21 Army Group: Normandy To The Baltic [Illustrated Edition]

Field Marshal Viscount Bernard Law Montgomery of Alamein KG GCB DSO PC

• Publisher: Lucknow Books
• Year: 2015
• eBook ISBN: 9781782897613
• Topic: History
• Subtopic: European History
• Index: History

[Illustrated with 46 highly detailed maps of the actions]
Field Marshal Montgomery commanded the Eighth Army from 13th August 1942 until the 31st December 1943, and the 21st Army Group from 1st January 1944 until the German surrender on the 5th May, 1945. Whilst in command of the British Army of the Rhine, in occupation of Germany, shortly after the end of the Second World War Montgomery set out to record the exploits and victories of the troops under his command.
Both this volume and its companion volume, El Alamein to the River Sangro, are superb examples of military history as presented by one of the greatest generals to command victorious armies in the field. The texts are taken from his personal war diaries and are distinguished by his incisive style. The whole strategy and course of these two campaigns are presented to the reader with great clarity and accuracy.
In Normandy to the Baltic the Field Marshal unfolds that greater task — the planning and implementation of the greatest invasion the world has ever known — Operation Overlord. He describes the whole plan behind. D Day and the Battle of Normandy. He continues with the battle for Caen and the capture of Cherbourg, the closing of the Falaise Pocket and the crossing of the Seine—through into the Low Countries and the Battle of Arnhem and the famous Battle of the Ardennes. He concludes with the battle of the Rhineland, the crossing of the Rhine and the rush across northern Germany to the final surrender. The whole pattern of the complex allied effort — British, Canadian and American — is described with extraordinary detail and each episode is analysed in retrospect.

 

CHAPTER ONE — The Second Front

The great design for the return of Allied Forces to North-West Europe had its beginnings at Dunkirk. From that time, in spite of the many setbacks which we endured during the early war years, the resolution remained that one day our forces would go back to France and the Low Countries to avenge the defeats of 1940.

In December 1941 President Roosevelt and Mr Churchill agreed upon the complete unification of the war effort of the countries they represented, and thereafter the United States and British forces were deployed under the direction of the Combined Chiefs of Staff. Soon after, the conception of a mighty cross-Channel assault against the Fortress of Europe began to receive consideration, for in April 1942 it was jointly decided that such an enterprise would constitute the principal Anglo-American effort for the defeat of the German forces.

In the spring of 1942 the Red Army was slowly falling back before the German onslaught, and joint conferences were held in London with the object of determining means of relieving pressure on the Soviets. In July Admiral King and General Marshall visited the British Chiefs of Staff in an urgent endeavour to find some way of distracting German forces from the Eastern Front. It was a dark hour; our resources were so meagre and our commitments so widespread, that a solution was difficult to determine. The possibility of attacking Western Europe was examined, but the strength of the enemy, and our own lack of equipment and of all the special adjuncts required for such an operation, made its successful accomplishment out of the question at this time.

It was eventually decided that the only operation that could be undertaken with a fair prospect of success was an assault landing in North Africa. This was far from Germany, but was calculated to divert at least some German energies from Russia, and would also materially improve the critical situation in the Middle East.

When the North African project was approved, it was accepted that the cost in joint resources would mean not only that any hope of an operation in Western Europe in 1942 would have to be abandoned, but also that it would be impossible to complete the assembly of forces in England for a major cross-Channel assault in 1943.

It has since been learned that the German plan at that time was to attempt the defeat of Britain by aerial bombardment and by destruction of her forces in the Middle East. Hitler’s main project was to break through Stalingrad and Egypt and join the two salients in the Middle East. The heroic defence of Stalingrad and the crushing defeat Rommel sustained at El Alamein dislocated the German pincer movement. The development of operations in North Africa together with the advance of the Eighth Army, and the Soviet offensive from the Volga, proved to be the turning points in the war: the Axis was forced on to the strategic defensive.

When Mr Churchill and President Roosevelt met at Casablanca in January 1943 it was apparent that the African campaign was destined to achieve decisive success, and the development of operations after the Tunisian campaign was discussed.

