The Second Front: Grand Strategy And Civil-Military Relations Of Western Allies And The USSR, 1938-1945

Captain Denys Schur

• Publisher: Lucknow Books
• Year: 2014
• eBook ISBN: 9781782898177
• Topic: History
• Subtopic: European History
• Index: History

The debate about grand strategy in the Second World War has scarcely ended even in the 21st Century. The present study examines the classical issue of the grand strategy in Europe and the anti-Hitler coalition as concerns the US-UK-Soviet exchange about the Second Front. The great phenomenon of the Second World War was the creation of an unprecedented military alliance between the western powers and the Soviet Union. Due to mutual antagonism, inter-Allied cooperation during the Second World War was very complicated and at times extremely tense. Perhaps the most acute disagreement in the relationship between the Allies was the "Second Front" controversy. Despite desperate Soviet demands to open the Second Front as soon as possible, the Western Allies launched a massive cross-channel operation in the northwestern Europe only in June 1944. This thesis analyses the reasons why it took the western powers so long to organize and execute such an operation and its implications for the post-war order. The detailed analysis of the grand strategy during the Second World War is one of the ways to comprehend the violent 20th Century amid the carnage of the 21st Century and its own problems of grand strategy.

III. — THE SECOND FRONT AS A RESULT OF GRAND STRATEGIES AND CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS OF WESTERN ALLIES AND USSR DURING THE SECOND WORLD WAR.

Inter-allied cooperation during the Second World War can be characterized as the clash of different politico-military approaches to attaining a primary objective. Each of the Allied countries, Great Britain, the United States and the Soviet Union, had as the common goal the destruction of Nazi Germany, but at the same time each of them pursued its own geo-political interests, and therefore had distinct and peculiar grand strategies. Each of the grand strategies, in turn, stemmed from different historical heritages, civil-military relations and political structures that often made the cooperation among the Allies complicated and uneven, and at times even suspicious.

The opening of the Second Front in Europe in June 1944 by the massive cross channel operation in northern France marked the highest point of development in relations between the Western Allies and the Soviet Union, and at the same time the starting point for the deterioration and eventual breakdown of this relationship. It can be said that the “Second Front” issue had been the pivotal question in building Allied strategy from the time the anti-Hitler coalition was created till the very moment of the invasion of Normandy. The opening of the Second Front in Northern Europe deprived the Germans of any chance of revival. There was no longer any hope for the Nazi leaders, not counting Hitler’s maniacal belief in final victory, that Germany would be able to prevail over numerically and materially superior adversaries while fighting a two-front war. Yet, until this moment, the hope that Germany would be able, if not to win the war, then to end fighting on acceptable terms, was quite alive among many members of the German high command.

According to Richard Overy, the Allies were able to win the Second World War because they created material superiority over the Axis powers. “Alliance between the British Empire, the Soviet Union and the United States created overwhelming superiority in manpower and resources. If there is any consensus about why the Allies won, it rests on the unassailable evidence that one side vastly outnumbered and outproduced the other.”{35} He also noted that the Axis powers were favored by the material balance up to 1942. “Up to 1942 the balance favored the aggressor and might well allow them to win before American economic power could be placed in the scales.”{36} But after that, due to the unprecedented speed of the American rearmament and revival of the Soviet economy, the balance of resources swung in favor of the Allies. Richard Overy wrote,

“By 1943 the material gulf was huge. That year the Axis produced 43,000 aircraft; the Allies produced 151,000. The temptation has always been that to assume that figures speak for themselves. The balance of populations and raw materials greatly favoured the Allies: hence whatever the Axis powers did they would always come up against the strategic dead end of material inferiority.”{37}

However, the considerable material superiority by 1943 did not allow Allies to finish the war earlier than May 1945. Nor did this factor help them open the Second Front in Europe, which had been a subject of desperate Russian pleas since June 1941, earlier than in June 1944. Given these facts, it might be easily assumed that there were serious reasons preventing the Allies from opening the Second Front in Europe before June 1944. There is no doubt that the opening of the Second Front in Europe was the result of the grand strategies Great Britain, the United States and the Soviet Union carried out in the course of the Second World War. This study argues that the differences in grand strategies that each of the Allied countries adhered to played the main role in the decision of the Western Allies to postpone the large-scale military operation in the northwestern Europe until June 1944.

