North Africa Campaign: A Logistics Assessment

Major Mark D. Kitchen

• Publisher: Lucknow Books
• Year: 2015
• eBook ISBN: 9781786250605
• Topic: History
• Subtopic: European History
• Index: History

This study analyzes the logistics operations of the North Africa Campaign. The thesis covers wholesale and retail level preparedness and execution of the U.S. ground force sustainment following the Allied landings in northwest Africa in November 1942. The analysis concludes with the German surrender in Tunisia in May 1943.The logistical efforts of the campaign are studied against the framework of modern Airland Battle doctrine. The functional areas of manning, fueling, arming, fixing, and transporting are assessed by the doctrinal imperatives of anticipation, integration, continuity, responsiveness, and improvisation.

CHAPTER ONE—INTRODUCTION

In James Huston’s definitive history of Army logistics, The Sinews of War, he wrote that “War frequently is likened to a game of chess, but chess is no strategic game, for there is no logistics.”{1} Strategic logistics dictated the when and where of America’s earliest combat involvement in World War II—Operation TORCH and the subsequent North Africa Campaign.

From this campaign emerged some of the most notable military leaders in the history of American modern warfare. Eisenhower, Patton, Bradley are names synonymous with the United States’ most important World War II successes. Much of the credit for these accomplishments must be attributed to the hard work and creativity of the military’s service and support branches. Logisticians faced the monumental task of supporting highly mechanical warfare against a formidable enemy. War would be fought in two hemispheres across vast oceans. In North Africa, Americans would encounter harsh terrain and climate coupled with a poor industrial and transportation infrastructure. The North Africa Campaign of 1942-1943 presented innumerable challenges to the U.S. logistics structure.

Logistically, the 1930’s was a critical period for the American Army. This was an Army armed and trained on the heels of the Great Depression. Research and development of new and improved weapon systems and other military equipment before June 1940 was restricted because of lack of funds. From 1925-1940, the average annual expenditure in this area was only 2.5 million dollars, the preponderance of which was given to the Ordnance Department, limiting the Medical Department and Quartermaster Corps to less than $20,000 per year. In 1937, Congress appropriated only $2,000 for the development of clothing, equipment, and motor vehicles.{2}

The fall of Poland in 1939 and France in 1940 to the Germans, coupled with the potential of war with Japan forced planners to consider potential U.S. involvement. Two years was a short time to build a highly mobile fighting force. Our first campaign—North Africa—would be a demanding first test.

The primary research question for the following study is: How effective was the logistical support of the North Africa Campaign (8 November 1942-13 May 1943)? Further, was the United States Army prepared to logistically support desert combat following the invasion of North Africa in November 1942? How could logistical shortcomings have been prevented, eased, or eliminated? How does the support provided during the campaign stand up to the scrutiny of today’s Airland Battle doctrine sustainment imperatives (by functional area)? What were the key sustainment lessons learned concerning support of intensive desert combat operations?

In order to pursue and answer the research questions, a general understanding of the strategic and tactical operations is required. What follows is a background summary which puts this study into its proper context and provides a framework for this logistics assessment.

THE BRITISH IN NORTH AFRICA

1939 saw the beginning of war in Europe. Adolph Hitler’s Wehrmacht marched almost at will throughout the continent. Poland crumbled under the German onslaught in September of that year. By July of 1940, Norway, Belgium, Holland and France were occupied and under German domination.

Italy, though not a dominant military force in Europe, had aligned itself with Germany. The Italians had participated to a limited degree in the final moments of the fall of France. Not to be outdone by the German’s success, Mussolini directed Italian forces to attack British holdings in the Mediterranean, particularly in East Africa.

In September 1940, while the Battle of Britain raged in the skies of England, the Italians made their move. Using the diversion to their advantage, Italian forces stationed in Libya attacked a much smaller British force in Egypt. The attack bogged down with little success and the Italians reluctantly agreed to accept a German offer of help. Though Italy demonstrated little military prowess, they opened yet another front in October by invading Greece via Albania. Hitler had previously opposed this maneuver and temporarily withdrew his offer of support to the Libyan operation.

When both the Italians’ Libyan and Balkan campaigns began to falter, Hitler provided support to both. Security of the German southern flank was of critical importance to the German plan for the blitzkrieg of Russia in the summer of 1941. Hitler’s military support also served to maintain the morale of the Italians and preserve the prestige of the Axis alliance. If Italy had fallen, the possibility existed that they could strike a separate peace accord with the British. Additionally, the free use of the Mediterranean by the British for future operations against the Axis powers could complicate or prevent a total German victory.{3}

To assist the Italian forces in east Africa, Hitler provided an armored force under the command of Generalleutnant Erwin Rommel. Rommel’s force, the German Afrika Korps, was an extension of Italian forces. Under the agreement, Hitler provided Rommel general directives only after Mussolini had approved them.

