Zero!

Martin Caiden, Masatake Okumiya, Jiro Hirokoshi

• Publisher: Verdun Press
• Year: 2014
• eBook ISBN: 9781782898405
• Topic: History
• Subtopic: European History
• Index: History

"This is the thrilling saga of war in the air in the Pacific Theater of Operations during World War II told from the Japanese point of view. It is the story of the men who created, led, and fought in the deadly Zero fighter plane. In their own words, Jiro Horikoshi (who designed the Zero), Masatake Okumiya (leader of many Zero squadrons), and Saburo Sakai (Japan's leading surviving fighter ace) as well as many other men, tell the inside story of developing the Zero and Japan's air force. They tell what it felt like to bomb American ships and to shoot down American airplanes - and then of their shock when the myth of invincibility was shattered by the new Lightning, Hellcat, and Corsair fighters. They tell of the fight against the growing strength of a remorseless American enemy; and how, in desperation the Japanese High Command ordered the creation of deadly suicide squadrons, the Kamikaze. And finally they reveal their reaction to the dropping of the atomic bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki."-Print ed.

1 — The Sino-Japanese Incident

At certain times in her history, economic, politicals and other implications have forced Japan into armed conflict with neighboring countries. Although such action may be justified, the nature of war demands from the belligerent nation a high cost in human lives, the drainage of natural resources, and the “judgment of God.”

Universal intimacy with the horrors of war makes it superfluous to discuss in detail the misery of the vanquished; however, recent history illustrates clearly that the victor also may lose far more than he gains from war. For large countries in an economically sound condition, damage usually is confined to relatively small areas, and the economy suffers but little. For a nation such as Japan, however, the damaging effects of only one major defeat in war may be so far-reaching and so profound that a subsequent series of victories will be unable to offset the damage incurred in the previous defeat.

We feel that we can justify the thesis taught to the Japanese masses whereby they were, subsequent to the Sino-Japanese and Russo-Japanese wars, led to believe that Japan would not and could not lose a war. Be that as it may, the military and political leaders in whose hands lies the future of a nation should concentrate their efforts on devising means not merely of winning a war but of preventing defeat, should armed conflict prove inevitable. Should these national leaders be misled by the outward appearance of the armed might at their disposal and throw their nation into the cataclysm of war without an exhaustive study of the implications of their actions, they cannot themselves escape the consequences of their acts. Their actions are nothing short of outrageous or, in modem parlance, subversive, regardless of theoretical justifications.

It has been the tragedy of modern Japan that those great and humane statesmen who attempted to follow the principles of “fair play” in international conduct often met death, and that several cabinets composed of such men fell by the wayside before the pressure of the military cliques.

We, the Japanese, must never forget that it was criminal to permit this situation to exist; that because of this intolerable political blindness we pushed millions of our good neighbors into misery and suffering beyond the comprehension of most Japanese civilians; and, finally, that our own foolish actions hurled Japan into the present economic abyss from which she finds it so difficult to emerge. We must provide some form of compensation for those countries on which we have visited destruction; we must maintain the utmost vigilance to prevent the repetition of past mistakes.

Despite this attitude, so necessary to peaceful international conduct, there arise occasions when armed might is indispensable to a nation’s welfare. Those persons who have been invested with their nation’s military responsibility must, without regard to politics, do their utmost to execute the duties entrusted to them.

To meet its military requirements, a nation will strive for the most effective weapons and manpower. Several decades ago Japan recognized adequate airpower as the weapon most suited to solve its national defense problems and accordingly stressed the growth of that arm, notably in the naval field.