The incompatibility of visions and approaches on the ways of how the war might be and should be won among the Allied countries precluded the opening of the Second Front in northwestern Europe until June 1944.

It is accepted that political leaders from time to time might change the directions of their strategies in order to achieve more vital objectives or find a compromise with an opponent. The opening of the Second Front in Europe became possible after every member of the “Grand Alliance” gave up some of their principles and aligned their strategies thereby forging a global strategy against Nazism. Once the common goal, the destruction of Nazi Germany, had been achieved, they diverged again.

A. — IMAGINARY AND REAL REASONS FOR THE POSTPONEMENT OF THE SECOND FRONT

There has existed a theory, fervently advocated by Soviet historiography, that the Western Allies were reluctant to open the Second Front in Europe due to their desire for the Soviet Union to fight the bulk of the German armed forces alone, so that the two hostile countries would exhaust each other and the Western powers could then establish their domination in Europe at a little cost. William R. Keylor, in this regard, wrote,

“Defenders of the Soviet Union have detected a cynical motive behind this Anglo-American hesitation, namely, the desire to see Russia bled white while her Western allies conserved their military and economic resources in order to step in at the last moment to replace defeated Germany and pre-empt exhausted Russia as a dominant power on the continent.”{38}

The development of the historical events indicates that it is hardly true.

First of all, although the main burden of fighting the German army lay on Russia’s shoulders, the Western Allies were in a difficult situation as well. Britain was still being bombed heavily. Her troops were in action in North Africa and she had the burden of organizing and carrying out the northern convoys of British and American supplies to Russia in accordance with the Lend-Lease program. The United States, literally, was involved in the war on two sides, in the Pacific and European theaters, and was making tremendous efforts in rearmament and mobilizing resources. Under such circumstances, neither of the Western allies could remain militarily inactive and focused on conserving their military and economic resources.

Secondly, the unwillingness to open the Second Front could always plant the seeds of a separate peace between Stalin and Hitler. Both, the British and Americans clearly understood that sooner or later they would have to do something to relieve the pressure from the Russians, and that the postponement of the Second Front in Europe would only increase the possibility of a separate peace.

Finally, both Britain and America clearly understood that the victory in this war depended on the survival of the Soviet Union. “The whole question of whether we win or lose the war depends on the Russians,”{39} said President Roosevelt in the late summer of 1942, probably the most difficult time for the Soviet troops. This situation required the maximum possible assistance of all kinds, and not a hesitation to conduct military operations in the Western Europe. That is why it would be insane for the British and Americans to risk losing the war by waiting for the last moment to step in.

In summary, the statement that the Western Allies were waiting for the right moment to launch large-scale military operations in Western Europe is not very convincing because the Western Allies needed the Second Front as much as did the Soviet Union. The postponement of the cross-channel operation until June 1944 was anything, but an attempt to win the war at the expense of the Soviet Union.

The development of events during the Second World War indicates that the opening of the Second Front in northern France was opened in June 1944 mainly because of the following reasons:

• The differences in strategic approach to conducting a large-scale military operation in Europe between Great Britain and the United States, which entailed lengthy strategic debate and, as a result, the postponement of the operation until June 1944;
• Insufficient means and forces, especially on the American side, for conducting amphibious operations prior to June 1944;
• The considerable improvement in the tactical performance of the Red Army, the growing capability of the Soviet Union to destroy Germany even without Allied military assistance and, as result, the possible Soviet domination of Europe.

B. — THE SOVIET DEMANDS AND ANGLO-AMERICAN REACTIONS

The Soviet pressure on the Western allies for the establishment of a Second Front in Europe began from the very moment the Soviet Union was involved in the Second World War. Indeed, in his first communication to Churchill on July 18, 1941, which was in answer to the first massage from the Prime Minister, and in which he was trying to break the ice and to establish both personal and official relationships, Stalin wrote,

“Perhaps it is not out of place to mention that the position of the Soviet forces at the front remains tense. The consequences of the unexpected breach of the Non-Aggression Pact by Hitler, as well as of the sudden attack against the Soviet Union—both facts bringing advantages to the German troops—still remain to be felt by the Soviet armies.”

“It seems to me therefore that the military situation of the Soviet Union, as well as of Great Britain, would be considerably improved if there could be established a front against Hitler in the West—northern France, and in the North—the Arctic.”

