The German Air Force versus Russia, 1941

Generalleutnant Hermann Plocher

• Publisher: Eschenburg Press
• Year: 2017
• eBook ISBN: 9781787206038
• Topic: History
• Subtopic: European History
• Index: History

The German Air Force versus Russia, 1941, written by Generalleutnant Hermann Plocher, and revised and edited by Mr. Harry Fletcher, is one of a series of historical studies written for the United States Air Force Historical Division by men who had been key officers in the German Air Force during World War II.The overall purpose of the series is twofold: 1) To provide the United States Air Force with a comprehensive and, insofar as possible, authoritative history of a major air force which suffered defeat in World War II, a history prepared by many of the principal and responsible leaders of that air force; 2) to provide a firsthand account of that air force's unique combat in a major war, especially its fight against the forces of the Soviet Union. This series of studies therefore covers in large part virtually all phases of the Luftwaffe's operations and organization, from its camouflaged origin in the Reichswehr, during the period of secret German rearmament following World War I, through its participation in the Spanish Civil War and its massive operations and final defeat in World War II, with particular attention to the air war on the Eastern Front.This work, volume one of a series, is devoted to a descriptive account, in some parts in great detail, of German aerial operations in the Eastern Theater of Operations during 1941.

Chapter 1 — THE BACKGROUND OF THE WAR AGAINST RUSSIA

Reasons for Germany’s Decision To Wage War

Hitler’s decision to open a military campaign against the Soviet Union was his most dangerous gamble of World War II, and one which set the stage for Germany’s greatest catastrophe. The question has often been asked how Germany, with its particular military, economic, and geographic resources, could have dared to attack an opponent which enjoyed so many natural advantages, for without question such an undertaking was bound to tax the Reich’s reserves to the limit and to dangerously weaken its forces in other areas.

Germany was in dire need of raw materials, especially foodstuffs, for the prosecution of its war effort, and its expanding population required additional living space (Lebensraum) in which to achieve its economic and national aspirations. These needs could be satisfied in the Soviet Union, the conquest of which would also permit Germany to achieve a successful end to the war in the West.

In 1940 the Wehrmacht was clearly superior to the Soviet armed forces, but Russian rearmament would rapidly alter this relationship to Germany’s disadvantage. Time was, then, a most important factor in deciding to go to war against the colossus in the East. The war against Britain was far from concluded, and the United States, then substantially supporting her, was demonstrating an increasingly hostile attitude toward the Axis powers. In such a situation a protracted war against Russia could have disastrous consequences.

Political Reasons for War

The steady expansion of Soviet power and the suspicious manifestations of Russian representatives during the many political, military, and economic conferences with Germany after 19 39 served to strengthen Hitler’s belief in the inevitability of war with the Soviet Union.

Among the more important political issues between the two governments were the Russian occupation of Rumanian Bessarabia and Bucovina, Russia’s demand for German recognition of Bulgaria as a part of the Soviet sphere of influence, Russian insistence upon a permanent agreement with respect to the final status of Poland, continued demands for German support of Soviet efforts to secure naval bases in the Dardanelles, and Russian insistence upon complete freedom of action in dealing with Finland. Since these demands were invariably made to coincide with periods of crisis for Germany, the conviction was naturally held in the Reich that the Russians would exploit every opportunity to act against Germany’s plans and interests. On 12 November 1940, Soviet Foreign Minister V. M. Molotov inquired into the “meaning of Germany’s declaration of guarantees to Rumania,” much to the consternation of German political leaders, whose suspicions were later deepened and confirmed by the Soviet treaty of “friendship” with Yugoslavia.

Hitler was aware of Germany’s exposed and vulnerable flank in the Balkans, and the memory of the once dangerous Salonika Front of 1918 doubtless exerted a powerful influence upon his thinking. The large number of conferences with Bulgaria, Rumania, Yugoslavia, and Hungary, in which the Germans sought to bring the Balkans under the influence of the Reich, were further indications of Germany’s awareness of the potential dangers from the south-east. The obvious solution to the problem was to divert Soviet attention and interests toward Persia and India where it could strike a blow at Britain’s most important sources of power, but Hitler, in his negotiations, neither supported nor pursued these ideas with the necessary firmness. Always continental in thought, he was habitually mistrustful and cautious, indeed, almost apprehensive of any global policy.

