Evolution Of Artillery Tactics In General J. Lawton Collins' US VII Corps In World War II

Major David S. Wilson

• Publisher: Lucknow Books
• Year: 2015
• eBook ISBN: 9781786253644
• Topic: History
• Subtopic: European History
• Index: History

This thesis examines the evolution of artillery tactics in World War II using General J. Lawton Collins' U.S. VII Corps as a case study. This study first reviews artillery doctrine and tactics during World War I and during the 1920s and 1930s, in which time future leaders like General Collins were military students.In 1943, General Collins commanded an infantry division on Guadalcanal where he was one of the first American generals to implement the Army's new doctrine of fire direction centers (FDCs) and massed fires using time on targets (TOTs). Collins then was selected to command the U.S. VII Corps for the invasion of Normandy and the subsequent breakout during OPERATION COBRA. From Normandy to the end of the war, Collins continued to hone his use of artillery based on his experience during the eleven-month campaign in Northwest Europe, contributing to his reputation as the best corps commander in World War II.This study looks at Army doctrine in 1944 to judge Collins' artillery tactics and concludes that he used established doctrine and that his tactics are the foundation for today's artillery tactics.

CHAPTER ONE—INTRODUCTION

This thesis examines General J. Lawton Collins’ use of artillery in World War II The Army’s pre-war manual, Field Manual 100-5 Operations, provided specific instructions on how to employ artillery. Collins would follow the fundamental principles of Field Manual 100-5 and employ his artillery based on the tactical situation. His use of artillery would parallel that of U.S. forces in World War II. Early on, U.S. forces believed that a moderate amount of artillery could achieve neutralization, but as the war progressed and the U.S. suffered increased casualties, more artillery rounds would be used to achieve neutralization of German forces. Overall, the U.S. Army in World War II followed the pre-war doctrine of using fire direction centers (FDCs) to control and mass artillery and the tactic of time on targets (TOTs) but came to realize that more firepower was needed to accomplish the pre-war definition of neutralization in order to win. Those interested in this thesis would be historians interested in the artillery tactics of World War II, and artillerymen who wish to examine how massed fires, in its simplest form with relatively simple technology, worked against fifty German divisions.

In World War II, the U.S. field artillery was one of the key instruments of America’s victory against the German Wehrmacht. In Northwest Europe, from June 1944 until May 1945, the U.S. artillery deployed 400 artillery battalions in support of approximately fifty infantry and armor divisions. These units fired approximately fifty million shells. With such a massive infusion of artillery into the Northwest European campaign, how was the American artillery used to assist the infantry and armor? According to two British historians, Dominick Graham and Shelford Bidwell, German veterans rated American massed artillery as more lethal than the Russian artillery barrages at Stalingrad.{1} As General George S. Patton eloquently said, “the artillery won the war.”{2} General William E. DePuy, developer of the Army’s doctrine of the Active Defense, said that his purpose as an infantry commander in World War II was to advance forward to position the artillery forward observers.{3}

With eleven months of combat in Northwest Europe, two U.S. corps were engaged the longest: U.S. V and U.S. VII Corps. Of the two, VII Corps, under the command of Major General J. Lawton Collins, stands out. U.S. VII Corps was responsible for the first victory in Normandy at Cherbourg and was selected to lead the breakout during OPERATION COBRA. It was VII Corps which stopped the German Mortain counterattack. As the war progressed, VII Corps captured Aachen, the first major German city to be captured, and along with General Matthew Ridgway’s XVIII Corps, closed the German bulge in the Ardennes, linking up with General George Patton’s Third Army at Houffalize.

VII Corps was the U.S. Army’s preeminent corps in Northwest Europe. Its success can be attributed to its commander, a future chief of staff of the Army, J. Lawton Collins. Collins earned the nickname “Lightning Joe,” while fighting at Guadalcanal, one of America’s first land victories in World War II. General Collins was unquestionably one of the best American generals in command of one of the best U.S. corps. As an infantryman who graduated from the Field Artillery Officer Advanced Course—a rarity then as it is today—how did Collins’ use of artillery contribute to his success?{4} If artillery was influential in winning the war, and Collins was the best corps commander, then it would be worthwhile to examine Collins’ artillery tactics.