Again the most desirable course of action would have been to close with the enemy in Western Europe. But again the Allied war potential had not yet been developed sufficiently to produce and sustain the resources required for such a gigantic under-taking, and once again the opening of the so-called ‘Second Front’ had to be postponed. Axis control of the Mediterranean islands and southern coast of Europe still forced our shipping into the 12,000 mile detour round the Cape; time was required to develop the vast mobilization in the United States, to ferry men and material across the Atlantic to England, to complete the defeat of the submarine, to develop the strategic air offensive over Germany, and to manufacture and assemble the truly enormous mass of material which the invasion of Western Europe demanded.

It was therefore decided that the next step would be to knock Italy out of the war, lock up the Italian fleet and open the Mediterranean. This would result in a great saving in shipping, would cause diversion of German forces, and would give us a footing in ‘Fortress Europe’ together with airfields of great strategic importance.

At the same time, it was resolved at Casablanca to resume the concentration of forces and material in the United Kingdom, and to commence detailed planning for the cross-Channel project. A joint Anglo-American staff was instituted, under the leadership of a Chief of Staff to the Supreme Commander (designate); and taking the initial letters of his appointment, the organization was christened ‘Cossac’. Cossac was directed by the Combined Chiefs of Staff to make preparations for the return of Allied Forces to Western Europe, in the event of a sudden weakening of Germany to the extent that landings could be made in the face of light or negligible resistance, and at the same time to make plans for a major seaborne assault as early as possible in 1944.

In preparation for the operation, the Allied Commanders decided to undertake the great strategic bombardment of Germany, which aimed at inducing a creeping paralysis throughout the country by smashing its industrial and economic capacity; by the middle of 1943 the air assault by Bomber Command and Eighth United States Air Force was in full swing and producing important results.

At the Washington Conference in May 1943 the conception of a full scale invasion of the Fortress of Europe was confirmed, and the code name ‘Overlord’ was formally accepted for the operation. The spring of 1944 was then designated as the target date.

By August 1943 Cossac had produced a tentative plan which was considered at the Quebec Conference, and, although at that time Mr Churchill suggested an increase in the forces it was proposed to employ in the assault, approval was given for implementing the project as far as it was possible before the appointment of a Supreme Commander.

This brief summary of the history of ‘Overlord’ brings us to the close of 1943.

During the long period of consideration given to the invasion of Western Europe, a number of long term projects were initiated which played an important part in the success which the operation achieved. The design and production of artificial harbours, the preparation of cross-Channel pipe lines for fuel supply, the evolution of the technique for assaulting defended beaches and the collection and collation of an immense volume of geographical and geological data concerning the ‘invasion coast’ and its hinterland, were some of the tasks undertaken many months and even years before D-day, the first day of operation ‘Overlord’.

It has been shown why the opening of the ‘Second Front’ did not take place earlier than 1944. By the late spring of 1944, however, the progress of the German forces had been halted in all theatres; in the Battle of the Atlantic the submarine was defeated; the Battle of the Air was paralysing Germany; and as a result of our operations in the Mediterranean, the short sea route had been reopened and the enemy had been forced to make considerable dispersion of his forces in southern Europe.

The stage was properly set for launching the greatest amphibious operation in military history.

CHAPTER TWO — The Appointment of the Higher Command for Operation ‘Overlord’ and the Evolution of the Revised Outline Plan

At the end of 1943 President Roosevelt and Mr Churchill met in Cairo and subsequently went to Teheran to confer with Marshal Stalin. Following these meetings the announcement was made of the appointment of General Eisenhower as Supreme Allied Commander for ‘Overlord’, and in due course I was appointed Commander-in-Chief of 21 Army Group: which comprised the British and Canadian forces in the United Kingdom destined to take part in the operation.

On I January 1944 I handed over command of the Eighth Army and started my journey to England from the Sangro River airstrip in Italy. It was arranged that I should stop at Marrakech to visit Mr Churchill who was recuperating there from his recent attack of pneumonia. With him I found General Eisenhower. I was shown for the first time a copy of the Cossac plan for the invasion of France, and the Prime Minister asked for my comments. In the short time available I did no more than express the opinion that the initial assaulting forces were too weak for the task of breaking through the German coastal defences, and that the proposed frontage of assault was too narrow, having in mind the necessity to plan for rapid expansion of the bridgehead and for the speedy reception of the follow-up forces and subsequent build-up.

