitive information and harass the enemy behind his lines. Shut down at war’s end, the OSS’s missions were gradually transferred to two other postwar organizations: the Central Intelligence Agency and US Army Special Forces. Established in 1952 (Bohrer 2002, 74), Army Special Forces were originally to have operated in a Soviet-occupied Europe much as the OSS had operated in Axis-occupied areas during World War II. Organized in small, multi-functional, 12-man teams, the Operational Detachment—Alpha, or ODA was the building block of SF units. It was designed to provide all the skills required to equip, train, advise, and, if necessary, lead up to battalion-sized foreign resistance elements operating behind enemy lines, at great distance from US support. Seen by some as an ideal counter-guerrilla force, Army Special Forces went to Vietnam soon after their creation to help South Vietnam counter its Communist insurgency. This organizational and operational mold persisted for the rest of the Cold War. Special Forces’ primary orientation was to assist friendly governments in defeating Communist supported insurgencies and, in the event of general war with the Soviet Union, to support movements resisting Soviet occupation. As the only standing special operations force for many years, Army Special Forces were expected to conduct direct action, or commando raids, and to engage in extremely long range, special reconnaissance. With the emergence of the international terrorist threat in the 1970s, Special Forces also seemed the ideal force for counter-terrorist operations. Special Forces today essentially comprise the same organization and training to discharge the same missions for which they had prepared throughout the Cold War (Cf. Skinner 2002, 19). Working with indigenous forces, they helped win impressive victories that ultimately overthrew the Taliban, and Special Forces now seem destined to play a major role in almost all future actions in the War on Terror. This thesis examines what specific training an SF soldier will require to effectively wage that war.

Overview

To determine whether Special Forces is ready to fight the War on Terror, this thesis will start by examining the operational environment and the threat. Having reviewed the nature of these factors, coverage will extend briefly to selected past strategies that have been successfully employed against similar threats. In a Special Forces perspective, the object will be to determine how these strategies might be adapted to the War on Terror. Next, Special Forces training will be reviewed to determine if that training adequately prepares the force to conduct appropriate operations now. If Special Forces is not ready, suggestions will outline the kinds of additional training Special Forces should conduct to better prepare for anti-terror and counter-terror missions.

Understanding the operational environment is a SOF imperative. Fully understanding all aspects of that environment—military, political, economic, informational, and cultural—is probably more important in the War on Terror than in any previous conflict. The environment will influence the enemy’s strategy and tactics. It will also influence third parties not directly participating in the operations, and it should influence how the US conducts current and future operations against that enemy. Unlike the world of the Cold War, which was relatively predictable, the current environment is dynamic. The world population, which continues to grow at potentially unsustainable rates, is moving en masse to urban areas, many of which cannot support them. National governments have, in some cases, lost so much power it is questionable if they really control their countries. The line between insurgents and bandits, never completely clear, is growing more blurred. High-tech weapons, once the exclusive province of national militaries, regularly find their way into the hands of warlords and criminals. The world itself is interconnected as never before, so that political and economic decisions in one area can be acutely felt in another. Culturally alien concepts arriving with new technology seem for some to threaten the very roots of cultural identity. Many of those who reject the West’s capitalism and democratic ideals are often ideologically adrift in the vacuum left by the demise of communism.

The Middle East is especially significant for many reasons, not least of which is that it has become the source of many men who embody the current terrorist threat. Aggravating this schism, the United States is losing the information war. Censored by repressive, autocratic governments, Muslim Arabs are encouraged by the same governments to rail against Israel and the United States. It is hardly surprising that most Muslim Arabs are convinced the United States is more favorably disposed to the hated Israelis than themselves. While most Arabs are no longer old enough to remember their struggles for independence, the birth of Arab nationalism, or the Arab-Israeli Wars, they do remember the US entry into their holy land to attack a nation of fellow Muslim Arabs (Kaplan, 2000, 43). Arabs are also fully aware that the US provides more aid to Israel than any other country. Yet they somehow overlook the fact that Egypt is the second biggest benefactor of US aid (Shaefer 1999, 1), and the fact that the United States has fought two wars, Bosnia and Kosovo, on behalf of embattled Muslims. Understanding this sub-environment is as important as understanding the world in general, and this thesis attempts to capture the essence of both dimensions.