On July 7, 1937, the Sino-Japanese Incident flared on the Asian mainland, almost a quarter of a century after we had undertaken to develop our naval air power. At this time the Navy was prepared to counter any eventuality with this striking force:

CARRIER STRIKING FORCE

FIRST CARRIER DIVISION

Under command of Rear Admiral Shiro Takasu, in Ryujo:

Ryujo, Captain Katsuo Abe:

12 Type 95 carrier-based fighters

15 Type 94 carrier-based dive bombers

Hosho, Captain Ryunosuke Kusaka:

9 Type 95 carrier-based fighters

6 Type 92 carrier-based attack bombers

SECOND CARRIER DIVISION

Under command of Rear Admiral Rokuro Horie, in Kaga:

Kaga, Captain Ayao Inagaki

12 Type 90 carrier-based fighters

12 Type 94 carrier-based dive bombers

12 Type 89 carrier-based attack bombers

12 Type 96 carrier-based attack bombers

LAND-BASED AIR FORCE

FIRST COMBINED AIR FLOTILLA

Under command of Captain Mitchitaro Tozuka, at Taipei (later Shanghai):

Kisarazu Air Corps, Captain Ryuzo Takenaka

6 Type 95 land-based attack bombers

24 Type 96 land-based attack bombers

Kanoya Air Corps, Captain Sizue Ishii

9 Type 95 carrier-based fighters

18 Type 96 land-based attack bombers

SECOND COMBINED AIR FLOTILLA

Under command of Rear Admiral Teizo Mitsunami, at Ohmura (later Shanghai):

12th Air Corps, Captain Osamu Imamura

12 Type 95 carrier-based fighters

12 Type 94 carrier-based dive bombers

12 Type 92 carrier-based attack bombers

13th Air Corps, Captain Sadatoshi Senda

12 Type 96 carrier-based fighters

12 Type 96 carrier-based dive bombers

12 Type 96 carrier-based attack bombers

Total strength: 66—carrier-based fighters

51—carrier-based dive bombers

54—carrier-based attack bombers

48—land-based attack bombers

219 combat-ready warplanes

There were also available the thirty scout and observation seaplanes of the coastal defense ship Izumo, the flagship of the Third Fleet (stationed at Shanghai); the seaplane tender Kamoi; and various cruisers.

When the fighting spread to Shanghai on August 13, 1937, our intelligence reported that the Japanese garrison in that city was completely encircled by a strong Chinese force, supported by three hundred planes based in the Nanking area. Additional reports revealed that a concerted Chinese attack could in a few days wipe out to the last man the Japanese marines who were isolated in Shanghai. The marine garrison faced overwhelming numbers of Chinese troops; since no airfield within Shanghai was usable, our men were denied local air coverage.

On August 14, following a series of sharp land battles, the Chinese planes opened bombing attacks against our forces in and around Shanghai. Even as the raids began, a single Type 90 scout-observation seaplane of the Izumo attacked the enemy formations, downing one fighter. This first aerial battle forecast greater commitments of planes by both sides.

On the evening of August 14, the Type 96 land-based attack bombers (Nells) of the Kanoya Air Corps based at Taipei (Formosa) attacked Chinese positions. On the following day Nells of the Kisarazu Air Corps from Ohmura Base on Kyushu Island began their bombing raids, and, commencing on the sixteenth, the carrier planes joined the rising tide of raids against the enemy’s forces. These attacks of the Nells constituted the first “transoceanic” bombing raids.

For many years the Japanese Army and Navy had hidden their armament and weapons; the public saw only the obsolete models of heavy guns, warships and planes. In contrast to this policy, other countries obviously attempted to frighten their enemies into submission through constant exhibition of their military forces. Knowledge of the true performance of foreign weapons was denied the public; the propaganda mills ground out exaggerated reports of the actual strength of each nation.

By importing many foreign aircraft and weapons, we in Japan were able to gauge approximately what these weapons could and could not do. By keeping our planes and other armament within our borders and free from prying eyes, we led the world seriously to underestimate the combat strength of our naval aviation.

The so-called transoceanic bombing missions of the Sino-Japanese Incident revealed for the first time the actual capabilities of Japanese warplanes. The long-distance raids by the Nell bombers, averaging two thousand kilometers (1250 miles) for each raid, exceeded by a considerable margin the previous maximum-range attacks of any country’s planes. Further appreciation of this startling advance in aerial warfare was possible when it was revealed that these airplanes were carrying out their attacks in extremely poor weather, flying from Formosa and Kyushu against targets in and around Shanghai, Nanking, Hanchou, and other cities.

