Intelligence

Col. Hoang Ngoc Lung

• Publisher: Normanby Press
• Year: 2015
• eBook ISBN: 9781786254566
• Topic: History
• Subtopic: Military & Maritime History
• Index: History

Includes over 10 maps and illustrationsThis monograph forms part of the Indochina Monograph series written by senior military personnel from the former Army of the Republic of Vietnam who served against the northern communist invasion."The war in Vietnam was often called an intelligence war. The challenges and responsibilities placed on the South Vietnam—United States—Free World intelligence community were great and constant.During this long war the entire intelligence program improved each day as our data base expanded, as more was learned about the elusive enemy, personnel were trained, and new procedures and techniques were tested and found effective.The most rewarding experience in intelligence activities during the Vietnam war was the very close cooperation and coordination between American and Vietnamese military intelligence personnel and systems. It was this cooperation that helped RVNAF military intelligence upgrade and become self-reliant during the post-cease-fire period.This monograph attempts to record all the facts concerning intelligence activities, its organizations and coordination procedures, its successes and failures during the period from 1965 to the final days of the Republic of Vietnam. In this attempt, one of the difficulties I faced was the lack of documentation to help make my work more accurate and more substantial. To overcome this shortcoming, I have interviewed several former colleagues of mine, American and Vietnamese, all of them highly experienced with intelligence activities in Vietnam. Apart from their invaluable contributions, most of the writing was based on my personal knowledge and experience."-Author's Preface.

CHAPTER I—INTRODUCTION

During the Vietnam war, there was a constant improvement of intelligence as each day passed. It is usually recognized that during the final years of cooperation between the Republic of Vietnam and United States combat forces, the commanders at most echelons were better informed about the enemy than in any war in the histories of these two, nations.

This was made possible because of the close coordination and cooperation between RVN and US Military Intelligence personnel and activities. This cooperation of joint planning, execution and exchange of information was essential because the RVN and the US were faced with an elusive enemy who, justifiably enough, earned such rhetorical qualifications as “unknown” or “mythical”. Knowledge about the enemy, as we confronted him in Vietnam, was not an easy proposition. But it was not an unattainable goal, nor did it elude our success altogether.

There is general agreement that the Vietnam war was a complex venture. It was this complexity that heavily influenced intelligence activities and subjected them to unprecedented challenges. As a result, an examination of intelligence, its organizations, its successes and failures must be made in the context of the war and preceded by an insight into its nature, its historical perspective and the opposing views that each side held with regard to its basic goals in this war.

Nature of the Vietnam War

A recent popular Vietnamese folk song about the war laments:

“A thousand years of domination by the Chinese invaders, A hundred years of domination by the French invaders, Twenty years of internecine fighting, day in day out.”{1}

In just a few phrases, the song eloquently sums up the long history of Vietnam, the history of a small nation constantly plagued by wars. Through many invasions from the North, the Chinese repeatedly attempted to annex the tiny Viet nation, and to subjugate and assimilate the Viet people. During the ten centuries of Chinese domination, from 111 B.C. to 938 A.D., numerous Vietnamese heroes rose up against the invaders to wrest back their independence. No Vietnamese can forget the story of Trieu Quang Phuc, the first Vietnamese military leader who employed guerrilla tactics to defeat the invaders of the Liang kingdom (7th century), or Emperor Quang Trung who by a surprise blitzkrieg, annihilated the Ching corps at the end of the 18th century.{2}

Then came the French who created a colony out of Vietnam for nearly a century from 1858 to 1945. The history of Vietnam under French suzerainty abounds in heroic uprisings and resistance movements, all of them waged with the sole purpose of reclaiming national identity and independence. Not until 1945 was this independence finally restored and precariously maintained before the whole nation was plunged into war against the French who sought again to impose their rule. It was unfortunate that this anti-colonialist war, although fought by the whole people, was led by hard line Communist cadres. This was gradually to change the nature of the war when it became apparent that the Viet Minh regime was leaning toward socialism through the “agrarian reform” of 1950.

