CACTUS Air Power At Guadalcanal

Major Timothy L. Clubb

• Publisher: Verdun Press
• Year: 2014
• eBook ISBN: 9781782894377
• Topic: History
• Subtopic: European History
• Index: History

This study examines the role of the CACTUS Air Force during the battle for Guadalcanal. Hurriedly planned and executed, Guadalcanal was the first U.S. ground offensive in the Pacific. Starting as an unopposed amphibious assault, the operation turned into a six-month-long air, land, and sea battle to secure the island. Operating from an expeditionary airfield, the U.S. Marine Corps employed air power as its primary means of defending the island. The CACTUS Air Force conducted the campaign with limited air assets and was plagued by a variety of critical shortages, yet it managed to play a key role in the U.S. victory. This study focuses on the specific contributions of airpower during this campaign. It examines the role of air power in reconnaissance, deep, close, and rear area air operations. It also examines the factors that influenced how air assets were employed and the changes in U.S. concepts about air operations that were made to conduct the air campaign. CACTUS planes assisted in defeating several major Japanese attacks. However, the daily presence and routine operations of the CACTUS Air Force were its key contributions. CACTUS Air's most important contribution was its ability to deny the Japanese air superiority and disrupt their freedom of action in the lower Solomon Islands.

CHAPTER I — INTRODUCTION

We were as well trained and as well armed as time and our peacetime experience allowed us to be. We needed combat to tell us how effective our training, our doctrines, and our weapons had been. We tested them against the enemy, and we found that they worked. From that moment in 1942, the tide turned, and the Japanese never again advanced.{1} — Major General Alexander A. Vandegrift, Challenge for the Pacific

Guadalcanal, an island in the Solomon Island chain, was the location of the first United States ground offensive in the Pacific during World War II (figure 1). This offensive, which began on 7 August 1942, was intended to keep the Japanese from gaining complete control of the Solomons. Operating from a base at Rabaul in the northern Solomon Islands, the Japanese were attempting to establish a series of airfields and ports along the Solomon Island chain to the south that would support offensive operations into New Guinea. Guadalcanal was important to the Japanese plan because it lay at the southern tip of the Solomon Island chain (figure 2). Japanese possession of this island would not only facilitate operations into New Guinea, it would also sever U.S. lines of communication into the region. Because of this, if the U.S. hoped to stop the Japanese offensive in the southern Pacific, it could not allow the Japanese to hold Guadalcanal.

The Guadalcanal campaign was long, hard-fought, and a stellar example of American willpower and resolve to overcome adversity. It also serves as an example of the interdependency of air power, land forces, and sea power. Throughout the campaign, air, land, and naval forces played a pivotal role in helping the U.S. ultimately achieve success.{2}

.This study focuses on the contributions to the campaign made by the land-based air arm, the CACTUS Air Force. CACTUS was the code name for Guadalcanal, and air assets based on the island soon became known as the CACTUS Air Force. This small air force often changed in composition, sometimes on a daily basis, and routinely suffered from a variety of shortages including fuel and pilots. Yet, this force was able to defend against daily air attacks and assist in defeating several major Japanese offensives to retake Guadalcanal. This contribution was crucial at certain points in the operation.

The CACTUS Air Force consisted of U.S. Marine Corps, U.S. Navy, and U.S. Army Air Force aircraft and personnel operating from the island of Guadalcanal. Although numerous carrier-based Navy aircraft and land-based Army B-17s participated in the campaign, they were never under the direct control of the CACTUS Air Force commander. The examination of air power in this study is limited to aircraft that were based on Guadalcanal.

A variety of works have examined the CACTUS Air Force and its efforts that turned the tide at crucial times. Books have been written on the individual exploits of pilots and the innovative ability of the force to overcome adversity. However, there is no clear analysis of how air power was used to fulfill operational commitments and how the air campaign was planned and executed. The purpose of this study is to address these issues.

This study looks at the Guadalcanal campaign and focuses on the unique contributions of the CACTUS Air Force. It examines the organization of the CACTUS Air Force and how that force managed to conduct such a successful campaign in the face of adversity. Finally, this study examines the lessons that the U.S. learned from this battle at the time and what lessons can still be learned from it.

The primary research question of this study is: How did U.S. air power contribute to the battle for Guadalcanal? To answer the primary question, several secondary questions must be answered. First, how was air power utilized? Second, what were the factors or circumstances that led to air power being employed in the manner it was? Finally, what changes in tactics and air power concepts were made which affected how air power was employed? To answer these questions, this study will examine the types of missions normally assigned to CACTUS aircraft and how these missions were prioritized. It will also examine the factors that determined which assets were used to execute different types of missions. Last, it will examine the influence of doctrine and the limitation of asset availability on air power employment.