After having examined the operational environment, focus shifts to the enemy himself. The child of traditional Muslim resistance movements, the current threat witnessed its first flowering after the devastating Arab defeat in the 1967 Arab-Israeli War (Wright 1985, 65). Strictly religious, the founders of this movement declared the West to be a force of moral decay and a direct threat to their way of life. Two decades later, disgusted by their own secular governments, which seemed subservient to the West, and flush with victory over a super-power in Afghanistan, now-unemployed Muslim fighters turned their attention to what they felt was afflicting their own countries. They concluded it was their own governments who depended on the West, and most importantly the United States, for support. Initially ineffective at changing the regimes at home, they eventually fixed attention on the United States to either indirectly pressure their home governments or just to fight “the Great Satan.” Over time the attacks grew larger and bolder, culminating—to date—in the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon.

President George W. Bush and most of the world have labeled these men terrorists. Unlike the marginalized extremists who populated terrorist organizations of the 1970s and 1980s, these men seem to have stronger support among their home populations. Despite condemnation from their governments, many Arabs seem to feel as much or even more sympathy for the hijackers and their aims than for the 9/11 attack victims (Doran 2002, 28-29). Viewing this popular sympathy within the context of terrorists’ stated goals of overthrowing their governments, one has to wonder whether these men are the same terrorists that we have come to know in the last thirty years, or if they really are the beginnings of a transnational insurgent movement. The distinction is important for this thesis, because it ultimately affects how the US will fight this threat. If the threat simply comprises terrorists in the old sense, beating them may simply involve identifying them and either legally or militarily neutralizing them. However, if they are insurgents, then the fight will involve not just neutralizing them, but also taking steps to isolate them from a sympathetic popular support base, all the while remaining aware of all the possible consequences of one’s own actions. This thesis will focus on the al-Qaida organization. Although not the US’s exclusive foe, it has proven the most determined, and to date the most deadly. Preliminary research also indicates that other threat organizations will resemble al-Qaida in ideology, support, structure, and operational tactics and strategies. Therefore, an understanding of al-Qaida provides adequate understanding of the threat the US faces in the War on Terror.

With a clearer understanding of the threat, effective strategies and tactics against this threat should become more apparent. Discussion within the Special Forces community has focused either on employing Special Forces much as they were employed in Afghanistan, or on their role as “global scouts” for the new interim or Objective Force units. While these applications are certainly valid, they do not use Special Forces to their fullest potential. More than just highly trained commandos, US Army Special Forces is unlike any other special operations force in the world. Having a cultural awareness possessed by few others, and, in some cases training in areas that bridge the gap between special operations and intelligence, SF soldiers are instruments for moving the United States toward both conventional and unconventional full-spectrum dominance.

As previously stated, if al-Qaida is simply a manifestation of marginalized extremists unlikely to achieve their goals, the US will most likely deal with it as other terror threats were dealt with in the post-World War II era, albeit on a grander scale. The US will heighten its operational security posture, conduct an intensive intelligence campaign to identify the people involved, and then use either military or legal means to neutralize them. If, however, the threat consists not just of hard core, committed terrorists, but also a support base of large segments of a sympathetic population, then the response may have to include more than just identifying and neutralizing key personnel. Considerations may include keeping operations lower profile to protect friendly governments with potentially hostile populations and reducing potentially damaging media exposure of legitimate, but controversial operations. In these mission environments, Special Forces soldiers may conduct foreign internal defense, but out of uniform, operating in the guise of civilian contractors clandestinely assisting governments friendly to the US, but whose populations for the moment are hostile. Special Forces may work clandestinely with friendly segments of a population, the remainder of which, as well as their government, is hostile or at least uncooperative with US efforts. Special Forces soldiers may find themselves pursuing individuals of strategic importance, then unilaterally but clandestinely neutralizing them. Alternately, Special Forces may find itself assisting other government entities such as law enforcement agencies with tracking and arresting terror suspects, or even help sympathetic host nation agencies doing the same thing. Special Forces may also unilaterally conduct operations typically conducted by host nation forces in unconventional war. Regardless of what missions Special Forces soldiers find themselves performing, a high probability remains that some missions will not be exactly what these soldiers have studied and trained for over the last twenty years. The important question, however, is whether existing training is sufficient to prepare them for these missions.