By April 1941, the Afrika Korps had torn across Libya until only the port city of Tobruk remained in British hands (Map #1). The British decision to hold Tobruk at all cost was key to the eventual security of the region. Rommel desperately needed a suitable port from which to support future operations deep into Egypt. The British garrison survived two major attacks by Rommel and seven months of siege before being relieved.{4} Without Tobruk Rommel’s Afrika Korps was never able to advance beyond Salum in Egypt, primarily because of supply shortages and stiff opposition from General Wavell’s Western Desert Force (Br.).

Wavell came under significant pressure to relieve Tobruk three months into the siege. He ordered an attack over the frontier in mid-June. In what is considered to be a major tactical blunder, he split his two available divisions into six semi-independent task forces and committed them piecemeal.{5} He suffered heavy losses and withdrew eastward from the Libyan-Egyptian border.

Source: Atlas of the Second World War ROMMEL’S FIRST OFFENSIVE 24 March-15 June 1941 (Map 1)

In July 1941, General Sir Claude Auchinleck succeeded Wavell in command of all British forces in theater. Under his charge, the old Western Desert Force was restructured and by October became the Eighth Army (Br.). The mounting of an offensive was of the utmost importance.

The new Eighth Army (Br.) Commander, General Alan Cunningham, prepared his forces to counter Rommel’s recently reinforced Afrika Korps.{6} Cunningham’s Army had recently been resupplied with American light tanks and he hoped to numerically overwhelm the Axis forces. He attacked on 18 November 1941 (Map #2), achieving complete surprise and seizing key terrain near Tobruk. Fighting ensued for six weeks in a series of small, uncoordinated actions with no coordinated front.

Because of indecisiveness on Cunningham’s part, Auchinleck personally assumed command of the operation. He forced the Germans back from Tobruk and Rommel narrowly escaped a British encirclement in late December. While Auchinleck enjoyed limited success, the Afrika Korps had the opportunity to reinforce and prepare for Rommel’s second offensive.

Source: Atlas of the Second World War AUCHINLECK’S OFFENSIVE 16 November – 31 December 1941(Map 2)

Major General Ritchie followed Auchinleck in command of the Eighth Army (Br.) in December. During the next six months, Rommel dealt Ritchie a series of tactical blows (Map #3). Ultimately, Tobruk fell to the overpowering strength of German dive bombers and artillery. Plentiful stocks of transportation assets, gasoline and other supplies fell into Rommel’s hands.

With Tobruk now under Axis control, Rommel and Hitler believed that the capture of the Nile valley was now a real possibility.{7} General Auchinleck again rose to the occasion and assumed command. Though he had lost some 80,000 men, the British finally stopped an equally exhausted and depleted Axis Army near El Alamein, Egypt.{8}

When General Montgomery took charge of the Eighth Army (Br.) in August of 1942, he brought with him a new fighting philosophy. Further withdrawals to the east were not in order. Forces would be massed and no more small independent units would be employed. Montgomery would fight Rommel on the El Alamein line.{9} After repulsing the last Afrika Korps offensive at Alam Haifa, the stage was set for the Battle of El Alamein.

Montgomery’s plan was executed in three phases. The first phase, called the “Break-In”, was a battle for position and gave the British key terrain. The second phase, “The Dogfight”, would attrit enemy forces and supplies to such a degree, they would be unable to withstand the knockout punch. The third phase, “The Breakout”, would collapse the enemy’s El Alamein positions.{10}

Montgomery’s plan was executed to perfection and by 4 November 1942, the Battle of El Alamein had been won.

With the Afrika Korps now in full retreat, Montgomery’s task was now to link up with Allied Forces in Tunisia. It was hoped to isolate the Axis Forces there and force their ultimate defeat.

THE GENESIS OF OPERATION TORCH

By 1939, numerous strategic plans had been developed by the U.S. Joint Planning Committee. The committee had previously developed the “color” plans for directing war toward individual nations (i.e., the ORANGE plan for war against Japan). But, by the late 1930’s, it became apparent to planners that the next war would be fought against...

Table of contents

• Title page
• TABLE OF CONTENTS
• ABSTRACT
• CHAPTER ONE-INTRODUCTION
• CHAPTER TWO - METHODOLOGY AND LITERATURE
• CHAPTER THREE - THE SUSTAINMENT STRUCTURE
• CHAPTER FOUR - SUSTAINMENT ACTIVITIES
• CHAPTER FIVE - CONCLUSION
• BIBLIOGRAPHY