Up until that time, the Viet Minh had not revealed the future direction of their regime. The people believed they fought a sacrosanct war for national independence, no one anticipated that the cause they were fighting for was to serve the Communist leaders’ own purpose.

In 1950, the Viet Minh leaders launched a country-wide “Agrarian Reform” campaign, the first step toward creating an egalitarian society. This proved to be their biggest mistake because the excesses and brutality of zealous cadres completely alienated the land-owners and, by extension, most of the educated “petite bourgeoise.”{3} It was a turning point and the seed of ideological difference, heretofore submerged beneath the patriotic fervor, began to take roots.

But the real turnabout tame when the Republic of Vietnam became an independent nation south of the 17th parallel. For the first time since 1945, a sense of national identity prevailed—which emboldened the Vietnamese of the South to defy and oppose the Communist regime in the North. Now that they were able to live under a regime of their choice, they were willing to defend it when it came under threat.

It was not the first time though that the Vietnamese fought among themselves. During its long history, Vietnam had been the theater of many fratricidal wars, the longest and hardest of which lasted over a century, from 1627 to 1774. This was the contest between the Trinh dynasty in the North and the Nguyen dynasty in the South. Within a period of forty-five years, large-scale warfare broke out six Limes in the Dong Hoi area (16th parallel) between the feuding dynasties. In the end, both sides were exhausted and neither was powerful enough to dominate the other. So they reconciled their difference and agreed to coexist on either side of the 16th parallel until 1774 when the Tay Son dynasty defeated both of them and reunified the country.

The remarkable thing about all these civil wars was that no matter which dynasty came to power, the regime remained basically the same and monarchy was maintained. The people by and large hardly felt any difference in their lives.

However, as early as in 1945, when the national purpose focused on reclaiming independence, first from the Japanese and later from the French, a new and most difficult question arose concerning what kind of regime was in store for Vietnam in the immediate future. For although the people would readily accept any government within a definite regime, they would not readily consent to any regime. As a result, a shift in national purpose gradually took hold and the struggle for independence gradually gave way to a conflict whose objective became the search for an appropriate political system. This polarization of political convictions among the Vietnamese turned the conflict into an ideological war fought between the Communists on one side and the Nationalists on the other.

For twenty years, this war dragged on. Its duration was a measure of its complexity because, in contrast with the Trinh-Nguyen contest which was local in nature, the war between the North and the South of Vietnam today was fought under the influence and with the implications of an international conflict.

Communist Viewpoint

To the North Vietnamese, their war aimed at achieving a socialist regime for Vietnam. In their view, the war was a just war led by the Communist Party on behalf of the working class. Their duty lay not only with the national cause but also with the international Communist movement, because the history of international proletarian revolution greatly influenced the way North Vietnam conducted the war. For them, the 1917 Russian Revolution and the Chinese Communist take-over of 1949 had invaluable lessons to be applied to the Vietnam war. As a matter of fact, the North Vietnamese conduct of the war almost exactly duplicated the pattern used by the Chinese Communists. The handbook entitled “Out Enduring Resistance Certainly Wins” by Truong-Chinh who is considered as North Vietnam’s foremost theoretician, contains arguments drawn from Mao Tse Tung’s work, “Yu Chi Chan” (Protracted War). According to Truong-Chinh, the Vietnam war and the war in China bear remarkable resemblance in that they were both fought against much larger and more powerful enemies. Consequently, success must depend upon the time factor. Time was necessary, Truong-Chinh argued, to create a balance of forces which would increasingly favor the underdog.