The scope of this study is limited to the period of 20 August 1942 to 9 December 1942. The twentieth of August is the day that the first assets of what became known as the CACTUS Air Force arrived on Guadalcanal. The ninth of December marks the departure of the First Marine Division from Guadalcanal. When the First Marine Division was relieved by the U.S. Army Americal Division, the land battle for the island was not yet over. However, by then the air battle had been clearly won by the U.S.

Because of certain developments during these four and one-half months, the campaign will be divided into three phases. The examination of each phase will look at command and control, asset availability and the missions assigned during that particular period. Through the context of a historical narrative and analysis, this study examines the deep, reconnaissance, security, close, and rear area operations of the CACTUS Air Force. This methodology will enable a look across the full spectrum of the air battle space in order to determine how air power was used and the contributions it made.

The battle at Guadalcanal was the first thorough test of U.S. Marine Corps’ doctrine, training, and equipment against the Japanese. The testing of aviation was particularly important because it had been almost ten years since Marine pilots had flown in combat and even longer for those from the other services.

While preparing to fight their next war, the Marines had been aided by ideas developed during World War I and the years after, in the words of the first Marine aviator Alfred A. Cunningham the only reason for a service to have aviation was to support the troops on the ground. Whether he was aware of it or not, Cunningham’s statement became the credo of Marine Aviation for all times.{3} Cunningham became the director of Marine Aviation in the 1920s and provided much of the early guidance and direction that made the primary mission of Marine Aviation supporting the Marine on the ground.

Prior to World War I, Marine Aviation had consisted of only 4 officers and 30 enlisted but by the war’s end it had grown to 282 officers and 2,180 enlisted.{4} On 5 October 1918 nine DeHaviland-4 and -9 aircraft hand dropped bombs onto a German position south of the Yser river in support of ground force-s.{5} After this first ground support mission, the Marine Corps spent the remainder of the war developing a focus on what it called close support bombing.

After World War I, Marine Aviation made noteworthy advances in tactics to support ground troops and conduct aerial combat. Marine aviators were the only U.S. pilots to actually participate in combat operations between World War I and II. Therefore, some of the doctrine, tactics, and techniques used at the beginning of World War II were derived from Marine Corps combat experiences. These lessons were learned in such places as Santo Domingo, Haiti, and Nicaragua. Dive-bombing was first utilized in Nicaragua by Marines. Another aviation first also occurred in Nicaragua when a patrol was pinned down by bandits. Laying out cloth panels, the patrol directed Marine planes against the enemy forces. This was the first instance of an air attack being directed by personnel on the ground. Later, this technique became a critical part of close air support.{6}

Experience in these “small wars” gave the Marine Corps insight into the difficulties of providing air support for ground units in adverse conditions and terrain. The Marine Corps took these lessons and attempted to standardize its close air support procedures during the early 1930s. However, following the end of the interventions in Central America and the Caribbean, close air support was not given the training emphasis it deserved.

Marine pilots were trained by the Navy and were indoctrinated in the naval tactics of air power employment. This training focused on fighter tactics, dive bombing, torpedo attacks, scouting, searching, and some observation techniques. The Navy flight syllabus failed to include coordinated attacks in support of ground forces.{7} Also, because of their small size and scope, the “small wars” had not provided the Marine Corps with an opportunity to conduct a large-scale air campaign. Guadalcanal provided the Marine Corps with an extensive test of its air doctrine and required the Marine Corps to conduct its largest air operation to date.

In addition to testing U.S. doctrine and aircraft, the Guadalcanal campaign also tested the men who flew the planes and their leaders. The training and understanding of air doctrine by the senior leaders of the CACTUS Air Force at Guadalcanal were important. It influenced not only what they brought to Guadalcanal in terms of experience but also how they employed air power in the campaign. Unlike the 1920s when the majority of pilots were ex-infantry officers, many of the pilots at Guadalcanal were brand-new, with little experience in the aircraft they were about to fly in combat. Most pilots were right out of college, eager to fight, but sadly lacking in air tactics and worse off in their knowledge of ground operations. Fortunately, the senior leadership of the CACTUS Air Force was not plagued with the same inexperience.

The commander of the CACTUS Air Force was Major General Roy S. Geiger, who was the fifth Marine to be designated as a naval aviator. Geiger brought a wealth of experience and aviation knowledge to Guadalcanal. He had flown every type of aircraft in the Marine Corps’ inventory plus every type it had ever owned. As the former head of Marine Aviation in the early 1930s, he was intimately familiar with the current air doctrine and uniquely aware of air power’s role in the campaign. Geiger and several members of his staff had gained their initial combat experience in the “small wars” of the 1920s. Their decisions on how to employ air power would be based on their experience and thirty years of doctrinal evolution.