It was decided that on my arrival in England I should examine the Cossac plan in detail, together with the Naval and Air Commanders-in-Chief, with a view to recommending any changes or modifications considered necessary to ensure the success of the operation. The Supreme Commander was on his way to the United States, but his Chief of Staff, General Bedell Smith, came to London bearing a letter which instructed me to act on General Eisenhower’s behalf during his absence.

The Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Naval Expeditionary Force was Admiral Sir Bertram Ramsay and of the Allied Expeditionary Air Force, Air Chief Marshal Sir Trafford Leigh-Mallory. There was no parallel appointment of Commander-in-Chief of the Allied land forces, but General Eisenhower decided that I should act in that capacity for the assault, and subsequently until the stage was reached in the development of our operations when a complete American Army Group could be deployed on the Continent. The assault was an operation requiring a single co-ordinated plan of action under one commander; I therefore became the overall land force commander responsible to the Supreme Commander for planning and executing the military aspect of the assault and subsequent capture of the lodgement area.

I arrived in England on 2 January 1944, and immediately started a detailed study of the Cossac plan. I formulated my views on the measures required to convert the project into a practical proposition with reasonable chances of success, and discussed them at length with Admiral Ramsay and Air Chief Marshal Leigh-Mallory. By 21 January, when the Supreme Commander held the first conference following his return from the United States, we were in agreement on a Revised Outline Plan, which General Eisenhower accepted.

The object of Operation ‘Overlord’ was ‘to mount and carry out an operation, with forces and equipment established in the United Kingdom and with target date 1 May 1944, to secure a lodgement on the Continent from which further offensive operations could be developed. The lodgement area must contain sufficient port facilities to maintain a force of some twenty-six to thirty divisions and enable that force to be augmented by follow-up shipments from the United States or elsewhere of additional divisions and supporting units at the rate of three to five divisions per month’.

The first problem was to decide where to deliver the assault. The Allied forces had got to smash into the German ‘Atlantic Wall’ defences, gain a firm foothold and then secure port facilities, in order to build up sufficient strength and resources to carry the war into Germany.

The Cossac plan selected the area between Grandcamp and Caen, in the Baie de la Seine, for the assault. This area was known by the code name ‘Neptune’, to differentiate it from other possible sectors in which ‘Overlord’ might have been launched. The choice was made after exhaustive inter-service study of the ‘invasion coast’, which, by the factor of aircraft range for fighter cover from home bases, was limited to the sector between Flushing and Cherbourg. Consideration of the beach areas suitable for combined operations revealed that those offering the best conditions for passing vehicles and stores inland were, firstly, in the Pas de Calais area (between Gravelines and the River Somme) and secondly, in the Baie de la Seine (between the River Orne and the base of the Cotentin Peninsula).

The Pas de Calais area involved a shorter distance from home bases, and thus would have enabled us to develop optimum air support and would have given a quicker turn round for shipping; but the strongest enemy defences along the whole coast existed in this sector, which was also a focal area for hostile fighter aircraft disposed for defence. The Caen area was relatively lightly defended and afforded the great advantage of a coastline sheltered from prevailing winds.

The hinterland of the Baie de la Seine provided good terrain for airfield construction (especially south-east of Caen) and offered the choice of developing operations to secure the Seine ports or the Cherbourg-Brittany group. From the Pas de Calais the rapid seizure of adequate port facilities would have been more difficult, as the alternatives were the Channel ports proper, including Antwerp—which could be reached only after crossing a series of major river and canal obstacles—or the Seine ports, which lay some 150 miles to the south-west of the most suitable beach areas.

Obviously the development of the full Allied potential depended on securing ports; Higher Command for Operation ‘‘Overlord’’ and the Revised Outline Plan the overriding consideration in the plan of operations once a bridgehead had been established, was the speed with which ports could be captured and opened for our shipping. Accordingly the Cossac plan recommended initially the seizure of Cherbourg and subsequently of the ports in the Brittany peninsula, including Nantes. The lodgement area therefore was to cover the Cotentin and Brittany peninsulas, and, in order to develop airfields, the area south-east of Caen. With these factors in mind,, and in view of the need for space to assemble the forces required for the invasion of Germany, it was considered that the eastern flank of the lodgement area should be carried to the line of the River Eure and lower Seine, while the southern boundary was to follow the line of the Loire.