The elation which swept the Japanese populace with the announcements of the bombing was understandable. We had a powerful, long-range, fair-and-foul-weather, day-and-night bombing force. Our planes constantly set new records; the only air battles fought across an appreciable expanse of water up to this time had been those undertaken in World War I across the Straits of Dover and its vicinity.

Despite the obvious quality of our planes and the caliber of our pilots, the Navy’s Air Force suffered heavy losses in the early days of the incident. There was much to be learned in the art of long-distance attack which could be acquired in peacetime, but the price which the Chinese exacted for these lessons was severe.

We learned—almost at once, and with devastating thoroughness—that bombers are no match for enemy fighter planes. We lost many men as this lesson was administered, including Lieutenant Commander Nitta, Air Group Commander, Lieutenant (JG) Umebayashi and Ensign Yamanouchi of the land-based attack-bomber groups, and other pilots well known in Japan.

The planes of the aircraft carrier Kaga suffered disastrously. The twelve Type 89 carrier-based attack bombers, led by Group Commander Lieutenant Commander Iwai, left the Kaga on August 17 for a raid against Hangchou. Bad weather prevented a rendezvous with an expected fighter escort, and near their target the bombers were attacked by a group of Chinese fighter planes. Eleven bombers, including the commander’s, were shot down. Lieutenant (JG) Tanaka managed to bring his bullet-riddled and crippled bomber safely back to the carrier; otherwise, the fate of the attacking group would never have been known, and another bomber formation might have suffered a similar fate. Tanaka 3 report astonished the officers of the fleet, and immediate warnings were issued to all bomber groups to take special precautions against the defending Chinese fighters.

We discovered that when our fighter planes provided escort to, over, and from the target such incidents did not occur. Comparing the shattered unescorted bomber groups with the relatively unharmed formations which were protected by fighters, the Navy reacted quickly. The Kaga was ordered to return immediately to Sasebo and to receive a full complement of the new Type 96 carrier-based fighters (Claudes).

Although the fighters had never flown in service operations from an aircraft carrier, the gravity of the situation warranted the risk of accidents. In early September the Second Combined Air Flo...

Table of contents

• Title page
• TABLE OF CONTENTS
• DEDICATION
• CHARTS AND BATTLE-MAPS
• ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
• PREFACE
• 1 - The Sino-Japanese Incident
• 2 - Peace Attempts Fail- The Fighting Continues
• 3 - Zero Fighters in China
• 4 - Eve of the Pacific War
• 5 - Opening of Hostilities Followed By Anxiety
• 6 - Prewar Anticipation
• 7 - The Pearl Harbor Attack: Overwhelming Victory as the War Begins
• 8 - Zero Fighters Assure Victories: Operations in the Philippines and the Dutch East Indies
• 9 - The Sea Battle Off the Coast of Malaya
• 10 - The Wake Island Operation
• 11 - The Indian Ocean Operation
• 12 - The Coral Sea Battle
• 13 - The Midway and Aleutians Operations: The Turning Point of the War
• 14 - Reorganization of the Combined Fleet
• 15 - Change in Warship-Building Policy
• 16 - Desperate Air Operations Over Long-Range Conditions: The Saga of Saburo Sakai
• 17 - Succession of Air Battles After Guadalcanal
• 18 - The Guadalcanal Campaign: Evaluation of American Warplanes
• 19 - “Operation A”-I-Go Sakusen
• 20 - Admiral Yamamoto Dies in Action
• 21 - Battle of Santa Cruz
• 22 - Our Situation Becomes Critical: Air Battles in the Solomons and Rabaul Areas
• 23 - The End is in Sight: Defense of the Mariana Islands
• 24 - The Kamikaze Suicide Attacks
• 25 - Air Raids and Earthquakes
• 26 - Defense of the Mainland: The B-29 Appears
• 27 - Carrier Planes Raid the Homeland
• 28 - The Atomic Bombings: Personal Observations of Masatake Okumiya
• 29 - Jiro Horikoshi’s Final War Diary
• CHARTS