Ideological Reasons

The clear impossibility of reconciling the philosophy of German National Socialism with the political and ideological views of the Soviet Union continued to be a factor of importance.{5} In the persisting insurmountable antagonisms separating the two powers, the so-called Russo-German Friendship Treaty of 1939 changed nothing, for their differences were neither resolved thereby nor diminished. In Hitler’s eyes, the Soviet Union had always been the ideological enemy which, because of its extortionist policies, would sooner or later attack Germany from the rear, and do so as soon as the world political situation seemed to require or Russian armaments permitted. Because Hitler thought that the Communist system in Russia had not been fully consolidated, he was convinced that the Soviet government, if attacked soon enough, would thus be unable to sustain itself against heavy external blows, and would quickly collapse.

Economic Reasons

In the conduct of its war against the West, Germany had a considerable dependence upon raw materials imported from Russia. The continuance of this supply was in part, and often almost exclusively, dependent upon the uncertain “good will” of the Soviet Union. A military occupation of European Russia would bring wheat from the Ukraine, coal and other ores from the Donets Basin, nickel from the Kola Peninsula, oil from the Caucasus, and wood from White Russia, all essential goods for war, without which a German victory would be doubtful. At the opening of the Winter Help Drive on 30 September 1942, Hitler declared, “The enormous area of Russia should be made available for the nourishment of the German people, for the assurance of their supply of raw materials, and, in a greater sense, for the maintenance of Europe.”

Military Reasons for War

The Soviet attitude toward the Reich remained perpetually uncertain, and many Germans viewed the Soviet sphinx as a constant latent source of danger. Russia had been attentively and anxiously observing Germany’s rise to power, and had already begun to take corresponding defensive measures, among which were the seizure of the Baltic States, Bessarabia and Bucovina, and parts of Finland. From 1939 to May of 1941 the number of Soviet divisions had increased from 65 to 158, and many of these were concentrated along the western frontiers. While such forces were ostensibly defensive in character, they nevertheless constituted a grave menace to Germany. The inference of this becomes more obvious in the light of a statement made by a Russian officer in 1945 to Field Marshal Albert Kesselring{6} that “Russia would have achieved a maximum level of armament and combat readiness by 1943.”{7}

Thoughts Become Reality

On 29 July 1940, General der Artillerie Alfred Jodl issued at Hitler’s behest precise instructions for a concentration of power in the East, a “Build-up East” (Aufbau Ost), to the National Defense Branch of the High Command of the Armed Forces (OKW). Logistical, operational, and administrational measures required for a war against Russia were then prepared by Generalleutnant Walter Warlimont, Chief of the National Defense Branch of the Wehrmacht, and sent to Field Marshal Wilhelm Keitel, Chief of the High Command of the German Armed Forces.

On 31 July 1940 Hitler informed the Commander-in-Chief of the German Army, Field Marshal Walther von Brauchitsch, and the Chief of the Army General Staff, Generaloberst Franz Halder, of his plan to attack Russia. Halder thereupon ordered a study on the proposed campaign to be made by Generalleutnant Erich Marcks (which was later completed by Generalleutnant Friedrich Paulus).

The War Economy and Armament Office, headed by General der Infanterie Georg Thomas, had been informed on 14 August 1940 of the Führer’s intention to discontinue all supply shipments—these were being made under the terms of the Russo-German trade pact—to Russia after the spring of 1941.{8} Appropriate steps for an expansion of the war were then taken in November, when Göring announced Hitler’s decision for a build-up of forces in the East.{9}

Although Grossadmiral Erich Raeder, the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, was apparently not apprised of Hitler’s plan until late 1940 or early 1941, the matter was clarified on 8 or 9 January 1941 when the Führer told Raeder that “Germany would be able to continue the war against England under completely tolerable conditions once the danger in the East had been eliminated,” and that “the collapse of the Soviet Union would constitute a great relief to Japan and would thus increase the dangers for the United States in entering a war against Germany.{10} {11}