“A front in northern France could not only divert Hitler’s forces from the East, but at the same time would make it impossible for the Hitler to invade Britain. The establishment of the front just mentioned would be popular with the British Army, as well as with the whole population of the southern England. I fully realize the difficulties involved with the establishment of such a front. I believe however that in spite of the difficulties it should be formed not only in the interests of our common cause, but also in the interests of Great Britain herself. This is the most propitious moment for the establishment of such a front, because now Hitler’s forces are diverted to the East and he has not yet had a chance to consolidate the position occupied by him in the East.”

“It is still easier to establish a front in the North. Here, on the part of Great Britain, would be necessary only naval and air operations, without the landing of troops or artillery. The Soviet military, naval and air forces would take part in such an operation. We would welcome it if Great Britain could transfer to this theater of war something like one light division or more of the Norwegian volunteers, who could be used in Northern Norway to organize rebellion against the Germans.”{40}

Churchill’s first reaction to the Soviet appeal was resentment toward the unconcealed Soviet demand to open the Second Front right away after almost two years of collaboration with Hitler. From Churchill’s perspective, the real Second Front was the one Stalin abandoned in August 1939 by making a non-aggression pact with Germany. From that time up to June 1941, the Soviet Government had watched the destruction of this front in France and in the air over Britain and had done nothing but assisted Germany in some minor ways. All that time, the Great Britain remained alone facing the full strength of the German army and, as a result, its resources by June 1941 were quite limited. Churchill tried to remind Stalin about that in the most comprehensive terms,

“You must remember that we have been fighting alone for more than a year, and that, though our resources are growing, and will grow fast from now on, we are at the utmost strain both at home and in the Middle East by land and air, and also that a Battle of the Atlantic, on which our life depends, and the movement of all our convoys in the teeth of the U-boat and Focke-Wulf blockade, strains our naval resources, great though they be, to the utmost limit.”{41}

The first reaction from the American side was ambivalence. On the one hand, President Roosevelt insisted on immediate military aid to Russia. On the other hand, the President and his followers faced not only anti-interventionist opposition, but also the negative assessment of military experts as to the wisdom of sending military aid to Russia. This assessment was made on the grounds that the Soviet Union would not be able to withstand the German onslaught, and therefore that military help of any kind would not be vindicated. Mark Stoler, in his book “Allies and Adversaries,” in this regard, wrote, “Two days after the initiation of BARBAROSSA Stimson informed Roosevelt...that Germany would be preoccupied with conquering Russia for no less than one but no more than three months...”{42}

Yet, despite all the negative assessments and predictions, both the British and American governments realized the fact that the German invasion of Russia dramatically altered the values and relationships of the war. The Soviet Union, with its huge natural resources and manpower, was the country that had the potential to stop Nazi advancement and create the preconditions for a successful land offensive against Germany. Mark Stoler wrote that, “As early as June 26 the president had predicted that if the eastern front proved to be more than a temporary “diversion,” it would “mean the liberation of Europe from Nazi domination”—a clear recognition of Soviet potential to alter dramatically the shape and outcome of the war against Germany.”{43} Winston Churchill, in turn, said, “...we rejoiced to have this mighty nation (USSR) in the battle with us, and we all felt that even if the Soviet armies were driven back to the Ural Mountains Russia would still exert an immense and, if she preserved in the war, an ultimately decisive force.”{44}

This attitude toward the Soviet Union was reinforced in the late summer and early fall of 1941, when the development of events on the Eastern Front gave some indications that the Soviet country would be able to survive the German attack and be the essential factor in victory over Germany. According to Mark Stoler, a number of prominent American officials, such as leading advisor Harry Hopkins, former ambassador to the Soviet Union Joseph Davies, former military attaché Colonel Philip Faymonlill, “apparently convinced the president by midsummer that the odds favored Russian survival, at least into 1942.”{45}

This early recognition of the Western Allies that the Soviet Union would be the decisive fo...

Table of contents

• Title page
• TABLE OF CONTENTS
• ABSTRACT
• ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
• I. INTRODUCTION
• II. THE COMING OF THE ANTI-HITLER COALITION
• III. - THE SECOND FRONT AS A RESULT OF GRAND STRATEGIES AND CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS OF WESTERN ALLIES AND USSR DURING THE SECOND WORLD WAR.
• IV. THE SECOND FRONT AS THE BEGINNING OF COLD WAR
• V. - CONCLUSION
• REQUEST FROM THE PUBLISHER
• LIST OF REFERENCES