Oriental philosophy is at the source of this concept of time. Whereas the Western world thinks of time in the short term (time is money), and favors the military concept of lightning war (blitzkrieg) and speedy victory, the Orientals believe they have all the time they need to achieve their goals. To them, perseverance is the key to success. As a result, the guiding principle in China as well as in Vietnam is to “give up space in order to gain time”. Hence, the fundamental approach to conflict is the conduct of protracted war. The

Communists theorized that a protracted war of resistance would progress through three military phases:{4}

First stage: Strategy—defensive; tactics—attack

Second stage: Strategy—stiff resistance (preparing for offensive); tactics—attack

Third stage: Strategy and tactics—counter-offensive

In more descriptive terms, Phase 1 aims at organizing, consolidating and preserving forces; Phase 2 aims at progressively expanding the forces and Phase 3 is the decisive phase whose aim is the destruction of the enemy. The transition from one phase to the next was discussed by Ho Chi Minh, “It is possible to examine the general situation in order to divide it into big stages, but it is not possible to cut off completely one stage from the ocher like cutting bread. The length of each stage depends on the situation in the home country and in the world, and on the chances between the enemy forces and ours.”

Truong-Chinh follows in Mao’s steps when he asserts that Phase 3 can be extended because of the possibility of negotiations. The customary concepts of reciprocation, of give and take, are not included in Truong-Chinh’s idea of negotiation. The Revolution’s goal excludes compromise. Negotiations are conducted with the sole purpose of gaining time, the time necessary to consolidate friendly forces and at the same time to attrite and wear down the enemy. In his work, “People’s War, People’s Army,” Vo Nguyen Giap reasserts that the concept of protracted resistance and the three-phase strategy are the most correct military conduct to confront the enemy’s military strategy of lightning attack and lightning success. According to Giap, protracted war will evolve from guerrilla warfare to conventional warfare and a war of movement coordinated with attacks against enemy’s strongholds. Guerrilla warfare is the kind of war fought by an armed force which is technically inferior and lesser-equipped, but which prevails because it has the morale and spirit to challenge and overcome advanced weapons and technique. However, as Mao observes, guerrilla warfare cannot achieve victory because it can only be likened to the mud which bogs down an enemy but can never destroy him. Hence, guerrilla warfare ought to be closely coordinated with a war of movement and the relative importance of its role depends on the situation pertaining to each phase.

Protracted war, however, cannot be conducted if all the people, all ages and both sexes, do not participate in it, and the people in the rear of the battlefield must support the front. Lenin wrote, “In order to wage a real war, there must be a solid and well organized rear.” The concept of people’s war includes the concept of participation and contribution. Truong Chinn emphasized, “Wealthy people should contribute their wealth, strong people should contribute their strength, talented people should contribute their talents to the Resistance,” for war is not fought only on the military front, it is also fought in all other areas: political, economic and cultural. Political warfare seeks to unite the entire people, while diplomatic activities gain the sympathy of ill the world and isolate the enemy.

The economic struggle strives to achieve a self-sufficient economy and at the same time to “encircle” the enemy’s economy by sabotaging all instruments of production and preventing the enemy from “using the war to feed the war.” The cultural struggle must forge thoughts in order to create in the people the spirit and endurance required for a long war. Various forms of traditional propaganda like folk songs, group singing, and plays are used to inflame the people’s spirit with new thought and dedication.

The three elements: “protracted,” “all people” and “total” are the three principal elements for the conduct of the people’s war, as Mao Tse Tung laid them down However, the Vietnamese Communists have applied this concept of the people’s war with creativeness of their own in order to fit the circumstances and exploit the situation in Vietnam. The situation changed radically after the Geneva Agreement in 1954 which created two political regimes, one in the North and one in the South. In 1960, when North Vietnam became seriously intent on conquering the South, its strategy in South Vietnam still bore the specific imprint of the “people’s war.” Nevertheless, the term “people’s war” apparently was no longer deemed expedient by the North because it would imply the aggressive character of the war. As a result, another label was chosen for the war being waged in the South, a “revolutionary war,” which implied that it was generated by the people of South Vietnam who revolted to overthrow the government of South Vietnam. The goal of the Revolution was to establish a people’s “democratic” regime before crossing over to socialism. But whether “people’s war” or “revolutionary war,” the strategy still called for a protracted struggle to be conducted in three phases. But the concept of protracted war has undergone some change. While maintaining that their strategy was still a protracted war, the North Vietnamese argued that they could achieve their goal in a relatively short time.{5} It is noteworthy that this change in concept could have taken place at the time when there were strong indications that the United States would soon become directly involved in the Vietnam war. The fear that the people and cadre might lose heart at the prospects of a prolonged war against, a great power impelled Le Duan, the Party’s secretary general, to this argument, he emphasized that North Vietnam, having learned from experiences of the 1945-54 war, could achieve an early victory. In order to achieve this early victory, the Communists launched the general offensive, general uprising of 1968, or in conceptual terms, passed on to Phase 3.