The Guadalcanal campaign provided a thorough test of U.S. air power doctrine, tactics, and training. In doing so it had an impact on air tactics and doctrine throughout the remainder of the war. Both during the battle and afterwards, numerous changes were made. These changes varied from modification of tactics to the reassignment of primary missions for aircraft. Refinements were made in close air support that included improved means of identifying targets and air-to-ground communications. The Army Air Corps’ P-400 received a change in its primary mission at Guadalcanal. The P-400 was originally designed as a fighter but proved virtually useless in that role at Guadalcanal. Japanese Zeros routinely approached at altitudes in excess of 25,000 thousand feet. The P-400 was unable to climb that high so it was incapable of conducting intercepts. Because of this shortfall, the P-400 was restricted to reconnaissance and close air support missions in which it later proved invaluable.

Besides testing U.S. equipment and doctrine, the Guadalcanal campaign also demonstrated to the Allied forces that the Japanese could be stopped. Until then, Allied forces had habitually been on the defensive reacting to Japanese initiatives. A growing sense of defeatism was evident at even the highest levels of U.S. command. At times it seemed likely that the Japanese would force the U.S. off the island during the long campaign, but in the end U.S. forces prevailed and Japan suffered a devastating defeat. This outcome, many felt, turned the tide of the war in favor of the U.S.

Finally, the air campaign had an effect on the remainder of the air war in one other significant way. It destroyed the myth of the invincible Japanese Zero and the fearless pilots that flew it. Prior to the war, U.S. intelligence sources received reports that the Japanese had a fighter that was superior to U.S. planes. These reports were dismissed at the time because most Americans believed that the Japanese were incapable of producing any type of aircraft superior to those made in the United States. Intelligence sources regarded the Zero as a poor copy of current western fighters. This underestimation continued even when first-hand combat reports were received from Claire Chennault and the Flying Tigers in China.

The pendulum quickly swung in the opposite direction when U.S. pilots first confronted the Zero in aerial combat in the Pacific. As rumors spread, the Zero’s “capabilities” grew with these tales. The Zero was soon overly feared and often regarded as nearly impossible to defeat. Pilots at Guadalcanal quickly shot down this theory by shooting down hundreds of these supposedly invincible fighters.

The lessons learned at Guadalcanal resulted in the refinement of doctrine and tactics that served the U.S. throughout the remainder of World War II. The Guadalcanal campaign is of further significance because the origin of many of our current tactics and doctrine can be traced to this battle. At Guadalcanal, U.S. forces found themselves operating from an expeditionary airfield with limited supplies, personnel, and firepower, while the nation was engaged in two simultaneous major regional conflicts. A similar scenario is feasible today. Because of this, many lessons learned from the experiences of the CACTUS Air Force at Guadalcanal have current relevance.

CHAPTER II — BACKGROUND

What the hell we want to take some little place nobody ever heard of?{8} — Marine on Guadalcanal, Airwar

Prior to the start of World War II in the Pacific, Japanese plans concerning the United States were defensive. Japan maintained a military advantage in the western Pacific due to its superior geographic position and the capability of the Combined Fleet to disrupt a U.S. defense or reinforcement of the Philippine Islands and Australia. When Germany started the war in Europe, Japan recognized an opportunity and made several aggressive moves in the Far East. In September 1940, Japan occupied northern Indochina and alarmed the world by signing the Tripartite Alliance with Germany and Italy.{9}

When Germany attacked Russia in the summer of 1941, the door was opened for the Japanese to pursue their objectives in the Far East. With Russia engaged in war, Japan no longer felt threatened by invasion from that direction. In July 1941, Japan occupied southern Indochina and the United States responded by freezing Japanese assets and restricting their access to oil exports.{10} This action stunned Japan. The Japanese had only eighteen months of oil reserves on hand to support their offensive actions. Ensuing diplomatic negotiations between the United States and Japan were fruitless and war loomed on the horizon.

Japan began its offensive in the Pacific on 7 December 1941 with the purpose of making itself economically self-sufficient.{11} Of particular importance to the Japanese were the objectives that provided access to oil fields. The Japanese strategic plan involved three distinct phases. These were characterized as a “centrifugal offensive,” a “period of consolidation,” and a “defensive phase.” In phase one, Japanese air...

Table of contents

• Title page
• TABLE OF CONTENTS
• ABSTRACT
• LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS
• LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS
• CHAPTER I - INTRODUCTION
• CHAPTER II - BACKGROUND
• CHAPTER III - OPERATION WATCHTOWER BEGINS
• CHAPTER IV - THE CACTUS AIR FORCE ARRIVES
• CHAPTER V - A NEW DIRECTION
• CHAPTER VI - THE END OF DOUBT
• CONCLUSIONS
• FIGURES
• TABLES
• GLOSSARY
• REQUEST FROM THE PUBLISHER
• BIBLIOGRAPHY