With its seven primary missions—Foreign Internal Defense (FID), Unconventional Warfare (UW), Direct Action (DA), Special Reconnaissance (SR), Combating Terrorism (CT), Counter Proliferation (CP), and Information Operations (IO) (FM 3-05.20 2001 2-1)—today’s Army Special Forces soldiers all receive basic UW training in their initial training, the Special Forces Qualification Course (SFQC). The last third of that course focuses on a mission to assist a resistance force generally resembling World War II anti-Nazi resistance movements. Involving role-play and tactical play, the scenario is constantly updated to ensure realism. In many ways it lays the psychological foundation for each SF soldier that enables him to accomplish the many varied missions he will encounter. Unfortunately, the Q-Course may be the last time many SF soldiers receive this type of focused training. Within Special Forces Groups, most teams have two primary missions. One is FID, the essential tasks of which they perform every time they teach host nation personnel a new task. For most teams, the other mission is SR, DA, a combination of those two, CT, or UW (CP and IO are highly specialized, not performed by most Special Forces soldiers, and therefore, beyond the scope of this thesis). Though not a hard and fast rule, often the only teams that do UW-focused training are those with the UW mission; the other teams focus on their reconnaissance, DA, or CT missions. The implications are that only the UW teams receive specialized training in areas that would make them expert covert or clandestine operators.

Another critical area of training includes linguistic and cultural skills. Although much touted, the typical SF soldier’s abilities in these areas often reflect both his chain of command emphasis and regional orientation. While the former is usually supportive of language training, some notables in the past have de-emphasized it, believing that it detracted from the more battle-oriented skills. The bigger problem, however, lies with the languages themselves. The Army categorizes languages into four levels according to difficulty. The relatively easy Romance languages are Cat I (AR 611-6 1996, Figures Section). Slightly harder languages, such as German, are Cat II (AR 611-6 1996, Figures Section.). More difficult languages, including the Slavic family, Persian-Farsi, and Indonesian, are rated Cat III, and the most difficult, including Chinese, Japanese, and Arabic, are Cat VI (AR 611-6 1996, Figures Section). All Special Forces Soldiers must graduate from four to six months basic language training following the Q-Course; failure to do so means the soldier does not receive his green beret. The last fact is deceptive. Graduation requirements are not very stringent, and almost everyone graduates. Proficiency, however, is more reflective of language difficulty. Typically, the Cat I Spanish and French-oriented soldiers leave the language school conversant, while those who have studied Asian and Middle Eastern tongues are barely conversant, and unless a soldier spends a year at the Defense Language Institute, his language ability is unlikely to improve. Unfortunately, the languages of most of current US enemies are the ones in which SF soldiers find themselves least proficient. While neither Unconventional Warfare techniques nor linguistic abilities may be critical in the War on Terror, they are areas with vast potential for training improvement.

Scope

This thesis reviews the current state of Special Forces training within the context of missions it may perform in the War on Terror. The thesis will review the world situation; examine al-Qaida and the terror threat; compare that threat with past threats to determine possible engagement strategies (although the objective is neither a comprehensive analysis of the threat, nor a thorough inventory of past counter-...

Table of contents

• Title page
• TABLE OF CONTENTS
• ABSTRACT
• CHAPTER I - INTRODUCTION
• CHAPTER 2 - THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT
• CHAPTER 3 - THE THREAT
• CHAPTER 4 - A RESPONSE
• CHAPTER 5 - TRAINING REQUIREMENTS TO SUPPORT THE RESPONSE
• REQUEST FROM THE PUBLISHER
• REFERENCE LIST