As early as mid-November of 1940, when Generalmajor Otto Hoffman von Waldau informed the officers of the Operations Staff of the Luftwaffe of the details of the plan for a campaign against Russia, many of them had already surmised the existence of such a plan because of Marshal Göring’s previous demand for a build-up of Luftwaffe ground forces in the East. However, photo-reconnaissance flights which were proposed as a consequence of this plan were banned by Hitler on the ground that they might incite the Russians to war prematurely. It can therefore be assumed that when Göring was informed of Hitler’s decision for war on 4 January 1941, it had long been expected by senior Wehrmacht officers.{12}

Probable Duration of the Campaign

Hitler really believed that the war in the East could be concluded in three or four months, and busied himself, even prior to the attack on Russia, with plans for later operations in the Near East. Spoiled by successful “lightning wars” in 1939 and 1940, Hitler and the top commanders of the armed forces unfortunately made too favorable an estimation of the situation.

While the High Command did not expressly object to the Führer’s timetable, and, in early June 1941, even asked for the formulation of a clear plan “for subsequent operations to be conducted after the smashing of the Russian armed forces,”{13} a later remark by General Halder indicates that he was “firmly convinced when Hitler began the Russian campaign in 1941 that it was with the preconceived notion, which was neither shared nor supported by the Army General Staff, that Russia could be forced to make peace in 1941.”{14}

Field Marshal Erhard Milch, State Secretary of Aviation, likewise remained unconvinced that the Soviet Union could be defeated in a “Blitz” campaign.{15} On 5 December 1942 he declared:

“...At that time [January 1941], of course, everyone knew that the action in the East was coming. That was long before June. I had been then asked whether or not we should prepare for winter. This was months in advance. I thereupon gave the order to prepare everything for winter; the war will last several years in the East. At that time the official opinion was otherwise. I know the East, its scope, and I had been there often. I have seen much of the world and know exactly what we are risking there.”{16}

The official German government viewpoint was best expressed by Foreign Minister Joachim von Ribbentrop in his boast to the Italians that if Germany and Russia came to blows the Soviet Union of Stalin would “disappear from the map within eight weeks.”{17} Hitler, too, spoke of a “short campaign in the East” during a conference with von Brauchitsch on 5 December 1940 at the Reichs Chancellory,{18} but Reichsmarschall Hermann Göring (Commander-in-Chief of the Luftwaffe) had serious doubts about it. In a speech before a gathering of Gauleiters (Nazi District Party Leaders) at Munich, 8 November 1943, Göring commented bitterly on the supposed “brevity” of the campaign:

“...And then came the Russian campaign!...at that time I had al...

Table of contents

• Title page
• TABLE OF CONTENTS
• INTRODUCTION TO THE SERIES
• FOREWORD
• AUTHOR’S FOREWORD
• PREFACE
• ABOUT THE AUTHOR
• Chapter 1 - THE BACKGROUND OF THE WAR AGAINST RUSSIA
• Chapter 2 - DEPLOYMENT OF GERMAN AND SOVIET AIR FORCES, JUNE 1941
• Chapter 3 - THE BATTLE FOR AIR SUPERIORITY
• Chapter 4 - FOURTH AIR FLEET OPERATIONS LEADING TO THE ENCIRCLEMENT BATTLE OF KIEV
• Chapter 5 - SECOND AIR FLEET OPERATIONS LEADING TO THE BATTLE OF KIEV
• Chapter 6 - KIEV
• Chapter 7 - FIRST AIR FLEET OPERATIONS IN ARMY GROUP NORTH AREA
• Chapter 8 - AIR OPERATIONS IN THE FAR NORTH IN 1941 (FINNISH-KARELIAN AREA)
• Chapter 9 - THE FOURTH AIR FLEET TO THE CRIMEA AND ROSTOV-ON-THE-DON
• Chapter 10 - WITH THE SECOND AIR FLEET TO MOSCOW
• APPENDIX I - BARBAROSSA DIRECTIVE
• APPENDIX II - BIOGRAPHICAL SECTION OF IMPORTANT PERSONALITIES
• LIST OF MAPS
• LIST OF CHARTS
• REQUEST FROM THE PUBLISHER