After the offensive failed, there was an animated debate among the Communist cadres over the validity of the three-phase strategy.{6} If the strategy were still valid, it implied that the Communists had admitted to the failure of Phase 3 and a retrogression to Phase 2. In effect, through COSVN Resolution No. 9 issued in July 1969 the Communists directed a reversion to the earlier phase through “small attacks but assured successes.” They presented a new argument for it, advocating abandonment of the three-phase strategy and instituting a single phase, the offensive.{7} They insisted that the “revolutionary war” of the South had become a total “people’s war” involving all the people of Vietnam, North and South, and all aspects of their lives, and that the North had always been the “great rear area of the great front-line area.”

South Vietnam Viewpoint

While the Communists always developed and expounded a clearly defined concept of the conduct of the war, the Republic of Vietnam never had a unified concept. To South Vietnam, the war was a defense against Communist aggression from the North. South Vietnam was an advanced outpost of the anti-Communist front in Southeast Asia. As such, it was entitled to help, to receive substantial aid for a? long as it was necessary from the Free World, represented by the United States. Since it was a defensive war, its military strategy was to push ahead with the pacification of the territory and the population, to free them from the influence and threat of the Communists. To confront guerrilla warfare, the Army of South Vietnam had been organized and trained along the lines of a conventional army heavily dependent on fire power and mobility. Military tactics were based on conventional techniques and modern weapons. This was the inevitable by-product of the political circumstances prevailing in South Vietnam. The political instability in South Vietnam resulting from skirmishes between the various religious sects, the “revolution” of 1 November 1963, and the subsequent developments compelled total reliance on the US strategy in the conduct of the war from 1965 to 1969. The strategy called for the expansion of the RVN Armed Forces, from 400,000 to 1,100,000 men and their gradual take-over of combat responsibilities.{8} Following the 8 June 1969 Midway Conference a new program was initiated called Vietnamization. The armed forces of the Republic of Vietnam would gradually accept full responsibility for ground combat operations in place of US forces which along with other Allied forces, would be withdrawn from South Vietnam battlefields. After the Paris Agreement of 1973, and faced with the new military situation and the prospect of diminishing aid, a new concept was conceived for the conduct of the war, “fighting a poor man’s war;” A lesson was learned from this attempt, however. It is easier for an armed force to upgrade from guerrilla warfare to conventional warfare than the other way around.

Comparisons

In the Vietnam war, both North and South Vietnam depended heavily on foreign aid for every rifle, every cartridge, every drop of fuel and even every...

Table of contents

• Title page
• TABLE OF CONTENTS
• INTRODUCTION
• PREFACE
• CHAPTER I-INTRODUCTION
• CHAPTER II-INTELLIGENCE, CULTURE, AND LANGUAGE
• CHAPTER III-REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM AND UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATIONS IN SOUTH VIETNAM
• CHAPTER IV-INTELLIGENCE COOPERATION AND COORDINATION
• CHAPTER V-MILITARY INTELLIGENCE COOPERATION AND COORDINATION IN VIETNAM FOLLOWING UNITED STATES MILITARY DISENGAGEMENT
• CHAPTER VI-SUCCESSES AND FAILURES OF ARVN INTELLIGENCE
• CHAPTER VII-COMMUNIST INTELLIGENCE
• CHAPTER VIII-CONCLUSIONS
• GLOSSARY