Doctrine is defined as “fundamental principles by which military forces guide their actions.”{5} Tactics is defined as the “art of employing available means to win battles.”{6} According to British historian Jonathan B.A. Bailey, “The principles of fire support [artillery] which emerged in the First World War have not changed “{7}Today, artillery doctrine and tactics are still relevant to the modem battlefield. In 1941, the U.S. Army published its Field Manual 100-5, Operations. This manual covered the Army’s basic doctrine, principles, and tactics. The 1941 manual, unlike today’s manual, goes into detail on how to employ artillery.{8}

While not the purpose of this thesis, the evolution of Collins’ artillery tactics of using more fires is relevant to the overall discussion of maneuver doctrine and tactics in World War II and may provide information to the unceasing debate between maneuverists and attritionists. World War II started off with the supposed pre-eminence of General Heinz Guderian’s panzer tactics in Poland, France, and Russia. While “Blitzkrieg” raged from 1939-1941, some maneuverists ignore the fact that no significant German armored counterattack after Kasserine in 1943 ever succeeded against American forces. Looking at VII Corps, from Normandy and Aachen to the Ardennes, American superiority in artillery and the tactic of massed fires using time on targets stopped German panzer attacks every time.

The problem with this lesson learned is that the U.S. Army as an institution forgets to mass fires and ignores the lessons of World War II. According to British historian John Ellis, for political and economic reasons, the U.S. has chosen not to remember the hard truth of World War II, that victory was won through massed firepower.{9} Also, according to another British historian, John Gudmundsson, the lesson of Vietnam taught the U.S. Army to assign forward observers to the smallest unit and to piecemeal the artillery into battery-sized firebases. Further, with computer automation, this has caused the Army to try to service every target on the battlefield, regardless of its significance.{10} This dispersion of artillery effects contrasts with Collins’ use of artillery in World War II. After the war, Collins stated that massing fires at the right place was the key to his success in World War II.{11}

In the evolution of warfare in the twentieth century, the U.S. Army got a late start in World War I and deployed no more than forty Army divisions to France and fought for only six months. Further, the U.S. Field Artillery was outdated, requiring the U.S. to use French 75-millimeter field guns along with French artillery doctrine.{12} From 1920 until 1940, the U.S. Army was one of the smallest armies in the world. With six divisions, the U.S. Army was smaller than Poland’s army of twenty divisions, which lasted only a month against forty German divisions in September 1939.{13} America’s resources to develop and test doctrine were austere. Further, a doctrinal debate raged over the pre-eminence of fires over maneuver.

When America entered World War II, it had an established doctrine, contained in Field Manual 100-5. This peacetime doctrine was developed by a small Army focusing on the lessons of World War I. This doctrine was implemented by a massed Army of citizen soldiers in a motorized war of attrition and maneuver. Compared to World War I in France, World War II was a war of maneuver. The first war lasted four years in France, whereas it took the Germans two months to conquer France in 1940 and the Allies four months to liberate France in 1944. Obviously, the operational tempo of war had changed since Verdun and the Somme. In World War II, new weapons appearing too late for World War I were fully integrated. The tank, the radio, and the airplane helped to evolve warfare into a more decisive combined arms mix. America’s artillery was now in support of armored divisions and motorized infantry divisions.

With better communications, fire direction centers, and time on targets, most artillery in World War II was fired at targets of opportunity. The fundamental principles of artillery doctrine did not change from World War I to World War II, but the tactics did. These same artillery tactics are the foundation for today’s tactics. By looking at Collins’ corps, the best examples of the tactic of massed artillery fires will be seen.