Until ports had been captured, reliance was to be placed on creating artificially sheltered berths by sinking specially built caissons and cargo ships in the Baie de la Seine, the projects for which went by the name of Mulberry (artificial harbours) and Gooseberry (breakwaters). The Cossac plan dismissed the possibility of the early capture of Cherbourg by assaulting the Cotentin peninsula, on the grounds that it would be easy for the enemy to block the base of the peninsula, and thus prevent further expansion of the bridgehead; the alternative of including beaches on the eastern side of the peninsula, as part of the frontage of assault, was also dismissed, as it was feared that the Carentan estuary and marshy country surrounding it would split our forces and render them liable to defeat in detail.

The operational plan of assault and subsequent development of operations was based on conjectural dispositions of enemy mobile reserve formations, on the basis of the maximum number regarded as acceptable if the project were to have a reasonable chance of success. Counting the coastal crust, it was assumed that we should encounter five enemy divisions on D-day, and that another seven would arrive in the beachhead area by D +5. Of these twelve, five would be Panzer divisions.

The invasion forces were assumed to be provided with sufficient landing ships and craft to lift three assault divisions and two follow-up divisions, while two further divisions would be afloat on D-day in ships. The anticipated air lift for airborne forces was two-thirds of one division.

The plan therefore provided for an assault on a frontage of one corps of three divisions, and, assuming optimum weather conditions, the build-up by D+5 was planned to ensure some nine divisions with a proportion of armour being available, exclusive of airborne troops. However, a study of weather conditions in the Channel in May over a number of years indicated that up to one day in four might be unsuitable for beach working. The effect of this might reduce our forces available on D+ 5 to only seven divisions. Subsequent build-up was to be at the rate of one division per day (again assuming favourable weather) and the bridgehead was to be developed to the general line Trouville-Alençon-Mont St Michel by D +14, by which time it was hoped to have completed the reduction of Cherbourg. Later staff studies indicated that this timing was probably very optimistic. Meanwhile the Cossac plan made certain reservations; the total number of enemy first line divisions immediately available in western Europe to reinforce Normandy was not to exceed twelve, and not more than an additional fifteen divisions should be moved into France from other theatres during the first two mon...

Table of contents

• Title page
• TABLE OF CONTENTS
• FOREWORD
• MAPS
• DIAGRAMS
• INTRODUCTION
• CHAPTER ONE - The Second Front
• CHAPTER TWO - The Appointment of the Higher Command for Operation ‘Overlord’ and the Evolution of the Revised Outline Plan
• CHAPTER THREE - The Inter-Service Organization for “Overlord” and the Order of Battle of the Invasion Forces
• CHAPTER FOUR - The Plan
• CHAPTER FIVE - Forging the Weapon
• CHAPTER SIX - The Mounting Of An Amphibious Operation
• CHAPTER SEVEN - The Battle of Normandy: I. The Assault
• CHAPTER EIGHT - The Battle of Normandy: 2. The Establishment of the Initial Bridgehead and the Capture of Cherbourg
• CHAPTER NINE - The Battle of Normandy: 3. The Break-out. The Battle of the Mortain-Falaise Pocket, and the Advance to the River Seine
• CHAPTER TEN - Review of the Battle of Normandy
• CHAPTER ELEVEN - The Development of Allied Strategy North of the Seine
• CHAPTER TWELVE - The Drive Across the Pas de Calais to Belgium, the Clearance of the Channel Ports and the Battle of Arnhem
• CHAPTER THIRTEEN - The Clearance of the Scheldt Estuary and Opening of the Port of Antwerp
• CHAPTER FOURTEEN - Preparations for the Battle of the Rhineland. The Clearance of the West Bank of the River Meuse
• CHAPTER FIFTEEN - The Battle of the Ardennes
• CHAPTER SIXTEEN - The Battle of the Rhineland
• CHAPTER SEVENTEEN - The Battle of the Rhine
• CHAPTER EIGHTEEN - The Advance to the Elbe
• CHAPTER NINETEEN - The Drive to the Baltic
• CHAPTER TWENTY - The Surrender
• CHAPTER TWENTY-ONE - ‘21 Army Group’ becomes ‘British Army of the Rhine’