CHAPTER TWO—1914-1940: ROLLING BARRAGE

World War II artillery doctrine and tactics owe their origin to World War I and the years between 1920 and 1940. World War I was an artillery war; both the Allies and the Central Powers had thousands of artillery pieces. Consequently, artillery fire plans were complex. Most armies had a limited number of heavier weapons (150-to 200-millimeter) with a few approaching the size of naval cannons.{14} During a typical preparation, such as the Battle of the Somme in 1916, 1.5 million rounds would be fired—two-thirds of these shells from 75-millimeter guns.{15} Overall, artillery and mortars were responsible for 60 percent of all casualties.{16}

In World War I, the intent of artillery was to destroy enemy defenses so that attacking infantry could maneuver freely. Planners were willing to give up the element of surprise if it afforded them the opportunity to provide mass fires to bear. As the war progressed, artillery battles, such as Verdun, were seen as a way to attrite the enemy. Even after consolidating on the objective, artillery was used to create protective barrages around objectives. A barrage describes artillery fired across a line that moved forward at specified times.{17}

The armies of World War I developed three terms to describe the effects of artillery: destruction, neutralization, and suppression Destruction was the elimination of an enemy unit through overwhelming firepower. Most armies define destruction as inflicting 30 to 50 percent casualties against an enemy unit. With such losses, it is expected that a military unit can no longer exist. Next, was neutralization, a term developed later in World War I. This was the economical use of firepower to kill or destroy enough elements to make an enemy unit no longer capable of performing its mission. Unlike destruction, a neutralized unit may still exist, but its losses were such that it could no longer perform its mission The last term was suppression. This was the temporary effect of preventing a unit from manning its weapons during the impact of incoming rounds.{18}

The fundamental principles of artillery doctrine consisted of three concepts. First, artillery preparations would be fired before the ground forces attacked. This was intended to destroy or neutralize a defending unit. Next, was the principle of close supporting fires. This was the artillery support requested and directed by the ground force as it maneuvered and closed to defeat the enemy. Finally, was the concept of counterbattery, intended to defeat enemy artillery. Due to communications problems in World War I, close supporting fires were hard to coordinate, so units fired rolling barrages. These barrages were lines of impacting artillery rounds that moved forward ahead of the advancing infantry. This predetermined movement of the artillery was to make up for the lack of communication between the guns and the maneuver force.{19}

The standard direct support artillery was a 75-millimeter gun with a range of 6,000 meters, and had the mission of cutting extensive wire obstacles. Instead of cutting the barbed wire, however, the 75-millimeter shells tended instead to detonate in the mud, thus being totally ineffective. Additionally, some of the 75-millimeter guns had the mission of counterbattery fire. This was planned to be executed at the last minute of the preparation to answer enemy counterpreparations. Also, due to the inaccuracy of counterbattery fire, chemical shells were planned to temporarily suppress enemy batteries.

General support weapons were 105-to 120-millimeter howitzers which fired out to 10,000 meters. In World War I, general support artillery had the mission of destroying trenches and strongpoints. Strongpoints were the primary target for artillery preparations, usually lasting a week. Airplanes were used to find entrances to these underground bunkers. The first priority was to destroy or collapse these entrances to prevent the enemy infantry from manning their trenches as the barrage moved on.{20}

Initially in World War I, there was not enough ammunition and target information available, so counterbattery was considered impractical. The British believed artillery should remain masked and that premature counter-fires caused unpredictable movement by the enemy, hence the use of counterbattery at the end of preparations. This failed to destroy enemy artillery and had only a temporary effect in suppressing it.{21}

By 1917, belligerents had realized that horrendous casualties were the result of artillery and the best way to reduce losses was through counterbattery. To improve counterbatter...

Table of contents

• Title page
• TABLE OF CONTENTS
• ABSTRACT
• ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
• TABLE OF ILLUSTRATIONS
• LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
• CHAPTER ONE-INTRODUCTION
• CHAPTER TWO-1914-1940: ROLLING BARRAGE
• CHAPTER THREE-LESSONS LEARNED: GUADALCANAL TO AACHEN
• CHAPTER FOUR-DESTRUCTION: ROER TO THE ELBE
• CHAPTER FIVE-CONCLUSION
• BIBLIOGRAPHY